The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by Fred R. Dallmayr, David G. Lawrence, George C. Edwards III, Fritz Nova, Roger Cobb, Jennie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross, Robert Gilpin, John H. E. Fried

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The Supreme Court and National Policy Making

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ARTICLES

11 **Party and Policy in West German Cities.** This paper attempts to measure the impact of party ideology focusing on policy making in West German urban government. An effort is made to determine whether city governments under the control of leftist parties sponsor different, possibly more leftist policies than cities under conservative control. It is found that while "leftist" control of municipal administrations does not produce leftist policies, conservative control does have a major impact in inhibiting the growth in the scope of local government.

Several reasons for the only rough correspondence between party control and policy are examined. The low correlation between leftist (SPD) control and municipal output is traced to differences among SPD cities in the power of the SPD majority, in class structure, and in degree of financial independence. It is also traced to the lack of intercorrelation among the forms of "leftist" performance and the incremental nature of most urban policy making. Other factors—the power of municipal counter-elites and the federalistic structure of the West German government—are discounted as possible intervening variables.

By Robert C. Fried, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

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25 **Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change.** This paper examines the relationship between the kinds of delegate allocation rules used in Democratic presidential primaries (Winner-Take-All, Districted, and Proportional) and the power of various states within the national Democratic party. It demonstrates that these rules are often, in the short run, more important than a state's voters in determining the fate of particular candidates. It shows, in the middle run, that different types of states are clearly favored by different sets of primary regulations. It closes with some speculation about the long-run impact of these tendencies.

By James I. Lengle, Supervisor, American History and Institutions Office, University of California, Berkeley, and Byron Shafer, Acting Instructor, University of California, Berkeley.

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41 **Elections and Public Policy.** In the absence of historical opinion survey data, studies of the linkage between popular voting and American public policy have been confined to relatively recent time periods. Questions about these linkages, however, necessarily have a temporal dimension—what is the relationship between voting and policy over time?

This paper establishes criteria for citizen policy choice that do not depend on opinion surveys. Data drawn from national party platforms and U.S. statutes, and aggregate voting data are compared to determine the extent to which majority choices are translated into national policy over time. Analysis of these data suggests that whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, over time, popular majorities appear to govern.

By Benjamin Ginsberg Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University.

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50 **The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.** The role of the Supreme Court of the United States in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. Both the relative influence of the Court vis-à-vis other political institutions and the implications of judicial review for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central to this discussion. Perhaps the most influential account of the role of the Court offered in recent years is Robert A. Dahl's 1957 article, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court in National Policy-Making." Dahl argues that the Court, like other political institutions, is a member of the stable ruling coalitions that dominate American politics, and that its decisions are generally supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions.

Consideration of the way Dahl interprets his own evidence, of Court decisions since 1957, and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis (particularly the activities of the Court in statutory construction and in cases arising out of states and localities) suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument admits.

By Jonathan D. Casper, Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.

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64 **Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics.** In contradistinction both to positivist empiricism and to the essentialism of "traditional" political thought, the paper delineates an approach to political study and theory stressing the critical interrogation between inquirer or participant and the experienced world. The approach—which relies chiefly on existential phenomenology and recent writings of the Frankfurt School—is illustrated and explicated in three contexts: those of philosophical anthropology, of epistemology, and of ethics and political action. With regard to the conception of "human nature," critical theory refuses to equate man either with a reactive mechanism or with pure consciousness, preferring to treat him as an embodied creature concerned (in Heidegger's terms) with the sense of his existence. In the domain of epistemology, the sketched

outlook deviates from simple "mirror" doctrines by emphasizing the experiential underpinnings of cognition and the need for continuous symbolic articulation. Concerning ethics, the perspective opposes both cognitivist and noncognitivist formulas in favor of the critical reconstruction of standards implicit in everyday life. The concluding portion of the paper indicates the relevance of such standards for practical politics and contemporary democratic theory.

By Fred R. Dallmayr, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University.

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80 **Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment.** This paper is both a criticism and extension of a small existing literature on procedural norms and tolerance which has been influential in several interpretations of American politics but which suffers from both conceptual and empirical shortcomings.

The existing literature concludes that tolerance is not widely distributed in the American mass public: unpopular groups such as Communists or atheists would not be allowed political activity by most Americans despite supposed acceptance by all of the principle of minority rights. The literature suggests that hostile attitudes towards the issue or group involved prevents application of the tolerant general norm in specific instances.

By failing to adequately measure or control for either issue orientation or general norms, however, the existing literature risks misrepresenting the actual extent and character of tolerance. This study discusses the weaknesses of the existing literature, describes how such weaknesses can be eliminated, and reports data which modify and expand the findings of past research for an updated set of issues, groups, and political acts.

By David G. Lawrence. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Fordham University.

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101 **Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power.** Presidential prestige or popularity has often been cited as an important source of presidential influence in Congress. It has not been empirically and systematically demonstrated, however, that such a relationship exists. This study examines a variety of relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support in the U.S. House of Representatives. The relationships between overall national presidential popularity on the one hand and overall, domestic, and foreign policy presidential support in the House as a whole and among various groups of congressmen on the other are generally weak. Consistently strong relationships *are* found between presidential prestige among Democratic party identifiers and presidential support among Democratic congressmen. Similar relationships are found between presidential prestige among the more partisan Republican party identifiers and the presidential support by Republican congressmen. Explanations for these findings are presented, and the findings are related to broader questions of American politics.

By George C. Edwards III, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

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114 **Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review.** The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially "creative"—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.

By Fritz Nova, Professor of Political Science, Villanova University.

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126 **Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.** Agenda building is the process through which demands of various groups in a population are translated into issues which vie for the attention of decision makers (formal agenda) and/or the public (public agenda). This paper presents three models for the comparative study of agenda building. The *outside initiative* model describes groups with minimal prior access to decision makers, who must consequently first expand their issues to a public agenda before they can hope to reach the formal agenda. The *mobilization* model accounts for issues which are placed on the formal agenda by political leaders, who subsequently attempt to expand these issues to the public agenda to obtain the support required for implementation. The *inside access* model refers to leaders, or to those having close contact with these leaders, who seek to place issues on the formal agenda directly, and for whom expansion to the public agenda is both unnecessary and undesirable.

Propositions are stated about intergroup variation in patterns of agenda building within societies; about variations in success rates for different strategies and probabilities of occurrence for the three models in different types of societies; and about characteristics of the agenda-building process which hold in all three models and in any social setting.

By Roger W. Cobb, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brown University, Jennie-Keith Ross, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Swarthmore College, and Marc Howard Ross, Associate Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College.

APSA Presidential Address

139 **Introduction**

By Pendleton Herring, Princeton, New Jersey.

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture. The American polity's designers proceeded from what John Adams called "the divine science of politics"—an approach very close to that of modern empirical political science. It was rooted in their conviction that truth is best discovered by the systematic investigation of experience; they investigated experience with methods primitive by modern standards but advanced for the eighteenth century; they applied their findings to the design of political institutions; and they regarded all institutions as experimental, to be revised when experience indicates. This faith in political and social engineering has remained ever since a major element in American political culture. It has recently been shaken by Vietnam, Watergate, and other systemic failures; but it is still far preferable to alternative faiths, especially if we today can cool our rhetoric, moderate our expectations, and recapture the pragmatic, experimental mood of those who created "the divine science."

By Austin Ranney, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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By Robert Gilpin, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University.

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By John H. E. Fried, Professor of Political Science, City University of New York.

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Party and Policy in West German Cities*

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Of the larger cities in the world, half or more are governed under some form of competitive local democracy. We are just now beginning to study in systematic fashion the extent to which the forms and outcomes of political competition in those cities have an impact on policy.[1] We are examining such questions as the following:

Does community politics have an apparent, direct impact on policy?
Does it have an independent impact?
Does it have more impact than other variables?
Does it have an impact in the generally expected direction?

For more than a decade, some students of American subnational government have been suggesting that key aspects of state and local political systems, such as the degree of interparty competition and the ostensible political orientation of the controlling party, have little power—statistically speaking—to account for observed diversities in the scope and direction of local government policy. However, other students of American state and local government have found political variables to be of major importance in shaping policy and have argued that the weakness of political variables has not yet been properly demonstrated.[2]

The same issues are now being studied in non-American contexts, with particular attention to the impact of *party* politics on policy. Quantitative comparative studies of the partisan dimensions of municipal policy have been made for cities in about a dozen, mostly advanced nations.[3] Efforts are also being made to study the determinants and consequences of urban policy on a cross-national basis.[4] In general, the expectation has been that party politics would play an important role in shaping urban policy in Western Europe and Latin America where cities are governed by parties and where these parties are often polarized on the basis of class, ideology, and religion. While Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisan personal fol-

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[1] For a synthesis of recent comparative studies of urban policy making, see Robert C. Fried, *Comparative Urban Performance*, Working Paper No. 1, European Urban Research, UCLA, which, in revised form appears as chapter 6 in volume 6 of *The Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). The unimportance of political factors in policy making was first argued by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the United States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May 1963), 265–289; and by Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[2] The possible importance of politics in policy making is counter-argued in several pieces, including Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (May 1967), 173–192, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), and *Regionalism in American Politics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September 1967), 701–716; Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (August 1968), 576–593; Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September 1970), 843–864; Robert Eyestone, *The Threads of Public Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June 1970), 508–522; Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 924–933; and Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 951–963.

William Bicker argues that the case against the importance of politics as an output determinant has not yet been properly established in "The Effects of Malapportionment in the States: A Mistrial," in *Reapportionment in the 1970's*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

[3] The countries: the United States, Belgium, Canada, England, Scotland, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy, and Venezuela. For references to these studies (as of 1973), see Fried, *Comparative Urban Performance*, pp. 63–81, where the reader will also find references to works concerning the impact of other kinds of political variables (e.g., party competitiveness, citizen turnout, etc.).

[4] On one such cross-national study, see Robert C. Fried, "The Performance of Cities: Explorations in Cross-National Comparison," Working Paper No. 4 (July 1964), European Urban Research project, University of California, Los Angeles. The EUR project is also conducting within-nation studies of the relationship between party variables, ecological variables, and policy variables for the 43 largest French communes (those over 100,000 population in 1968), the largest 38 Dutch communes (those over 50,000 population in 1965), and the largest 20 Swedish communes (those over 50,000 population in 1968).

lowings might not be expected to sponsor or produce distinctive local policy outputs, it is logical to expect greater diversity among the cities of Western Europe and Latin America, where local government is highly politicized and where the spectrum of ideology runs from neo-Fascism through Maoism to nihilism. In European cities, in particular, the socialist movement, with its stress on class solidarity, party discipline, and redistribution, has been active and influential in city government since World War I and before. It has recently been asserted, in fact, that European cities are, at least in this sense, more democratic than American cities because of the explicit representation in urban government of the working classes and the poor by socialist and communist parties.[5]

Great differences should logically be found in the policies pursued, for example, by Italian cities, which are governed by a wide range of political forces. But despite the political polarization within and among Italian cities, variance in the scope, orientation, and quality of Italian municipal government is more readily explained in terms of economic, social, and cultural variables ("ecological" variables) than in terms of party control variables. Only minor differences at times existed in the policies of municipal governments controlled by communist, Catholic, and neo-Fascist administrations. Partisan differences are much less important than regional (i.e., North-South) differences in accounting for differences and uniformities in the policies adopted by Italian city councils, at least in the larger communes. Indeed, region seems to be decisive not only in shaping municipal policy, but also in shaping whatever small impact party politics has had on municipal policy. Communist strength has been associated with conservative policies in the North and progressive policies in the South; Christian Democratic power, in contrast, has been associated with progressive policies in the North and conservative policies in the South. Exactly what variables, or complex of variables, make for the regional impact—which holds up even when socioeconomic variables are held constant—is still not clear.[6]

In any case, the study of Italian cities does suggest that party variables are relatively weak in shaping local policy and that there are sometimes major discrepancies between the kinds of policies we might expect to be associated with different sets of political forces and the kinds of policies with which, in practice, they are actually associated. Studies of the relation between party and municipal policy in other countries have produced mixed results. In some instances, party impact has been found to be strong and independent and to take the direction predicted by party location in the political spectrum. In many instances, however, party impact has been weak and, in some instances, contrary to prediction.[7]

Party and Policy in West Germany

This study of West German cities is concerned with the same kind of question: namely, the extent and direction of party impact on municipal policies. West German cities are particularly suitable for this kind of study. In the first place, comparative data on many aspects of municipal government in Germany have been systematically collected and published for many decades. The first statistical yearbook of the German Municipal Association dates back to 1890. Thus, abundant materials for the comparative study of German cities exist, though they have seldom been subjected to social science analysis.

West German cities are interesting also because municipal government in that country is competitive, party government. Thus in West German cities one can test the relative impact of party on policy, as well as the direction of party impact, if any. Where municipal government is nonpartisan or is dominated nationally by the same party, neither of these two questions can be directly examined. In West Germany, municipal government is party government. Local branches of the three dominant national parties—the Social Democrats (SPD), the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and the Free Democrats (FDP)—contend periodically for control over city councils and posts in the city executive.[8] The times of election, just as the form of municipal government, vary from place to place since the framework of West German government is federal and each state (*Land*) of the federal union is free to establish its own system of local government.[9] Nonetheless the same national political parties are active in city government throughout the country.

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[5] L. J. Sharpe, "American Democracy Reconsidered," *British Journal of Political Science*, 3 (January 1973), 1–28 and 3 (April 1973), 129–167. Similar comments applying to Rome may be found in Robert C. Fried, *Planning the Eternal City: Roman Politics and Planning Since World War II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 255–256.

[6] See Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," *The Journal of Politics*, 33 (November 1971), 1008–1051. Two other studies on Italian urban policies have been published; one by Pietro Giarda, "Un' analisi sui determinanti delle spese degli enti locali," in *Studi sulla finanza locale*, ed. Cesare Cosciani (Milan: Giuffrè, 1967), and the other by Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Studying 85 small towns in the Milan metropolitan area, Giarda found party to be of modest explanatory power as did the Fried study of the 31 largest Italian communes (over 100,000 population.) The Galli and Prandi study of 13 communes in the 100,000–200,000 population bracket and of the 92 provincial capitals found no systematic or consistent association between political orientation of the local government and budgetary policies (p. 241).

[7] For further discussion, see Fried, "Comparative Urban Performance," 63–81.

[8] On German local party politics, see Otto Ziebell, *Politische Parteien und kommunale Selbstverwaltung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964). On the historical aspects of local party politics, see also Gerhard A. Ritter, *Die*

It makes sense to study the impact of party politics on municipal policy in West German cities for still a third reason: the relatively great autonomy which municipal governments in the Federal Republic enjoy.[10] Local parties can have a direct impact on municipal policy only where local governments have discretion enough to make significant policy choices. West German cities have been given considerable resources by their state governments. Thus, the impact of party politics on local policy will be more detectable than when municipal governments are subject to a high degree of central direction.

The Contexts of Performance. The present study focuses on the policies and scope of government in fifty-three of the fifty-seven large West Germany cities—the so-called *Grossstädte* with 100,000 people or more. The fifty-seven cities are distributed among the *Länder* of the Federal Republic as shown in Table 1. Comparisons made in the study involve only 53 cities since in the three so-called "city-states"—Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin—state and local functions are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to separate out figures on municipal-level functions and employment with which to make comparisons with the other cities. West Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, and Bremerhaven (located in Bremen *Land*) have thus been dropped from comparative analysis.

Table 1. Distribution of the *Grossstädte* Among the *Länder* in West Germany

Land	Number of Cities
Lower Saxony	7
Bavaria	5
North Rhine Westphalia	25
Saarland	1
Berlin	1
Baden-Württemberg	5
Rhineland-Palatinate	4
Hesse	5
Hamburg	1
Bremen	2
Schleswig-Holstein	3

Each of the remaining 53 cities is an independently organized municipality or commune (*Gemeinde*). Some of these political jurisdictions are geographically self-contained and isolated, while others, most notably the twenty cities located in the Rhein-Ruhr district, are parts of a single, vast urbanized region.[11] The 53 cities differ from each other in a variety of other ways, as illustrated in Table 2.

As Table 2 shows, the 53 cities differ remarkably in religion, demography, occupational and age structure, size, density, physical age, growth rate, and affluence.

The cities also differ in political orientation and in the pattern of party control since World War II. Previous studies of the partisan impact on policy making in West German cities have attempted to detect that impact at one point in time or within a relatively short period of time.[12] In this study the impact of party on policy has been measured over a relatively long period of time—roughly 1950 to 1970.

Because of the availability of long-term com-

Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich (Colloquium Verlag: Berlin, 1959); James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century Germany," *Past and Present*, No. 51 (1971), pp. 116–137; Helmuth Croon et al., *Kommunale Selbstverwaltung im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971); William H. Dawson, *Municipal Life and Government in Germany* (London: Longmans, 1914).

[9] On West German local institutions, see Roger H. Wells, *German Cities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932), *The States in West German Federalism* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1961), and "Local Government," in *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. E. H. Litchfield, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953). See also Herbert Jacob, *German Administration Since Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), and Frido Wagener, "Gemeindeverwaltung," in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften* (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1952–65), IV, 323–338.

[10] The remarkable strength of municipal autonomy as a German political tradition is shown in the lip-service paid to its principles even by the National-Socialist regime. See, for example, the essay on changes made in German local institutions under the Nazi regime by Erich Gaertner, "Der Wandel des kommunalen Aufgabenkreises von der Machtübernahme bis zur Jetzzeit," in *Jahrbuch für Kommunalwissenschaft*, vols. 6–7 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1939–1940), 1–64, and Horst Matzerath, *National-sozialismus und kommunale Selbstverwaltung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970). It should be noted that local autonomy, rather than *democratic* self-government, was the political tradition involved and that Nazi practices were as little respectful of the principles of local autonomy as they were of the principles of nationalism and socialism.

[11] For a comparison of German and American urban concepts and definitions, see Conrad J. Weiler, Jr., "Metropolitan Definitions in Comparative Political Research," *Comparative Politics*, 3 (April 1971), 429–446.

[12] The study by Stuart Rakoff and Guenther Schaefer, "Policy Responsiveness of German and American Cities: A Time-Series Analysis of Municipal Expenditures" (paper presented to the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, September 1973), does not deal with party variables.

Table 2. The Range of Urban Environments (53 Cities)

Socio-economic variable	Minimum (City)	Maximum (City)	Median
% Protestant	15% (Regensburg)	87% (Lübeck)	52%
% Catholic	7% (Kiel)	83% (Würzburg)	42%
1961 Population	80,000 (Gottingen)	1,085,000 (Munich)	245,000
% workers	30% (Bonn)	62% (Bottrop)	46%
% white collar employees	19% (Wanne Eickel)	41% (Frankfurt)	31%
% youths under 15	14% (Munich)	25% (Salzgitter)	19%
% people over 65	8% (Leverkusen)	14% (Kiel)	11%
% East German refugees	5% (Saarbrücken)	48% (Salzgitter)	19%
private cars/1,000 residents (1963)	115 (Wanne Eickel)	232 (Saarbrücken)	173
% of dwellings built since 1949 (1961)	24% (Wilhelmshaven)	71% (Würzburg)	43%
Area (1968)	21.3 sq. km. (Wanne Eickel)	310.6 sq. km. (Munich)	85.7 sq. km.
Per capita income (1963)	DM3790 (Wilhelmshaven)	DM12640 (Leverkusen)	DM7335
Density (persons/km^2) (1961)	520 (Salzgitter)	5020 (Wanne Eickel)	2443
Metropolitan area population increase, 1951–1964	−2% (Lübeck)	40% (Münster)	26%
Center city population increase, 1951–1964	−7% (Regensburg)	56% (Neuss)	25%
Center city share of metropolitan area population (1961)	1% (Leverkusen) (Neuss)	85% (Lübeck)	39%

parative data on policy in West German cities, it is relatively easy to trace variations in municipal policy over time. Data on party politics, however, are much more difficult to obtain. Local elections occur at different times in the different *Länder*, making difficult the collection of uniform election statistics. A further difficulty arises from the fact that there are three important parties in German municipal politics: the same municipal council may produce different ruling coalitions. Thus it is not possible to infer the pattern of party control precisely from the pattern of party membership on the city council. Nor is information on the pattern of party control over the council and over the executive available in the centrally collected statistics of the Municipal Association.

In face of these difficulties and uncertainties regarding the pattern of actual party control over West German cities, I have developed from different sources two measures of party control over time. Each indicator of party control measures the length and extent of party control. The first measure refers to the length of time between 1950 and 1970 that the Social Democrats held a relative majority on the city council. Table 3 shows the overall pattern of relative majorities as it has evolved in the postwar period. Here we find a contrast between six cities in which the SPD has never held a relative majority and 31 cities in which the SPD has uninterruptedly held a relative majority since 1946. (The average length of time during those 24 years in which the SPD has enjoyed a relative majority is 18 years.) Data on the size of the SPD relative majority are derived from council composition statistics published by the West German Municipal Association.

The second indicator of party control is based on the length of time that the SPD has held the post of *Oberbürgermeister* in a city and presumably enjoyed relative dominance in city politics. Using this measure, we have the contrast between eight cities in which the SPD between 1950 and 1970 never elected the mayor and the 20 cities in which the mayor between 1950 and 1970 was always a Social Democrat. Data on occupancy of the mayor's office are derived mostly from the *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*—the political yearbook of the Christian Democratic party.[13]

A third indicator of party control—the percentage of the vote won by the SPD, CDU, and FDP in elections during the period 1957–1962—is also used to detect party impact on policy indicators from the mid-1960's.[14]

The correlations among these political-control measures are only moderately high, suggesting that we are dealing with related but not identical dimensions of the local political process.

Contrasts in Policy and Performance. West German cities are quite varied in their policies: some tax their citizens and business firms much more than others; some spend much more on welfare; some incur larger debts; some employ many more people. Some have been much more active than others in buying up land within their territories. Important differences in the behavior of West German cities are also to be found when their performance is examined over time. The scope of government in some West German cities—as measured by the size of the municipal budget and the size of the municipal bureaucracy—has expanded at vastly different rates in different cities. In some cities, there were fewer municipal employees in 1970 than there were in 1950, while in other cities, by 1970, the number of municipal employees doubled. In some cities, municipal spending rose by one-fifth between 1952 and 1970, while in others, spending rose four times as much. There are clearly major differences among West German cities in the scope of government and the rate at which that scope is expanding.[15]

Table 3. Party Majorities in Postwar West German Cities

	Relative Majority as of								
Party	*1946*	*1950*	*1954*	*1958*	*1962*	*1966*	*1970*	*1973*	
SPD	35	41	45	45	48	50	49	45	
CDU	21	15	12	12	9	7	8	12	
FDP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	56*	56*	57	57	57	57	57	57	Total Number of Cities

* In 1946 and in 1950, Saarbrücken, one of the 57 cities, was not yet part of the Federal Republic. Thus in those years, n = 56. The figures include Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, and Bremerhaven—cities excluded from the other tables of this paper.

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[13] Data on occupants of the mayor's office are drawn from the Christian Democratic party, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*; from the series *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, published by Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne; from *Wer is Wer? Das Deutsche Who's Who*, Walter Habel, ed., published by Arani Verlags, Berlin; and *The Yearbook of the Socialist International*, ed. Julius Braunthal, published by International Socialist Yearbook Publishers, London (1960–1961).

[14] Data on council composition and elections for the period 1957–1962 are taken from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden* (henceforth, SJDG), 1963, pp. 379–380.

[15] Data on postwar city outputs have been drawn from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutschen Gemeinder* (*SJDG*) as SJDG 1950 (municipal employment, 1950); SJDG 1952 (spending, 1952); SJDG 1963 (taxation; owner-occupancy; financial dependency); SJDG 1964 (public safety employment; education employment; utility employment; general employment; city land ownership); SJDG 1965 (welfare, libraries, spending); SJDG 1970 (hospitals); SJDG 1971 (city land; 1968 housing data, including public assistance, owner-occupancy, multi-family dwellings); SJDG 1972 (spending, 1970).

Expected Links between Party and Policy. The links between party and policy in West German cities that one expects to find depend on the *source* of one's expectations. If one bases his expectations on previous studies of policy outputs in West German cities, he will expect the impact of party to be either weak or nonexistent. In my previous study of West German cities, little correlation emerged between measures of party voting strength and such measures of output as per capita city debt, taxation, general spending, spending on welfare, or spending on public libraries.[16] A fairly strong correlation (.54) between CDU voting strength and crowding in the public schools was found in reality to be a correlation between inadequacy of schools and school location in the state of North Rhine Westphalia. The major impact of party strength seemed to be on the size of the municipal bureaucracies: CDU voting strength was negatively correlated with public safety, public education, and total municipal employees per resident (−.41). Correlations between SPD strength and these indicators of bureaucratization were weaker, but positive.

In my previous study, political variables generally emerged as much weaker than "ecological" (i.e., social economic, or cultural) variables in predicting and explaining diversities in policy outputs. Party variables did have important associations with outputs, however, once the dominant ecological variables were held constant. Party variables were useful, if secondary, elements in the regression formulas derived to predict six of the eight outputs examined.

One would expect party variables to play minor roles in explaining outputs also on the basis of Lothar Deppe's study of social and cultural expenditures in 222 communes of North Rhine Westphalia.[17] Deppe argues theoretically that "political activities" of private groups and of city governments are important as secondary influences on municipal spending in social and cultural affairs. Unfortunately, he does not attempt to weigh the impact of political variables on outputs in the empirical section of his study.

In contrast, if one's expectations are based on statements by West German local political leaders, one would expect to find direct and intense partisan impact. In the eyes of CDU spokesmen, for example, there are strong differences between the *Kommunalpolitik* of the CDU and those of the SPD.[18] The SPD is said to favor "*Gemeindesozialismus*" ("municipal socialism"), entailing municipal activism in all cultural, economic, and social spheres and a tendency to discourage private, particularly church, activities in those spheres. Consequently, one of the marks of a city run by the Socialists should be extensive *Kommunalisierung* (municipalization)—the proliferation of municipal enterprises, such as public utilities, hospitals, homes for the aged, nurseries, libraries, and cultural centers. Another mark should be the lack of subsidization for private institutions that rival public enterprises in the cultural, educational, or economic sphere.

The SPD is also said to favor various kinds of collectivism, including municipal ownership of land and large, publicly sponsored housing projects. While the CDU claims to encourage private property and small-scale housing, the SPD is said to favor public ownership and massive residential buildings. In the words of one CDU spokesman:

> The residential blocks of the big Social Democratic cooperatives are the best means of hindering a genuinely Christian family policy. In these mammoth buildings, it is easy for the [party] functionary to distribute the newspapers of the 'Red publishing houses'; to collect party dues; to sell tickets to Socialist-sponsored theater productions and to educational and cultural events; to place children, as a friendly gesture, in the nursery of the workers' welfare association; to occupy the leisure time of growing youth in the social-activity rooms of these elephantine buildings—all in accordance with the demands of the program of central party headquarters.[19]

The SPD's image in CDU propaganda as an activistic, collectivistic, and expansionistic political party is fully in keeping with traditional SPD party principles, as expounded in party programs since the 1920's.[20] The CDU depicts itself as being the party of private property and private initiative.[21] Are party principles—whether those of the SPD or of the CDU—reflected in municipal policy? Does knowledge of the party in power enable one to predict the nature of municipal policy?

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[16] R. Fried, "Politics, Economics, and Federalism: Aspects of Urban Government in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland," in *Comparative Community Politics*, ed. Terry Clark (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1974), 313–350.

[17] Lothar Deppe, *Das Verhältnis der kommunalen Ausgaben zur Grösse, Struktur, Funktion und Finanzkraft städtischer Gemeinden: Untersucht am Biespiel der sozialen und kulturellen Ausgaben in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Münster: Institut für Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 1966), p. 232.

[18] For an interesting analysis of the differences between the SPD and the CDU in power and policy, see Günter Triesch, "Kommunalpolitik und Parteiarbeit," in *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945*, Ossip K. Flechtheim (Berlin: Wendler, 1965), vol. 4, part 1, 208–221.

[19] Wilhelm Ritter, "Christliche Kommunalpolitik in den Ratund Kreishäusern," in *Polititisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU: 1960*, 107–115 at 108.

[20] Ziebill, *Politische Parteien*, pp. 30–31.

[21] See, e.g., Triesche, "Kommunalpolitik," p. 210.

Findings: Party as a Determinant of Municipal Outputs

To test the impact of party on policy, we have grouped policy outputs into three categories, as illustrated in Table 4.

In Table 5, the correlations between party variables and output variables are shown, together with the correlations between ecological variables and outputs.

Of the seventeen outputs listed in Table 5, only

Table 4. Forms of Performance in West German Cities

Form of Performance	General Nature	Empirical Indicator
Activism	Scope of government	Average per capita spending, 1952–1970 Police/10,000 residents, 1963 Education employees/10,000 residents Municipal employees/10,000 residents Per capita taxation, 1964 Per capita welfare spending, 1963 Per capita library spending, 1963
Collectivism	Preference for public ownership and enterprise	% of multifamily dwellings, 1968 % of city territory owned by city % of owner occupancy, 1968 % of publicly assisted housing, 1968 Municipal utility employees/10,000 residents % of patients in public hospitals, 1969
Expansionism	Tendencies towards increased activism and/or collectivism	Per capita spending increase, 1952–1970 Increase in municipal bureaucracy, 1950–1970 Increase in municipal employees, (*Angestellten*), 1950–1970 Increase in municipal functionaries (*Beamten*), 1950–1970

Table 5. The Determinants of Municipal Output: Party vs. Ecology

	Activism							Collectivism						Expansionism			
	Spending	Police	Education	Municipal employees	*Taxation*	Welfare Spending	Library Spending	Multifamily Dwelling	City Land	Owner Occupancy	Public Housing	Municipal Utilities	Public Hospital	Spending	Bureaucracy	Employees	Functionaries
SPD vote					.26			.33					.35				
SPD majority								.26		−.36							
SPD mayor								.23		−.41							
CDU vote	−.31	−.33	−.23	−.46	−.26	.27		−.22			.33	−.38	−.36	−.42	−.25		−.46
FDP vote										.32							
Turnout	−.41			−.36		.36		−.29				−.26		−.41			−.24
Population size	.38				.57					−.41				.38	.29	.35	
Population growth			−.26														
Catholic													−.29				
Aged	.30			.39				.25	.35				.39	.30	−.25	−.31	
Cars	.79	.31			.44	−.29					−.31	.41	.26				.47
Area	.38	.46	.44	.29	.45			.26				.55		.38			
White Collar	.67	.24		.50					.44			.34		.68			
Income	.74			.57							−.24	.46	.30	.74			.27
Workers	−.39			−.36		.28			−.34	−.26				−.39			−.26
Metropolitan Population Change			−.35								.25		−.27				
City/Metropolitan Population Change	.39	.26		.44								.27		.39			.36
Density								.46		−.52			−.31				−.25
% New Housing	.31										.25			.31	.27	.27	.24
Youths	−.63	−.39	−.34	−.55	−.46	.28		−.39			.36	−.51		−.63			−.37
Manufacturing	−.42	−.37		−.37		.26		−.32		−.26						.26	−.41

two (owner occupancy and publicly assisted housing) are more strongly correlated to party variables than to ecological variables. City size, motorization, and per capita (private) income are the most powerful single predictors for twelve of the outputs. *The "merely" secondary impact of party variables on performance appears to be reconfirmed.*

Table 5 reveals not only the intensity of party impact, but also its direction. The lack of correlation between the three measures of SPD control and the measures of activism, collectivism, and expansionism is rather striking. SPD influence is modestly correlated with one form of activism (taxation); with three forms of collectivism (multifamily housing; lack of owner occupancy; public occupancy; public hospitals); but with no form of expansionism. On the other hand, CDU influence is correlated at a significant level (.05 or better) with 13 of the 17 outputs, including all three forms of performance. CDU influence correlates with low levels of spending, taxation, and public employment; with low levels of multifamily housing, municipalization, and public hospitalization; and with low levels of expansionism in both spending and bureaucratization. Prediction of the direction of CDU impact on the basis of party principles seems accurate enough, except for the one instance of publicly assisted housing. Rather surprising is the lack of correlation between CDU voting strength and the diffusion of owner occupancy in housing.

In Table 6, outputs in the six CDU strongholds have been contrasted with those in the eight cities where the SPD power has been greatest.[22] Predictions based on ideology are correct for twelve of the seventeen outputs. But contrary to expectations—or at least those based on party ideology—CDU cities spent more on public libraries; owned slightly more of city territory; spent on an average 12 per cent more money; and had slightly more publicly-assisted housing than the SPD strongholds. Also, in CDU cities, there was a lesser decline in the number of bureaucratic functionaries between 1950 and 1970 than occurred in the SPD cities.

The identification of the SPD with activism, collectivism, and expansion and of the CDU with the opposites of these things is, while on the whole correct, only roughly so. In the next section, we shall see why the correspondence between party principle and party policy is only approximate.

Table 6. Performance Contrasts Among Socialist and Christian Democratic Cities

	Median Output for:		
	CDU cities (n=6)	Top SPD cities (n=8)	Expected direction on basis of ideology?
1. *Activism*[a]			
Police	58	64	Yes
Employees	124	139	Yes
Taxation	DM2,894	DM3,044	Yes
Welfare	DM1,871	DM1,872	Yes
Libraries	DM367	DM291	No
Education	55	58	Yes
Spending	DM5,864	DM5,233	No
2. *Collectivism*			
Multifamily dwellings	70%	78%	Yes
City land ownership	29%	27%	No
Owner occupancy	25%	15%	Yes
Public-assisted housing	35%	34%	No
Utility employees	702	962	Yes
Public hospitals	0%	10%	Yes
3. *Expansionism*			
Spending	332%	397%	Yes
Bureaucracy	−14%	−6%	Yes
Lower civil servants	19%	37%	Yes
Functionaries	−23%	−31%	No

[a] For the units involved, see the output definitions in Table 4.

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[22] The CDU strongholds are: Aachen, Bonn, Koblenz, Mönchen-Gladbach, Münster, and Neuss. The SPD strongholds are: Bochum, Dortmund, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hannover, Herne, Kassel, and Mülheim.

Reasons for the Weakness of Party Impact on Policy

The impact of party ideology on policy and performance may be weak for a variety of reasons, some of which can be tested empirically. The weakness of ideological impact, of course, seems more characteristic of the SPD than the CDU: CDU voting strength is, after all, correlated, albeit moderately, with output, while SPD strength, measured three ways and over time, is not. Ideological impact may be weak, particularly for the SPD, for at least the reasons to be outlined in the subsections that follow.

(1) The Weakness and Transience of SPD majorities. The SPD may have difficulty translating party principles into policy because of the weakness of the SPD in some cities as compared to others. Conceivably, party principles are more easily translated into practice where SPD voters are numerous, where the SPD has had majorities over long periods of time, and where the *Rathaus* remains for similarly long periods under the direction of an SPD *Oberbürgermeister*. This proposition can be tested by contrasting outputs in two different sets of SPD cities: those where the SPD held a relative majority for at least twelve years but less than 24 years between 1946 and 1970 (the "weak SPD" cities) and those where the SPD held a relative majority throughout the period.[23] Doing so gives some confirmation to the proposition that the disuniformity in output among SPD cities (leading to low correlations between party and output) is partly produced by differences among the SPD cities in the strength of the SPD over time. Outputs seem more socialistic in the stronger SPD cities than in the weaker ones for most forms of activism (except welfare) and most forms of collectivism (except city land ownership). The weaker SPD cities, however, display greater expansionistic tendencies in spending and employment. This is logical since in the weaker SPD cities, the SPD in most cases achieved a relative majority only some years after the War and perhaps expanded employment and spending rapidly in order to make up for lost time.

(2) Diversities in Socioeconomic Environment. Another reason for the weakness of ideological impact might be the diversity of environments in which the SPD fights to maintain control as compared to the (relative) homogeneity of CDU cities. But this contention is easily disproved: as Table 7 shows, the CDU cities, if anything, are even more diversified socially and economically than the SPD cities. Uniformity in the CDU impact on municipal policy is achieved in spite of the diversity of contexts in which the CDU operates. There is likewise a strong contrast among the SPD's cities, particularly between the proletarian cities of the Ruhr and the white-collar commercial centers also run by the SPD. Conceivably, we might find more correspondence between principle and policy in proletarian SPD cities than in white-

Table 7. The Intercorrelation Between Party and Ecology[a]

	SPD Vote	Years SPD Majority	Years SPD Mayor	CDU Vote	FDP Vote
% Protestant	.34	.64	.40	−.54	.32
% Catholic	−.31	−.53	−.45	.47	−.37
1961 Population	.30	.28	.25		
% Workers	.41	.35	.37		−.29
% White Collar	−.33	−.26	−.32	−.21	.39
% Youths					
% Aged		.23		−.34	.30
Cars/residents	−.26			−.27	.36
Manufacturing	.44	.42	.32		−.36
% New Housing		−.24			
Area	.27	.27		−.28	
Per Capita Income			−.35		.23
Density			.21		
Metropolitan Increase				.35	
City Increase	−.26	−.36		.36	
City/Metropolitan Area			−.24	−.34	

[a] All correlations with significance levels above .05 have been omitted.

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[23] Here, as in several other places, lack of space precludes publication of the actual statistical findings. These will gladly be supplied by the author to interested readers on request.

collar SPD cities, such as Frankfurt, Hannover, or Munich.[24]

Surprisingly, the SPD is more socialistic in its middle-class cities than in its proletarian strongholds. Middle-class SPD cities are more activistic (except for welfare spending), more collectivistic (except for publicly assisted housing), and more expansionistic than proletarian SPD cities! (See Table 8.)

Table 8. Outputs in Different Types of SPD Cities

	Median for:	
	Proletarian SPD cities (n = 10)	White-Collar SPD cities (n = 6)
1. *Activism*		
Policemen	55	377
Education	51	72
Employees	1,136	2,050
Spending	DM4,878	DM7,379
Libraries	DM259	DM272
Welfare Spending	DM2,158	DM1,584
Taxation	DM2,883	DM3,867
2. *Collectivism*		
Public Hospital patients	0%	36%
Multifamily dwellings	78%	81%
City Land %	25%	34%
Owner occupancy	16%	17%
Publicly assisted housing	42%	25%
Utility employees	525	2,031
3. *Expansionism*		
Spending	404%	474%
Bureaucracy	−7.5%	19.3%
Employees	28%	54%
Functionaries	−35%	57%

(3) The Power of Establishments. Both parties may find it hard to translate principle into policy because of the relative weakness of political parties in the city as compared to (a) bureaucratic elites; (b) private economic elites; (c) ecclesiastical elites; or (d) labor union elites. In a crude way, we can test the possibility that party impact is blunted by the power of some counterelite by examining the links between party policy and outputs, holding constant variables which may just possibly measure the power of some non-party elites.

To measure the power of the *bureaucratic* elite, we shall use one of the outputs—the rate of expansion in the functionary group between 1950 and 1970. The power of the bureaucratic elite is perhaps reflected in the ability to expand its ranks. To measure the power of the community *business* elite, we shall use per capita yields from the municipal tax on business and payrolls. The power of an economic elite is perhaps reflected in the amounts of money it pays (and may possibly stop paying) into the city treasury. To measure the power of a putative *clerical* elite, we shall use the percentage of Catholics in the community, making the assumption that the power of Roman Catholic church leaders in German cities bears some relationship to the proportion of Catholics in the population. (Perhaps this indicator also measures the weakness of Lutheran clerics in the community.) Statistics on labor union membership in German cities are not available with which to test the power of union elites.

Table 9 shows the results of this attempt to "partial out" the power of community counterelites. The bureaucratic counterelite seems to intervene appreciably in the relationships between party and policy, reducing somewhat the negative correlation between CDU voting strength and the size of city bureaucracies.[25] The power of Church elites, however, if that is what we are measuring, is most imposing. Table 9 suggests that CDU negativism is even stronger than it appears in the simple correlation coefficients of Table 5; the inference is that Church elites operate to mitigate that negativism. Only the power of the business elite seems, by this admittedly crude test, not to possess much influence on party-policy relationships.

(4) Differential Municipal Autonomy. The lack of strong correlation between party and output, particularly for the SPD, may be due to the variance among West German cities in financial autonomy.[26] Low correlations between SPD power and policy outcomes may result from the fact that only financially independent SPD governments are able to pursue socialistic politics, while the others must be content with the less costly policies of laissez faire. To test this hypothesis, I have contrasted outputs in financially dependent SPD cities (those with at least 15 years of SPD relative majority, 1950–1971, and with more than 25 per cent

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[24] The proletarian SPD cities include: Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen, Hagen, Herne, Oberhausen, Recklinghausen, Salzgitter, and Wanne Eickel. The middle-class SPD cities include: Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Hannover, Karlsruhe, Kassel, and Munich. On the class basis of West German party politics, see David P. Conradt and Dwight Lambert, "Party System, Social Structure, and Competitive Politics in West Germany," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (1974), pp. 61–86.

[25] CDU spokesmen have often accused the SPD of packing the upper levels of municipal bureaucracies with SPD functionaries, selected more for their party loyalty than their expertise. SPD power, which is thus built into the city bureaucracy, then makes it difficult, claims the CDU, to reverse municipal policy even when the CDU wins control of the council and the executive. For these charges, see Triesche, "Kommunalpolitik," 215. We lack data on the party affiliations of municipal bureaucrats which would help us to weigh the validity of these accusations.

[26] See Karl-Heinz Nussmacher, "Parteien in kommunalpolitischen Zielbildungsprozess," *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 1 (1973), 39–65.

Table 9. Party and Policy Correlations, Holding Establishment Power Constant

		Controlling for:		
	Simple Correlation Coefficient	Bureaucratic Power	Business Power	Church Power
1. *Activism*				
Police SPD				.24
CDU	−.33		−.24	−.48
Employees SPD				
CDU	−.46	−.26	−.42	−.57
Spending SPD				
CDU	−.31			−.38
Welfare SPD				
CDU	.27			.30
2. *Collectivism*				
City Land SPD				
CDU				
Public Hospital SPD				
CDU	−.36	−.31	−.31	−.26
Utility SPD				
CDU	−.38	−.32	−.31	−.42
Owner occupancy SPD				
CDU	−.46	−.46	−.45	−.45
3. *Expansionism*				
Spending SPD	.27	.28		.25
CDU	−.42	−.37	−.36	−.41
Bureaucracy SPD				
CDU	−.25			−.29
Employees SPD				
CDU				
Functionaries SPD		—		
CDU	−.46	—	−.44	−.61

of their budgets derived from grants-in-aid) with outputs in financially independent cities (those with similar SPD majorities over time but less dependence on grants). The results tend to confirm the hypothesis that financially independent SPD cities are more able than financially dependent SPD cities to pursue "socialistic" politices. (See Table 10.)

(5) The Nature of Performance. Undoubtedly, party ideological impact is weak because the forms of performance—activism, collectivism, and expansionism—are not highly intercorrelated. Activistic cities are not necessarily collectivistic or expansionistic. There is among West German cities no single syndrome of high performance, whether judged from a socialistic or an antisocialistic perspective. Empirical ties among the forms of performance—among the forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism—are not very strong. Indeed, in some cases, they seem to be mutually opposed (as, for example, between city landownership, on the one hand, and utility employment and bureaucratic expansionism, on the other). Nor are the links very strong *within* the three categories of performance. There are surprisingly weak associations among the forms of bureacratic expansionism: expansionism at the lower levels (*Angestellten*) apparently follows different "laws" than does expansionism at the functionary (*Beamte*) level.

The nature of performance also may help to explain why the CDU, as compared to the SPD, has a more uniform impact on policy. The CDU stance is predominantly negative and consists of resisting all forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism. Lack of intercorrelation among the forms of performance suggests that even the more activistic political force may be constrained by limited resources to pick and choose among the forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism. The statistically measurable impact of SPD principles on policy may be reduced by the lack of uniformity in the choices made by SPD cities among the available tradeoffs.

(6) Federalism. The (statistical) impact of party on policy may be greater within the *Länder* of the Federal Republic than when it is viewed from a nationwide perspective. Lack of nationwide uniformity in the policy outputs of the same political force may result from differences among the *Länder* in legislation, finance, and policy as related to local government. Parties may find it difficult to apply the same political principles uniformly from state to state. To determine whether or not this is the case, we can look at the relations between party and policy in a single state—North-Rhine-Westphalia—which has within it half the large cities of West Germany. In North-Rhine-Westphalia state, the legislative and financial context for performance is uniform; any party impact on policy in its 25 large cities should therefore be readily detectable. But when we compare the differences among cities in the entire Federal Republic with those among cities in North-Rhine-Westphalia, we find that, far from being stronger within North-Rhine-Westphalia, interparty differences in most cases are less pronounced. Federalism, with its attendant diversities in state and local relations, is apparently *not* an important reason for the lack of strong nationwide correlations between party and policy.

(7) Reformism. Perhaps a more plausible reason that socialist control does not correlate with socialist policy is the by now traditional gap between Social Democratic theory and Social Democratic practice. Social Democratic theory since at least Weimar, and especially under Weimar, has been to the left of Social Democratic practice, both national and local.[27] A study by this author of outputs under Weimar—assuredly a period of ideological fervor and commitment—shows little correlation between SPD municipal power and such measures of activism as spending and public housing.[28] Since Weimar, in fact, it has become normal for the German Left to denounce the opportunism or "false pragmatism" of the SPD, especially when the SPD is in power.[29]

Table 10. Contrasting Performance of SPD Cities: The Financially Dependent vs. The Financially Independent

Forms of Performance	Median Outputs for Financially Dependent SPD Cities (n = 12)	Median Outputs for Financially Independent SPD Cities (n = 24)
1. *Activism*		
Police	61	78
Teachers	58	57
Employees	1,203	1,636
Spending	DM4,516	DM6,653
Libraries	DM434	DM298
Welfare	DM1,901	DM1,906
Taxation	DM2,809	DM3,346
2. *Collectivism*		
Hospitals	0%	43%
Multifamily Dwelling	77%	79%
Owner Occupancy	17%	18%
Public Housing	35%	31%
Utility Employees	671	741
Per Capita City Land	870	1,017
3. *Expansionism*		
Spending	424%	454%
Bureaucracy	−15%	−2%
Employees	19%	41%
Functionaries	−26%	15%

Conceivably, the behavior of the SPD *Fraktion* on the city council and of SPD members of the executive becomes more opportunistic and less socialistic in orientation where certain conditions obtain: (a) when there is a low ratio of party members to party voters; (b) when there is a low proportion of manual workers among party members; (c) when there is a low proportion of Young Socialists (*Jusos*) among party members; and/or (d) when there is a low proportion of leftist-faction members among members and in the party delegation in the city government. Unfortunately, data are not available with which to test the correlation between variations in internal SPD politics. Testing these correlations remains a future task.

In defense of the SPD, it should be said that it has tried in the postwar period to close the gap between theory and practice, mostly by abandoning its more radical principles and adopting principles more acceptable to middle-class and Christian voters. The transformation of the SPD from a Marxist revolutionary party of the working class into a pragmatic reformist *Volkspartei* (or party of the whole people) has been conscious, open, and, as it were, principled.[30]

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[27] Heino Kaack, *Geschischte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), pp. 135–36.

[28] Fried, "Politics, Economics, and Federalism," in Clark, pp. 322–338.

[29] The expression "false pragmatism" comes from a long denunciation of alleged SPD opportunism by the Young Socialists, (JUSOs) in December 1969, reprinted in H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, pp. 534–536. See also *SPD und Staat: Geschichte, Reformideologie, "Friedenspolitik,"* Friedhelm Ernst, ed. (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1974).

The result of *Entideologisierung* in the SPD has been a new set of programmatic principles which will make the SPD impact even less easy to discern in the future than it has been in the past. When the SPD proclaims principles such as "*Eigentum für alle*" ("Property for All"), it acquires a policy stand difficult to distinguish from that of the other political parties.[31] A distinctive party impact on policy will be hard to discern when parties are no longer differentiated by principle or known differences in orientation.

(8) "Antiparty Affect." It may be difficult to translate party principles—old or new—into practice because of the hostility in German political culture to partisanship in local government. It used to be said under Weimar that there was no Social-Democratic or German-National way of paving the streets. The role of parties in local government was seen as unfortunate, to be minimized. The same "antiparty affect," in Heino Kaack's phrase, persists under the Bonn Republic and it may be one of the reasons for the apparent hesitancy of the parties to attempt the militant translation of party principle into policy.[32] Energetic implementation of party programs and invocation of party ideology may alienate a largely unpolitical, centrist, and antipartisan electorate. Antiparty feeling is, of course, strongest in the smaller local jurisdictions, which consequently are often run on a nonparty basis. In the big cities party control is more accepted. But if there are variations in local political culture that affect the acceptability of overtly partisan policy making, these have not yet been examined; thus we cannot at this point probe for the possible impact of "antiparty affect" on local policy making.

(9) Incrementalism. It is now a truism that much policy making usually consists of making only minor adjustments in existing policies and that public budgeting consists of making only minor changes in budgets inherited from the near, sometimes remote past. It should therefore be only mildly surprising that, in the case of West German cities, one can fairly accurately predict per capita municipal spending in 1970, using as a predictor per capita municipal spending in 1928! Per capita 1928 spending, in fact, accounts for nearly half the variance in average per capita spending in the period since World War II. Local policies can evidently persist through upheavals of historic proportion.

Assuming incremental change, is the impact of party to be found in the deviations from incrementalism? Is party related to the size and direction of the residual—the discrepancy between observed output, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, output as predicted on the basis of previous output? Are party variables more related than ecological variables to deviations from incrementalism?

If we predict (a) average spending for 1952–1970 on the basis of 1928 spending, (b) 1970 per capita spending on the basis of 1928 per capita spending, and (c) 1970 per capita spending on the basis of 1952 spending, and then test the capacity of party variables to predict the size of the residuals (the deviations from incrementalism), we obtain the results displayed in Table 11.

In all three cases, negative departures from incrementalism ("under-spending") are found in communities with large proportions of CDU

Table 11. Deviations from Incrementalism: Party vs. Ecology

	Size of the Residual, Predicting		
	Average spending 1952–1970 using 1928 spending	1970 per capita spending, using 1928 spending	1970 spending using 1952 spending
1. *Party*			
SPD vote			
CDU vote	−.41	−.51	−.59
SPD majority			
SPD mayors			
2. *Ecology*			
Population size			
Protestant			
Workers	−.33	−.34	−.29
Cars	.50	.50	.65
Area			
White Collar	.44	.46	.56
Income	.59		.61
Youths	−.51	−.45	−.48
City/Metropolitan area share	.57	.54	.42

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[30] See the references in H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, p. 11, and in particular, Douglas A. Chalmers, *The Social Democratic Party in Germany: From Working-Class Movement to Modern Political Party* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), and Harold K. Schellenger, *The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1968).

[31] See Georg Leber, "Unser innerpolitischer Auftrag," in *Mündige Gesellschaft: Die SPD zur zukunft der Nation*, Klaus Dieter Arndt, ed. (Hannover: Verlag Dietz Nachf., 1967), pp. 62–66 at p. 63.

[32] O. Ziebilt, *Politische Parteiein*, p. 30; K.-H. Nussmacher, "Parteien"; and H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, p. 476. Kaack actually uses the phrase "*Antiparteieneffekt*"; Nussmacher suggests that "*Antiparteienaffekt*" is what Kaack really means to say, (Nussmacher, "Parteien," p. 46, n. 23).

voters, workers, or youths.[33] Positive departures from incrementalism ("over-spending") are common to cities with high personal income, high proportions of white-collar workers in the labor force, or high ratios of autos to residents. Overspending (using incrementalism as the norm) is also characteristic of cities occupying a large share of the total metropolitan area population, i.e., cities without vast suburbs not under the jurisdiction of the central city. This last finding is surprising, since we would expect overspending in just the opposite circumstances—where central cities had to provide services for large daytime populations of suburban commuters. However this may be, we can see from Table 11 that party variables have about the same correlation with the residuals as ecological variables: knowing a city's politics enables one to predict its departures from past budgeting choices about as well as knowing the city's size, religion, class composition, age structure, or central-city/suburb ratio.

Conclusions

Party control over cities has sometimes been regarded as a variable with little or no impact on city policy making. When party control was observed to have an impact, it was sometimes in a direction contrary to expectation based on knowledge of party principles. This study, however, indicates that party control can, indeed does, play an important role in shaping the scope of government over extended periods (20–30 years). The results of this study indicate that the trend toward discounting the impact of party politics on local policy may be premature: party control of urban government can be one of the important determinants of city policy making. In West Germany, although Social Democracy does not have uniform impact in the direction of activism, expansionism, and collectivism, CDU control is associated with negative performance on all three counts.

Low correlation between SPD power and municipal output can be traced to a variety of factors: differences among cities controlled by the SPD in the size of the SPD majority; differences in the class composition of SPD cities; differences among SPD cities in degree of financial independence; lack of intercorrelation among the forms of "socialist performance" and the negative requirements for implementing CDU principles; and the incremental nature of much urban policy making. Certain factors do *not* emerge as crucial intervening variables: the power of municipal counterelites and the federalistic nature of West German government. Some variables of great potential interest variables involving local SPD membership characteristics and "antiparty affect" in local political culture cannot be tested because of lack of data.[34] Party control, however, clearly affects policy, although we have yet to determine fully its role and function in municipal policy making.

It is hard to know whether party control is more important as a "determinant" or "explicator" of municipal outputs in West German cities than in the cities of other countries. This is because there are no cross-national municipal policy studies and because comparative urban policy is being conceptualized and analyzed in such different ways in individual country studies. Policy studies are most easily carried out *within* countries, where one is likely to find some uniformity in the way urban government is regulated and the way policy for cities is generated. It is relatively easy for students of comparative urban policy in a given country to agree on standards for estimating the weight of various policy determinants. On a cross-national basis, however, the cultural and institutional uniformities do not exist which would reassure us that we are comparing equivalent phenomena.

Further development of the comparative study of urban policy will come, therefore, not only from greater sophistication at the single-country level but also from greater efforts to make single-country studies comparable at the cross-national level. Further development at the single-country level will come from greater attention to the following: (a) the diffusion of party impact over time, (b) policy in a wide range of fields, (c) nonbudgetary indicators of policy, (d) central-local policy interactions, (e) indicators of distributional and redistributional outcomes of policy, and (f) output preferences and satisfactions (subjective performance). Further development at the cross-national level will require some common, if crude, measures that will allow us to compare the impact of party on policy in different countries with some degree of precision. At both the single-country and cross-national levels, further development will also require the identification of the mechanisms that tie together determinants, outputs, and consequences. Only by identifying the mechanisms or processes involved in the urban policy process will we be able to use the accumulating mass of empirical findings to establish some reasonably firm (for the moment) truths about competitive party politics and urban policy.[35]

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[33] This accords well with the correlation of −.42 that we have found between CDU voting strength and spending increase between 1962 and 1970 (Table 8).

[34] Nor do we have data on the age of the mayor—frequently asserted as being predictive of municipal outputs.

[35] For some recent efforts, see the papers presented at the Conference on Politics, Policy, and the Quality of Urban Life, Bellagio, Italy, June 20–24, 1975.

Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change*

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For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost;
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
—*Mother Goose*

The Invisible Participant

The late 1960s and early 1970s were boom times for predictions about the future of American politics. Grand organizing concepts abounded—a "new ethical consciousness," an "emerging conservative majority," the "triumph of social engineering," a "revolt against the future," etc.—and each was asserted to be the trend which would sweep away institutional obstacles and human opponents, the "theme" which historians would use (50 to 100 years hence) to summarize our era.

Scholars who are more concerned with the mechanics of American politics were not often drawn into this argument, but many must have suspected that while history is often *written* in these terms, it seldom *occurs* that way. Instead, American political history wells up out of the situational calculations of candidates, activists, and voters. If any given tendency is to be judged, retrospectively, to have dominated the politics of our own era, it must reach that domination through the decisions which these actors make in order to influence public policy, and especially through the decisions which individual politicians make in order to gain and hold public office. If the rules of politics reliably cause the latter to seek votes in certain ways, to stress certain issues, and to address a certain clientele, those rules—far from being rolled over by the "current of history"—may be crucial in determining how that current will run.

The regulations governing presidential primaries are a shining example. These ground-rules—mandating either Winner-Take-All, Proportional, or Districted allocations of primary delegates—remain nearly invisible when compared with the groups, issues, and personalities that are the stuff of campaign coverage. Yet these inconspicuous channeling devices may ultimately affect the destinies not just of a few office-seekers but of entire political parties and major public issues as well. So far, only the Democrats have had enough contests in one year to support any sensible predictions, but that year makes it difficult to overrate the importance of primary rules. In 1972, a few simple alterations in these unseen "participants" could easily have produced a different Democratic nominee. (See the next section.) If 1972 is an adequate guide, altered primary regulations, over the medium run, could well determine which blocs will be influential within a party, thereby working fundamental (if unintended) change on that party. (See the third section.) Finally, in the long run, such ground-rules may even shape the grand conflicts of an epoch, indirectly but powerfully favoring some causes and not others.

In the last presidential nomination race, the beneficiary of the power hidden in the rules of the game was Senator George McGovern. Most primaries offered delegates by (Congressional) District, and Districted primaries maximized McGovern's strength. One simple shift, however, to generalized Winner-Take-All laws, would have *minimized* that strength, in the process guiding a healthy plurality of primary delegates (along with the nomination?) to Senator Hubert Humphrey. A second change, to Proportional regulations, would have undercut both McGovern and Humphrey, leaving only Governor George Wallace to derive electoral satisfaction from primary rules.

But beyond the fate of three particular politicians (none of whom may ever again seek the Oval Office) lies the fate of the social groups whose fortunes they hoped to advance, and whose backing they hoped to parlay into a presidency. The influence of these groups, too, was sharply affected in 1972 (and probably, for the foreseeable future) by the way primary rules modified the comparative power of different states within the national party. The old, eastern, industrial states, which had previously been essential to any Democratic nomination, shrank in importance. Two newly powerful blocs—one, of the persuasion known as "Southern Democratic," the other, Midwestern-Western (and presidentially Republican)—filled the vacuum, thanks to primary election laws which helped compensate for their smaller populations and which capitalized on their political homogeneity.

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Nothing guarantees that the interplay among Democratic candidates, states' voters, and formal regulations in 1972 is essential to the prediction either of political trends in the late twentieth century or of what historians a half-century hence will say about them. Dramatic events (major wars or severe economic declines) may move the bulk of the general public so powerfully that no institutional arrangements can redirect the trend. But in the absence of such events, or if such events should occur but leave no enduring political legacy (i.e., until there is good reason to believe that the *pattern* of interaction between social forces and formal regulations which surfaced in 1972 will change), that interaction can be extrapolated to hint at the drift of American politics in the years to come.

The Primaries: Other Rules, Other Results

Political ground-rules are not always overlooked, underanalyzed, or passively lamented. Between 1968 and 1972, the Democrats' Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection reconsidered all of the party's internal regulations. The Commission deliberately instituted numerous changes in traditional party practice.[1] It inadvertently created as many others, one of the most crucial being a vast increase in the percentage of delegates available in primaries.

The Commissioners did not want to multiply the number of primaries. Yet by issuing eighteen additional guidelines for delegate selection, they in effect announced eighteen new ways to unseat state delegations. Many state party leaders responded with what was apparently the surest method of avoiding this threat: They simply threw all aspiring delegates on the ballot. Thus states as diverse as Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New Mexico, which in 1968 had done their party business at state-level conventions, added primaries to the list for 1972.

The increase in the number of "effective" primaries was even greater, however, because (required) reforms upgraded previously less significant arenas into serious campaign sites. In fact, the biggest rise in the number of delegates along the primary route came not from new entries but from changes in old ones. In 1968, nearly half of all primaries had been "advisory," i.e., either voters could express a presidential preference but delegates would be chosen *independently* in party conventions, or, more commonly, a presidential preference could not be logically connected with the *separate* vote for delegates. By 1972, the linkage between candidate preference and delegate selection had been tightened so much that the free agents of past primaries—"favorite sons," "bosses," and "uncommitted" delegates—had almost disappeared.

The pattern of successes and failures in these primaries is already a historical footnote.[2] The lightweights (Lindsay, Hartke, Yorty, Mills, etc.) and one ostensible heavy (Muskie) were squeezed out early. Three major factional leaders (McGovern, Humphrey, Wallace) then campaigned through the pre-California contests. With a victory in California, McGovern effectively smashed the last organized pre-Convention opposition, and moved "inexorably" (at least by hindsight) to the nomination.

What this familiar account omits is the tremendous impact of state primary *rules*, rather than state primary *voters*, on these candidates and their fortunes. While a first glance shows nearly as many recognizably different sets of rules as there were state primaries,[3] all of these are in fact minor variations on three basic plans:

A) *Winner-Take-All:* The candidate with a *plurality in the total statewide vote acquires all that state's delegates*, regardless of the size of his vote or lead. Thus Rhode Island gave all 22 of its delegates to McGovern, whose 16,000 votes were twice Muskie's total, though still only 2 per cent of the eligible electorate.

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[1] See its final report: Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970).

[2] For the chronology, see Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973).

[3] Among the 22 states with presidential primaries, there were, in fact, 18 recognizably different primary plans. A heavy majority of states did use Districted regulations, but the variety within that designation was such that no state needed to apologize for a lack of institutional creativity. There were Districted states which put their delegates in Congressional Districts (Wisconsin), State Senatorial Districts (Pennsylvania), and Counties (New Jersey). There were Districted states which apportioned these delegates by prior Democratic vote (Ohio), by population (Maryland), or by a combination of the two (New Hampshire). There were Districted states which allowed persons elected to other offices (e.g., the Democratic State Committee) to pick a small share of the delegates on a Winner-Take-All basis (Florida) or on a Proportional basis (New York), Districted states which allowed delegates who were elected under Winner-Take-All (Maryland) or Proportional (Pennsylvania) rules, and Districted states which reserved seats for persons not connected with that election at all (the Democratic National Committeemembers from Nebraska). There were Districted states in which voters could pick individual delegates from different slates pledged to different presidential candidates (West Virginia), Districted states in which voters could pick the delegates but could not tell whom they were pledged to (Indiana), and Districted states in which voters could decide to whom the delegates should be pledged but could not pick the delegates (Tennessee).

Three more states adopted Proportional plans, incorporating a percentage cut-off (5 per cent in Michigan), a

B) *Proportional:* Each candidate who tops a statewide vote threshold (usually expressed in percentage terms) gains a share of the delegation; *his percentage of the total vote cast for all candidates who pass the threshold determines the exact number.* Thus North Carolina used a 15 per cent cut-off, which only two entrants (George Wallace and Terry Sanford) out of five met; Wallace, with 57 per cent share of the two-man total, got 37 delegates, leaving Sanford with 27 (43 per cent).

C) *Districted:* Delegates are apportioned to pre-established units (almost always congressional districts) on a fixed basis (past party vote, straight population, or half of each): the candidate with *the plurality in each district receives (all) its delegates.* Thus Florida put from 4 to 7 delegates, depending on prior Democratic vote, in each of 12 congressional districts. George Wallace carried 11 of these for 54 votes, and Hubert Humphrey picked off one for 7.

Individual states mixed or matched these three plans to suit local political needs. The desire to avoid credentials challenges, to preserve a strong state party organization, to enhance reformers' new-found clout, or just to get some sort of primary rules through a hostile (Republican) legislature were each major considerations in one or more states. Few, however, intended to favor one particular presidential aspirant. Fewer tried to guess how their regulations would affect the distribution of power within the "national party," which is, after all, a quadrennial fiction, not an ongoing body. None attempted to predict what their decisions would contribute to historians' judgments fifty or one hundred years later.

Table 1. Pre-California Primaries

State	Date	Delegates
New Hampshire	March 7	18
Florida	March 14	81
Wisconsin	April 4	67
Pennsylvania	April 18	182
Massachusetts	April 18	102
Ohio	May 2	153
Indiana	May 2	76
Tennessee	May 4	49
North Carolina	May 6	64
Nebraska	May 9	24
West Virginia	May 9	35
Michigan	May 16	132
Maryland	May 16	53
Oregon	May 23	34
Rhode Island	May 23	22

But while purely local, tactical needs shaped most primary rules, this in itself promised only that any bias for or against a particular candidate or state would be accidental—not that it would be absent, nor that it would average out by convention time. In fact, a strong, consistent bias was operating. It escaped notice during the campaigns because any given primary could be conducted under only one set of rules. The final popular vote was filtered through a particular state's primary law, delegates were distributed among various contenders according to these results, and candidates and newsmen then rushed off to the next contest.

A lack of neutrality in the rules becomes very apparent, however, if *the final popular vote is used three different times to get three different delegate distributions for each state*—one Winner-Take-All, one Proportional, and one Districted.[4] When the recorded vote is filtered through each of these three basic plans, the primaries can in effect be "rerun" to highlight the power inherent in their regulations.

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candidate cut-off (the top two finishers in New Mexico), or both (a 15 per cent cut-off *and* a four-man cut-off in North Carolina). Finally, four states used 'simple' Winner-Take-All rules, but even these varied according to whether the candidates had greater (Rhode Island) or lesser (California) control over who could stand as a delegate for them. Nine other states reserved some (usually small) share of their delegations for the statewide front-runner on a Winner-Take-All basis, a share that ran from 2 delegates (Oregon) to 38 (Ohio).

A good example of the intricacies which could arise from an imaginative mix of the three basic plans was Pennsylvania, where: (a) 137 delegates were apportioned among State Senatorial Districts according to a formula based 50 per cent on Democratic vote and 50 per cent on population; (b) 27 more delegates were chosen, at-large, by the first 137 delegates (who were elected on a Districted basis), by standards that were roughly (but only roughly) Proportional to the presidential preferences of this first 137; and (c) 18 additional delegates were chosen by the (independently elected and Party-Districted) State Democratic Committee, and were then pledged to presidential candidates in (*very*) rough approximation to those candidates' support among the first 137 (Senate-Districted) delegates. To get this process moving, the Pennsylvania citizen had to mark his ballot at least three times—once at the top of the ballot to indicate his presidential preference, and then two to four times at the bottom to elect delegates who might (but need not) be committed to that presidential preference.

[4] For states which asked their citizens to mark the ballot twice—once at the top for a presidential preference, and once at the bottom for district delegates—we have used the top (presidential preference) line as the "recorded vote." This insures comparability across the three basic sets of primary rules, since both Winner-Take-All and Proportionality demand a statewide vote. It has the additional research advantage of *underestimating* our findings. If we were, instead, to construct an artificial "statewide vote" by averaging the votes for district delegates whenever possible, this second figure would magnify our estimates of the impact of Proportionality and, especially, of Districting. Thus the top ballot line, which is more useful for comparison, is also more likely to provide a tough test of our argument.

The three major primary plans to which this vote was applied were defined as follows: (a) WINNER-TAKE-ALL: All of the state's delegates were awarded to the candidate who got the largest popular vote (on the top ballot line); (b) PROPORTIONAL: All of the state's delegates were divided among the candidates who got at least

Before the California result took the delegate hunt off the hustings and into the Credentials Committee, there were fifteen primaries which were entered by a major candidate (McGovern, Humphrey, or Wallace) and in which presidential preferences can be reliably attached to voters' choices.[5] (Table 1). When these fifteen are rerun on paper, they show the "invisible participant" hard at work.[6]

Pennsylvania is the starkest example. Keystone voters thought most highly of Hubert Humphrey, who would have amassed the largest share of their delegates under *any* of the three basic plans (Table 2). But by leading the field under Districted rules, Humphrey garnered only half of what the same performance would have gotten him via Winner-Take-All—although this was still nearly half again as much as it would have given him under Proportional regulations. In fact, the *difference* (in delegates) between winning Pennsylvania through Winner-Take-All and winning Pennsylvania Proportionately is greater than the total number of delegates available in twelve out of the first fifteen primaries (see Table 1). On abstractly statistical grounds, then, Humphrey-for-President partisans might reasonably have cared more about primary law in Pennsylvania than about whether anyone at all voted for their man in, say, Massachusetts.

Table 2. Pennsylvania Results Change Radically Under Different Primary Rules

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	182	66	93
Wallace	—	40	16
Muskie	—	38	34
McGovern	—	38	39

The runner-up in the Pennsylvania balloting, George Wallace, was also disadvantaged by the method for awarding delegates. His solid second would have gotten the Alabama governor the second greatest delegate total if his vote had been filtered through Proportional ground-rules. Under the actual Districting procedure, it made him a poor fourth in convention representatives—with the worst return per vote of any candidate entered. Clearly, without asking a single *voter* to change his mind, Pennsylvania state *legislators* could have juggled between one-sixth and two-thirds of the delegates going to their winner, while making either Wallace (Proportional), McGovern (Districted), or no one (Winner-Take-All) the "runner-up" (Table 2).

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15 per cent of the popular vote, in proportion to their share of that vote. The 15 per cent figure will be required in all Proportional primaries in 1976, and seems likely to be continued in the future. (But see footnote 9 for an estimate of the effect of substituting a 5 per cent cut-off.); (c) DISTRICTED: All of the state's delegates were placed in Congressional Districts and apportioned according to a formula based 50 per cent on prior Democratic vote and 50 per cent on population; the candidate with the largest vote in each district then received its delegates. This was the most common version of Districting in 1972 (all but four Districted states adopted it), and most of the other variants in use that year have been outlawed for 1976.

In view of the nearly infinite minor variations that are possible within these three arrangements (see footnote 3), it might seem that the general impact of Winner-Take-All, Proportionality, or Districting could be substantially altered by manipulating subrules within any one plan, rather then by having to scrap the plan itself. In fact, this does not appear to be true. Some of these variations actually have no effect at all, and most have measurable but trivial effects when compared with the differences *between* the three basic primary laws. An example of the former is the provision which permits some states' elected delegates to choose a small additional share of their delegations. As long as they choose by Proportional rules (as most do), this has no impact on the strengths of presidential aspirants or on the power of states within the party (although it might still influence the behavior of these delegates at the national convention). An example of the latter (clear but minimal impact) is the provision which permits some states' voters to select individual delegates from different candidates' slates. In 1972, exactly 11.5 out of 3,016 convention votes were changed by this subrule, and no candidate faced a loss/gain of more than 4 delegates through it. In the same way, the permission for states which used Districted rules to apportion their delegates either entirely by past Democratic vote or by half-Democratic-vote/half-population would have shifted no more than 2 delegates in any one state, and all the shifts (though trivial) would have reinforced our argument in the third section.

[5] Two primaries which occurred during this period, Illinois (March 21; 170 delegates) and the District of Columbia (April 18; 15 delegates), are ignored because they could not meet both of these criteria.

[6] A detailed example of the way this was done might be useful:

Table A. The Tennessee Primary, Under Three Different Primary Election Laws

THE RECORDED VOTE	Wallace	Humphrey	McGovern	8 Others
1st Cong. Dist. (5 Delegates)	17,580	5,430	3,051	2,200
2nd Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	25,066	10,231	7,463	3,521
3rd Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	33,128	8,450	5,163	3,556
4th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	50,342	9,418	3,855	5,567
5th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	52,001	9,811	6,525	4,294
6th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	47,433	6,507	3,081	4,510
7th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	63,737	9,352	2,651	4,598
8th Cong. Dist. (8 Delegates)	46,571	19,151	3,762	14,716
TOTAL (49 Delegates)	335,858	78,350	35,551	42,962
Percentage (100%)	68.2%	15.9%	7.2%	8.7%
Percentage for those over 15%	81.1%	18.9%	—	—
THE DELEGATE DISTRIBUTIONS	Wallace	Humphrey	McGovern	8 Others
Winner-Take-All	49	—	—	—
Proportional	40	9	—	—
Districted	49	—	—	—

But if candidates can lose up to two-thirds of their delegate potential through the intervention of particular primary rules, they can also win those primaries in more than one way. Primary elections, of course, allow someone to amass the most delegates; this is the traditional notion of victory. Unlike the November election, however, they also allow contestants to "win" by attracting favorable notice through a "surprisingly strong" showing. Newsmen are the custodians of this second form of "victory," and a switch in the rules in Pennsylvania would undoubtedly have altered it as well.

Under existing Pennsylvania regulations (Table 2), there were two wins, one loss, and one draw in the media war. The "draw" went to Hubert Humphrey. By primary time, Humphrey was expected to win, but not romp. When he did just that, he picked up a sizable bloc of delegates, but only a ho-hum from the press. Gains with the latter were instead recorded by McGovern, who drew measurable support in a state that was widely thought to be "not his type" (while also piling up 102 delegates in Massachusetts that day); and by Wallace, who ignored Pennsylvania nearly completely but came in second anyway. Commentators pinned a "must-win" label on Edmund Muskie before the primary, and a "loss" on him after it. Muskie's camp concurred, and he deactivated his candidacy after the Pennsylvania votes were counted.

In a primary occurring as early as Pennsylvania's, media-pronounced victories can be worth every bit as much, in terms of future resources, as larger delegate collections. Such "victories" can in fact be crucial for renewing a potential nominee's reservoir of financial contributions, activists' energies, and popular support. By mid-April, no rules change short of vote fraud could have garnered favorable press reviews for the Muskie candidacy, but the other Pennsylvania press judgments ("wins" for McGovern and Wallace, with a "draw" for Humphrey) were really deduced as much from primary law as from the vote distribution. They would surely never have survived a Winner-Take-All primary, resulting in *182* delegates for Humphrey, and *0* for McGovern and Wallace together.

Table 3. Other States Show the Same Strong Effect of Primary Rules

3a. Ohio

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	153	78	96
McGovern	—	75	57

3b. Indiana

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	76	40	49
Wallace	—	36	27

Pennsylvania was a particularly strong example of a relatively common, though not universal, phenomenon—the "intervention" of primary rules between the distribution of votes and the division of the delegation. In similar states, like Ohio and Indiana, similar percentages of delegates' allegiance derived from primary law rather than from voters' commands[7] (Table 3). Thus a switch from Ohio's actual Districted system to Winner-Take-All would have altered the loyalties of close to forty per cent of the state's convention representatives. A second move from Winner-Take-All to Proportional would have swung nearly fifty per cent. An only slightly milder version of the same effect appeared in Indiana, where one-third and one-half of the delegates, respectively, would have shifted with these changes.

Primary ground-rules might still be judged unimportant if the advantages which they concealed had eventually cancelled out. In theory, benefits might have gone randomly to candidates, with, for example, the Districted plan favoring McGovern in Ohio, Humphrey in Pennsylvania, Wallace in Indiana, etc. In fact, such averaging did *not* occur. When possible outcomes for the fifteen pre-California primaries are summed, alterations in "minor" rules lead to impressively different results (Table 4).

Table 4. The Differential Impact of Rules of the Game Does *Not* Even Out in the Long Run

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	446[a]	314	324
Wallace	379	350	367
McGovern	249	319	343
Muskie	18	82	52
Others	0	27	6

[a] Delegate totals for fifteen pre-California primaries.[8]

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[7] In states with a different kind of social base, the rules had a much more muted impact on delegate disbursements. Tennessee is such a state (footnote 6), and analogous rules changes would have had little effect on the loyalties of its delegates. This interaction between primary rules and the various types of states is analyzed in the final two sections of this paper.

[8] The actual results of these fifteen contests—Hum-

Under the existing welter of regulations, of course, George McGovern had become the "man to beat" by the June 6 California showdown. But if he had first faced fifteen Winner-Take-All primaries, he might well have loomed tiny as California approached. For given uniform Winner-Take-All ground-rules, Hubert Humphrey would have squeezed the most from the states with delegates on the ballot. He would have been pressed most closely by Governor Wallace, who would have been followed by a relatively distant Senator McGovern. Humphrey, who under the actual rules could never match McGovern's delegate collection, would have almost doubled his rival's total.

Unfortunately for Senator Humphrey, a majority of states actually adopted Districted primaries. If they *all* had, the Winner-Take-All leader (Humphrey) would have dropped from first to last, jettisoning a substantial share of his delegate potential in the process. The primary election crown would have passed to Governor Wallace, with about the same number of delegates under both plans. But the candidate for whom Districted rules would have been most congenial would have been Senator McGovern, who could have squeezed *half again as many* delegates out of a change from Winner-Take-All to Districting.

Governor George C. Wallace, alone among the three major factional leaders, could have looked with equanimity on any set of rules. Proportionality might have offered some added attractiveness, since it would have provided him with his largest lead, but Districting still would have made him the primary king, and Winner-Take-All regulations would have given him his greatest raw total of delegates. Proportional rules would also have pumped the maximum amount of "medicine" into the ailing candidacy of Senator Edmund Muskie, although the extra (thirty to sixty) delegates would hardly have been enough to save the patient.[9]

Since candidates and voters are not laboratory animals, the primaries must be rerun on paper, rather than in the voting booth. These "paper elections" are an excellent way to unmask the magnitude of the impact of different primary rules, but they are only a reasoned approximation to the (precise) number of delegates which particular candidates might have obtained if things had been different. If the rules had been changed, the strategic decisions of some participants would surely have changed, too, with some (changed) electoral outcomes. Yet only massive strategic shifts—the kind which are highly unlikely in the short run, where candidates are well known and citizens have reliable voting habits—could have altered the general thrust of each primary plan. Strategic shifts of a scope sufficient to keep the rules of the game from having *any* major impact on candidates' chances are, in practical terms, unimaginable. In short, in 1972, primary regulations were extremely important in determining who the nominee would be.

In fact, the ground-rules often did as much as the vote in establishing who "won," and by how much. Because they did, they give rise to a final, long chain of speculation: Changes in the rules would have significantly influenced the strength of early contestants, might well have altered (or neutralized) the result in the "key" California primary, could subsequently have led to a different (if unpredictable) nominee, and might ultimately have delivered "four less years"—in the same way that a single, unnoticed, fabled nail once toppled a kingdom.

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phrey 284, Wallace 291, McGovern 401.5, Muskie 56.5, Others 59—do not, of course, match the outcomes which a consistent application of any of these three plans would have created, mainly because different states used different basic plans. Thus McGovern's ability to surpass his apparent "optimum," and the inability of Wallace and Humphrey to attain their apparent "minimums," are partially due to the way their varying *levels* of electoral support within states meshed with the type of primary rules in effect in those same states.

Humphrey and Wallace each suffered from one other rule-related problem, stemming from the way the *social status* of their respective supporters interacted with the rules. Because lower-income voters were most likely to fail to mark their ballots completely, and because Humphrey's voters were more likely to be from the lower-class parts of the party, Districted rules (with their usual two-step voting requirement) deprived him of delegates in areas where he was the favorite; conversely, McGovern, with higher-income support, picked up delegates in areas where he could do no better than third in the preference poll. In Pennsylvania alone, Humphrey lost 20 delegates (more delegates than there *are* in the New Hampshire primary) through this "voter fatigue;" McGovern picked up 15 of them.

Wallace's supporters were a "problem" at a much earlier stage. Unlike the more middle-class followers of George McGovern or the party/union activists of Hubert Humphrey, George Wallace's early enthusiasts were often not sufficiently organized (or perhaps, organizable) to mount delegate petition drives. Consequently, Wallace occasionally placed his name on the presidential preference line without providing delegates who would stand for him on the lines below. In Pennsylvania, he finished comfortably ahead in districts which should have delivered 16 delegates, but since they contained only 2 pledged Wallaceites, he lost 14 of these 16 to the other candidates (Humphrey, Muskie, and especially, McGovern).

[9] If these Proportional rules had used a 5 per cent cutoff, rather than the tougher 15 per cent, Muskie's total would have continued to grow—to 113. These additional delegates would have arrived *after* he had withdrawn from active candidacy, courtesy of states where his name was still on the ballot. The biggest gainer from the reduced vote threshold, however, would have been the category "Others," where a collection of long-shots (Chisholm, Lindsay, Sanford, Jackson, and Yorty) stood to amass 74 delegates. Humphrey, Wallace, and McGovern would have surrendered delegates to these others in about the same proportions, coming to rest at totals of 292, 324, and 289, respectively.

Primary Rules and Political Power

Technical party regulations, no matter how great their power, are rarely debated during election campaigns, and 1972 was no exception. Once the presidential election was past, however, combat over party rules began again within the Democratic party. The site for the debate was the new Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, and, while press attention was concentrated on the issue of representational quotas, primary ground-rules were also on the Commission's agenda.

On October 5, 1973, the Commissioners voted to outlaw Winner-Take-All regulations, and to limit states to a choice of Districting or Proportionality.[10] The Winner-Take-All primary was killed off by a coalition of those who believed that the latter plans would increase the power of Democrats with the same policy preferences, those who felt that the latter plans were simply more "democratic," and those who were looking backward to the experience of one particular (1972) candidate or forward to the chances of a new (1976) one. Some combination of the same three criteria—the internal distribution of party power, conceptions of democracy, and candidate loyalities—will neccesarily guide anyone else who passes judgment on the Commission's decision.

Diehard candidate loyalists, as always, have a very simple decision-rule at hand. Whichever primary system favored their man is equitable; all others are distortive. Thus Table 4 suggests that: (1) Devoted McGovernites may rest content with the actual mix, but could encourage the proliferation of Districted primaries; (2) Fervent Humphreyites should see justice solely in Winner-Take-All plans; (3) Rabid Wallaceites, alone among the partisans, might take the statesmanlike view. Proportionality may hold a special place in their hearts, but they could swallow Winner-Take-All or Districted regulations without difficulty.

Such hero worship is never very helpful in evaluating political arrangements, partly because it is far from objective, but mainly because heroes suffer political mortality while the rules which favored them live on. Reformers who want to avoid these selfish, personalized, and transitory standards can turn instead to "democratic theory," a realm untainted by past partisan attachments. For these rule-makers, party law should be deduced from general standards of democratic government and then extended to all facets of party activity, including primary elections.

Unfortunately, democratic theorists offer few consensual standards. Those who favor Proportionality claim the closest approximation to the actual vote, along with the greatest incentive for any and all hopefuls to enter the primaries—both clearly "democratic." Winner-Take-All advocates counter that by driving aspirants out of the race and by forcing voters toward compromise, they insure meaningful choices before the Convention and a chance of winning the election after it—both clearly "democratic." Lastly, Districting supporters hold out the "golden mean," promising some diversity in candidates but some hope that they will be forced to coalesce—and that is also "democratic."[11]

Fortunately, there is a middle-ground between abstract theoretical guidelines and particularistic personal loyalties because all primary plans also advantage specific geographic areas; in other words, they give political power disproportionately to some states (and hence to some states' *residents*) and not to others. Since they do, primary rules can be used deliberately to alter the balance of power within a political party. In fact, regardless of whether reform commissioners consider the internal distribution of party power, their decisions *will* benefit either politically liberal or conservative areas, either electorally competitive or noncompetitive areas, and either reliably Democratic, waveringly Democratic, or regularly Republican areas.

The Democratic National Committee has always recognized this impact of the rules on constituents' fortunes when it allocates Convention delegates to the states. At this (earliest) stage of the delegate selection process, the D.N.C. engages in some deliberate manipulation of party blocs, through an allocation formula which rewards both sheer (Electoral College) size and past Democratic support. The party-voting criterion, by inflating states which normally go Democratic, is an attempt to guarantee that individuals who are most typical of the Democratic vote will have the most weight within the party. The size criterion, by rewarding states which have most to offer in the Electoral College, is an attempt to guarantee that the nominee will be a winner. Inadvertently, it also increases the likelihood that he will be devoted to the social-welfare policies and coalition-of-minor-

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[10] See its report to the Democratic National Committee: Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, *Democrats All* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1973). Guideline 8("Unit Rule") abolishes the Winner-Take-All primary. Guideline 9.A covers Districted primaries, and Guideline 11 contains the Commission's recommendations on Proportionality. The Democratic National Committee raised the cut-off figure in the Proportionality section (from 10 per cent to 15 per cent), but otherwise accepted the Commission's guidelines as written.

[11] If the argument of the last two sections is correct, however, this claim (that Districting is a "mean" between Winner-Take-All and Proportionality) is true *only* in formal-structural terms. In terms of the plan's effect on state power within the national Democratic party, it is, instead, the most extreme case (see below).



Figure 1. Winner-Take-All[a] Rules Maintain Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the state's "political value," i.e., the delegate *margin* obtained by the candidate who finished first in that primary. Under Winner-Take-All rules, the "political value" is the same as the size of the state's delegation under other rules, it may not be (see Figures 2 & 3). The seven primary states with the largest delegations have the striped bars in Figures 1, 2, & 3; the eight primary states with the smallest delegations have the plain bars.

ities politics which traditionally characterize the national Democratic party, and which find special favor in the big, urban, industrialized, working-class, ethnic- and racial-minority-oriented states.

As long as top state party officials could select and direct their delegations, a state's power at the Convention faithfully reflected the size and Democratic-vote criteria. The bigger the state, the more claim it could have on potential nominees. The more reliably Democratic the state, the more muscle it could throw behind its choice. Thus the dozen largest states were more important than all their brethren combined. And thus, for states of similar population, a look at the last presidential vote would predict comparative importance at the next convention.

The proliferation of (reformed) primaries since 1968 has changed all this. The first allocation of delegates no longer insures the internal party power of large and/or reliably Democratic states if their delegates end up on the ballot. To be sure, there are primary plans which maintain the original advantages bestowed by the Democratic National Committee, there are also systems which neutralize these advantages, and there are even arrangements which reverse them. In 1972, primary regulations had a strong, unintended impact on which states were vital to candidates' fortunes: They magnified the influence of Democrats in areas which are likely to go Republican in most general elections or which, while remaining Democratic for most lower offices, are apt to desert the party at presidential election time.

If all states had implemented Winner-Take-All primaries in 1972, this redistribution of state party power would not have occurred. A state's "political value"—the delegate *margin* obtained by the candidate who finished first in its primary—would have corresponded exactly with the size of delegation authorized by national party rules (Figure 1). The key battlefields would have been generally northeastern, urban, industrial, minority-oriented, populous, and two-party competitive in November, while the lesser ones would have been southern and western, more rural, agricultural, homogeneous, sparsely populated, and politically one-party.

Candidates would have been forced to attend to



Figure 2. Proportional Rules[a] Erode Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the share of the state's *political value* (under Winner-Take-All rules) which it can retain under Proportionality.[12]

the former states, on pain of losing any chance at nomination. Campaigners would have been particularly drawn to states like Pennsylvania and Ohio, which are not just competitive at the general election, but are highly competitive within the state Democratic party itself. Narrow victories there (and victories would predictably be narrow) could swing a huge phalanx of delegates. Consequently, such states would have a maximum opportunity to extract policy promises from candidates. Pennsylvania, for example, offers multiple bases of support for presidential aspirants: the coal regions, inner-city Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, wealthy suburbs, extensive farm belts, etc. The man who could best appeal to a plurality of these Pennsylvanians would receive a net gain of 182 delegates; the man who attracted New Hampshiremen, by contrast, would inherit one-tenth of that. In fact, placing first in Pennsylvania would have been worth as much as a comparable performance in all six of the smallest primary states *combined* (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Oregon, West Virginia, and Tennessee).

The position of the largest states would begin to erode seriously if all primaries were instead run Proportionately. Where a Winner-Take-All plan favors states with the greatest *total number* of delegates, and in effect offers a bonus to those which are internally competitive, a Proportional arrangement favors those which can generate the greatest *vote difference*—an extra reward for the noncompetitive (Figure 2). As a result, the more politically homogeneous of the middle-sized states would increase their ability to command candidates' attention and to wield power within the party, at the expense of the more politically diverse among the big states.

Tennessee, in 1972, was the outstanding example of the way that Proportionality would confer benefits on such middle-sized, noncompetitive states. Given Proportional rules, George Wallace's Tennessee landslide (75 per cent of the ballots cast) would have been worth as large a lead in delegates (an edge of 31) as Hubert Humphrey's much narrower victory in Pennsylvania (a margin of 26). Tennesseans would have generated the same delegate margin for their favorite as Pennsylvanians did for theirs—even though the latter were entitled to four times as many convention votes. Politicians would have had to learn to calculate accordingly: The magnitude of a potential winner's lead, not the size of the states he could win, would become the key to nomination hopes.

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[12] For example, Tennessee gives its first-place finisher a margin of 31 delegates under Proportional rules, compared to 49 under Winner-Take-All; thus it retains 63 per cent of its original political value—the best record among these fifteen states. Comparable figures for the remaining states are: Massachusetts 43 per cent (44/102); Oregon 41 per cent (14/34); Florida 38 per cent (31/81); West Virginia 31 per cent (11/35); Michigan 26 per cent (34/132); Rhode Island 18 per cent (4/22); North Carolina 16 per cent (10/64); Pennsylvania 14 per cent (26/182); Maryland 13 per cent (7/53); New Hampshire 11 per cent (2/18); Wisconsin 9 per cent (6/67); Nebraska 8 per cent (2/24); Indiana 5 per cent (4/76); Ohio 2 per cent (3/153).

The benefits which Proportionality could have brought to Tennessee would have been felt as severe costs in, for example, Ohio, where a net gain of *three* delegates would have been skimpy spoils for the victor (Figure 2.) A three-delegate *lead* in Ohio would not be trivial in the winner's quest for a convention majority, since it still represents a large *total* of delegates. (See Table 3a.) But it would not be too much consolation either, since at least one other candidate (and possibly more) would be gaining only three fewer convention votes.

Because it has a substantial delegation in total size, Ohio would not be crossed off the itineraries of presidential aspirants; they would still be well advised to rally their partisans there. But if they had the capacity to attract Tennesseans as well, they should certainly transfer more of their time and, presumably, policy promises to the Volunteer state. Even if they could not do so—and not everyone can roll up three-quarters of the vote in Tennessee—they would still be facing a changed environment within the party. Where Winner-Take-All rules once made Ohio (153 delegates) more than three times as large as Tennessee (49), Proportionality would now reverse the situation (+3 versus +31). In tactical terms, a candidate who finished first in Ohio and a poor third in Tennessee could, historically, have thumbed his nose at a competitor who finished first in Tennessee but third in Ohio; he would, after all, have beaten the latter by better than 3-to-1. In the post-Winner-Take-All era, however, the Ohio winner would have to stifle his contempt, since a Tennessee victor could often eclipse him in the delegate race.

Tennessee and Ohio were, of course, extreme cases. In general, Proportional plans would subtract unevenly from the edge of the big states, since these states are not necessarily more internally competitive than their medium-sized or tiny counterparts. Residents of Michigan or Massachusetts, for example, voted as lopsidedly in their primaries as anyone. The big states which *are* competitive would shrink in importance, relative to both noncompetitive big states and noncompetitive smaller ones. Their slack would be taken up by the more one-sided among the middle-sized. Few of the states in this size range could derive as dramatic gains as Tennessee, although the fact that these states are predominantly southern might have substantial policy implications for the party as a whole (see last section.) The smallest states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Nebraska) would derive much less of an advantage, since a huge *percentage* victory in any of them still represents a comparatively small *number* of delegates (e.g., nine in Rhode Island). Under Proportionality, then, big, competitive states decline in importance; middle-sized, noncompetitive states rise, and small states stay at the bottom of the heap.

The latter could be rescued from this position by a broad-scale implementation of Districted primaries. If all primaries had been Districted—as most were—the net benefits coming with a first-place finish would have been almost unrelated to size of delegation, and hence to Winner-Take-All margins (Figure 3.) Where a Winner-Take-All victory in Pennsylvania would have been equivalent to victories in all *six* of the smallest states, any *two* of these states could have offered about the same delegate margin as the Keystone state under Districted regulations, and North Carolina and Tennessee could have matched its political value by themselves. In the battle for power within the Democratic party, it would have been North Carolina over Pennsylvania, Tennessee over Ohio, Nebraska over Indiana, and Oregon over Wisconsin.[13]

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[13] It might be argued that our definition of a state's "political value" (the delegate margin which it can provide to its favorite) is not the ideal measure of the impact of primary rules on power within the Democratic party. One could argue that, for purposes of understanding presidential politics in the long run, the crucial consideration is not what a state can give to any particular candidate, but how much of a margin it can generate for its favorite *wing* of the party, i.e., for each group of candidates (the left-Democrats, the liberal-Democrats, or the conservative-Democrats) *as a group*.

In 1972, the question of which measure to use—the "candidate margin" or an artificial "ideological margin"—was, of course, irrelevant, because two of the first four primaries, and all of those after the fourth (Pennsylvania), featured a maximum of three serious contenders (McGovern, Humphrey, or Wallace), one for each wing of the party. Collectively, they would have amassed well over 90 per cent of the delegates from the first 15 contests under any set of rules (Table 4).

Future nomination campaigns are very likely to follow this same pattern—a rapid thinning of the field until there is a champion for each major faction—because the central problem in seeking a major party nomination is the scarcity of political resources, especially activists, finances, and popularity. An aspirant must succeed in monopolizing these within his wing of the party, and must then defeat the standard-bearers of the other wings. If he fails to drive other contenders who resemble him out of the race early, he will surely find that the resource situation allows one of them to drive him out instead—witness Lindsay (elimi-

The shift from universal Winner-Take-All to universal Districted plans sharply alters the tactical environment on the way to the convention. The largest states suffer a tremendous diminution in political influence because they contain pockets of strength for any number of candidates. The smaller states will never face this problem; each of the six primary states with the fewest delegates could have given exactly the same share of those delegates—100 per cent—to its favorite under either Winner-Take-all or Districted rules (Figure 3). Where once a candidate could only hope to gain the nomination if he had substantial muscle in the eastern industrial states, the change to Districted primaries should make it every bit as feasible to pursue a "southern" or "western" strategy. A presidential contender can now secure a decent minority of districts in the biggest states and then aim for all the districts in either those states which are normally Republican in the November election (mainly western or midwestern) or those states which are of the hybrid persuasion known as "Southern-Democratic."

Selection of delegates by District is, in fact, an excellent example of the way that one set of rules (those governing primaries) can nullify the effects of another (those governing apportionment of delegates to the states). A Winner-Take-All system supports the original apportionment formula, giving extra power to large and/or reliably Democratic states (Figure 1, where the striped bars precede the plain ones). Proportionality operates to neutralize the formula (Figure 2, where the striped and plain bars are mixed randomly). Districting works to *reverse* it (Figure 3, where the plain bars precede the striped ones).

Each primary plan, by the way it parcels out delegates, favors a particular blend of delegation size and internal competition. Consequently, each plan leads to a different distribution of power within the party. A Winner-Take-All system fragments *no* delegations, thereby making the larger and more competitive states more powerful. A Proportional system, on the other hand, fragments *all* delegations, making the larger and less competitive states more powerful. A Districted system takes the final step by fragmenting the delegations of the big states but not those of their less populous counterparts—in effect maximizing the power of the smaller and less competitive states. The widespread adoption of Districted primaries after 1968, or the prohibition of Winner-Take-All primaries after 1972, were not, then, just inconsequential decisions to hand out delegates via a certain mechanism. They were indirect, apparently accidental, but far-reaching choices about the types of candidate who would bear the party's standard, the types of voter who would have the power to choose those standard-bearers, and the types of issue with which both groups would try to shape history. They were, in short, a decision on how to (re)construct the Democratic party.

Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change

Primary rules necessarily change the balance of power within a party. In any single campaign, that altered balance can elicit moderate tactical adjustments; it cannot remake political personalities. A presidential aspirant is, after all, a man with a past. In his political career, he will have accumulated friends and enemies, and have arrived at stands on most major questions of the day. If his following is mainly urban, not farm-belt, Democrats, he cannot practially desert Ohio for Nebraska (although he *can* shift barnstorming time). If he has built a name in civil liberties, he cannot court street-crime victims by urging unlimited detention of suspects (although he *can* switch positions on other, less publicized controversies). Even if he can discover ways to remodel himself to benefit from changed conditions, he may not make the

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nated early by McGovern), Muskie (isolated from his potential resource base by Humphrey), or Mills (smothered by Wallace) in 1972.

It is probably extremely fortunate that investigation of the political role of primary rules does not require the analyst to lump one candidate's voters or delegates with another's, and then to assert that they form a bloc, since this would introduce severe distortions into the results. An observer might conclude, for example, that McGovern, Chisholm, and Lindsay make up one bloc, that Humphrey, Muskie, Sanford, and Jackson are in another, and that Wallace, Mills, and Yorty form a third. Yet this assumes both that the second choices of lesser candidates' voters will lie within the same bloc, and that the convention voting of minor candidates' delegates will mirror the votes of delegates pledged to the bloc's front-runner—both patently untrue assumptions. Among the "minor" candidates, Muskie attracted the greatest number of voters and delegates. But while Muskie and *Humphrey* appear to hold similar ideological positions, potential Muskie *voters* were torn between Humphrey and *McGovern* after their hero had suspended operations; in fact, some commentators viewed the California primary not as a contest between Humphrey supporters and McGovern supporters, but as a contest between Humphrey and McGovern for the allegiance of (former) Muskie supporters. The same picture emerges from attempts to create delegate blocs. Muskie may have most closely resembled Humphrey, and he may even have asked his delegates at the convention to follow Humphrey's leadership temporarily, yet these delegates split (roughly in half) on the floor, some staying with the Humphreyites, but many going with the McGovernites.

(It might be noted, parenthetically, that even though we advise against pretending that these "ideological blocs" are real entities, we did carve up primary voters into the three blocs outlined above, to see what effect this would have on the role of primary election plans. It had almost none: Winner-Take-All was still the optimal plan for the the large, competitive states; Proportionality was still the middle-sized, noncompetitive states' plan; and Districting still favored the smaller states, whatever their level of competition.)



Figure 3. Districted Rules[a] Destroy Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the share of a state's *political value* (under Winner-Take-All rules) which it can retain under Districting.[14]

effort. If attaining the presidency had required Senator McGovern to accept the war in Vietnam, Senator Humphrey to back away from universal medical insurance, or Governor Wallace to forsake the neighborhood school, the presidential contest would have had three fewer entrants.

But if primary regulations do change the balance of power within a political party, they do so regardless of the ability or desire of any particular contender to adapt. Any given man may move only slightly in response to an altered political eironment, but the types of contestants, of issues, and of electoral strategies which characterize politics will shift more markedly. If candidates must attract newly powerful areas in order to campaign realistically for the nomination, candidates will appear who can attract those areas. If a certain set of issues is important there, champions will arise who have those issues as their major claim to fame. Over the course of several elections, the men who seek the nomination, the voters they must appease to get it, and the policies they use to do so will, together, constitute a recognizably different era in American politics.

A theoretical outline of what would happen *if* a new political environment were produced by primary rules is not, of course, a description of that new environment; it is not evidence that the new "era" will continue beyond the election in which it was first detected; it is not a set of logical deductions about what the new situation implies for

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[14] For example, Tennessee gives its first-place finisher a margin of 49 delegates under both Districted and Winner-Take-All rules; thus it retains 100 per cent (49/49) of its original political value. Comparable figures for the remaining states are: Massachusetts 100 per cent (102/102); West Virginia 100 per cent (35/35); Oregon 100 per cent (34/34); Nebraska 100 per cent (24/24); Rhode Island 100 per cent (22/22); New Hampshire 100 per cent (18/18); North Carolina 81 per cent (52/64); Florida 73 per cent (63/81); Michigan 70 per cent (92/132); Wisconsin 52 per cent (35/67), Maryland 51 per cent (27/53); Pennsylvania 30 per cent (54/82); Indiana 29 per cent (22/76); Ohio 25 per cent (39/53).

(future) national politics. The previous section of this paper is an attempt to meet the first of these objectives, and it contains an implicit argument about the second: If "size" and "degree of internal competitiveness" are in fact the key links between primary rules and a state's influence within the Democratic party, then the new political environment should endure. This is not to say, on the one hand, that charismatic leaders or dramatic events (sufficient to overwhelm any rule-related effect) cannot appear, nor, on the other hand, that party officials might not reverse themselves and restore the pre-reform regulations. But by assuming the absence of both of these situations, it should be possible to meet the final objective—and to produce some deductions about the policy outcomes of a new and different balance of power within the national Democratic party.

The inadvertently retailored Democratic party toward which Districted primaries contribute features two groups of states on the rise and one in decline.[15] The biggest losers are the northeastern, industrial states (plus, in the future, California?), which have always been the mainstay of the Democratic party, and which remain essential for the election of a Democratic president. These are the states which epitomize the old coalition-of-minorities politics, and which are the heart of support for "social-welfare" programs (e.g., aid to education, plentiful jobs and guaranteed employment, Social Security, Medicare and universal health insurance). Their residents have been opposed to the more radical "social engineering" approach to policy making (busing, job quotas, etc.), but that opposition has not (in most cases) induced them to react against progressive legislation in the social-welfare mode.

Under Winner-Take-All rules in the primaries and then in the Electoral College, the ten largest of these states can nominate a Democrat and elect him. Obviously, primary rules which shift control over the nominee to areas favoring social engineering, or areas desiring a reaction against it (see below), risk cracking the Democratic coalition in the large states. Because the latter are usually highly competitive in November, substantial cracks in the coalition are likely to drive them into the Republican column, and that, in turn, should be enough to decide most presidential elections. The party power of the large, politically heterogeneous states is thus intimately tied to a style of politics, a wide-ranging set of policies, and a strategy for winning elections.

Recent alterations in primary law reduce that power, and increase the party role of two (mutually hostile) groups of smaller, more politically homogeneous states—each with its own preferred course for the Democratic party. First are the Midwestern and Western states, which can deliver well over three-quarters of their delegates to the same man without any need for a Winner-Take-All provision.[16] Unlike the Northeastern states, where policy preferences, party politics, and general election strategy form an internally consistent package, these (Midwestern-Western) areas present a contradiction: While most are presidentially Republican across the state as a whole, and while as a group they provide the bedrock of which senatorial and congressional conservatism is founded, their *Democratic delegates* often support candidates who are markedly more liberal than the bulk of the party.[17] These delegates were the essential base for a liberal-left challenge to Northeastern candidates and social-welfare policies even before the reform of the delegate selection process, and that tendency was exaggerated afterwards.

Increased power for the plains and mountain states, then, promises a double result: First, greater convention support for social engineering policies, and second, sharply curtailed electoral prospects for the nominee. More influence for Midwestern-

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[15] By mid-1975, it appeared that at least 28 of the 32 primaries in 1976 would be Districted, and both the number of primaries and the incidence of Districting may yet increase. This is already a situation much like the pure Districted arrangements shown in Table 4, or the state power picture presented in Figure 3.

[16] If more of these states should add primaries to the list in the future, Districting will provide an even more inflated edge for this segment of the party, thanks to a peculiarity in delegate apportionment which Districted primaries accentuate. Because half of all convention delegates are assigned according to a state's share in the Electoral College, because more Electoral Votes go to the smallest states than they are entitled to by population, and because small states are disproportionately Midwestern-Western, this group of states receives "extra" delegates. This is hardly unfair or unreasonable; presidential voting is done through the Electoral College, so the relevant size figure is not census population, but Electoral College "population." Since Districted rules, however, will allow these areas (if they institute presidential primaries) to cast their (extra) convention votes as a bloc, the combination of apportionment peculiarities and the distortions involved in Districting will be additive: It will further undercut both the middle-sized (Southern-Border) states, which get no bonus delegates from the apportionment formula, and the big (Northeastern industrial) states, whose delegations are fragmented by Districted rules.

[17] This support is probably not directly rooted in any mass favorability toward social engineering policies, even among Democrats. Rather, it can be explained by two other factors characterizing Democratic party politics in the plains-mountain states. First, mass electorates in these areas, compared to the rest of the nation, prefer "cleaner," more "purist" candidates on stylistic grounds, and this tendency is reinforced by a preference for potential nominees who are not identified with the industrial Northeast. Second, a continuing party leadership structure is nearly nonexistent, so that there is no regular party organization to resist a quadrennial take over by independent, liberal activists. As a result of this combination, apparently conservative states are very likely to produce left-liberal delegates.

Western areas means greater irritation for the other (Southern-Border) areas which primary rules have revitalized, making it even more likely that the Democrats will not carry the latter (see below). A larger role for the plains-mountain states is at the very least an additional problem for electoral politics in the big states, since the policy concerns of (delegates from) the former are unlike those of the industrial core of the party's voters. Finally, and ironically, greater party power for these areas will probably not make it more likely that any more of them will go Democratic in November. Even if it were possible to "trade" the Midwest and West for the Northeast, the deal would be a bad one in numerical terms, but in reality the question is unlikely to arise: The plains-mountain states are still solidly Republican presidentially, and greater delegate power at the Democratic Convention will do little to overcome that.

The Southern and Border states make up the second group for which Districted (and even Proportional) regulations are a major boon. Like their Midwestern-Western counterparts, all of the states below the Mason-Dixon line can deliver more than three-quarters of their delegates to one man, in the absence of any aid from Winner-Take-All provisions. Compared with the plains-mountain states, however, these areas have historically been more conservative before the nomination and more Democratic at election time. They remain more conservative in convention, but the situation at the presidential level has changed over the past decade: Southern-Border electorates have increasingly been attracted by generalized attacks on social change and, when Democratic nominees have failed to endorse such attacks, have subsequently crossed over to the Republicans.[18] A combination of historical ties plus social-welfare programs (a presumed "need" in the lowest-income section of the country) has kept them from doing the same thing at the senatorial and congressional levels; although their legislators have been restless on social-welfare matters and have defected to the Republicans on many others. Whether the same combination can be used to allay the general Southern suspicion that the national Democratic party has been captured by social engineers, and thus to bring the presidential vote back into line with the vote at lower levels, is an open question. Whether future Democratic national conventions will make the effort is equally open.[19]

New patterns of convention decision making do seem very likely to follow the new party power configuration, and such decisions will, in turn, be critical in determining what the party stands for, and how much of that can be implemented. These new patterns may, again, be accelerated or delayed by the American economic or international situation. They may even be interrupted entirely by the appearance of charismatic figures or unforeseen events. Barring such developments, however, the power distribution created by primary rules does provide a basis for speculation on the direction in which future conventions will take the party, and on its subsequent fate. At the very least, the combination of more potent Midwestern-Western (left) and Southern-Border (right) wings should decrease the probability of Democratic presidential election victories, although the amount of the decline is, as yet, unclear. More imaginative political analysts can certainly find more extreme scenarios: The new political environment, for example, could permanently detach a huge minority of all Democrats from their (former) party and convert them into registered Republicans.

Of the three basic primary plans, Districting promises the most sharply divided conventions and the most severe problems in postconvention electioneering. Under this plan, the more radical candidates on both ends of the party's ideological spectrum will have a maximum number of delegates. Aspirants at the center will, conversely, be at their weakest, leaving the convention with a dilemma. It can appease the delegates on the left, settling on a contender who favors social engineering policies, and who will drive off more conservative Democrats in November. Or, it can placate the delegates on the right, settling on a candidate whose electability is purchased through a closer resemblance to the Republican standard-bearer, a much closer resemblance than pre-reform Democratic nominees needed or wanted.

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[18] Desertions by the voters have been less regular at the senatorial and congressional levels, but the old lines are seriously breached there, too. While this can hardly be chalked up to presidential primary rules, it can also hardly be slowed (much less reversed) by primary arrangements which have the net effect of favoring the Republicans at the presidential level.

[19] This seems to suggest that those who desire both to obtain primary rules reform and to avoid doing serious damage to the party's electoral prospects should back Proportionality, and so they should if these were the only factors in the analysis. Many (perhaps most) reform advocates, however, are interested in the cause of rules reform because they believe it will lead to more liberal policy positions by the party's presidential nominees, i.e., because it will create a more change-oriented party. Judged by these standards, Proportionality is the least attractive primary plan—less attractive than Districting, which promises more liberal nominees and reform, but a decreased likelihood of winning elections; and less attractive than Winner-Take-All, which promises more liberal nominees, no reform, and an increased probability of winning elections.

Under Districting, the bargaining capacity of the big industrial states is reduced severely, to the point where their old-line party "regulars" may well be unable to insist on the usual moderate-liberal candidate with a social-welfare program. Instead, they will have to join either a left-leaning or a right-leaning coalition. Because the regulars are (so far, at least) unwilling to move toward the Republicans on basic economic issues or on civil rights and liberties, conventions will in all likelihood compromise to the left. But since Districting also increases the influence of the party's more conservative members, providing them with recognized leaders in the process, a left-leaning compromise at the convention is very likely to shove them into the Republican column in November. If the same rules which strengthen the Midwestern-Western bloc and its sympathizers did not also magnify the power of the Southern-Border alliance and its affiliates, conservative Democrats might be swept along at the general election. But because the rules do empower both extremes, they inevitably foster short-run defection.

Prognosticators who are willing to drive this argument to a further conclusion might well argue that the problem of desertion by a sharply defined (and large) body of registered Democrats will not be a long-lasting one. No major group is likely to work hard year in and year out to influence the nomination of one party, and then just as regularly be forced to flee to the opposition on election day. If subsequent Democratic conventions persist in deferring to their Midwestern-Western wing, with the nomination and/or with major policy concessions, the problem of debilitating dissension within the party could ease: The South, the Border states, and a significant share of the Northern working class could simply leave permanently. Defections by Democrats would decline sharply, as the most likely deserters became Republicans. Harmony and consistency would be restored—within the new *minority* party. A minimum of political difficulty would then surround the selection of a left-liberal contender who could present a far-reaching program of social engineering, and public policy debate would center on these new issues. The costs of restructuring the American policy agenda in this way might well, however, include: First, the loss of social-welfare program expansion, and second, a continual rejection by a majority of the American people of both the policies and the candidate of the (new, minority) Democrats.[20]

If Districted rules remained in effect, but if a greater share of party leaders began to agree that left-leaning coalitions were electorally risky, conventions might compromise toward their Southern-Border wing instead. This might, in turn, permit retention of both reformed regulations and hopes for victory. A right-leaning compromise would generate some desertions by left-wing Democrats, but these would be limited by the fact that there is nowhere (at least at present) for dissident leftists to go. Such desertions as did occur would, in any case, be politically less costly than conservative defections, since they would not be gains for the Republican candidate. The (newly conservatized) Democratic party could retain a mild social-welfare orientation, while retrenching on civil rights and civil liberties, but it could probably put this program forward only after remarkably acrimonious conventions.[21]

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[20] There is a growing literature in the field of American party politics which is related to the same concerns as our final section—namely, large-scale changes in electoral coalitions, and their associated shifts in public issues and candidate orientations. This concern with what have come to be called "realignments" had its roots in the work of V. O. Key, most particularly in V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18.

By the mid-1970s, the concepts which Key first pulled together had ramified (and rarefied) to the point where a student of American politics can find support in them for nearly any view of the future which strikes his fancy. There are those who foresee the breakup of old political alignments and the forging of a protracted Republican era, e.g., Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969), but there are those who see the same breakup with a recoalescence around the national Democratic party instead, e.g., Lanny J. Davis, *The Emerging Democratic Majority* (New York: Stein & Day, 1974). There are those who forecast the disintegration of old arrangements without any subsequent realignment, and who view this as a "new sophistication," e.g., Walter DeVries and Lance Tarrance, Jr., *The Ticket-Splitter* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1972), but there are those who predict disintegration without realignment, and who interpret it as the "new anomie," e.g., Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). There are those who think that a new majority coalition is waiting to be born, but has not yet been called into existence, e.g., Samuel Lubell, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970) and there are those who think that it is already in existence, but is waiting to be claimed by one party or the other, e.g., Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward, McCann, 1970).

The only threads common to all of these studies are the "gut feeling" that "something's happening," a willingness to make rather sweeping assertions about what that "something" is, and a belief that the social forces which are loose at the moment are so strong that institutional factors are inconsequential barriers in their path.

We have, in our final section, laid out our own set of realignment-type scenarios, each of which, we feel, has some plausibility. Our own suspicion about the realignment controversy. however, is that the state of the literature mirrors the state of its subject matter, i.e., that there has been no new coalitional movement in American society substantial enough to make one of these perspectives true, and the others false. Our view, obviously, is that changes in the rules of the game at this point are particularly likely to facilitate the resolution of social instabilities along whatever lines those new rules favor. This is, however, merely a subproposition of our general belief that there will always be continued, minor movements in American society in nearly any direction you can imagine, and that a major determinant of whether these develop into more far-reaching changes in the political climate is whether the political rules of the game facilitate them, or whether they run at cross-currents to them.

Even if one were programmatically undismayed by these developments, however, Southern-oriented compromises at the convention might still have some serious tactical drawbacks. If the Democratic party leans toward its right, its nominee and his policies would be less clearly distinguishable from those of the Republicans. In one sense, this makes it unnecessary for conservative Democrats to jump the fence. But in a second sense, it makes defection less costly. If a convention is characterized by virulent protests on the part of Midwestern-Western delegates and their sympathizers, and if it does not both squelch these firmly *and* produce the vigorous advances in bread-and-butter economic matters which would attract lower-income conservatives, many Democrats might decide to desert anyhow.

Proportional regulations could rearrange the same dilemmas, reducing the chance that the party will be captured by a minority on its left, but maintaining the risk of substantial defections to the right. By restoring the bargaining power of the big industrial states, Proportionality would make traditional Democratic presidential politics (the "moderate-liberal with a social-welfare program" approach) at least more practical. By cancelling the advantages which Districting (and only Districting) offers to left-liberals, Proportionality ought to give them the sole option of joining a moderate-liberal coalition at the convention or of forcing the moderates to turn to the conservatives for support. By removing left-liberalism as a realistic "threat," Proportionality should, finally, lessen conservative Democrats' incentive to desert.

But the same tactical problems which a right-leaning coalition presented under Districted rules would probably be only very partially solved by Proportionality. Attempts to contain potential right-wing defections by broadening the nominating coalition to include (many) Southern-Border delegates should, indeed, be more common under Proportional rules than under Districting. Resulting coalitions would have familiar policy consequences—a diminished social-welfare program, plus retrenchment on civil rights and liberties. They would generate a familiar political irony—a mild shift toward conservatism, propelled by reforms which ostensibly were designed to make the party more change-oriented. And, ultimately, they would face a familiar tactical problem—some defections on the left, coupled with the (more serious) possibility that a narrowed gap between Democrats and Republicans would facilitate cross-overs, rather than eliminate them. This latter problem might be exacerbated by Proportional rules' generosity to the type of splinter movements which cannot hope to secure a nomination, but which can generate extremist delegates and which may guarantee a high enough level of dissension at the convention to reliably infuriate conservatives. A plan which maximizes the number of Southern-oriented delegates can hardly make their displeasure less evident to those who follow the convention. By the same token, it can hardly make the Democratic right-wing less able to organize a party bolt at election time.

Each primary plan, then—like all of the laws that regulate politics—is itself "political" because it distributes power in one way rather than in others. Each different power distribution, in turn, leads directly to a different set of strategies for winning elections and a different policy agenda. Thus each basic plan can be judged not only for its theoretical structure or through the particular men it favors in any one year, but by the social interests it rewards and by the kind of politics and policies this should create. In these latter terms, the contribution of primary rules reform is toward the emergence of a more conservative era in American politics.

In the longest run, an era of consolidation and order, rather than experimentation, may be in the wind *regardless* of any party's regulations. It may be that the American people are tired of governmental intervention in the market system of delivering health care and other services, tired of a standard of living for the poorest elements of society which is artifically augmented, and tired of aggressive assertions of civil liberties. There must be many, however, who think that it would be more than a shame if history recorded that after 1968 the American people grew tired of all these things—when what really happened was that the Democratic party changed its delegate selection rules.

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[21] Democratic conventions dominated by conservative coalitions would be a highly ironic result of reform. The rules alterations which led to a multiplication of primaries were motivated by a feeling that the pre-reform party was not sufficiently aimed at facilitating change. Thus if right-leaning coalitions subsequently became more frequent, or if such coalitions were *necessary* in order to win elections under the new rules, reform would have seriously miscarried. If either of these conditions were to accompany Districting—and we have argued that one or the other is quite likely to accompany it—then the pre-reform (Winner-Take-All) primary regulations could promise a greater likelihood of carrying the election, along with more generous social-welfare programs and more extensive civil rights and liberties.

Elections and Public Policy*

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The central questions of democratic politics concern the relationships between popular choices and public policy. With the advent of survey research, these relationships have been the objects of intensive scrutiny. Although the techniques of survey analysis are essential for dealing with many important questions about the linkages between voting and policy, it is not true that all major problems in this area require survey data for an adequate solution. Moreover, to the extent that survey analysis is of relatively recent vintage a capacity to examine voting and policy linkages without such data would add considerably to our understanding of historical periods for which opinion surveys are unavailable.

Though much of this analysis must be considered exploratory and tentative, my aim is to examine the links between public policy and popular voting between 1789 and 1968. To this end, criteria are established for citizen policy choice that permit drawing meaningful conclusions without interview data. Then, data from party platforms, United States statutes, and aggregate voting statistics, are used to determine to what extent electoral choices are translated into policy decisions over time.

Voting and Public Policy

The absence of historical survey data precludes inferences about the reasons behind an individual's electoral decisions. Our lack of information, however, does not make this decision any less of a choice. Whatever the preferences of voters, votes are, in effect, choices among alternatives. In the same sense that the behavior of consumers vitally affects the national economy whether or not consumers are completely aware of the differences among products, the decisions made by voters can have major policy consequences whether or not voters are fully aware of the implications of their actions.

If we concentrate on the effects of voting behavior, two factors become particularly important. First, the effects of voting behavior are conditioned by the alternative policy positions represented by opposing candidates and parties. Given the presence of alternatives, the electorate makes at least implicit choices. If opposition candidates offer policy alternatives substantially different from those defended by incumbents, electoral choices can result in changes in national policy. In European political history, for example, the presence of radical alternatives offered the potential for change even when voters did not take advantage of these possibilities. Second, voting behavior can directly affect public policy to the extent that winning candidates and parties implement policies based on their preelection positions. If winners behave randomly in relation to their preelection positions, the electorate's choice is irrelevant. If sets of winning candidates, in fact, implement policies based on their preelection positions, the electorate's implicit choices are translated into national policy.

The effects of voting behavior are, thus, a function of both the magnitude of the choices available to voters and the extent to which electoral choices are implemented. Given these criteria, we can ask to what extent, over time, popular majorities govern.

Public Choice and Electoral Realignment

Our principal clues about the historical relationships between voting behavior and public policy are provided by the theory of critical elections. Seminal studies of American voting behavior conducted by V. O. Key and others suggest that during critical periods in American political history, major reorientations have occurred in the partisan attachments of large portions of the electorate.[1] The voter alignments established during these critical periods, 1798–1800, 1826–36, 1852–60, 1874–80, 1892–96 and 1928–36, support, over relatively long periods of time, the dominance in government of the victorious party.

Schattschneider, Burnham and others have suggested that voter realignments involved choices about national policy.[2] During realigning periods discontented elements penetrated or replaced one

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[1] V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18. Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Electoral Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 10. Also, Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," in *The American Party Systems*, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 289.

[2] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

or the other of the two major parties, altered the terms of partisan conflict and substantially increased the magnitude of choice available to the electorate. Alteration of the substance of electoral alternatives, "redefinition of conflict," in Schattschneider's terms, forced voters to make new decisions and thus had the effect of altering the voting behavior of some segments of the electorate. The emergence of the Republican party in the 1850s, for example, resulted in redefinitions of partisan conflict to emphasize competing sectional rights. Populist control of the Democratic party in the 1890s presented the electorate with the opportunity to vote in favor of redistributions of economic rights in favor of small-scale agrarian entrepreneurs. Our first problem is to determine empirically whether the suggestions made by Schattschneider and Burnham are correct. We want to discover whether voter realignment was associated with increases in the magnitude of choice available to voters. We shall, then, examine the policy consequences of voter choices.

The content of all Democratic and Republican national party platforms (1844–1968) has been analyzed employing seven broad categories of issues.[3] Some results of this research are reported elsewhere, but for the sake of clarity the essentials of the analysis are repeated here.[4]

Platforms were analyzed in terms of the following categories:

(1) *Capitalism:* the aggregation of wealth and control over the distribution of wealth by business, financial and mercantile elites.
(2) *Internal Sovereignty:* exercise of the power and increase of the sphere of action of the central government *vis-à-vis* states, localities, and individuals.
(3) *Redistribution:* reallocation of wealth in favor of the economically disadvantaged.
(4) *International Cooperation:* open-ended cooperation with and friendship toward foreign objects.
(5) *Universalism:* equality of rights and privileges for domestic minorities.
(6) *Labor:* labor and labor organizations.
(7) *Ruralism:* farms, farmers and the rural way of life.

These categories were selected, in part, because of their inclusion of policy areas which have been important throughout American history. The categories were defined in such a manner as to permit the scoring of positive and negative advocacy statements. The unit of measure is the paragraph. A score indicates that within a given paragraph there occurred a statement or symbol of positive or negative advocacy of the category as defined above. Thus, the statement, "We oppose federal interference in local affairs," would be considered a negative advocacy of Internal Sovereignty, i.e., opposition to "the exercise of the power and increase of the sphere of action of the central government." A paragraph containing this statement would, if the symbol "federal interference" were found in the set of dictionary entries under Internal Sovereignty, be scored as a negative mention of the category for the appropriate party and year.

Any given paragraph may receive a maximum of fourteen scores—one positive and one negative for each of the seven categories. In practice, because the platforms tend to be divided into relatively short, thematic paragraphs, the range tends to be zero to three scores per paragraph. To compare platforms, absolute scores were converted into percentages based on N, the number of paragraphs. The rescoring of a sample of one-third of the platforms by a second coder resulted in a .94 overall level of agreement as determined by a standard intercoder reliability equation. The scores reported by the first coder were employed throughout.

To determine whether the degree of choice available to voters increases during critical eras requires examination of the scope of the alternatives presented to voters by the Democratic and Republican parties over time. The degree of difference between the two parties on any issue involves at least two elements. First is the relative polarity of the parties' positions on the issue dimension in question. Liberalism and conservatism, for example, define differential polarities of position along some issue dimensions. The second element defining the degree of difference between the two parties is the relative weight or importance assigned by the parties to the policy area in question. In those instances, for example, when the parties present differential polarities of position on some particular policy, given the expectation of relatively fixed budgets of money and time, they may also differ on the issue's salience or priority on the agenda of public policy. The total degree of difference between the two parties on any issue is a function of the interaction between differences of polarity and salience. The issue alternatives presented by opposing parties are conventionally said to be radically different, for example, when differences of polarity on issues are exacerbated by differences on the salience or priority of the issues.

In a hypothetical case, the Democratic and Republican parties might offer voters a choice both of differential issue polarities and of the importance to be assigned to social welfare policy. The distance between the positions of the two parties, and thus the degree of choice available to voters on the issue is a function of both the differential polarities and the weights assigned to the issue by the two parties. This total distance between the positions of the parties can be defined as the product of the two differences, or $P_D S_D$, where P_D equals the difference in polarity and S_D is equal to the difference in salience assigned the issue by the two parties.[5]

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[3] We are aware that few voters read platforms. Platforms are employed as indicators of the general preelection positions of the two parties. Although some historical problems are raised, Democratic and Whig platforms were compared in 1844, 1848 and 1852. Source of party platforms: *National Party Platforms*, ed. Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), and 1968 supplement.

[4] Benjamin Ginsberg, "Critical Elections and the Substance of Party Conflict: 1844 to 1968," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16, No. 4 (November, 1972), 603–625.

In any given year, the two parties may differ on a number of individual issues. The total degree of difference between the "bundles" of issue polarities and weights presented by the two parties defines the overall degree of choice available to voters. This total difference is defined as the sum of the products of the differing polarities and weights of the parties on each individual issue or $\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_D S_D$. The larger this overall difference, the greater the total distance between the bundles of issue positions presented voters by the two parties.

For any issue, the difference in polarities between the two parties is given by the percentage difference between the positive percentages of references to that issue by each party weighed by the total salience of the issue.[6]

Set: A = the proportion of positive references in the Democratic platform
B = Democratic, negative
C = the proportion of positive references in the Republican platform
D = Republican, negative

Then for any issue the difference in polarity, P_D, is equal to

$$\left[\frac{AD - BC}{(A + B)(C + D)}\right][A + B + C + D]$$

The differential salience between the two parties on any issue, S_D, is given by

$$(A + B) - (C + D)$$

Then, the total distance between the positions of the two parties on any individual issue is given by $P_D S_D$. The overall distance between the positions of the two parties across issues is $\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_D S_D$.

Table 1 reports the overall distance between the issue positions of the two parties during each national election year from 1844 to 1968. Differences on each individual issue are reported by Table 2. For convenience, signs appearing on Table 2 always indicate the relative direction of Democratic polarity.[7]

Table 1. Overall Differences of Issue Position Between the National Parties Over Time

Year	Degree of Difference
1844	.016
1848	.177
1852	.292
1856	.228
1860	.111
1864	.118
1868	.132
1872	.029
1876	.017
1880	.075
1884	.008
1888	.016
1892	.063
1896	.094
1900	.080
1904	.063
1908	.018
1912	.054
1916	.028
1920	.009
1924	.031
1928	.007
1932	.069
1936	.017
1940	.026
1944	.014
1948	.008
1952	.019
1956	.009
1960	.007
1964	.041
1968	.013

The data reported by Table 1 indicate that the overall degree of difference between the issue positions of the two parties has varied considerably over time, with the greatest degrees of difference occurring during periods of voter realignment.

Extremely large issue differences occur throughout the Civil War and pre–Civil War periods, centering particularly around 1852 and 1856. Indi-

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[5] Every unit of difference in polarity is acted upon by a unit of difference in salience. We are, therefore, interested in the product of the two differences. Intensity and polarity cannot be summed in either a scalar or vector sense. The vector sum or Euclidean solution might be appropriate if the two independent variables were comparably measured and addable. Not only is this not the case, but our assumption is that the effects on the dependent variable are the results of a multiplicative interaction. Whether this assumption is correct depends upon whether our results are consistent with the hypothetical results.

[6] We assume that the magnitudes of differences in polarity are, in part, related to the total importance of the issue.

[7] Signs indicate the polarity of the Democrats relative to the Republicans not the absolute polarity of the Democratic position.

Table 2. Degrees of Difference Between the National Parties Over Time

Year	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1844	−.009	0	0	+.007	0	0	0
1848	−.046	−.100	0	−.031	0	0	0
1852	−.050	−.239	0	−.001	−.002	0	0
1856	−.030	−.144	0	+.054	0	0	0
1860	0	−.023	0	−.059	−.029	0	0
1864	0	−.118	0	0	0	0	0
1868	−.018	−.084	0	−.027	−.003	0	0
1872	0	−.011	0	+.018	0	0	0
1876	+.012	−.005	0	0	0	0	0
1880	−.021	−.023	0	0	−.031	0	0
1884	0	−.005	0	−.003	0	0	0
1888	−.011	0	0	+.005	0	0	0
1892	−.051	−.008	0	+.004	0	0	0
1896	−.086	0	0	+.008	0	0	0
1900	−.045	0	0	+.035	0	0	0
1904	−.006	−.005	0	+.052	0	0	0
1908	−.015	0	0	+.003	0	0	0
1912	−.049	−.003	0	−.002	0	0	0
1916	−.015	0	0	+.013	0	0	0
1920	+.001	0	−.001	+.007	0	0	0
1924	−.029	0	0	.001	0	.001	0
1928	−.004	0	0	+.003	0	0	0
1932	−.064	0	0	−.005	0	0	0
1936	−.007	+.005	+.005	0	0	0	0
1940	−.015	+.004	+.004	+.003	0	0	0
1944	+.002	0	0	−.010	0	.002	0
1948	−.006	0	0	+.002	0	0	0
1952	−.005	+.004	+.004	−.005	0	.001	0
1956	−.005	0	0	+.004	0	0	0
1960	−.001	+.002	−.002	+.002	0	0	0
1964	−.002	+.002	+.009	+.020	+.001	0	0
1968	0	+.006	+.006	+.001	0	0	0

* The absence of a sign indicates that polarities were virtually identical.

vidual issue differences, reported in Table 2, indicate that differences on "Internal Sovereignty" issues account for the bulk of the differences between the two parties during this period.[8] Issue differences between the parties during the Populist period, centering at 1896, rank second in order of magnitude. These differences occur primarily in the "Capitalism" category. Relatively large issue differences are exhibited in 1880, at the close of Reconstruction, primarily in the "Capitalism," "Internal Sovereignty," and "Universalism" categories. The 1932 platforms rank fourth in terms of degree of issue difference between the two parties. The bulk of this difference occurs in the "Capitalism" category. All these findings indicate that during each realigning period, the overall degree of difference between the two parties and thus the relative degree of choice available to voters was considerably greater than usual.[9]

While data on the attitudes of voters during these periods do not exist, electoral realignment appears to have been associated with increases in the scope of choice available to voters. During these critical periods, the insurgent party exhibited considerably more than usual policy disagreement with the incumbent party. Whatever the attitudes of voters, these increases in the scope of voter alternatives meant that votes in favor of the insurgent party during each of these periods were also implicit choices favoring policy changs. During two realigning eras, 1828–36 and 1892–96, voters defeated insurgent parties, while during the four remaining periods, 1798–1800, 1852–60, 1874–80, and 1928–36, voter realignment resulted in victory for insurgents and changes in party control of the government. The data suggest that during these four periods the electorate's behavior represented, in effect, a majority choice in favor of policy changes.[10] Now, let us see whether the electorate's implicit choices were translated into national policy.

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[8] This finding is very much in accord with Stokes's assertion that the period just prior to the Civil War was *the* era in American political history when political conflict was most nearly focused on a single issue dimension. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 177.

[9] It is interesting to note that 1912 and 1964, years often associated with substantial amounts of partisan conflict and changes in voting behavior, rank fifth and sixth, respectively, in terms of the magnitude of the difference between the two parties. It is also interesting that the level of conflict between the two parties appears to have diminished considerably over time. Analysis of the causes and consequences of this diminution of conflict is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper.

Changes in Public Policy Over Time

To determine whether major changes in public policy occur in 1801, 1861, 1881 and 1933, the dates immediately following insurgent victory during critical eras, all United States statutes between 1789 and 1968 were analyzed.[11] Each statute was scored as nominally favoring or opposing policy objectives within the same seven broad categories used in the analysis of national party platforms. For example, a statute which granted privileges or property to a railroad corporation received a +Capitalism score as nominally promoting "the aggregation of wealth by business, financial and mercantile elites." Because a single statute might be aimed at more than one object, multiple scores were permitted. Each statute could, therefore, receive a maximum of seven scores, one positive or one negative in each category. The object, in the case of each statute, was the nominal intention of policy makers rather than the law's impact or effect. The focus of concern is whether policy makers nominally attempt to implement policies consistent with their preelection positions. Obviously, policies often fail to achieve their objectives, but the reasons for failure are numerous and not necessarily related to the aims of policy makers.

These procedures required reading and analysis of each of the more than 60,000 public laws issued in the United States over a 180 year period. Fortunately, American public laws in the 18th and 19th centuries, at least, tended to be short and to the point. The precise intent of most statutes is obviously subject to varying interpretations. In every instance we attempted to make as general and straightforward an interpretation of the stated intent of the law as the statute's wording would permit. With the aid of historical materials and congressional hearings and records, it proved relatively easy to determine the place of a statute in the broad domains defined by our policy categories. The recording of samples of statutes by additional coders resulted in an overall level of intercoder agreement of .86.

In spite of the many months of labor required, analysis of statutes rather than some other form of policy output (governmental expenditures, for example) appeared to represent the method best suited to the purposes of this study. Since the aim was to determine whether the preelection positions of policy makers were implemented in public policies, it appeared to us to be necessary to look directly at the substance of the relevant public policies. Governmental expenditures offer another reasonable type of indicator and are extremely useful for some purposes. But, expenditures are based, at least in part, on the actual cost of effecting policy aims. Differential costs of implementing various aims make comparisons across types of policy difficult.

Clearly, some statutes are more important than others, and statutes vary considerably in the magnitude of the policy objectives they attempt to achieve. This analysis, which weighs each statute equally, ignores important qualitative differences among statutes. It is, however, difficult to conceive of any procedure which would permit systematic qualitative comparisons of the importance of laws. The aims of policy makers in any policy area can best be characterized in terms of their overall behavior. The behavior of policy makers in the case of a relatively minor piece of legislation is not necessarily a less important indicator of their general aims than is their behavior in the case of a major piece of legislation. This assumption is also implicit in most studies of roll call voting, for example. In addition, during the course of the analysis an impressive consistency became evident, during each year, between the nominal aims of minor and major pieces of legislation in each individual policy area. It is very probable that many statutes which are generally thought important are so considered because, and only if, they set the tone for other pieces of legislation, i.e., are trend breaking or trend setting. For these reasons, to determine the extent to which policy makers attempted to effect policies consistent, on the aggregate, with the implicit choices made by voters, each U.S. statute was analyzed and each was weighed equally.

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[10] Because of the temporal limitations of our data we can, of course, only make inferences about the 1798–1800 period. The 1874–80 period, in many respects, respresents an anomalous case. Voter realignment during this period primarily, but not exclusively, involves the return of the Southern Democratic vote. Party competition during this period includes the Conservative Republican and Southern Democratic alliance which led to Hayes's disputed election in 1876. Changes in Radical Republican policy, though of different types, were espoused by both parties during this period. In some respects, the election of 1880 represented the electorate's implicit ratification of the results of the elite compromise reached in 1876, i.e., to proceed with rapid industrial expansion while permitting the formal return of the South to national political participation. This compromise meant that the South would be an economically and, for a time, politically subordinate region but, would be autonomous in the area of race relations.

[11] *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1789–1968), Vols. I to LXXXII.

To search for changes in public policy over time, a variant of a procedure suggested by Ezekiel and Fox[12] and used by Burnham in his analysis of electoral data was employed.[13] The time series provided by each category of policy has been separately regressed on time, the linear trend removed, and a residual series obtained for each category. A *T*-test for difference of means was then applied to successive sets of five residuals within each category—years 1 through 5 compared with years 7 through 11, and so on. It should be noted that *T* is not used here as a conventional statistical test. Since we are dealing with a population rather than a sample, there is no question of statistical significance. Therefore *T* is simply a convenient aggregative device: the numerator compares true population means, the pooled deviation in the denominator smoothes out the effects of isolated deviant years.

This search procedure permits comparison of the magnitudes of the differences between all successive five year periods in each policy category. These magnitudes are reported by Table 3. The data reported in Table 3 do not directly permit us

Table 3. Changes in Public Policy Over Time

Year	Congress	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1799	1	2.404	.4627	2.080	.6059	−1.258		−2.034
1801	2	3.242	− .5872	1.628	.3531	.3558		−3.126
1803	3	2.442	− .2490	1.809	.8696	1.540		−5.157
1805	4	2.754	.2646	3.389	2.008	1.044		−5.453
1807	5	2.725	− .4130	1.595	1.188	2.566		−3.765
1809	6	.6497	− .9051	− .0809	.8588	1.372		−3.185
1811	7	.1249	−1.303	.0947	.8176	.0197		−1.375
1813	8	.0644	−1.199	− .7543	− .7217	− .5746		− .9991
1815	9	− .3686	−2.062	−1.576	−3.645	− .5741		−1.133
1817	10	.0463	− .7611	−1.287	−2.753	−1.378		−0.4637
1819	11	−1.249	.6290	− .6445	−1.948	− .2224		− .8654
1821	12	1.250	2.632	−1.818	−2.251	.7890		−2.309
1823	13	.8284	2.219	−1.762	−1.545	.7883		−1.843
1825	14	1.931	1.335	−2.170	−1.948	.7874		−1.057
1827	15	.9497	.4042	−1.850	− .3269	.7867		− .4348
1829	16	1.646	− .3936	−1.391	− .4465	1.469		.0851
1831	17	1.535	−2.002	−2.016	+ .3362	.0452		1.552
1833	18	.5960	−1.086	−1.929	.0218	.4525		2.983
1835	19	.2163	− .2727	−1.827	.8070	.4529		2.798
1837	20	.1433	+ .6916	− .0513	1.285	.4533		1.406
1839	21	.0422	+1.448	− .6049	1.444	.4593		1.017
1841	22	−1.083	+1.820	1.047	.3105	2.318		1.230
1843	23	− .0304	+ .7740	1.245	.2865	.9749		.2161
1845	24	− .7008	+ .2114	1.836	− .0261	.9792		−1.029
1847	25	−1'012	− .7630	1.394	−2.047	.9834		− .6953
1849	26	−1.023	−1.521	3.398	−2.376	.5208		−1.721
1851	27	.0485	−1.468	2.831	−2.410	− .9617		−2.645
1853	.28	− .4774	−1'974	1.267	−1.626	−1.060		−1.001
1855	29	− .5709	−1.723	2.710	−1.746	−1.520		.1227
1857	30	.4708	−1.741	.8729	−2.137	−2.102		.8435
1859	31	− .4557	−2.247	.4010	−1.157	−3.737		3.459
1861	32	−1.680	−1.836	.2166	− .5131	−5.404		4.219
1863	33	−2.172	.3797	−1.432	−1.893	−1.405		2.022
1865	34	−1.802	.4246	− .5248	− .6049	− .5779		1.233
1867	35	− .7695	.7320	1.067	− .2604	.6924		.0331
1869	36	.3661	1.651	− .0884	.0701	2.014		−2.057
1871	37	1.463	2.057	− .2197	.2371	3.920		−3.766
1873	38	1.860	3.822	.5447	1.745	1.814		− .7491
1875	39	1.300	4.214	− .3133	2.156	1.904		.5416

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[12] Mordecai Ezekial and Karl A. Fox, *Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 343.

[13] Burnham, *Critical Elections*, p. 13.

Table 3. Continued

Year	Congress	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1877	40	−.4939	2.629	.4837	2.669	1.961		2.044
1879	41	−1.838	3.669	1.594	2.355	3.079		2.108
1881	42	−3.329	2.935	1.813	1.873	6.095		4.303
1883	43	−4.532	.9464	.8442	2.841	2.892	−3.610	2.333
1885	44	−6.494	.8770	1.729	1.900	1.859	−2.722	.8434
1887	45	−3.352	.3538	.8962	.3324	.5711	−.3363	.3344
1889	46	−1.273	−.4317	.5892	−1.122	.1783	+1.096	.8014
1891	47	−1.070	−.1263	.8852	−.5680	.0543	1.325	1.368
1893	48	−.7090	.8583	1.206	−.8249	1.264	2.544	.6042
1895	49	−.4614	.3872	.7299	−.5897	1.584	3.428	.3561
1897	50	−.2047	.4540	.4078	−.2153	1.658	1.898	.3211
1899	51	−1.309	−.0323	.0796	1.542	1.111	1.417	−1.299
1901	52	−.3272	−.1618	.1809	.6232	.0492	.3198	−4.712
1903	53	.8196	−1.009	.0726	.8418	−1.111	−.1174	−3.285
1905	54	1.527	−2.230	.4442	.4496	−1.809	−1.800	−1.945
1907	55	1.997	−2.494	−.5348	.5268	−.8971	−2.420	−2.224
1909	56	1.998	−3.837	.4979	1.018	−1.141	−1.863	−1.899
1911	57	2.117	−3.959	.0376	1.224	−1.183	.2429	−2.389
1913	58	1.962	−3.012	.4169	1.146	−1.285	.7035	−2.963
1915	59	1.503	−2.467	.5045	1.192	−1.287	2.064	−2.231
1917	60	2.109	−1.197	.5630	.9470	−2.524	3.510	.8564
1919	61	1.806	+.6090	−.0605	−1.109	−.2001	6.087	.1816
1921	62	3.838	1.581	.9064	−1.414	.6271	3.160	1.827
1923	63	3.569	.9089	.9591	−1.306	1.257	1.463	3.012
1925	64	2.464	1.424	−.2818	−1.293	1.312	−.1819	1.010
1927	65	2.227	.7017	−1.097	−1.080	1.578	−1.100	−1.161
1929	66	3.743	.4354	−1.977	−.3414	1.236	−2.483	−1.471
1931	67	3.882	.7295	−3.152	1.704	1.565	−2.975	−3.111
1933	68	3.777	.0949	−3.499	1.285	.6000	−5.261	−4.427
1935	69	4.868	.4640	−2.445	1.863	1.960	−4.938	−2.113
1937	70	3.644	.4185	−.7498	2.219	1.983	−5.706	−.3685
1939	71	3.384	.3852	−.5285	2.390	−.1929	−2.863	1.056
1941	72	2.352	−.2912	−.3880	1.827	−.1921	−1.234	1.883
1943	73	.8203	−1.064	−.9960	−.0030	−.4547	−.7014	2.436
1945	74	−.5583	−3.444	−.5833	−1.055	−1.425	1.106	2.088
1947	75	.0693	−3.718	−1.036	−1.371	−2.625	1.786	.5297
1949	76	.3789	−3.820	−.0473	−1.427	−.9545	1.218	−.5189
1951	77	.6324	−2.596	.0698	−1.217	−2.408	1.736	−.4934
1953	78	1.375	−1.078	1.405	−1.006	−2.928	3.587	−1.226
1955	79	1.465	.3420	.2967	.4166	−1.709	1.833	−.5184
1957	80	.4668	.9128	−.6556	.3896	−.9949	.9864	.9305
1959	81	.9521	2.071	−1.921	.7790	−1.356	1.590	1.536

Positive Score = *Decrease*
Negative Score = *Increase*

to determine whether insurgent victory during realigning periods is associated with major policy changes; discrete changes in national policy may result from any number of factors unrelated to realignment—international events, economic changes, and so on. To determine whether the policy changes occurring at 1801, 1861, 1881, and 1933 are of a greater magnitude than changes occurring during other years, the means of the absolute values of the *T* scores in each policy category for each year were obtained. The resulting summary scores, reported in Table 4, indicate the overall magnitude of the difference between public policies before and after each year. The highest summary value occurs in 1881, followed in order of magnitude by 1933, 1805, and 1861. Each peak value summarizes a set of policy changes occurring around that year. 1805, 1861, 1881, and 1933 appear, indeed, to mark center points of transition for national policy.[14]

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[14] We should note that minority party victory is, on the average, associated with greater than usual degrees of policy change:

Mean change following critical years: 2.52(.124).
Mean change following other minority victories: 1.66(.064).

Table 4. Total Change in Policy Over Time

1799	1.475	1881	3.391
1801	1.549	1883	2.571
1803	2.011	1885	2.346
1805	2.486	1887	.882
1807	2.042	1889	.784
1809	1.175	1891	.771
1811	.624	1893	1.144
1813	.810	1895	1.077
1815	1.560	1897	.737
1817	1.115	1899	.970
1819	.926	1901	.911
1821	1.842	1903	1.037
1823	1.498	1905	1.458
1825	1.538	1907	1.584
1827	.792	1909	1.751
1829	.905	1911	1.593
1831	1.248	1913	1.641
1833	1.178	1915	1.607
1835	1.062	1917	1.672
1837	.672	1919	1.436
1839	.837	1921	1.915
1841	1.310	1923	1.782
1843	.588	1925	1.138
1845	.797	1927	1.278
1847	1.149	1929	1.669
1849	1.760	1931	2.446
1851	1.728	1933	2.706
1853	1.734	1935	2.664
1855	1.399	1937	2.156
1857	1.361	1939	1.543
1859	1.910	1941	1.167
1861	2.312	1943	.925
1863	1.551	1945	1.466
1865	.861	1947	1.591
1867	.592	1949	1.195
1869	1.043	1951	1.307
1871	1.944	1953	1.872
1873	1.756	1955	1.012
1875	1.738	1957	.763
1877	1.714	1959	1.458
1879	2.441		

Mean change, all other years: 1.32.

The mean degree of choice available to voters prior to both critical changes and other minority party victories is given in parenthesis. The number of cases is too small to permit the use of measures of association. The 1848 election is included as a minority victory although the Whigs captured only the presidency.

Reexamination of Table 3 to determine the elements that account for each summary value indicates that the 1805 peak is composed primarily of negative changes in the Capitalism, Redistribution and International Cooperation categories, and positive changes in the Ruralism category, all occurring in the period from 1801 to 1805 following the Jeffersonian victory. The primary components of the 1861 peak are positive changes in the Internal Sovereignty and Universalism categories and negative changes in the Ruralism category, from 1860 to 1863. The 1881 peak is accounted for primarily by positive changes in the Capitalism category and negative changes in the Internal Sovereignty, Universalism and Ruralism categories from 1875–1885. The major components of the 1933 peak appear to be negative changes in the Capitalism category and positive changes in the Redistribution, Labor and Universalism categories from 1933–1935.

In each case, while the issue categories suggested by our analysis of platform content are among the principal elements of policy change, large changes also occur in other categories. Although random association cannot be excluded, historical analyses of party ideologies in many instances suggest relationships between these additional changes in policy and the set of issues on which we expected to find policy change. While issues related to "Capitalism" were emphasized by the two parties during the 1928–36 period, for example, belief systems during this period associated negative positions on Capitalism with positive positions on "Labor" and "Redistribution," so that the coincidence of changes in these three categories is not surprising.[15]

Given such historical associations, the clusters of policy change we have identified seem to be consistent with the Schattschneider-Burnham thesis and our analysis of platform content data. Thus, the policy changes associated with Jefferson's victory in the election of 1800 are consistent with an electoral choice in opposition to a pro-British foreign policy and neomercantilist economic policy.[16] Republican victory in 1860 is associated with changes in national policy consistent with an electoral choice in favor of national sovereignty and opposing the expansion of slavery.[17] The policy changes centering around 1881 are consistent with an implicit electoral choice favoring the termination of Reconstruction and the expansion of industrial and commercial activity.[18]

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[15] William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1957), vol. I, remain excellent sources.

[16] Two excellent sources are William N. Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Noble E. Cunningham, *The Jeffersonian Republicans* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963).

[17] Among the best historical accounts are William W. Freehling, *Prelude to Civil War* (New York: Harper, 1966) and Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[18] Stanley Cobben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Reexamination," in *The Economic Impact of the American Civil War*, ed. Ralph Andreano

Changes in policy after 1933 are in keeping with voter choices favoring alterations in the economic system and redistributions of opportunities in favor of urban working class elements.

It appears to be the case that the choices made by the electorate during these critical periods are translated into major changes in national policy.

Electoral Choices and Voter Alignments

Approximately once in a generation, voters are given the opportunity to alter national policy significantly. The decisions made by voters during these critical periods define the termini of broad epochs in American political history.

Between critical periods, the degree of issue difference between opposing parties and the opportunity for voter choice are diminished. In the case of two issue areas, "Internal Sovereignty" and "Universalism," the implicit choices made by the electorate at the termination of radical reconstruction—in effect to leave the South politically subordinate but autonomous in the area of race relations, and to affirm the changed status of blacks while making no further changes in race relations—were not offered again until the 1960s. In these policy areas, the electorate's role ended when it made its choices in 1876 and 1880.

In every other instance, however, choices continue to be available to the electorate following realignment. While the magnitude of the difference between the two parties and thus the opportunity for voter choice generally diminishes following the critical era, in each case, the general terms of choice established by the two parties prior to voter realignment persist following realignment. Some opportunity for choice thus continues beyond critical periods. Stable voter alignments, in effect, represent continuing policy choices on the part of the electorate. Our findings suggest that voter alignments are, in effect, organized around substantive issues of policy and support the continued dominance in government of a party committed to the principal elements of the choice made by voters during critical eras. Stable partisan alignments are, in effect, the electorate's choice in favor of the continuation of a particular set of policies. Partisan alignments form the constituent bases for governments committed to the translation of the choices made by the electorate during critical periods into public policy over a relatively long period of time. The absence of major policy changes between realigning periods suggests that these implicit voter choices in favor of continuity are also translated into national policy. The policy-making role of the electorate is, in effect, a continuing one.

A perennial question of American politics involves the extent to which national policy represents the choice of the people. This question necessarily has a temporal dimension. While some particular policy may or may not be in accord with the wishes of a majority at any particular point in time, the more general and perhaps more significant question is whether, on the whole, national policy is related to electoral choice most of the time.

Our longitudinal analysis indicates that American public policy is shaped to a significant degree by the behavior of voters. Whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, popular majorities appear, over time, to govern.

(Cambridge: Schenkman, 1962), pp. 144–164. Also Louis Hartz, "Government-Business Relations," in *Economic Change in the Civil War Era, Proceedings of a Conference on American Economic Institutional Change, 1850–1873*, ed. David T. Gilchrist and W. Donald Lewis (Greenville, Delaware: Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, 1965).

The Supreme Court and National Policy Making*

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The role of the Supreme Court in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. The relative influence of the Court vis-à-vis other political institutions and the implications of its activities for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central issues in this discussion. One of the most influential treatments of this issue in recent years is the argument advanced by Robert A. Dahl in 1957.[1] Dahl offers a sophisticated "political" view of the role played by the Court, arguing that it is an active participant in the ruling national coalitions which dominate American politics but that the Court does not perform the task of protecting fundamental minority rights that is often attributed to it. The Court, like other political institutions, says Dahl, is a member of such ruling coalitions, and as such its decisions are typically supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions. Dahl's account has endured so well because it frames the questions precisely and brings to bear a carefully selected body of evidence upon a dispute long characterized by anecdote and example.

I argue here that Dahl's account is not adequate for understanding the role of the Supreme Court in policy making. Consideration of the way he interprets his own evidence and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument suggests.

My argument begins with a summary of Dahl's analysis of the role of the Court and then proceeds to a discussion of events that have occurred since he wrote, bringing his body of evidence up to date. The third section examines the way in which Dahl treats his own evidence and then discusses evidence that Dahl excludes from consideration, particularly the decisions involving statutory construction and federal constitutional issues in cases arising from states and localities. The final section focuses upon the model of policy making that is implicit in Dahl's analysis and argues that it is too narrow. If a broader conception of the policy-making process is adopted, the contributions of the Court may be more adequately understood.

Dahl's Argument

After a brief discussion of "traditional" and "realistic" views of the role of the Supreme Court in American society, Dahl concludes that the Court is inevitably a "policy-making" institution. Like other political institutions, the Court is frequently called upon to select among alternative policies about which there is disagreement in society and uncertainty about the consequences of various choices. Dahl then poses two questions: Who benefits from the choices made by the Court? How does the Court's role as a policy maker square with our notions of a democratic political system? His exploration of the Court is, in many respects, an attempt to assess the commonly offered argument that the Court acts as a protector of fundamental minority rights against majority tyranny.

How can we tell whether the Court has often intervened to protect the fundamental rights of minorities when majorities have attempted to deny them? Answering this question requires, Dahl argues, that we examine situations in which there have been conflicts between the preferences of the majority and the policies of the Supreme Court. Even with modern survey research techniques, there are difficulties in establishing the preferences of the majority of citizens, and in the period before such techniques were developed, what indicators are available? Setting aside electoral results as inadequate indices, Dahl selects as his measure of majority preferences what he calls a "lawmaking majority"—the approval of a majority of members of the Senate and House and of the President which is necessary for the passage of federal legislation. After noting difficulties in making inferences about the preferences of citizens from the expressed preferences of legislators and the President, Dahl argues that such a notion of "lawmaking majority" is as reasonable a surrogate for a "national majority" as is available.

This, then, establishes his framework for determining whether the policy choices of the Court

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[1] Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," *Journal of Public Law*, 6 (Fall, 1957), 279–295. Dahl integrated and somewhat revised this article as a chapter in two editions of his American government text. See Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), chapter 6; in the 1972 edition, called *Democracy in the United States*, see chapter 16. Because the original is the clearest and most widely read version of his argument, I shall focus upon it here.

have often run contrary to those of national majorities and, when they have, whether the Court has typically acted on behalf of the fundamental rights or interests of minorities. The data to be used are Supreme Court decisions declaring federal legislation unconstitutional. Some might suggest that the Court protects the rights of "national majorities against local interests in federal questions"—by overturning state and local statutes on the basis of the federal constitution—but Dahl argues that the "role of the Court as a policy-maker is not usually defended in this fashion." He adds that "therefore, I propose to pass over the ticklish question of federalism and deal only with 'national' majorities and minorities."[2]

We shall return to this issue, but for the moment we have seen how Dahl has cleared the decks for his test of the role of the Court as a national policy maker, and how his test has been operationally defined. To use terms to which we shall return, Dahl asks three questions about this class of Supreme Court decisions: What is the *frequency* of such decisions? What is their *direction* (who has benefitted and who has been harmed by such decisions)? What has been the *decisiveness* of such Court activity (has the Court's policy survived, been modified, reversed, or ignored)?

Dahl finds that through 1957 only eighty-six provisions of federal law had been struck down in 78 cases during the 167-year history of the Court. He notes that a new Justice has been appointed to the Court about every two years. Given the propensity of presidents to appoint and of Senate majorities to confirm primarily those whose general political philosophies are not radically different from their own, the recruitment process provides a powerful mechanism for promoting some level of consensus among President, Congress, and Court majority. ". . . [P]olicy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." To put the point more generally, ". . . the Court is least likely to be successful in blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a major policy and most likely to succeed against a 'weak' majority; e.g., a dead one, a transient one, a fragile one, or one weakly united upon a policy of subordinate importance."[3]

Supporting this proposition is the fact that only one-half of the decisions of unconstitutionality have come within four years of the enactment of the legislation—the period during which Dahl asserts it is reasonable to expect that the lawmaking majority is still viable. An examination of the decisiveness of this group of decisions (more than a third of which involved New Deal legislation) reveals that the Court's policy, especially for what Dahl calls "major policy" issues, has not endured—it has been reversed by Congress or by subsequent Courts. Thus, generally speaking,

> the application of the majority criterion seems to show the following: First, if the Court did in fact uphold minorities against national majorities, as both its supporters and critics often seem to believe, it would be an extremely anomalous institution from a democratic point of view. Second, the elaborate "democratic" rationalizations of the Court's defenders and the hostility of its "democratic" critics are largely irrelevant, for lawmaking majorities generally have had their way. Third, although the Court seems never to have succeeded in holding out indefinitely, in a very small number of important cases it has delayed the application of policy up to as much as twenty-five years.[4]

Moreover, examination of the direction of the cases in which the Court succeeded in delaying policy for extended periods of time does not suggest that the Court acted as protector of fundamental rights against majority tryanny. The Court's rather successful battles against child labor laws, the federal income tax, and application of workmen's compensation laws to longshoremen do not quite fit the mold of protector of fundamental minority rights. Finally, the direction of the other half of Supreme Court decisions of relevance here—those that occurred more than four years after enactment of the statute—seems to undermine further the libertarian view of the Court. Very few of these decisions were based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights, and many were of a less than libertarian case—e.g., upholding the rights or interests of whites vis-à-vis blacks or property-holders as against wage-earners. Though employers or slave-holders were a "minority" of the population when these cases arose, their interests were not "fundamental" in the sense that defenders of the Court seem to have in mind when offering their justifications for judicial review. Thus, Dahl argues that the Court has not, in general, effectively substituted its policy goals for those of law-making majorities, and when the Court has attempted to do so, the record does not bespeak consistent attempts—successful or unsuccessful—to protect fundamental rights or liberties against tyrannical majorities.

Although these findings run contrary to much rhetoric surrounding the Court, they should not, Dahl argues, be particularly surprising. National politics in this country is generally dominated by relatively stable alliances of political interests, and the Supreme Court—whose members are socialized by the same forces as are others active in politics and whose membership is selected by representatives of these political interests—is itself typically a member of such stable coalitions.

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[2] Dahl, p. 282.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 285–86.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

> Except for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance. As an element in the political leadership of the dominant alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance. By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy. In the absence of substantial agreement within the alliance, an attempt by the Court to make national policy is likely to lead to disaster, as the *Dred Scott* decision and the early New Deal cases demonstrate. . . . The Supreme Court is not, however, simply an *agent* of the alliance. It is an essential part of the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. . . . It follows that within the somewhat narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court *can* make national policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a powerful committee chairman in Congress who cannot, generally speaking, nullify the basic policies substantially agreed on by the rest of the dominant leadership, but who can, within these limits, often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate policy. Thus the Court is least effective against a current lawmaking majority—and evidently least inclined to act. It is most effective when it sets the bounds of policy for officials, agencies, state governments or even regions, a task that has come to occupy a very large part of the Court's business.[5]

He closes by suggesting that occasionally the Court is in a stronger position to influence national policy and pursue an independent course of action:

> The main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the successful coalition. There are times when the coalition is unstable with respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy. Probably in such cases it can succeed only if its action conforms to and reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership; norms which are not strong enough or are not distributed in such a way as to insure the existence of an effective lawmaking majority but are, nonetheless, sufficiently powerful to prevent any successful attack on the legitimacy powers of the Court. This is probably the explanation for the relatively successful work of the Court in enlarging the freedom of Negroes to vote during the past three decades and in its famous school integration decisions.[6]

The Supreme Court and Federal Legislation, 1958–1974

Dahl's article was published in 1957, appearing at the end of a decade that had seen one of our periodic episodes of national political repression. Fear of internal subversion by Communists and fellow-travelers had produced not only intense public concern but a variety of federal and state programs aimed at control of the thought, expression, and behavior of allegedly subversive elements in our society. The rulings of the Supreme Court in this period did not mark it as a bastion of individual rights standing against a fearful and repressive national majority. The Court vacillated on the civil liberties issues raised by the loyalty-security programs and generally placed the imprimatur of legitimacy upon a variety of constitutionally questionable governmental activities (e.g., prosecutions under the Smith Act, employee loyalty-security screening programs, legislative investigations.)[7] In this particularly salient issue area, then, the Supreme Court did follow the deferential path suggested by Dahl's analysis.

Since then, we have witnessed the work of the Warren Court and are currently in the midst of the emergence of the Burger Court. The Warren Court, by general reputation at least, was quite different from most of its predecessors. Indeed, one associates with it precisely the characteristics that Dahl found lacking in the Supreme Court—activism and influence in national policy making and protection of fundamental rights of minorities against tyrannical or indifferent majorities. The first step, then, in examining Dahl's thesis is to look at what has happened since he wrote. Do events since that date suggest the possibility of a different pattern of Supreme Court participation in policy making?

With respect to the dimensions of frequency, decisiveness, and direction, the data since 1957 are somewhat mixed. During this period, the Supreme Court declared 32 provisions of federal law unconstitutional in 28 cases. In the entire previous 167-year period, 86 provisions had been declared unconstitutional in 78 cases. Putting the two sets together, we note that more than a quarter of all cases involving a declaration of unconstitutionality (28 of 106) have occurred since 1957. In terms of frequency, the Supreme Court proved more active in recent years than it typically had been in the past.

But Dahl's argument does not rest simply upon the frequency of Supreme Court holdings that federal statutes are unconstitutional. Since he focuses upon the relation of policy emerging from the Court to policy emerging from the "lawmaking majority," particular attention is paid to the period of time that occurs between passage of legislation and the declaration that it is unconstitutional. Dahl lays great stress upon declarations of unconstitutionality occurring within four years of enactment—"where the presumption is . . . that the lawmaking majority is not necessarily a dead one." Table 1 reproduces his findings about the time intervals between enactment and Court decisions and also brings them up to date. Recent decisions seem to follow the same pattern as before—the bulk of cases involve a Court decision somewhat removed in time from the passage of the legislation. In sum, the data suggest that although the period since 1957 did involve a substantial amount of Supreme Court activity in declaring legislation unconstitutional, only about a fifth of the cases involved clashes between what Dahl would call "live" national majorities and a Court bent upon pursuing other policy alternatives.

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[5] Dahl., pp. 293, 294.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[7] For a discussion of the role of the Supreme Court during the 1950s, see Walter F. Murphy, *Congress and the Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Jonathan D. Casper, *The Politics of Civil Liberties* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), chapter II.

Table 1. Cases in which Federal Legislation was Held Unconstitutional, Arranged by Time Intervals Between Legislation and Decision

Time Interval (in years)	1789–1957[a]	1958–1974	1789–1974
2 or less	30%	7%	25%
3 to 4	18	14	17
5 to 8	24	11	20
9 to 12	11	21	13
13 to 16	6	21	10
17 to 20	1	7	3
21 or more	10	18	12
	100% (N=78)	99% (N=28)	100% (N=106)

[a] See Dahl, p. 290.

Dahl also pays attention to the decisiveness dimension—what happened *after* the Court declared laws unconstitutional within four years of enactment. Especially in matters involving what he calls "major policy," Dahl found that the Court policy has typically been reversed, either by legislation, constitutional amendment, or a change of heart by the Court itself. In the six cases during the 1958–74 period in which the Court held legislation unconstitutional within four years after passage, one seems clearly "major" and was reversed by a quickly passed constitutional amendment (*Oregon* v. *Mitchell*,[8] holding that the provision of the 1970 Voting Rights Act lowering the voting age in state and local elections to 18 was beyond the power of Congress). Since Dahl does not offer a definition of "major" and "minor" policy, it is difficult to classify the other five cases. They involved the residency requirement for welfare recipients in the District of Columbia,[9] military trials for civilian dependents and employees stationed abroad with servicemen,[10] and a form of censorship of mail from Communist countries.[11] The Court's decision was not followed by reversal or a change of mind in any of these cases. The same was true with the 22 cases holding federal statutory provisions unconstitutional more than four years after enactment—all were followed either by positive congressional acceptance (e.g., amending the law to conform to the Court's holding or formal repeal) or by acquiescence. Thus, the evidence appears to support the view that the Court intervened decisively in these 22 cases holding federal legislation unconstitutional. In the next section, however, we will discuss a peculiar feature of the way in which Dahl treats his evidence—he considers the decisiveness dimension only for cases occurring within four years of enactment. Those occurring more than four years after enactment are excluded on the ground that we cannot be sure that the law-making majority continues to be "alive" and hence that the clash of preferences required to judge relative influence exists. As a result, it is not clear how to interpret the 22 cases during the 1958–1974 period. For some—particularly those dealing with internal security matters—the view that the law-making majority was no longer "alive" seems plausible; for others—those dealing with the administration of justice, citizenship rights, and welfare programs—an account attributing influence to the Court seems more plausible.

Thus, because of the nature of Dahl's coding rules, evaluation of the Court's recent work on the decisiveness dimension is difficult. Given that there has been only one instance of reversal in 28 cases, one must conclude either (1) that the ambiguity in Dahl's coding rules makes the issue unanswerable for the recent period (and, it is argued in the next section, for the period Dahl himself covers); or (2) that the recent experience does not support the Dahl thesis.

On the dimension of direction, the pattern of decisions since 1958 is clearly at variance with Dahl's findings. With the exception of *Oregon* v. *Mitchell*, all of the 28 decisions were based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights (primarily the First and Fifth Amendments) and the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to furthering the interests of all in the society in greater freedom of expression, equal application of the laws, and procedural fairness, the decisions had special impact upon such groups as aliens,[12] communists and other alleged subversives,[13] criminal defendants,[14] war protesters,[15] and poor people.[16] The Court attempted to extend to these groups rights and privileges that the law-making majorities had not chosen to extend.[17] For example, a series of decisions struck down statutes that took away citizenship for such activities as voting in foreign elections, desertion from armed forces, leaving the country to avoid military service, and extended residence in country of origin. By the same token, the heart of the McCarran Act—its registration provisions and restrictions upon employment in sensitive industries for members of Communist action organizations—was struck down on Fifth and First Amendment grounds.

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[8] 400 U. S. 112 (1970).

[9] *Washington v. Legrant*, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

[10] *Grisham v. Hagan*, 361 U. S. 278 (1960); *McElroy v. Guargliardo*, 361 U. S. 281 (1960); *Kinsella v. Singleton*, 361 U. S. 234 (1960).

[11] *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U. S. 301 (1965).

We have now examined the recent decisions in terms of Dahl's three dimensions. The results, while not wholly conclusive, do not tend to support Dahl's thesis. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, struck down federal legislation more frequently than in the past. The Court's decisions, with one exception, were not met with reversal by legislation, constitutional amendment, or a reversal by the Court itself (though a few have occurred sufficiently recently that this outcome may still occur). By the same token, however, the bulk of the decisions did not involve legislation passed shortly before the Court intervened, so one cannot, under Dahl's rules, be sure that the law-making majority on the issue was still alive. Finally, in terms of direction, the recent cases demonstrate a concern for and protection of basic liberties and rights of minorities that is different from the picture Dahl draws from past cases. With the exception of *Oregon* v. *Mitchell*, none can be adequately interpreted as protecting the privileged at the expense of the poor or a majority at the expense of an insular minority.

It would be somewhat improbable—in either a statistical or substantive sense—for the Court in 16 years to erase a pattern that had stood for nearly 170 years before. My updating of Dahl's argument does not render his conclusions invalid or totally inapplicable to more recent events. By the same token, recent experience does suggest that the Court may operate differently from the way in which Dahl suggests it has and, even more important, from the way he suggests it must.

The Evidence Considered

One of the most appealing aspects of Dahl's argument is his careful specification and gathering of evidence. In dealing with an issue that has long been the subject of discussion and argument based upon impression and example, Dahl offers a carefully developed specification of the question and of the evidence that he believes is required for an informed resolution of the conflicting views that have been offered. Yet analysis of what Dahl has done and what he has not done reveals problems both in his mode of analysis and his conclusions. The issues I wish to raise in this section deal with both the way in which he treats his own evidence and with relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis.

Dahl considers only cases in which federal legislation has been declared unconstitutional, and offers two justifications for casting his evidentiary net in this way. The first centers around the proposition that relative influence in policy making can be determined only when there are disagreements among participants,[18] and upon his selection of the "lawmaking majority" as the most useful criterion for majority preferences. The second is based upon the assertion that it is *national* (for which he substitutes *federal*) issues that defenders of the importance of the Court in policy making have in mind:

> A case might be made out that the Court protects the rights of national majorities against local interests in federal questions [i.e., cases involving challenges to such activities based upon the federal constitution], but so far as I am aware, the role of the Court as a policy-maker is not usually defended in this fashion; in what follows, therefore, I propose

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[12] *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86 (1958); *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); *Schneider v. Rusk*, 377 U. S. 163 (1964).

[13] *Aptheker v. Sec. of State*, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); *U. S. v. Brown*, 381 U. S. 437 (1965); *Albertson v. SACB*, 382 U. S. 70 (1965); *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U. S. 253 (1967); *U. S. v. Robel*, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).

[14] *U. S. v. Romano*,382 U. S. 136 (1965); *Marchetti v. U. S.*, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); *Grosso v. U. S.* 390 U. S. 62 (1968); *Haynes v. U. S.*, 390 U. S. 85 (1968); *U. S. v. Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968); *Leary v. U. S.*, 395 U. S. 6 (1969); *U. S. v. Covington*, 395 U. S. 57 (1969).

[15] *Schact v. U. S.* 398 U. S. 58 (1970); *Chief of Police v. J. Rankin Brigade*, 409 U. S. 972 (1972).

[16] *U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry*, 413 U. S. 508 (1973); *U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno*, 413 U. S. 528 (1973).

[17] Six of the total of 28 cases in which federal legislation was declared unconstitutional in the 1958–74 period were discussed in the text above (see notes 8–11); 19 of the cases are cited in notes 12–16; the remaining three cases are as follows: *Blount v. Rizzi*, 400 U. S. 410 (1971)—holding unconstitutional a procedure by which Postmaster General was authorized to deal with allegedly obscene material sent through the mails; *Tilton v. Richardson*, 403 U. S. 672 (1971)—declaring unconstitutional on Establishment grounds a section of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963; and *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U. S. 677 (1973)—holding unconstitutional a form of discrimination against women members of the armed forces in eligibility for quarters' allowances and medical benefits for dependents.

[18] Dahl's "ruling elite model" article, published in 1958, argues that influence can only be measured effectively in such situations. See "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review* 52 (June, 1958), 463–69.

> to pass over the ticklish question of federalism and deal only with 'national' majorities and minorities."[19]

Both of these justifications are plausible, but they produce a very narrow evidentiary net. Later in this section, I shall suggest a variety of relevant evidence that is excluded. First, I shall discuss the way in which Dahl analyzes the data that he does utilize.

Dahl's Evidence and Coding Rules. Dahl asks three questions about Supreme Court decisions declaring federal legislation unconstitutional: what has been their frequency, their decisiveness, and their direction? In analyzing the cases to determine whether they support the view that the Court plays an influential role in national policy making, he relies almost exclusively upon the decisiveness dimension. Thus, in dealing with two typical sequences of events, he codes them as follows on the dimension of relative influence of Court and lawmaking majority:

Type I (Court Influential)
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy within 4 years
(3) Court's policy stands

Type II (Law-making Majority Influential)
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy within 4 years
(3) Court's policy reversed

Thirty-eight of the 78 cases he discovered fell into one of these two categories, and, of these, 19 fell into what I shall call Type II (law-making majority influential). Moreover, applying a distinction between what he calls "major policy" and "minor policy" cases, 17 of 23 "major policy" cases fell into Type II.

He takes special note of the fact that in some of these Type II situations the overriding of the Court's policy has taken a period of many years (e.g., those dealing with child labor legislation, the federal income tax, and workman's compensation for longshoremen). But his analysis of the decisiveness dimension concludes that, particularly in cases involving "major policy" issues, the Court has not generally succeeded in resisting the law-making majority. This finding is the linchpin for his conclusion that the Court does not play the significant role in national policy making that many of its defenders have suggested.

Yet Dahl considers the decisiveness dimension *only for cases in which the Court declares federal legislation unconstitutional within four years of the enactment of the statute.* What of the forty cases in which the Court's decision came more than four years after enactment? His analysis of this group of cases—which comprises more than half of his data—is restricted to a discussion of the *direction* of the Court's policy. He notes that the bulk of the Court decisions were neither based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights nor protective of fundamental rights of minorities. He provides neither data nor discussion of the decisiveness of these decisions.

Dahl's reasons for this approach are discussed only casually. He obliquely asserts that in situations involving a period of more than four years between enactment and Court decision, the lawmaking majority cannot be assumed to be still viable, and hence we cannot judge relative influence. For example, he introduces his discussion of what I call here "Type I" and "Type II" cases (declarations of unconstitutionality *within* four years) by saying that in these cases "the presumption is . . . that the lawmaking majority is not necessarily a dead one."[20] In his discussion of the cases that occurred more than four years after enactment (what I will call Type III), he asks, "Do we have evidence in these [cases] that the Court has protected fundamental or natural rights and liberties against the *dead hand of some past tyranny* by the lawmakers?"[21] If more than four years have passed, then, we lack the evidence necessary to judge relative influence.

There is logic to this argument, but it has implications that are largely unexamined. Not only do we lack data relevant to assessing the decisiveness of Court action in nearly half the cases, but the logic of Dahl's argument seems to load the dice strongly against the possibility of discovering influence by the Court if we *did* gather such data. Consider the following sequences of events:

Type IIIa
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy more than 4 years later
(3) Court's policy stands

Type IIIb
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy more than 4 years later
(3) Court's policy reversed

Common sense would suggest that Type IIIb is one in which the law-making majority should be judged to have been influential. By the same token.

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[19] Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," p. 282.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 292, emphasis added.

Type IIIa is one in which the Court ought to be judged to have exercised influence. Assume, for example, that the Court declares an act of Congress unconstitutional more than four years after its enactment. Assume that there is no move to reverse the Court or that there is a move to reverse the decision by further legislation or a constitutional amendment but that such an effort is defeated. What are we to make of the relative influence of the Court under such circumstances? The Court appears to have played a decisive role: without its intervention, the original policy would presumably have been continued. Yet Dahl's coding scheme asserts that the law-making majority was "dead" by the time the Court acted and hence we cannot judge relative influence (and cannot conclude that the Court has intervened in an important fashion). If we did gather data on cases occuring more than four years after enactment and most of them fell into Type IIIb—if the bulk of such decisions were reversed by the law-making majority—it would be reasonable to conclude that they, like those of Type II, support Dahl's conclusion that the Court has not been able to intervene decisively against the law-making majority. But suppose most of them fell into Type IIIa? Dahl seems to assert that this would not be evidence for decisive intervention by the Court because we cannot assume that the law-making majority is still viable. Under such a view the Court *cannot* be judged to be influential in circumstances that compose more than half of his evidence. If the Court's policy is reversed, it has clearly not been influential; if the Court's policy stands without discussion or is debated but not reversed, again the Court has not been influential. With such coding rules, heads and the law-making majority wins; tails and the Court loses.

This feature may assume increasing importance as the workload of the Court becomes heavier. The time required for the typical case to get to the Supreme Court for resolution is now on the order of two to three years and seems to be growing. As a result, the probability that an issue will reach the Court in time to fall within the category when we can, under Dahl's rules, assess relative influence, is decreasing.

In sum, more than half the cases Dahl discovered fall into a category in which under his coding rules it is not possible to conclude that the Court (or law-making majority) has been influential. Not only does he fail to provide the relevant data, but he seems tacitly to assert that if such data were gathered and appeared to indicate decisive interventions by the Court (Type IIIa), such data would not be interpreted in this fashion. This feature of his treatment of the evidence suggests that the conclusions based upon his analysis, though by no means disproved, are potentially a product of an asymmetry in the coding rules as well as of the nature of the evidence itself.

The Evidence Excluded.

Dahl limits his consideration to cases in which the Court held federal legislation unconstitutional. Yet cases involving tests of constitutionality of federal legislation compose only one segment of the work of the Court.[22] Two other types of activities also stand out as particularly important arenas in which the Court contributes to national policy making. The first deals with statutory construction and the second with federal constitutional issues arising out of state and local legislation or practice.

Statutory Construction. The Court is frequently called upon to interpret the meaning of federal statutes, and in the course of doing so, important policy choices must be made. If we adopt for the moment the notion that influence in policy making is most accurately judged in situations in which various participants conflict with one another, it is clear that the interpretations that are made by the Court—even when they are based on "legislative intent"—are often quite different from those that members of Congress and the President had in mind when the legislation was passed. The Court's doctrine that it will, if at all possible, interpret a statute in such a way as to "save" it from being declared unconstitutional means that the Court will often significantly twist and change the ostensible provisions of a statute. Thus, in interpreting statutes the Court often makes important policy choices, and these choices are at least arguably quite contrary to the preferences of the law-making majority that passed the legislation. The more influence the Court exercises by virtue of statutory construction, the less influence it will appear to have in terms of Dahl's coding rules. When the Court "saves" a law by interpreting it rather than declaring it unconstitutional, its contribution to the course of public policy is excluded from consideration under Dahl's rules.

Pennsylvania v. *Nelson*[23] illustrates the use of the statutory construction technique in rather stark detail. The case involved a prosecution under a so-called "little Smith Act," a state statute modeled after the federal Smith Act that punished those who advocated the violent overthrow of the government of the United States or of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that federal legislation dealing with such subversive activity (particularly the Smith Act of 1940) so occupied the field that Congress had left no room for state activity and that problems of possible conflict between federal and state prosecutions required that the supremacy clause be invoked. Forty-three other states as well as Alaska and Hawaii had similar laws, so that the decision had an impact throughout the country.

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[22] The summary of the Supreme Court's work published each fall in the *Harvard Law Review* provides a useful account of the Court's business. In the 1972 term, for example, of 164 cases decided with full opinions, 69 involved the federal government as a party; of course many of these cases involving the federal government did not involve a challenge to constitutionality, but issues of administrative procedure, statutory construction, etc. See Note, "The Supreme Court, 1972 term," *Harvard Law Review*, 87 (November, 1973), 307–09.

[23] 350 U. S. 497 (1956).

The three dissenters in the case made a very cogent argument that members of Congress had been quite aware of such state laws when the Smith Act was passed and that there was little reason to believe that those who supported the Smith Act had any intention of doing away with similar legislation in the various states. Moreover, the dissenters were able to point out a section of the U.S. Code (in the same title as the Smith Act itself) that explicitly stated that "nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States, under the laws thereof."[24] Finally, they dealt quite persuasively with the majority's concerns about state interference with federal enforcement of the Smith Act. The dissenting opinion cited an *amicus curiae* brief filed by the U. S. Department of Justice which stated that since the passage of the Smith Act no difficulties had been created by the existence of similar state statutes. In short, the dissenters were able to muster rather cogent arguments to the effect that whatever one might think about the policy of state anti-sedition statutes, the supercession argument did not seem to have compelling force either in terms of congressional intent or administrative difficulties. Subsequently, a series measures was introduced in the Congress to reverse the *Nelson* decision, easily passing in the House and only narrowly defeated in the Senate.[25]

Recent years have seen a variety of similar instances of important policy making by the Court in the context of statutory construction. The extension of conscientious objector status to those without formal religious training,[26] restrictions upon the use of delinquency provisions against opponents of the Vietnam War,[27] restrictions upon residency requirements for welfare recipients,[28] limitation upon the power to use surveillance techniques without a warrant,[29] elimination of the "man-in-the-house" rule for welfare recipients,[30] and freedom for broadcasters to refuse to sell air time to individuals and groups wishing to speak out on public issues[31] have all been based wholly or in important measure upon interpretations of various federal statutes.

In some of the examples cited, especially those in which attempts by Congress to reverse the interpretation offered by the Court failed to pass, the mode of Dahl's analysis might suggest that the law-making majority was no longer viable, and hence the influence of the Court not significant. Yet this argument has the peculiar implication discussed above: if the Court acts and Congress overrides, then the Court has not been influential; yet if the Court acts and Congress *fails* to override, then, again, the Court has not been influential for we assume the law-making majority no longer exists.

In sum, then, one must consider the work of the Court in the area of statutory construction in any discussion of its role in policy making. Dahl's exclusion of this activity in his consideration of the role of the Court constitutes a serious omission, and its inclusion will significantly increase the scope of Court influence that one is likely to observe.

The State and Local Cases. The second major area of the Court's work that is excluded from Dahl's analysis involves constitutional issues arising in cases involving state and local statutes or practice. As suggested above, this exclusion is justified on the grounds that we lack evidence about the preferences of the lawmaking majority in such cases and that these cases have not been typically cited by defenders of the Court as the basis of their view that the Court plays a significant role in national policy making. Although there are, to be sure, difficulties in establishing the preferences of the national majority in these cases, a review of them suggests that many do indeed involve the Court in important issues of national policy.

To use the schematic device introduced above, the state and local cases deal with situations in which the Court may be conceived of as speaking first and in which the law-making majority is placed in the position of responding to the policy promulgated by the Court. Applying the type of coding rules that Dahl follows, one might code the following sequences of events in terms of relative influence:

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[24] 18 U.S.C. s. 3231.

[25] Murphy, especially chapters 7, 9.

[26] *U. S. v. Seeger*, 380 U. S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. U. S. 398 U. S. 333 (1970).

[27] *Oestereich v. Sel. Service Board*, 393 U. S. 233 (1968); *Breen v. Sel. Service Board*, 396 U. S. 460 (1970).

[28] *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

[29] *U. S. v. U. S. District Court*, 407 U. S. 297 (1972).

[30] *King v. Smith*, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).

[31] *Columbia Broadcasting System v. DNC*, 412 U. S. 94 (1973).

Type IV (Law-making Majority Influential)
(1) Court promulgates policy
(2) Law-making majority reverses policy
(3) Law-making majority's policy stands

Type V (Court Influential)
(1) Court promulgates policy
(2) Law-making majority fails to reverse policy
(3) Court's policy stands

The decision in *Chisholm* v. *Georgia*[32] asserting federal jurisdiction in diversity suits against state governments and the subsequent passage of the Eleventh Amendment is an example of a Type IV sequence.

Type V situations are more significant for our purposes. Here the Court speaks "first," and its policy is not followed by reversal by the law-making majority. In the various cases discussed below, this appears to have been the pattern followed, despite frequent attempts at reversal by legislation or constitutional amentment. After a brief review of these cases, we shall return to the problem of whether they are consistent with the argument that Dahl presents and what they suggest about the role of the Court in national policy making.

In the nineteenth century, a long line of important Supreme Court decisions dealt with the development of interstate commerce and relations between the national and state governments. Cases like *McCulloch* v. *Maryland*,[33] *Gibbons* v. *Ogden*[34] and *Cooley* v. *Board of Wardens*,[35] are merely the landmarks in a gradual development of a set of rules designed to produce a national government and economy. In citing the power of Congress via the supremacy and interstate commerce clauses, the Court was not simply legitimizing assertions of power by the national government vis-à-vis the states but took the initiative in offering its own theory of the nature of the union and of the most satisfactory distribution of powers among the various levels of government. Such cases are excluded from Dahl's analysis.

In the area of individual rights and liberties during the second half of the twentieth century, the contributions of the Court are equally striking. A simple catalogue of the issue areas in which the Court has become involved suggests the breadth of its contributions to national policy that emerged in the context of state and local cases.

In the area of reapportionment, the line of decisions beginning with *Baker* v. *Carr*[36] and proceeding through *Reynolds* v. *Sims*[37] and on to the recent decisions in *Mahan* and *Gaffney*[38] have produced significant changes in the districting of local, state, and congressional districts in nearly all the states. Although questions have been raised about the impact of such changes upon party competition and policy outputs of legislatures, it seems clear that such widespread reform in legislative apportionment would not have occurred without the Court's intervention.

In the religion cases, especially the *Engel* and *Schempp*[39] decisions, the Court set forth a policy toward devotional exercises in public schools that affected all schools, not just those in particular localities. Though the decisions were by no means greeted with total compliance, they have not been reversed and still stand as national policy. By the same token, a string of decisions dealing with aid to parochial schools has restricted the nature and types of aid that states and the federal government have been permitted to offer. Though the decisions have not cut off such aid, they have shaped these programs in ways that run contrary to the directions that they would have gone without such intervention.[40]

A long line of confusing and confused decisions emerged as the Court attempted to define obscenity and thus to determine what enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment and what did not.[41] Though the Court is still grappling with this problem and has even further confused the situation recently,[42] the upshot of this line of cases has been to expand greatly the range of materials available to the society.

In the area of race relations, the Supreme Court played a vital role in the development of national policy. Its decisions in the 1950s and 1960s placed a stamp of legitimacy upon claims for equality on the part of black citizens that was crucial to the development of organizations and activities that eventually succeeded not only in the streets but in the Congress as well.[43] Though a solid consensus against *de jure* segregation did subsequently emerge, the Court played a crucial role in this process rather than merely reflecting developments in other political arenas.

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[32] 2 Dall. 419 (1793).

[33] 4 Wheat 316 (1819).

[34] 9 Wheat 1 (1824).

[35] 12 How. 299 (1852).

[36] 369 U. S. 186 (1962).

[37] 377 U. S. 533 (1964).

[38] *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).

[39] *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); *Abington Township v. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).

[40] See, for example, *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); *Levitt v. Committee for Public Education*, 413 U. S. 472 (1973); *Sloan v. Lemon*, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); *Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist*, 413 U. S. 756 (1973).

[41] For example, *Roth v. U. S.*, 354 U. S. 476 (1957); *Manual Enterprises v. Day*, 370 U. S. 478 (1962); *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U. S. 184 (1964); *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U. S. 413 (1966); *Ginzburg v. U. S.*, 383 U. S. 463 (1966); *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U. S. 502 (1966).

[42] E.g., *Miller v. California*, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); but also see *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 41 L. Ed. 2d. 642 (1974).

In the area of criminal procedure, the Court developed a federal constitutional code of criminal justice, ranging from initial contacts of suspects with police, through the development of evidence, the adjudication of guilt or innocence, the imposition of penalties, the appellate process, and the treatment of offenders by probation and correction agencies.[44] From a wealth of cases reflecting the diverse policies of various jurisdictions the Court produced a series of rules aimed at vindicating the adversary system and vouchsafing substantive and procedural rights ignored in many localities. Surely uniformity of treatment has not been achieved in doctrinal, much less behavioral, terms. Yet the Court has moved us toward policies that were not emerging from state legislatures or Congress. The criminal justice cases illustrate an issue area in which the Supreme Court itself took up the burden of being the major advocate for a group in the society that was politically powerless and subject to deprivation of basic procedural rights.

This brief review of some of the Court's work in the area of state and local statutes and practice suggests several issues relevant to Dahl's analysis. First and most important, the policy questions at stake in these cases are not narrow, local or regional issues. In all of these areas the policy promulgated by the Court, although emerging in the context of cases arising out of states or localities, was directly aimed at and had an effect upon governmental activities throughout the nation. *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, *Gideon* v. *Wainwright*, *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, *Abington Township* v. *Schempp*, *Cooley* v. *Board of Wardens*, *Memoirs* v. *Massachusetts*, *Brown* v. *Board of Education* all came from cities or states. Yet the policies that were enunciated had relevance to the whole nation in ways much more manifest than many of the cases involving federal legislation with which Dahl deals.

Did the Court prevail? Was it reversed by a subsequent act of the law-making majority? Did the Court itself take back what it had said? In some areas, these questions are difficult to answer at this time, for a few of the decisions are recent. In terms of one crude indicator, the Court has not been substantially reversed in any of these areas by the passage of legislation or constitutional amendment. In some areas, though, the pattern Dahl suggests does seem apposite: unpopular decisions became part of the country's political agenda, and changes in political regimes affected recruitment to the Court. The replacement of the Warren Court by the Burger Court is to some extent verification of his thesis. Recent decisions in the areas of obscenity, [45] reapportionment,[46] and criminal justice[47] suggest modifications in policy to some extent congruent with the demands of Court opponents. So the thrust of this argument is not that new evidence unambiguously indicates a role for the Court that is radically different from the one that Dahl suggests. The Court *is* a member of ruling alliances and does respond to others. But examination of the state and local cases does reveal that the arena in which the Court makes policy is substantially broader than the limited area Dahl selects for discussion. Moreover, it suggests that the Court can and does get its way a good deal more frequently than his analysis implies.

Assuming that the Court has not been reversed and has not reversed itself in several important issue areas arising out of state litigation—a plausible account of the areas of civil rights, religion, and the basic thrust of policy in criminal justice and reapportionment—what are we to make of this fact in assessing the relative influence of the Court in our political system? One of the problems with dealing with such cases—and one of the reasons why they were excluded from Dahl's analysis—is that it is, to be sure, difficult to make the determination of the preferences of the national majority that Dahl says is necessary in order to decide whether the Court's policy was influential. Yet these cases did involve issues of broad national significance, and none of the decisions was struck down by legislation or constitutional amendment, even though such efforts were attempted. Thus, in formal terms the Court seems to have "won" (setting aside for the moment the possibility that new appointments may lead the Court to step back to some degree in some issue areas). On the other hand, Dahl's analysis might suggest that the very lack of overriding legislation indicates that the Court was not acting contrary to the preferences of a law-making majority. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that it places the Court in a no-win situation: if it acts first, regardless of what happens subsequently, it is judged not to have exercised influence.

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[43] E.g., *Brown v. Bd. of Education*, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); *Holmes v. Atlanta*, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); *Boynton v. Virginia*, 364 U. S. 454 (1960); *Turner v. Memphis*, 369 U. S. 762 (1962); *Watson v. Memphis*, 373 U. S. 526 (1963); *Johnson v. Virginia*, 373 U. S. 61 (1963); *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); *Robinson v. Florida*, 378 *Brown v. Louisiana*, 383 U. S. 131 (1966).

[44] For a useful review of the Warren Court's decisions dealing with criminal procedure, see A. Kenneth Pye, "The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure," in *The Warren Court*, ed. Richard H. Sayler et al. (New York: Chelsea House, 1969), pp. 58–77.

[45] E.g., *Miller v. California*, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974).

[46] E.g., *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).

[47] E.g., *Harris v. New York*, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U. S. 25 (1970); *U. S. v. Robinson*, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); *U. S. v. Calandra*, 414 U. S. 338 (1974).

Another facet of Dahl's argument is relevant to this issue. He suggests that, in general, the major function of the Court, as a member of the ruling alliance at any particular time, is to "confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the successful coalition." He goes on to note that at certain periods—when the ruling coalition in an issue domain is weakened and decaying or when a stable coalition has not emerged in the issue area—the Court may "at great risk to its legitimacy powers" intervene and even "succeed in establishing policy." The Court, in such situations, is likely to be successful only when its "action conforms to and reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by political leadership." Dahl refers to the work of the Court in dealing with civil rights as an example of this ability of the Court to intervene when stable coalitions do not exist.

The areas in which the Court has been particularly active in recent years—civil rights, reapportionment, criminal justice, religion, obscenity, privacy—do seem to have been characterized by substantial division both within the political stratum and in the society at large about the most preferable policy alternatives. The Court's intervention has been followed by substantial controversy and attempts to modify its policy as well as attacks on its institutional powers. Both types of opposition have been unsuccessful, and the activities of other members of the political leadership stratum have been of great importance. Lyndon Johnson's activities as majority leader during the late 1950s were crucial in thwarting attempts to modify decisions dealing with loyalty-security programs and to punish the Court for its libertarian decisions in the 1956–57 terms.[48] John F. Kennedy's support for the bible-reading and school prayer decisions was, again, an important element in cooling off attacks on the Court as an institution and attempts to reverse its policy by constitutional amendment.

Assuming, though, that many of the Court's most important contributions to public policy in recent years have involved situations in which the Court was appealing to norms implicitly held by other influential policy makers and that the ability of the Court as an institution and the policies it has promulgated to survive have required support by others, what are we to make of these facts? Dahl's argument stresses the importance of the values and activities of other policy makers rather than the influence exercised by the Court. In one sense he is of course correct, for no institution can successfully carry the day when others are cohesively arrayed against it. But the overall impression that his analysis yields is somewhat misleading. He argues that the Court's activities are best understood by examining the constellation of other political interests willing to support its policies even though they were not united and powerful enough to promulgate such policies on their own. An equally plausible interpretation of such events would suggest that the crucial role was played by the Court, by its willingness to set forth policies that other state and federal institutions were unwilling or unable to promulgate. To be sure, support for such policies by others, or at least their grudging acquiescence, was crucial to the viability of the Court's policies (just as the Court's acquiescence is often crucial to the success of policies promulgated by the law-making majority). But if we are to identify the crucial participants in the policy-development process, to minimize the role of the Court, as Dahl is inclined to do, provides a view of policy making that does not do justice to the potential or actual contributions of the Court.

In sum, there are several difficulties with the evidence that Dahl gathers and the ways in which he utilizes it. The coding rules he employs have a certain asymmetry such that much of his own evidence is excluded from analysis and if further relevant information were gathered it would not be possible to conclude that the Court has been influential. He also excludes from consideration a large body of evidence that seems highly relevant to determining the Court's role in national policymaking. Consideration of this evidence indicates a substantially more influential role than Dahl's argument admits.

The Court and Policy Making

Dahl's analysis is based upon the premise that policy making is most fruitfully analyzed in terms of concepts like influence or power, a view that the crucial questions deal with winners and losers. The argument that Dahl sets out to confront and evaluate—the view of the Court as a protector of fundamental minority rights against majority tyranny—is itself framed in terms of influence. Moreover, Dahl's article was written at a time when he was developing and conducting his research on community power. In his article dealing with the "ruling elite model" published in 1958, Dahl asserts that "one cannot compare the relative influence of two actors who always perform identical actions with respect to the group influenced. What this means as a practical matter is that ordinarily one can test for differences in influence only where there are cases of differences in initial preferences."[49]

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[48] Murphy, chapter 9.

If one can judge relative influence of various individuals, groups, and institutions only when there are disagreements among them, focus upon Court declarations that federal legislation is unconstitutional appears to make sense. From this basic posture about the way in which to study influence, Dahl moves to a view of the policy-making process that focuses upon disputes among policy makers and determines who prevails and who does not. His view of the way to measure influence shades into a conception of policy making that stresses its zero-sum characteristics.

There are several difficulties with Dahl's account of policy making and the role of the Court in it. Some deal with his specific conclusions about the role of the Court; others center about the relatively narrow conception of policy making that underlies his argument.[50]

To begin, let us assume that the winners and losers view that Dahl utilizes is a reasonable way to conceive of the policy-making process. Dahl's basic conclusion is that, except for its important role as a legitimator, the Court does not play an especially influential role in national policy making. There are three major difficulties with this view, the first two of which may be disposed of briefly. First, as argued above, the exclusive focus upon cases in which federal statutes are declared unconstitutional ignores a good deal of what the Court in fact contributes to national policy making. Second, Dahl does not place sufficient emphasis upon those cases in which the Court succeeded in delaying policies for periods of up to 25 years. He focuses upon the dénouement—upon the ultimate rejection of the Court's policy—while an equally salient feature of these examples is the extensive period of time in which the law-making majority was prevented from working its will.

The third and most important objection to Dahl's characterization of the influence of the Court—assuming that we accept the winners and losers approach—is that he engages in a somewhat misleading contrast in comparing the influence of the Court to that of the law-making majority. Dahl concludes that the Court does not typically play a decisive role in national policy making. "Acting solely by itself with no support from the President and Congress, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy." He essentially stops here, contenting himself with an effective antidote to the mythology that the Court stands as a lonely bastion single handedly thwarting tyrannical majorities from trampling upon the rights of despised minorities.

Although he does not address the question in detail, at this level of generality such a proposition is true of all institutions of government as well as other groups and individuals in the society. Certainly this comports with Dahl's emphasis upon the building of coalitions, upon the notion of minorities' rule, and upon the great restraints that such stable coalitions place upon the policy choices that may be made at any point in time. But because he frames the question in terms of who wins or loses—Court versus President and Congress—and because he does not in this article emphasize the degree to which *no* institution is really capable of the decisive role he argues the Court fails to possess, the impression of the Court's relative insignificance is cemented. Thus, the framing of the question as one of relative influence produces a view of policy making in which such influence seems to be the touch-stone of significant participation, and this produces a view that the Court, except in its legitimizing role, simply is not a particularly important participant in national policy making.

The arguments offered above suggest that even within the framework for analyzing policy making that Dahl adopts, there is room for disagreement with his basic conclusion that the Court does not frequently exercise an important influence on the national political outcomes. There is another set of objections that center about the rather narrow conception of policy making that seems to inform Dahl's analysis.

The policy-making process involves more than clashes among political coalitions and institutions, more than winners and losers.[51] The winners-and-losers view implies that there are decisive outcomes to disputes about issues—that among the variety of policies that might be selected, one outcome ultimately prevails. It implies (1) that when interests or institutions clash, the position of one side or another prevails; (2) that the outcomes in policy making that occur as a result of such disagreements somehow "settle" disputes; and (3) that the crucial contributions to policy making consist in promulgating policies that prevail. All of these are implicit in the conception of policy making that informs Dahl's approach to the Supreme Court, and none is adequate.

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[49] Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," p. 464.

[50] I shall not discuss here the problem of taking account of "anticipated reactions" in discussing the relative influence of the Court in the policy-making process. It seems plausible to argue, though, that just as the Court in its decisions may take account of the breadth and intensity of support for various policies, members of Congress may take into account their predictions of potential rulings by the Court in making choices about what legislation to pass. For a discussion of the role of constitutional considerations in the legislative decision-making process, see Donald G. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), and Paul Brest, "The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation," *Stanford Law Review*, 27 (February, 1975), 585–601.

[51] Much of Dahl's work is consistent with this view and has added to our understanding of the ways in which these processes operate. Yet in the article under consideration here, a narrower view of the nature of the policy-making process emerges from the fashion in which he formulates the question and gathers his data.

Dahl argues that when the Court clashes with the law-making majority we can assess its significance in policy making by examining whose policy prevailed. The consistent "winner" in such clashes is judged to be influential and the loser to be a less significant contributor to the policy-making process. This view assumes that when such clashes occur the policy of the "winner" is adopted and the policy of the "loser" is discarded. In fact, when such clashes occur, the policies that eventually emerge are affected by the interaction among institutions that takes place.

For example, when we examine the role of the Court in policy making in the area of economic regulation in the first third of this century, Dahl's view suggests that the Court, although delaying certain policies, was ultimately not influential because its laissez-faire policy was discarded. But one could argue that the Court played a particularly important role in this episode of policy development. Not only for the period in which its decisions thwarted the law-making majority, but also for its role in leading other groups and interests in society to come to grips with laissez-faire economic policy and the interests that supported it. The laissez-faire decisions contributed to the development of the coalition that led to the election of Roosevelt, the legislation of the New Deal, and the eventual discarding of the Court's policies in favor of a conception of public welfare policy that had not heretofore enjoyed the political base it subsequently developed. In this way, both the nature of subsequent policies—their breadth, their statutory and administrative form—and the constellation of political forces in the society were shaped by the activities of the Court. What emerged at the "end" of this struggle was quite different from what had been proposed by the law-making majority at its beginning.

To suggest another example, suppose that changes in Court decisions or a constitutional amendment were to "reject" the Supreme Court's politices since 1957 dealing with the freedom to distribute and possess "obscene" materials. Two features of this hypothetical case suggest difficulties with the notion of examining winners and losers in policy making. First of all, it is hard to imagine what the supposed "winning" policy might be that we could compare with the "losing" policy of the Court. Because there was almost no federal constitutional doctrine on the subject of obscenity before 1957, almost any new "winning" policy would produce a policy outcome different from the pre-1957 status quo.

Second, suppose the new "winning" policy permitted states and localities a substantially greater discretion to restrict the dissemination of such materials. Surely events of the past 18 years affect what types of material would remain available. Experience with the availability of pornography—for example, the fact that substantial numbers of people in the society have come to enjoy it or to believe that it is less harmful than they once believed—would probably produce policies permitting substantially greater availability than existed in the pre-1957 period. Moreover, the political and economic interests with an investment in protecting the freedom to distribute and profit from such materials have greatly increased in recent years and would also operate to dampen to some degree the ability of the "anti-obscenity" interests to impose restrictive policies. In this fashion, the very enunciation of a policy by one institution is likely to affect future policies, even if the original policy is "reversed." The notion of a "winning" and a "losing" policy when institutions clash imposes an artificial distinction that obscures a dynamic process in which even "losers" contribute importantly to outcomes that eventually emerge.

The second objection is related to the first, and it simply states that many of the issues in which national political institutions become involved are not "settled" but continue to recur. Conflicts among political institutions produce not "winning" and "losing" policies, but rather tentative solutions that themselves become the basis for future policy making. Consider, for example, recent developments in national policy dealing with racial equality, legislative apportionment, the relationship between church and state, and criminal procedure. All of these were issues that had long smoldered beneath the surface of American politics. Regardless of the decisions of the Warren Court, these issues have surely not been resolved: we have not succeeded in defining, much less in embracing, racial equality; malapportionment remains a disputed issue; religious practices continue in many schools; and the typical criminal defendant does not enjoy the rights that the Court has doctrinally afforded. Yet all of these issues have become increasingly salient features of the national political agenda in the past twenty years; what was latent conflict has become manifest, and both the general public and political institutions have been forced to confront the policy questions involved. The dénouement is not clear, any more than it was twenty years ago, for these are questions that our society presumably will always have to confront. Though at various times one position or another may carry the day, ultimate resolutions are not discovered, and the Court, like other political institutions, has and will continue to make important contributions to the "solutions" that carry the day, become the subject for further debate, and are modified or rejected.

This suggests a third point. The policy-making process—and the exercise of influence within it—involves more than producing outcomes that prevail. Providing effective access to participants who wish to take part in decision making, placing issues on the agenda of public opinion and of other political institutions, providing an imprimatur of legitimacy to one side or another that may affect its ability to attract adherents, mobilize resources, and build institutions—these are all important parts of the policy-making process that may get lost if we pay attention only to winners and losers. One reason that courts may have particular importance in placing issues on the agenda of other political institutions and in development of interest groups is that "success" in a court requires only that a party convince a relatively small number of decision makers. At the trial level, success requires only a favorable decision from a single individual; at the Supreme Court level, success requires the approval of five of nine. Thus, interests that lack resources for effective influence in legislative, executive, or administrative arenas may find the legal system an attractive spot in which to attempt to influence public policy. "Success" in a court then becomes useful in participation in these other arenas—the court's decision may require other institutions to come to grips with an issue they have ignored; the legitimacy conferred by victory in court may be useful in attracting members and resources and mobilizing others. For example, the civil rights decisions culminating in *Brown* contributed to the growth of civil rights organizations like SCLC, CORE, and SNCC that became active in the streets as well as in the Congress. The right-to-counsel decisions contributed to the development of a more respectable criminal bar and widespread use of organizations like Public Defender offices that have become active in behalf of criminal defendants not only in trial courts but in appellate courts, the legal community, and legislative settings as well.

The burden of this section, then, is that the view of policy making that informs Dahl's analysis is too narrow. Even in Dahl's own terms, he does not take account of the Court's influence on public policy. Moreover, the winners-and-losers approach leads to a view of policy making that diverts attention from a variety of ways in which the Supreme Court makes significant contributions to national policy making.

Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics

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That political thought has fallen on bad days is a commonplace among diagnosticians of our age. Although distressing, the circumstance is perhaps not surprising, given the general political malaise and social disarray prevalent in Western societies today. Obviously, the infirmity of political thought signifies neither an end of politics nor necessarily a cessation of philosophical reflection as such. Our century has not been marked by a lack of political drama or ideological commitment; politics—conceived both as spontaneous activity and as the more systematic planning and implementation of social panaceas—has left its indelible imprint on the physiognomy of our age. At the same time, intellectual endeavors have netted remarkable advances in terms of analytical rigor and methodological refinement; academic philosophers have made great strides in clarifying the logical and conceptual arsenal of inquiry. What is at issue is not so much the analytical sagacity of our time but the fate of political philosophy and, more broadly, the relationship between thought and everyday practice. By and large, contemporary philosophers have been reluctant to venture beyond academic boundary lines; encouraged by the inhospitable character of the political arena, they have been insufficiently concerned about the lot of their fellow-men to exchange the ivory tower for the hazards of the market place. To this extent, the dearth of political theory illustrates and corroborates a basic symptom of the crisis of our period: the disintegration of public deliberation and discourse among members of the political community.

To professional students of politics, it is true, the situation may seem less bleak than indicated. As is well known, political thought as a field of study has been cultivated during recent decades by a devoted group of scholars in the discipline; as a result of these efforts, we have even been told of a "revival of political theory" in our time.[1] Regarding intellectual outlook, this group or school has adhered by and large to what one may call a stance of "metaphysical realism"—a posture claiming direct access of the mind to a domain of ultimate and objective reality; in a sense, since positive knowledge of this final domain is postulated, the outlook might also be labeled "higher positivism."[2] The point here is not to challenge the dedication and scholarship of individual members (nor even, for the moment, the cogency of the adopted stance); at issue is simply the philosophical character of the group's enterprise. To a remarkable extent, this enterprise has remained apart from major currents or trends in contemporary philosophy—apparently on the assumption that the questions raised by these trends are either not worth asking or not worth answering. With few exceptions metaphysical realists in political science have preferred to open interrogation the reiteration of past doctrines or ancient wisdom, a preference sometimes shading over into a fascination with esoteric knowledge. A similar segregation persists with regard to empirical political inquiry. Despite periodic (and increasingly ceremonial) clashes between realists and empiricists, the discipline has for all practical purposes accepted a division of labor which assigns to positivists the terrain of concrete research and to theorists the privilege of final insight. Not surprisingly, as a corollary of these types of intellectual enclosure, the discussed outlook has been virtually immune from the dilemmas and agonies of contemporary political and social experience. In all these respects, professional political theory approximates what Merleau-Ponty at one point called "thought in retreat." While "to philosophize is to seek," he noted, we today prefer the pretense of having found: "We 'return' to one or the other of our traditions and 'defend' it. Our convictions are founded less on perceived values and truths than on the vices and errors of those we do not like."[3]

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[1] See, e.g., Dante Germino, *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

[2] The above comments are not directed against ontology as such, but only against an objectivistic or deterministic ontology which (in Heidegger's terms) levels Being into the world of objects. For a critical appraisal of metaphysical realism or "ontological determinism" compare Hwa Yol Jung, "Leo Strauss' Conception of Political Philosophy: A Critique," *The Review of Politics*, 29 (October 1967), 492–517; also his communication to the editor in *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 964–965.

[3] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, trans. John Wild and James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 41. As he added: "Each of us is expiating for his youth. This decadence is in accord with the course of our history. Having passed a certain point of tension, ideas cease to develop and live. They fall to the level of justifications and pretexts, relics of the past, points of honor; and what one pompously calls the movement of ideas is reduced to the sum of our nostalgias, our grudges, our timidities, and our phobias."

In these pages I propose to delineate an alternative perspective which broadly may be described as "critical theory of politics." The term "critical" in this context is meant to refer not simply to a desire to challenge opposing postures, but to a general willingness to submit the premises of one's argument to scrutiny and inspection. A critical outlook of this kind, in my view, can draw inspiration primarily from two major currents in contemporary thought: one is existential phenomenology; the other, critical Marxism, especially as articulated by members of the so-called Frankfurt School. To be sure, the two currents are not entirely congruent; in fact, if Marxism is identified with materialism and phenomenology with the intuitions of subjective consciousness, their concerns appear diametrically opposed. Yet, as it seems to me, there is sufficient common ground between the two currents to support the suggested linkage.[4] Critical Marxism derives important impulses from the writings of the young Marx (discovered some four decades ago) which clearly reveal Marx's debt to, and involvement in, the legacy of philosophical discourse. In equal measure, neo-Marxists have been influenced by Georg Lukács's early studies, especially by his plea (in *History and Class Consciousness*) that Marxism be treated not as a series of fixed assertions but as a critical method of inquiry intent on interpreting particular phenomena in the light of the broader fabric of social experience. Relying on these and similar precedents, the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research during the prewar period developed a program of "critical theory" in order to unravel the dilemmas of bourgeois society. As articulated by its initial protagonists, the Frankfurt program was not entirely free of doctrinaire beliefs; in the writings of the young Horkheimer, for example, the effort of comprehensive assessment was marred at crucial points by an indiscriminate fusion of theoretical insight and practical advice, of concrete observation and political commitment.[5] In all these respects, recent investigations by Frankfurt theorists have tried to overcome ideological preconceptions by applying the standards of critical inquiry to such diverse fields as epistemology, ethics, and the theory of language. The leading protagonist of these efforts is the philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas; he has been seconded and sometimes undergirded by Karl-Otto Apel, a philosopher broadly conversant with the major theoretical trends of our time and generally sympathetic to the Frankfurt program.

Phenomenology from its inception has never claimed to be a finished system of propositions. Husserl's celebrated call "to the things themselves" was an exhortation to abandon preconceived doctrines in favor of fresh observation and interpretation; rather than vouchsafing simple introspection or confinement in a solipsistic consciousness, the procedure of "*epoché*"—the "bracketing" or suspension of naïve assumptions about reality in favor of reflection—encouraged open-ended inquiry and the sustained scrutiny of knowledge claims. While stressing the embeddedness of all human endeavors in an ongoing and prereflective social life-world, Heidegger's hermeneutical perspective involved the purge of routine conceptions in an effort to permit renewed investigation and exegesis. Combining and reconciling Husserlian and Heideggerian themes, Merleau-Ponty formulated the contours of a critical phenomenology attentive to concrete experience. His inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, entitled *In Praise of Philosophy*, was a eulogy of the Socratic method. As he tried to show, philosophy is not a set of ready-made doctrines but an endeavor comprising "inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity"—without lapsing into equivocation. "Even those," he noted, "who have desired to work out a completely positive philosophy have been philosophers only to the extent that, at the same time, they have refused the right to install themselves in absolute knowledge." Following in the footsteps of his Greek mentor, Merleau-Ponty added, the Socratic thinker is equally far removed from haughty detachment—the pretense of esoteric insight—and a spurious complicity in practical schemes: "The irony of Socrates is a distant but true relation with others." Seen from this perspective, philosophy is bound to be a precarious and "limping" enterprise: "It dwells in history and in life, but it wishes to dwell at their center, at the point where they come into being with the birth of meaning."[6]

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[4] For a general comparison of the two currents compare my "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in *Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications*, ed. George Psathas (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 305–356. More recently I have tried to indicate in more detail the similarities and divergencies between existential phenomenology and Habermas's version of critical theory; see "Einleitung" and "Epilog" in *Materialien zu Habermas' "Erkenntnis und Interesse"* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 10–21, 418–432.

[5] See, e.g., Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in his *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 188–243. Regarding the Frankfurt School compare Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973); Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Theory* (New York: Braziller, 1973); and regarding Georg Lukács his *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), esp. p. 1.

[6] *In Praise of Philosophy*, pp. 4–5, 38, 58. Commenting on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty noted at another point:

Critical thought in the Socratic mold militates against both disdain for truth and doctrinaire rigidity. Philosophical doubt and self-scrutiny are not equivalent to skeptical indifference or agnostic despair—just as growth in understanding offers no shield against further examination. It is a perspective of this kind that Paul Ricoeur invoked when he spoke of "a rational feeling that is regulative and purificative both of skepticism and fanaticism: skepticism which refuses to look for meaning and fanaticism which declares it prematurely." In a similar vein, Merleau-Ponty linked the philosopher with the "common man" whose latent thought he expresses, arguing that both are aligned against "the important one who thinks by principles and against the roué who lives without truth."[7] Given the open-ended character of critical inquiry, the following pages cannot aim to offer a full-fledged doctrine or a systematic set of propositions; rather, the goal can only be to sketch the implications of critical thought for selected areas of discourse. For present purposes, three broad topics or problem areas have been selected. After exploring the parameters of everyday experience or the "human condition" underpinning more reflective types of endeavor, the paper turns to questions of cognition and the search for valid knowledge, with particular focus on social and political research. A concluding section shifts attention to the justification of ethical standards and the relevance of such standards for democratic theory and practical political life.

The Human Condition

One of the major developments in our century has been the impressive growth of scientific knowledge and especially the expansion of scientific research into the recesses of human and social experience. Assisted by biological science, behavioral analysis has mapped out the basic parameters of human dispositions and their nexus with environmental conditions. As a result of these advances, it is claimed, "human nature" has become amenable to objective explanation and predictive control. It matters little in this context whether the human "core" is located in innate genetic endowments or in a reactive mechanism transforming stimuli into behavioral responses; in either case, man is seen as an empirical factor in a knowable and manageable universe. The concern with an objective "human nature" is not limited to behavioral scientists but shared by many adepts of "traditional" political philosophy; the conflict between positivists and metaphysical realists in this respect concerns not so much the goal as the procedures of verification. From the realist perspective, man is viewed as a distinctive and definable creature integrated into a larger cosmos which, in turn, is animated by an intelligible purpose.[8]

Countering both positivist and realist arguments, critical thought erodes the solidity of the postulated "human nature." From its beginning, phenomenology opposed conceptions identifying man either with internal dispositions or with a reactive mechanism (or with a combination of the two dimensions). In introducing and developing the notion of intentionality, Husserl sought to overcome the gulf customarily erected between internal or mental capacities and physical endowments, or (in Cartesian terms) between matter and thinking substance. With the stress on intentionality, man emerged as an inquiring creature, a creature able to question both his environment and himself. Once man was seen in this light, the compactness of human nature was bound to disintegrate. For, how can any delimitation be definitive, given man's intentional self-awareness—the ability to view himself as his own alter ego? First of all, any proposed model or theoretical construct of man operates on a different level from empirical or substantive findings and cannot, thus, be explained in their terms. More important, any substantive delimitation opens itself up to self-awareness and reflection—a reflection which inevitably adds a new dimension to the postulated model and pushes man beyond his delimited alter ego. Against this background, man appears at best as the horizon of his empirical operations and substantive qualities.

The implications of this view of man have been explored and patiently delineated by Heidegger and other existential phenomenologists. Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* pictures man as a unique "being-in-the-world," a creature intimately enmeshed in the fabric of ongoing social and cultural practices. Yet, although thrust into this web, man is not simply a reactive apparatus or a blind victim

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perpetual beginner, which means that he takes for granted nothing that men, learned or otherwise, believe they know. It means also that philosophy itself must not take itself for granted, insofar as it may have managed to say something true; that it is an ever-renewed experiment in making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the description of this beginning, and finally, that radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial situation, unchanging, "The philospher, as the unpublished works declare, is a given once and for all." *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. XIV.

[7] See *In Praise of Philosophy*, p. 63; Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 12.

[8] For examples of positivist (behavioralist) and realist postures compare Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 3–11, 133–138 ("Introduction: The Root is Man," "Epilogue: The Goal is Man"); and Eugene F. Miller, "Political Philosophy and Human Nature," *The Personalist*, 53 (Summer 1972), 209–221.

of natural causes. Overcome by "eeriness" (*Unheimlichkeit*), man discovers the dilemma of being involved but not properly at home in the objective universe; moved by "care" (*Sorge*) he becomes concerned and inquires about his condition and about the point of his involvement in the world. *Dasein* in this light is at best an incongruous and precarious enterprise, a relationship rather than a fixed substance. In the words of one observer: "Man is the gap which separates and at the same time unites subject and object"; instead of fitting into a compact scheme of things he discloses "a rift within Being."[9] Man's incongruous condition, however, does not simply sanction mental self-enclosure or the retreat into subjectivism; the need to inquire about the significance of his condition offers no warrant for private speculation. As Heidegger is wont to insist (especially in his later writings), genuine questioning presupposes openness toward a dimension of reality which, though immune from reification, lies beyond subjective fancy. In raising questions, the *Introduction to Metaphysics* states, "We seem to belong entirely to ourselves. Yet it is this questioning that moves us into the open, provided that, in questioning, it transform itself (which all true questioning does), and cast a new space over everything and into everything."[10]

Heidegger's conception was corroborated and in some respects amplified in Merleau-Ponty's writings. The characterization of the human condition as "être-au-monde" was meant to accentuate man's precarious and incongruous involvement in the world. Elaborating on Hegelian insights, Merleau-Ponty argued that man, "as opposed to the pebble which is what it is," should be defined "as a place of unrest (*Unruhe*), a constant effort to get back to himself, and consequently by his refusal to limit himself to one or another of his determinations." Arguing against both empiricist and idealist premises, he stressed that man is neither an object nor a "constituting consciousness" but a special "intentional" creature: "oriented toward all things" but "not residing in any." Together with Heidegger, he rejected the label "humanist" for his outlook—"if one understands by 'man' an explanatory principle which ought to be substituted for the others." As he noted in his address before the Collège de France: "One explains nothing by man, since he is not a force but a weakness at the heart of being, a cosmological factor, but also the place where all cosmological factors, by a mutation which is never finished, change in sense and become history."[11] As in Heidegger's case, the stress on intentionality was not an endorsement of subjective whim. Following Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty focused attention on human "embodiment"—a term referring both to man's bodily constitution (governed by the laws of the physical universe) and to the body's function as key in an intersubjective search for meaning. In his later writings, he expanded phenomenological inquiry progressively to the levels of preconscious and unconscious experience, an endeavor which, in the words of one observer, transformed his philosophy into an "archaeology which does nothing but excavate the meaning of the world which is already before us to be discovered."[12]

To some extent, phenomenological and existentialist arguments find a parallel in critical Marxism. In his *Theses on Feuerbach* Marx himself rejected a naturalistic brand of humanism which reduces man to a fixed substance among other empirical factors. In a similar vein, Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* commented that the treatment of man as the measure of things was plausible only if this measure as open-ended horizon was applied to man himself in his concrete or substantive manifestations.[13] Among neo-Marxist thinkers, no one has probably been more persistently concerned with the dilemmas of the human condition than Ernst Bloch. The cornerstone of Bloch's thinking has always been the incongruity and dark tension implicit in the lived moment, a tension pushing man beyond the immediate presence toward the "not-yet" of a future whose contours can at best dimly be anticipated or divined. Intentionality in his view means a relentless striving beyond present confinements toward a world free of despair and oppression. "The desiderium, the single honorable quality of men," he wrote in the *Principle of Hope*, "has not been investigated. The not-yet-conscious, the not-yet-become, although it fulfills the mind of every man and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept." Because of the rift between present circumstances and aspirations, man's condition is basically characterized by incompleteness and deficiency; subject to detours and reversals, the human "venture is not yet successful" and in fact "no man yet really lives." In his actual state, according to Bloch, man should be described not so much as a substance but as a lack—as a hidden creature or *homo absconditus* searching for self-realization. This search, in his view, is not simply an idiosyncratic exercise but is supported by a latent proclivity in nature: the proclivity toward a "humanization of nature" corresponding to man's reconciliation with his habitat.[14]

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[9] Karsten Harris, "Martin Heidegger: The Search for Meaning," in *Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, ed. George A. Schrader, Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 171, 185. Compare also Helmut Fahrenbach, "Heidegger und das Problem einer 'philosophischen' Anthropologie," in *Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 97–131.

[10] Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 29–30. As Richard E. Palmer comments: "Questioning, then, is a way that man contends with and draws being into showing itself. It bridges the ontological difference between being and the being of beings." *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 150.

[11] See *In Praise of Philosophy*, p. 44; and *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. Hubert L. and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 66 ("Hegel's Existentialism") and 72 ("The Battle over Existentialism"). Compare also his statement that man is "like an open notebook in which we do not yet know what will be written"; *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 6.

[12] Hwa Yol Jung, "The Radical Humanization of Politics: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Politics," *Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie*, 53 (May 1967), p. 239.

[13] Compare Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 186–190; also my "History and Class-Consciousness: Georg Lukács' Theory of Social Change," *Politics and Society*, 1 (November 1970), 113–131, at 129.

Frankfurt theorists have long been preoccupied with similar issues—although early formulations (by Horkheimer and Marcuse) tended to alternate unevenly between the stress on human freedom or indeterminacy and the notion of a predictive teleology. Later statements reflect a more circumspect approach. In an essay on "philosophical anthropology," Jürgen Habermas in 1958 argued that man should be viewed simultaneously as a creature of nurture and of culture and that his condition should be examined both in terms of biological evidence and cultural significance: "To speak, act and produce means not only to make use of certain bodily organs but to disclose a meaning." As he noted, the dual aspect was distantly related to Kant's distinction between a "physiological" and a "pragmatic" anthropology—the former dealing with "what nature made of man" and the latter with what man makes of himself. In Herder's terminology, man had to be seen as "the first emancipated creature of nature"—a perspective which, however, does not imply a complete indeterminacy. In comparison with animals, man is marked by instinctual diffuseness and disorientation—a deficiency which is compensated by, and one of the chief impulses for, the establishment of cultural institutions and norms. "Human existence," Habermas commented, "denotes a peculiar combination of environmental confinement and purposive openness. By itself, the one or the other aspect would be applicable to animals or angels; but man is placed between both." As he added, the attempt to transform man either into a compact creature (with a fixed environment) or into a pure spirit is bound to lead to a substantive definition—with hazardous political consequences: "When clinging to a substantive (ontological) procedure by focusing on the unchanging or permanent features of human life, anthropology becomes uncritical and encourages in the end even a dogmatism with political implications (the more dangerous because presumably scientific)."[15]

In developing his argument, Habermas relied in large measure on the insights of one of the pioneers of "philosophical anthropology," Helmuth Plessner, whose work seems at least broadly compatible with the Frankfurt perspective. Equally attentive to the findings of biological and physiological research and to contemporary philosophy (including phenomenology) Plessner in his writings has delineated a broad-gauged and complex interpretation of the human condition. Like Merleau-Ponty he pictured man as an embodied creature—with the dual connotation that he experiences the world through his bodily organs and that he "has" a body and is able to reflect on his empirical situation. Marked by a "natural artificiality," human existence from this vantage point appears lodged at the crossroads of nature and history, of physical adaptation and the search for meaning. Drawing on Uexküll's studies of the closed ecological milieu of animals and of the fixed linkage between instincts and stimuli in animal behavior, Plessner argued that man is distinguished by a peculiar instinctual deficiency and incongruity, by an "ex-centric position" in regard both to himself and his environment. Eccentricity, in this context, does not denote a complete removal from physical and environmental bonds but rather the lack of a stable ecological habitat. Instead of being safely enmeshed in a life-cycle or the stimulus-response nexus, man has to "lead" his life by designing a web of symbolic meanings and by embodying himself in cultural and institutional settings. In Plessner's view, such settings provide at best a temporary and precarious refuge; contrary to the opinion of some anthropologists (especially Arnold Gehlen), cultural and institutional arrangements offer no shield against continuing scrutiny and interrogation. At the same time, eccentricity and open-ended inquiry are not synonymous with a simple withdrawal from role patterns or a retreat into a purely private or subjective "authenticity." Constrained to find himself through interaction with others and yet impelled to question existing arrangements, man is at best (in Kant's phrase) a "crooked timber" and his disposition toward others an "unsociable sociability."[16]

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[14] See Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 4, 225, 327; *Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterungen zu Hegel* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1962), p. 471. Compare also David Gross, "Ernst Bloch: The Dialectics of Hope," in *The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin*, ed. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 107–130; and Pierre Furter, "Utopia and Marxism according to Bloch," *Philosophy Today*, vol. 14 (Winter 1970), pp. 236–249.

[15] Habermas, "Anthropologie," in *Fischer-Lexikon: Philosophie*, ed. Alwin Diemer and Ivo Frenzel (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer, 1958), pp. 19, 21, 32–33. Compare in this context also Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism," *Social Research*, 39 (Summer 1972), 285–305; and Christian K. Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthroplogy," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2 (September 1972), 231–246.

Epistemology and Political Inquiry

The implications of the sketched view of the human condition are numerous and complex; one issue which has intensely preoccupied both phenomenology and neo-Marxism is the contemporary "knowledge explosion" and its significance for human life. As has frequently been observed, our century has witnessed an unprecedented accumulation of scientific and technological information and an impressive refinement of the methodological tools of analysis; these advances, however, have not been paralleled by a comparable clarification of human purpose. Indeed, an inverse relationship seems to prevail: to the extent that scientific inquiry has gained in rigor and rational lucidity, the parameters of private and public conduct have tended to become blurred and obscure. The circumstance is not entirely fortuitous; in large measure, the contrast is built into the prevailing theory of knowledge. According to the dominant (though no longer uncontested) versions of positivism, the role of the human observer is marginal if not detrimental to objective inquiry. Among early empiricists, the assumption was widely shared that knowledge involves a simple verbal replication of factual data and thus a direct correspondence between findings and description. More recently, because of a growing recognition of the importance of theoretical formulation, positivism has paid closer attention to conceptual and semantic rigor—with the result that knowledge has come to be identified both with logical consistency and with the indirect factual adequacy of propositions. While useful for theoretical innovations, the experiential qualities of the researcher from this perspective are reduced to a "heuristic" function if not to the level of psychological idiosyncrasy.[17] In all these points, metaphysical realism parallels or at least approximates the positivist position; both insist on objective "correspondence" and some degree of rational articulation the difference residing mainly in the aspect that positivists limit knowledge claims to empirically testable statements while realists do not.

Despite differences in detail, both phenomenology and critical Marxism have tried to maintain or revive the nexus between analysis and purpose or between knowledge and human experience without being ready on this account to abandon valid cognition to subjective preference. Throughout his life, Husserl strove to uncover and elucidate human consciousness as the vital infrastructure of all cognitive endeavors. In his early writings, it is true, consciousness tended to be portrayed as transparent receptacle of objective reality; once purified through "bracketing" (*epoché*), the observer's mind was supposed to have access not only to surface appearances but to the "essence" or inner core of phenomena. In the long run, however, the program of a rigorously "scientific" philosophy proved less satisfactory or manageable than initially expected. For, assuming as end goal the correspondence and coincidence of mind and reality, how could philosophy be maintained as a perpetual beginning and renewal? Moreover, how could consciousness articulate its findings without relying on language and intersubjective understanding? In his later writings, Husserl turned his attention steadily to the human "life-world" as the prereflective dimension of experience underpinning conscious investigations. Instead of denoting a collective psychology or a mere reservoir of heuristic guesses, the life-world gave direction to inquiry and findings acquired meaning against its background. To be sure, prereflective experience is not self-explanatory and needs to be clarified through rigorous scrutiny. At this point, a certain ambiguity persists, since the relationship between the "natural attitude" and transcendental analysis and consciousness is open to diverse interpretations. Perhaps the most balanced statement of Husserl's epistemological approach can be found in his *Experience and Judgment*—a posthumously published work which, according to its translator, is dedicated to the thesis "that, even at its most abstract, logic demands an underlying theory of experience" and which traces the "genealogy of logic" from pre-predicative conditions over structures of predicative judgment to the level of conceptual thought and valid knowledge.[18]

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[16] Compare on the above points my "Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology: Implications for Role Theory and Politics," *Inquiry*, 17 (Spring 1974), 49–77. Regarding the notion of man as a "crooked timber" or an "anthropology of disproportion" see also Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man* (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), and his essay "The Antinomy of Human Reality and the Problem of Philosophical Anthropology," in *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, ed. Nathaniel M. Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 390–402.

[17] The heuristic importance of theoretical models or frameworks has been stressed primarily by Karl R. Popper and his school; e.g., in his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959). In a more radical departure from orthodox positivism, other philosophers of science have come to view the community of investigators as a "context of discovery" shaping the successive "paradigms" of inquiry (but with a bent to treat this context as a sociological or psychological environment); see, e.g., Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962; 2nd ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970); and Norwood R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1958). For the controversy between the Popper school and Kuhn's approach compare *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1970).

The dimension of the life-world and pre-predicative existence became the focus of exploration in Heidegger's interpretive or hermeneutical phenomenology. As he forcefully argued in *Being and Time*, human consciousness and cognition presuppose the factuality of man's being-in-the-world, his involvement in a prereflective matrix of experience. As a living context, "world" in Heidegger's usage referred neither to an external environment nor to a subjective construction, but rather to an intersubjective fabric of relationships (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) pregnant with latent meanings and connotations. Even prior to investigation, man encounters objects and events as significant in a dimly perceived sense and thus as implicitly interpreted and understood. Conscious thought raises the structure of pre-understanding to the level of an explicit and articulate interpretation; in doing so, thinking moves in the so-called "hermeneutical circle" in the sense that every exegesis draws upon (without being rigidly confined by) the implicit pre-understanding of the life-world.[19] Merleau-Ponty pursued and elaborated on the implications of Heidegger's "being-in-the-world"—without forgetting Husserl's plea for lucidity and rational scrutiny. He was centrally preoccupied with the infrastructure of human knowledge, especially with the prereflective, perceptual nexus between man and the world. As he tried to show in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, "the perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence." The relationship between thought and experience, he insisted, was not one between a detached intellect or thinking substance and an opaque environment but rather one between a primary web of latent meanings and a derivative effort of clarification. Scientific rationality, in particular, was not a self-contained universe of propositions; rather science was "built upon the world as directly experienced" and any effort to grasp its presuppositions must begin "by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression." The chief task of phenomenology, from this perspective, was to promote such reawakening: "To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always *speaks*, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is."

As in Heidegger's case, Merleau-Ponty's notion of perceptual experience was equally far removed from private or idiosyncratic feeling and from detached predicative judgment; apart from linking the individual and phenomena, it was the passkey to a world of intersubjective understanding and reciprocal correction: "The thing imposes itself not as true for every intellect, but as real for every subject who is standing where I am." In addition to eluding the subject-object dilemma, moreover, perception militated against other customary dichotomies. The perceived world was neither derived from the synthetic acts of a transcendental consciousness, nor was it a set of empirical data, since their significance was never fully exhausted: "Thus there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given." While stressing the primacy of perception, Merleau-Ponty was unwilling to renounce the task of reflection and analytical scrutiny. He readily admitted that "we cannot rest satisfied with the description of the perceived world" and that "it appears as a psychological curiosity if we leave aside the idea of the true world, the world as thought by the understanding." As an attentive student of Husserl's opus, Merleau-Ponty fully appreciated the importance of "bracketing" and of the temporary suspension of familiar involvements; the aim of such suspension in his view, however, was not to sanction retreat into an ivory tower but to bring everyday life into fuller view and to rekindle amazement and "wonder" in the face of the world: "Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire." Bracketing and experience thus were intimately linked; far from contradicting Heidegger's "being-in-the-world," Husserl's procedures were destined "to bring back all the living relationships of experience, as the fisherman's net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed." The movement from perception to valid cognition, against this background, was not so much a straight or linear progression, but a complex process of clarification in which experience "gradually rectifies itself and proceeds by dialogue with itself and with others"—a dialogue which is not aimless chatter but enveloped by a common horizon of truth.[20] In his posthumously published work, Merleau-Ponty expanded the range of reflective scrutiny by delving into the unconscious and submerged layers of experience—but without rupturing the linkage between inquiry and the world which (we are told) "exists in the interrogative mode."[21]

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[18] See Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. xxi–xxii ("Translator's Introduction").

[19] Compare Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); also *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

On the Marxist side, questions relating to knowledge and cognition had long been neglected; or rather, they were widely presumed to have been conclusively settled. At least since Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, a realist correspondence theory of truth—according to which the function of the mind is to mirror reality—was accepted as official doctrine; with the accumulation of empirical evidence, the adopted realist stance was expected to be raised to the level of positive scientific knowledge. Lenin's realism and incipient positivism, however, were never uniformly endorsed in the Marxist movement. The legacy of the Hegelian dialectic was bound to have an unsettling effect on the notion of a static correspondence; even among Hegelians, however, cognition was treated as a secondary issue—an issue overburdened with connotations of a Kantian "pure synthesis" of perception. Critical neo-Marxism, intent on clarifying its premises, thus was confronted with the task of re-examining the epistemological domain and of formulating a new approach to the problem of knowledge. Recent publications by Frankfurt theorists and cognate thinkers testify to the scope and intensity of this endeavor. Karl-Otto Apel's early writings were animated by the effort to uncover the complex underpinning of cognition, an effort strongly influenced by existential phenomenology. Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Apel argued that every type of cognitive inquiry presupposes a prereflective matrix of ongoing practices and relationships, a "bodily involvement" (*Technognomie*) of the researcher in some dimension of the life-world. Bodily involvement in his treatment, it is true, was not presented as sufficient condition for valid judgments; knowledge, he granted, depended also on a temporary reflective suspension of everyday practices. His later writings, broadly speaking, pursue the exploration of experience and reflection in the direction of a critical or "transcendental" hermeneutics in which truth is assumed to emerge from the universal discourse of mankind conceived as community of investigators.[22]

Among Frankfurt theorists, the most comprehensive and penetrating scrutiny of the epistemological domain has been undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, especially in his study *Knowledge and Human Interests*. While substituting the term "interest"—prominent in the Marxist tradition—for the broader notions of experience or perception, the study in its basic thrust paralleled phenomenological investigations by concentrating on the prereflective premises of human cognition. As Habermas tried to show, epistemology on a grand scale had last been practiced by Kant in his critiques of human understanding; but the framework of cognition had in this case been lodged in the categories of an abstract and invariant consciousness. While maintaining the ambition of universal knowledge, both Hegel and Marx ultimately eroded reflection on the genesis of cognition—the former by identifying spirit and nature, the latter by submerging thought in human self-production through labor. Under the impact of Comte and his positivist followers, finally, cognition was stripped of its philosophical and experiential parameters, a development which led to the triumph of scientific methodology. The later part of the nineteenth century witnessed an assault on the positivist paradigm along two major lines: in Peirce's notion of a "community of investigators" as the pragmatic context of scientific inquiry and in Dilthey's reliance on the socio-cultural life-world for purposes of historical exegesis. Moving beyond these beachheads, *Knowledge and Human Interests* postulated that knowledge claims of any type had to be traced to an underlying experiential matrix, to the level of basic cognitive competences or "interests." These competences, in Habermas's view, denote neither pure transcendental categories nor mere empirical impulses or instincts. "Cognitive interests," he observed, "mediate the natural genesis of mankind with the logic of its cultural learning process" and are "not meant to reduce this process to a naturalistic dimension." As he added, the linkage between knowledge and interest was ordinarily complicated and indirect; only in the recesses of self-reflection was thought able to penetrate and merge with its experiential basis.[23]

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[20] See Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. viii–ix, xiii, xv; also "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, pp. 13, 16–17, 19, 21.

[21] See Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 103.

[22] Compare Karl-Otto Apel, "Technognomie: Eine erkenntnis-anthropologische Kategorie," in *Konkete Vernunft: Festschrift für Erich Rothacker* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1958), pp. 61–78; "Sprache und Wahrheit in der gegenwärtigen Situation der Philosophie," *Philosophische Rundschau*, 7 (Fall 1959), 161–184; and "Einleitung: Transformation der Philosophie," in *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 9–76.

[23] Compare Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,

Since its first publication, Habermas's study has been the target of numerous critical assessments and reviews. Central among objections raised were complaints about the hazy and ill-defined character of "cognitive interests" and about the stipulated nexus between such interests and the pursuit of knowledge. In some of his subsequent writings, Habermas responded to the arguments of his critics and, in doing so, reformulated and partially revised his outlook. The central thrust of the reformulation pointed in the direction of a certain loosening of the linkage between cognition and prereflective interest, between the validity of knowledge claims, on the one hand, and the genesis as well as application of knowledge, on the other. The loosening was effected chiefly through the introduction of the notion of "discourse" and its differentiation from everyday practice or experience. In Habermas's definition, discourses are efforts to provide reasons or justifications for knowledge claims. While in everyday experience cognitive assertions or intersubjective norms tend to be naively accepted or taken for granted, discursive exchanges involve a temporary suspension of belief in the interest of thorough investigation and interrogation. As he noted, discourses of this type are roughly comparable to the phenomenological procedure of bracketing, especially to the "reduction" of existence to potentiality: "To speak as Husserl does, in discourse we bracket the general thesis" (of reality). To be sure, while Husserl's procedure was performed by a transcendental consciousness, Habermas's approach involved intersubjective communication and a reciprocal testing of propositions.[24]

Knowledge and Human Interests, together with subsequent elaborations, made a contribution not only to contemporary epistemological discussions in general, but also to a clarification of the character and status of social and political inquiry. Drawing at least in part on past distinctions between cognitive pursuits—especially between natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*—the study differentiated among three main types of knowledge: strict empirical science; historical and hermeneutical inquiry; and "critically oriented" social and political investigation.[25] These types were all held in some manner to be animated by and linked with underlying experiential dispositions or interests. The methodology of empirical science revolved around the formulation of hypothetical propostions connecting observable phenomena, propositions which, following empirical experimentation or testing, serve to support law-like theorems endowed with explanatory and predictive capacity. Contrary to the intimations of positivism, however, the parameters of the empirical model were not themselves derived from observation nor from purely logical deduction; rather, they were anchored in the pragmatic context of the success and failure of experimental or instrumental operations. For this reason it seemed plausible to argue that empirical analysis approaches reality from an instrumental perspective, a perspective guided by an interest in the "technical control over objectified processes." Hermeneutical inquiry, on the other hand, aimed at the understanding of meaning rather than empirical observation and explanation; the testing of law-like theorems was replaced by the interpretation of symbols or texts. Paralleling the positivist misrepresentation of empirical methodology, historicism had misconstrued hermeneutical study in an objectivist direction, by reducing the records of human history to relics in a "*musée imaginaire*." As Habermas insisted, however, hermeneutical understanding always presupposed the interpreter's perspective; interpretation implied a merger of horizons, an effort to grasp the meaning of the past by relating and applying it to the interpreter's situation. As a result it was possible to affirm that hermeneutics is guided by a practical interest: the interest in the maintenance and expansion of the domain of intersubjective communication and understanding.

With regard to social and political inquiry, Habermas admitted a certain disarray and proliferation of contemporary orientations and methodological preferences. To some extent, present-day social research emulates the empiricist paradigm as it has been developed primarily by the natural sciences; by embracing the "nomological" model, behavioral social and political studies aim at the explanation, prediction, and potential control of social events. Countering the behavioral strategy, other approaches concentrate on the con-

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1971), pp. 196–197; also my "Reason and Emancipation: Notes on Habermas," *Man and World*, 5 (February 1972), 79–109.

[24] On the above, see Habermas, "Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973; translation of the 4th rev. edition of *Theorie und Praxis* of 1971), esp. p. 19; also my "Critical Theory Criticized: Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* and Its Aftermath," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2 (September 1972), 211–229. More recently, Habermas has formulated a discursive or "consensual" theory of truth, according to which truth and valid knowledge emerge from a universal discourse and exchange of propositions—propositions which are virtually uncontaminated by experiential bias. Compare his "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Stuttgart: Neske Verlag, 1973), pp. 211–265.

[25] For a historical sketch of past distinctions between types of knowledge (including the dichotomy between natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*) and their relationship to political inquiry compare my "Political Science and the 'Two Cultures,'" *Journal of General Education*, 19 (January 1968), 269–295.

crete understanding of social experience, on the interpretive exegesis of past or present symbolic communications.[26] By and large, the mentioned avenues of research do not transcend the prevailing models of science and hermeneutics; according to Habermas, a novel and unique paradigm can be found, however, in the case of "critical" social and political analysis. Proceeding from the distinction between invariant laws of nature and in principle changeable social constraints, such analysis has as its goal the unmasking and dismantling of ideologically camouflaged social manipulation and political oppression. In pursuing this aim, the "critique of ideology" is able to combine and reconcile explanation and understanding: once accepted and assimilated by the victim of domination, explanations of law-like social conditions can engender a process of reflection which, in turn, can lead to greater self-awareness and a liberation from spurious or unintelligible constraints. The paradigmatic model employed by critical inquiry is that of Freudian psychoanalysis. Moving beyond the domain of purposive and communicative interaction, Freud's "depth hermeneutics" was concerned with the decoding not only of intended but of systematically distorted or repressed meaning patterns. For this reason, causal explanation was intimately linked with interpretation: the analysis of pathological symptoms served the therapeutic goal of deepened self-understanding and the recovery of personal identity. Transposed to the social arena, psychoanalysis offers guidelines for critical social and political investigations, to the extent that explanatory propositions seek to rescue social discourse from suppression and corruption. The experiential framework for such investigations is the human capacity for self-reflection, a capacity which, because of its recuperative effect, can be said to be permeated by an emancipatory interest.[27]

Apart from the legacy of the *arbor scientiae* and traditional classifications of branches of knowledge, Habermas's typology of modes of inquiry can find support in past and present philosophical teachings, both inside and outside the Marxist camp.[28] In a preparatory essay to his epistemological study, Habermas listed as precedent Hegel's lectures during the Jena period in which, contrary to Kant's a priori reasoning, knowledge was presented as result of a complex learning process revolving around man's interchange both with his environment and his fellow-men. As Hegel specified at the time, this learning process occurred on various levels and comprised distinct patterns of mediations: especially the patterns of language, work, and communicative interaction. While work, abetted by instruments and utensils, channeled man's involvement with his environment in the direction of technical control, communicative interaction centered on the struggle for mutual recognition and on the disruption and restoration of moral bonds; language, finally, provided the general symbolic mediation between reflection and experience. Habermas in the same context also pointed to Marx's distinction between "forces" and "relationships" of production, between work and the social organization of the productive process; as he noted, however, social interaction in orthodox Marxism has tended to be subordinated to instrumental labor, a subordination inviting a positivist interpretation of human praxis.[29] More intimate and suggestive parallels can be detected in contemporary philosophy and especially in existential phenomenology. In delineating the basic experiential categories of the human condition, Heidegger's *Being and Time* sketched a "triad of care" comprising the different modes of man's involvement in the life-world: concern for workday things and practical designs; solicitude for others; and care for the self in its quest to be free from deception and unintelligible restraints. Adopting a somewhat more condensed formula, Paul Ricoeur in *History and Truth* concentrated on the dialectic between "work" and the "word," on the nexus between "saying and doing, signifying and making." It is the task of the humanities, he observed, "to compensate for the adaptation of man as worker to finite tasks by the interrogation of critical man upon his human condition in its entirety and by the chant of poetic man."[30]

Ricoeur's formula, to a large extent, is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's arguments regarding the relationship between philosophical, and especially hermeneutical, inquiry and exact empirical science. Strict science, he wrote in "The Philosopher and Sociology," designates "the effort to construct ideal variables which objectify and schematize" the lessons of experience, while philosophy refers to reflective awareness "of the open and successive community of *alter egos* living, speaking, and thinking in one another's presence and in relation to nature." Husserl's great merit, in Merleau-Ponty's view, was "to mark out a realm and an attitude of inquiry where philosophy and effective knowledge could meet." Despite his insistence on the "rigorous distinction" between the two cognitive dimensions, his investigations of the life-world and especially his notion of a "psycho-phenomenological parallelism" led him in the end "to the idea of *reciprocal envelopment.*" In application to social inquiry, the problem was how social life "can be both a 'thing' to be acquainted with without prejudices, and a 'signification' which the societies we acquaint ourselves with only provide an occasion for—how, that is, the social can exist both in itself and in us." Sociology, Merleau-Ponty insisted, could not restrict itself to a "mere recording of facts" devoid of interpretation and a concern for the meaning of data: "If objectivism or scientism were ever to succeed in depriving sociology of all recourse to significations, it would save it from 'philosophy' only by shutting it off from knowledge of its object." Conversely, hermeneutical interpretation could not sever its ties with empirical knowledge without deteriorating into empty speculation: "The philosopher thinks about his experience and his world. Except by decree, how could he be given the right to forget what science says about this same experience and world?"[31]

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[26] Compare, e.g., Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969); John B. O'Malley, *Sociology of Meaning* (London: Human Context Books, 1972); Maurice Natanson, ed., *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, two vols. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). For a critical review of divergent approaches to social inquiry see Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften: Materialien* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).

[27] The above presentation relies both on Jürgen Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* and on the lecture of 1965 with the same title which is reproduced in the Appendix, pp. 301–317.

[28] For an argument closely akin to Habermas's typology see Apel, "Szientifik, Hermeneutik, Ideologie-Kritik: Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnis-anthropologischer Sicht," *Man and World*, 1 (February 1968), 37–63.

[29] See Habermas, "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*," in *Theory and Practice*, pp. 142–169.

[30] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Sections 41–42; Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, pp. 4–5, 213. For the reference to Heidegger I am indebted to Theodore Kisiel's essay "Habermas' Purge of Pure Theory: Critical Theory without Ontology?" (forthcoming).

Apart from juxtaposing and correlating the perspectives of empirical science and interpretive understanding, Merleau-Ponty during the later years of his life came to appreciate increasingly the significance of Freudian psychoanalysis as a key for decoding human experience. The Freudian approach, in his view, diverged both from positivistic scientism and from a hermeneutical phenomenology limited to the level of conscious intentionality. In an essay published shortly before his death, Merleau-Ponty strongly endorsed the endeavors of those who "separate psychoanalysis from a scientistic or objectivistic ideology, who consider the Freudian unconscious as an archaic or primordial consciousness, the repressed as a zone of experience that we have not integrated." Phenomenology and psychoanalysis, he noted, were linked by close bonds of affinity—provided the thrust of phenomenology was broadened beyond the range of a simple "philosophy of consciousness." Given such a broadened conception, the basic terms of phenomenological inquiry were altered. Although consciousness was always "consciousness of something or of the world," this something or this world could no longer be treated as "an object that is what it is, exactly adjusted to acts of consciousness"; rather, consciousness emerged now as the "soul of Heraclitus" and "Being which is around it rather than in front of it" as "a Being of dreams, by definition hidden." Only by descending "into its own substratum" could phenomenology be reconciled with the Freudian enterprise. By contrast, a "phenomenological idealism" narrowly clinging to subjective intentionality was philosophically "insufficient" and a direct "threat to the Freudian heritage." Psychoanalysis, from this vantage point, appeared as a remedy both to the pretensions of reflective thought and to the arid myopia of empiricism; by delving into the realm of unconscious or preconscious experience, it successfully bypassed "idealist" as well as "objectivist" deviations—and perhaps the two dangers "are not so opposed at that."[32]

As in the case of Habermas, Freudian analysis in Merleau-Ponty's treatment combined the virtues of scientific knowledge and therapeutic insight; one should note, however, some differences of accent. As presented by Merleau-Ponty, depth psychology constituted a genuine synthesis rather than an amalgam of elements; knowledge and hermeneutical exegesis were able to blend because both perspectives were conceived from the beginning as congenial and mutually complementary. More importantly—and partly as a result of this convergence—psychoanalysis furnished not only critical weapons for combatting individual or social ills, but also an arsenal of coded or cryptic guideposts to recovery; viewed as an "archeology" of human experience, Freudian therapy emancipates from present constraints by uncovering submerged memories of the past. In all these respects, Merleau-Ponty's arguments are corroborated by Paul Ricoeur. In several of his writings, Ricoeur has insisted on the close linkage and complementarity between scientific explanation and hermeneutical interpretation. Science and exegesis, he has noted at one point, can no longer be rigidly separated as in Dilthey's time: "If understanding passes through explanation, explanation is completed in understanding." With regard to psychoanalysis, his *Essay on Interpretation* placed Freud's approach at the crossroads of two kinds of inquiry: a "hermeneutics of suspicion" concerned with the unmasking of systematic distortions and mystifications, and a "hermeneutics of reminiscence" aiming at the recovery of latent meanings and aspirations.[33]

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[31] Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Sociology," in *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 99, 101–102, 110. As he added (p. 98): "We need neither tear down the behavorial sciences to lay the foundations of philosophy, nor tear down philosophy to lay the foundations of behavorial sciences. Every science secretes an ontology; every ontology anticipates a body of knowledge."

[32] Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard's L'Oeuvre de Freud," in *The Essential Writings of Merleau Ponty*, ed. Alden I. Fisher (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), pp. 81, 84–86.

Ethics and Political Life

In addition to elucidating cognitive endeavors and the acquisition of knowledge in various domains, critical thought also contributes to a clarification of normative issues and to the reintegration of such issues into contemporary politics. Probably, this contribution is paramount—given the prevailing disarray of individual and social norms and the enormous discrepancy between the wealth of empirical information and the lack or dearth of purposive benchmarks. While science and technology today provide the potential for global destruction, the criteria of individual or social choice have become cryptic or confused. To a considerable extent, this dilemma is the outgrowth of the positivist fact/value dichotomy and the concomitant devaluation of normative-practical considerations in favor of empirical knowledge. According to the ethical or metaethical teachings of positivism and logical empiricism, normative standards—unless expressly equated with statements about empirical conditions or dispositions—are outside the pale of rational or intelligible argument. While "cognitivists" tend to view moral preferences as informative assertions about the world or factual states of affairs, "noncognitivists" treat the same preferences as emotive effusions or arbitrary commands. The difference between cognitive positivists and realists in this domain is chiefly one of emphasis and limited to the meaning of cognitivism—especially to the question whether normative yardsticks are subject to empirical verification or reflect intuited layers of reality. In the assessment of one observer, the positivist fact/value dichotomy has deeply permeated contemporary social and behavioral science, with noncognitivism constituting "the assumption underlying most modern writings dealing with empirical research" and also "the dominant view among political theorists" in our time.[34]

Actually, the present situation is considerably more fluid and complex than the preceding portrayal would indicate. During recent decades, philosophical trends in a variety of contexts have pointed toward a revival of moral argument even in the absence of cognitive premises; by means of a careful and critical scrutiny of normative statements, philosophers of different persuasions have progressively uncovered the distinctive and autonomous status of moral discourse vis-à-vis empirical propostions. The trend has been particularly prominent within the domain of analytical philosophy or linguistic analysis. Relying on Wittgenstein's delineation of "language games" as social life-forms, "ordinary language" theorists in recent times have probed the multi-faceted meanings and connotations of moral terms in everyday interactions or communicative exchanges.[35] Although emerging from a vastly different background, similar developments can be detected in Continental European thought. In the context of phenomenological inquiry, the cognitive intuition of objective (or absolute) values has increasingly given way to hermeneutical explorations of the meaning patterns of the "life-world" and of the moral implications of everyday practices. Despite its advance beyond positivist constraints (especially the cognitivism-noncognitivism bifurcation), however, the sketched reorientation has not removed all ethical or metaethical quandaries. In the writings of analysts as well as phenomenologists, ambiguity persists regarding the justification or validity of normative standards. According to many language theorists and some phenomenologists, the task of ethical reflection is simply to provide a descriptive account of ongoing language games or community practices, including the conventions of moral argument. The result has been a perspective—which might be labeled linguistic or phenomenological "descriptivism"—in which ethics and habit, moral conviction and prejudice tend to be precariously fused. Coupled with other defects, this danger has quickly aroused the protest of dissenters who view moral judgment as the outgrowth of free choice—a choice inspired by general imperatives prescribing yardsticks for human conduct. Unfortunately, as presented by most "prescriptivists," the binding character of postulated rules remains in doubt—especially if the selection of rules is itself predicated on arbitrary preference.[36]

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[33] Compare Ricoeur, "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue," *Philosophy Today*, 17 (Summer 1973), 163; also "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," *Social Research*, 38 (Autumn 1971), 529–562, and *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

[34] Felix E. Oppenheim, *Moral Principles in Political Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 166. The above comments are not meant to belittle the difference between noncognitivism and realism, but merely to suggest similarities between positivists and realists in respect to cognitivism. Compare, e.g., Bruce E. Wright, "A Cognitivist Program for Normative Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 675–686.

[35] Compare, e.g., Stephen E. Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1950); also Paul Edwards, *The Logic of Moral Discourse* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

Quandaries of this kind throw into relief recent initiatives by members of the Frankfurt School in the domain of ethical and metaethical theory. The notion that descriptive and prescriptive elements somehow need to be joined in ethical argument has for some time been recognized (albeit dimly) by philosophical pioneers in our century, including critical Marxists; in a sense, the entire history of ethics (at least in Western thought) seems to revolve around the tensions and shifting accommodations between the two elements.[37] Implicitly, a philosophical reconciliation was suggested or foreshadowed in Merleau-Ponty's writings. Turning against the pretensions of a naturalistic or teleological cognitivism, Merleau-Ponty in the "Battle over Existentialism" denounced the view that men "like things" are "nothing but a nature heading toward its perfection." As he insisted, ethics was inconceivable without the premise of free choice: "If I can say yes or no to my destiny, then the Good is not my good unless I agree to it." Freedom of choice, however, was not synonymous with arbitrary preference or private whim, and the conception of norms could not be divorced from the broad patterns of human experience. "If we admit," he noted in a different context, "that our life is inherent to the perceived world and the human world, even while it recreates it and contributes to its making, then morality cannot consist in the private adherence to a system of values."[38]

A similar thrust, although formulated progressively in a more elaborate and complex manner, can be found in Habermas's thought. From the time of his earliest publications, Habermas viewed social interaction or the "public domain" as an arena of practical-moral argument devoted to the clarification of common purposes—an arena whose steady erosion and decay he deplored. In *Theory and Practice* he denounced both cognitivist and noncognitivist doctrines as inimical to moral discourse. The cognitivist fallacy, he observed, was represented in our time especially by scientism with its bent to deduce policies or goals of action from empirical analysis; noncognitivism, on the other hand, tended to abandon rational judgment in favor of blind, emotive decisions or commitments.[39] In his subsequent writings, Habermas couched his arguments increasingly in terms of contemporary language philosophy and linguistics. Regarding ordinary language analysis and hermeneutics, his attitude on the whole has tended to betray a mixture of approval and criticism: while agreeing that ordinary language and everyday experience provide the basic parameters for human endeavors in all fields, Habermas has resisted the lure of a linguistic or hermeneutical descriptivism. This stance has significant implications for the formulation of a critical ethics or metaethics. Although grounded in ongoing interactions and meaning patterns, moral discourse and the justification of norms—in his view—cannot be grasped adequately either through the descriptive portrayal of prevailing practices or through the stipulation of abstract, prescriptive rules; rather, their understanding requires an effort to reconstruct and explicate in a critical manner the normative standards implicit in intersubjective communicative encounters.

Habermas's posture toward ordinary language theory and hermeneutics was delineated succinctly in an essay exploring the presumed "supremacy" or universal application of interpretive understanding. As he acknowledged, contemporary "philosophical hermeneutics" (especially as articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer) has persuasively demonstrated the nexus of language and thought and the intimate linkage between interpretive understanding and human experience in its diverse forms. The interpretive thrust, he added, played a particularly important role in our age dominated by science and technology: by revealing the communicative underpinnings of scientific research and by fostering the reintegration of technological discoveries into everyday communication. While endorsing these features, however, Habermas was weary of the presumed self-sufficiency of understanding—the tendency to treat ordinary speech as the unassailable canon of philosophy. Elevated to a position of supremacy, hermeneutics was in danger of obfuscating the distinction between opinion and reason or between valid judgment and prejudice. Several strategies, he argued, were available for debunking this pretense; the discussed essay focused on a limitation arising within the arena of intersubjective encounters: the issue of systematically distorted or corrupted communication. Present to a greater or lesser extent in most social interactions, distortions or breakdowns of communication could not be disentangled through simple exegesis but required the diagnostic and therapeutic procedures of depth psychology. In trying to decode corrupted meaning patterns and to unlock the secret of repressed layers of experience, psychoanalysis relied on insights exceeding ordinary speech, while at the same time postulating the possibility of uncorrupted and nonrepressive communicative interaction. "A critically informed hermeneutics which differentiates between insight and deception," Habermas noted, "incorporates into its perspective the findings of depth psychology regarding the factors entailing systematically distorted communication. Such an outlook ties understanding to the principle of rational discourse according to which truth is guaranteed only by a consensus arrived at and maintained under the idealized conditions of unlimited and nonrepressive communication." The stipulated standard, moreover, was not merely of theoretical but also of practical significance owing to the close interdependence between undistorted communication and a nonrepressive life context: "In this sense, critical understanding implies an anticipatory vision of the good life."[40]

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[36] Compare, e.g., Richard M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); also Hans Albert, "Ethik und Metaethik," in Albert and Ernst Topitsch, eds., *Werturteilstreit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), pp. 472–516. For a critical comparison of descriptivism and prescriptivism see esp. William D. Hudson, *Modern Moral Philosophy* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970).

[37] To some extent, Aristotle and Kant may be said to typify the descriptive and prescriptive legacies in Western thought—provided that descriptivism is defined as an outlook tying norms to preponderant inclinations (happiness), and prescriptivism as a doctrine stressing duty and the adherence to universal imperatives.

[38] Merleau Ponty, "The Battle over Existentialism," in *Sense and Non-Sense*, pp. 75–77; "The Primacy of Perception," in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*) p. 25.

[39] Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 253–282.

The notion of nonrepressive communication as a standard of social interaction was developed at greater length in other essays, from a vantage point inspired chiefly by recent trends in linguistics. Relying on Noam Chomsky's concept of "linguistic competence"—and subsidiarily on the notion of "speech acts" delineated by John Austin and John Searle—Habermas formulated a theory of "communicative competence," a theory designed to reconstruct the basic rules governing speech situations and enabling individuals to participate in communicative encounters. The purpose of the argument, however, was not simply to modify and expand Chomsky's monological perspective in the direction of social dialogue; the aim was also to disclose a normative thrust in such dialogue. According to Habermas, all speech acts and communicative exchanges are geared toward mutual understanding and agreement and, ultimately, toward a standard of justifiable conduct. Ordinary language, in other words, is permeated by the anticipation of reciprocal consensus, a consensus achievable on the level of nonrepressive discourse or "ideal speech." Equally applicable to the validation of propositions and the justification of norms, the anticipatory thrust cannot be questioned or rejected—since such questioning involves the same anticipation of consensus. As Habermas added, the mentioned yardstick is neither prescriptively postulated nor derived from empirical observation and description; rather, embedded in the very core of communication, its tenets need to be carefully explicated and reconstructed. Given the prevalence of distorted or mangled communication patterns, to be sure, actual practice regularly falls short of the norm of ideal speech; yet, because of the consensual thrust, ordinary encounters always proceed on the implicit (though normally counterfactual) presumption that the norm is operative and observed. The distance between actual and projected patterns, in Habermas's view, involves not so much a logical conflict as a practical challenge and political task: from this challenge, "the critical theory of society takes its departure."[41]

Habermas's efforts to articulate a critical ethics and metaethics find a close parallel in Apel's writings, especially his essay "The Apriori of Communication and the Foundation of Ethics." Under the impact of positivism—Apel argued in that essay—contemporary ethical thought had bifurcated into two equally untenable positions: cognitive scientism or dogmatism and noncognitive relativism, with the former submerging moral choice in empirical demonstrations and the latter reducing it to private whim. In trying to overcome the pitfalls of the positivist paradigm, the paper discussed and assessed two major strategies or lines of argument: the strategies of linguistic and phenomenological descriptivism and of critical reconstruction. As Apel indicated, descriptivism was valuable for many reasons, in particular for challenging the positivist fact/value dichotomy and the rigid segregation of normative from empirical statements. In the view of both hermeneutics and ordinary language theory, normative preferences form an intrinsic part of the life-world of everyday experience and communication. This outlook, he added, reflects an important philosophical premise or insight: that of the "apriori of communication" or of the embeddedness of all thought in intersubjective language and discourse. While opposed to "monological" types of analysis, the premise buttresses the significance of interpretive understanding in human inquiry. Despite these and other advantages, however, Apel noted several deficiencies of the sketched approach. Descriptivism, first of all, has difficulty in grasping the impact of extralinguistic factors—such as technology or power—on the human life-world. More importantly, a descriptive account of language and meaning patterns tends to contract or shortcircuit the justification of norms, transforming moral judgment into a synonym for habit. To counteract self-enclosure, discourse thus has to be viewed as an open-ended, "quasi-transcendental" matrix of thought, amenable to critical evaluation. Ordinary language, the essay noted, "is insurmountable only in the sense that it constitutes the vehicle—the only available vehicle—for anticipating and implementing the normative goal of consensus."

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[40] Habermas, "Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik," in Karl-Otto Apel et al., *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 154. An English version of the middle section of the essay (with slight alterations) appeared under the title "On Systematically Distorted Communication" in *Inquiry*, 13 (Autumn 1970), 205–218, and as first part of a longer essay entitled "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in Hans P. Dreitzel, *Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 115–130. Compare also Paul Ricoeur, "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue," and Theodore Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology," *Philosophy Today*, 14 (Summer 1970), 151–160.

[41] Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was leistet die Systemforschung?* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 141. A preliminary draft of the essay in English appeared under the title "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in *Inquiry*, 13 (Winter 1970), 360–375, and as the second part of the essay "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in Dreitzel, *Recent Sociology No. 2*, pp. 130–148. Compare also Thomas A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (June 1973), 135–156; and for a further development of Habermas's ethical and metaethical views the third chapter in his *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 95–143.

While also relying on everyday discourse and experience, critical reconstruction preserves the open horizon of language. According to Apel, action or purposive endeavor is always enmeshed in an intersubjective and morally significant fabric of meaning—an involvement which is not a matter of private choice or preference. Thinking and intelligibly choosing, he emphasized, are impossible apart from the matrix of communication; every moral decision purporting to be intelligible, therefore, testifies to an underlying framework of mutual understanding and to an implicit intent of reciprocal justification (a process requiring "recognition of participants as equal partners in the discussion"). Intersubjective validation of norms from this perspective constitutes not merely a heuristic assumption, but rather a prereflective and primordial premise of argument and practical conduct; as long as language is supposed to make sense, "the moral standard implicit in argument can be termed unconditional or categorical." Although focusing on ongoing interaction, the reconstructionist approach does not simply derive moral yardsticks from prevailing social opinions. In contrast to contractual doctrines stressing factual agreement, the consensus uncovered by critical reflection discloses the transcendental parameters of thought and experience—parameters akin to the Kantian "fact of reason." Needless to say, reconstruction or explication of implicit norms does not insure their implementation or observance. Together with Habermas, Apel acknowledged the discrepancy and even antagonism between factual interactions and the ideal demand of justice or reciprocal justification; like the former, he interpreted this divergence as a tension which needs to be faced and sustained in everyday life and in the "unfinished dialectic" of history.[42]

Given the linkage between standards and social life patterns, the outlined ethical perspective has distinct implications for politics and political thought. Heeding the normative significance of ordinary experience, critical theory aims at universal interaction and discourse—politically speaking, at the establishment of a global democracy maintained by autonomous moral agents and committed to intersubjective equity and decency. This goal is not simply an abstract or groundless fantasy, nor is it synonymous with prevailing practices or trends; instead, it may be described as a "concrete utopia": a social and political benchmark combining the need of mankind's effective survival with the broader aspiration of the "good life." In a similar vein, the term "democracy" cannot simply be equated with empirical arrangements or the reign of factual opinion; nor can the term be identified with speculative doctrines or principles.[43] Among phenomenologists, no one has been more eloquent than Merleau-Ponty in denouncing the pretense of a "judicial politics" oblivious of concrete human agonies and concerns. "Whatever one's philosophical or even theological position," he wrote at one point, "a society is not the temple of value-idols that figure on the front of its monuments or in its constitutional scrolls; the value of a society is the value it places upon man's relation to man." From the perspective of a critical phenomenology, politics thus revolves basically around intersubjective experience and around the way people treat each other in everyday life. Political action is seen as embedded in social meaning patterns which are morally relevant but free of ideological obfuscations: "To understand and judge a society, one has to penetrate its basic structure to the human bond upon which it is built; this undoubtedly depends upon legal relations, but also upon forms of labor, ways of loving, living, and dying."[44]

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[42] See "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik," in Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie*, vol. 2, pp. 358–435. For a more detailed portrayal of Apel's argument compare my "Toward a Critical Reconstruction of Ethics and Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (November 1974), 926–957.

[43] For the contemporary debate about "democracy" compare, e.g., Mustafa Rejai, *Democracy: The Contemporary Theories* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967); and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967). Regarding the notion of a "concrete utopia" compare Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie* (1918; rev. ed. Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1964); also "Über die Bedeutung der Utopie" in *Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 124–132.

In focusing upon the life-world and in opposing mystification, critical theory also remains attentive to the hazards besetting the quest for consensus—especially to the prevailing inequalities of status and power. Actually, given the dialectical nexus of concrete conditions and aspirations, a simple neglect of power and a retreat into private innocence tends to perpetuate existing modes of exploitation. "In advocating nonviolence" under all circumstances, Merleau-Ponty wrote, "one reinforces established violence, or a system of production which makes misery and war inevitable." At the same time, however, he was equally aware that "in the return to the play of violence there is the risk of permanent involvement." The central issue of political life, in his view, was that of the relationship between power and equity or between "humanism and terror"; from the vantage point of a critical Marxism, the "essential task" was "to find a violence which recedes with the approach of man's future."[45] In his "Note on Machiavelli," Merleau-Ponty portrayed the Florentine as a critical analyst equally far removed from cynicism and spurious hope—as a thinker who managed to offend "good feelings in politics" while simultaneously unmasking the strategies of the powerful. In exposing the sinews of political conflict and removing ideological camouflages, Machiavelli did not simply glorify force or oppression, but rather made "a contribution to political clarity"; at the same time, without false rhetoric or bigotry, he "formulated some of the conditions of any serious humanism." His originality resided in the fact that "having laid down the source of struggle," he went beyond it "without ever forgetting it" and that he discovered in conflict the seeds of mutual recognition: "By putting conflict and struggle at the origins of social power, he did not mean to say that agreement was impossible; he meant to underline the condition for a power which does not mystify, that is, participation in a common situation."[46]

Far from being tailored to the narrow issue of power politics, Merleau-Ponty's comments link up with his broader concerns and especially with his interpretation of the mentor of Western philosophy: the image of a non-Machiavellian Machiavelli betrays some of the peculiar "limping" qualities characteristic of Socratic inquiry. The present pages have tried to explore these qualities or accents in a variety of contexts—including the contours of the human life-world, the framework of epistemology and political knowledge, and the dilemmas of moral and political life. Patterned after the Socratic mold, critical thought correlates but does not collapse theory and practice: involved in practical experience but aware of its hazards, the perspective shuns both blind activism and the lure of total contemplation (a posture which presupposes a finished universe). In his eulogy of the Socratic philosopher, Merleau-Ponty spoke of "the rebellious gentleness, the pensive engagement, the intangible presence which disquiet those who are with him." As a corollary of the nexus of experience and reflection, critical theory is lodged also at the interstices of knowledge and ignorance, of agnosticism and dogmatic belief. Pledged to the quest for truth and the good life, critical inquiry involves necessarily a reverent and devoted attitude or disposition; despite its theoretical fecundity, skepsis is "only the beginning of an attention, a seriousness, an experience on the basis of which it must be judged." By the same token, precisely in order to continue its search, inquiry has to remain aware of its shortcomings, including the temptations of prejudice and arrogance. For this reason, thinking cannot divest itself of critical doubt—unless the horizons of experience are to be closed off and philosophy is to be transformed into idolatry. The Socratic enterprise, Merleau-Ponty noted, simply "presses to the limit that criticism of false Gods" which the Judeo-Christian tradition had introduced into history. "Yes," he added, "where will one stop the criticism of idols, and where will one ever be able to say the true God actually resides if, as Maritain writes, we pay tribute to false gods 'every time we bow before the world'?"[47]

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[44] Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xiv. As he adds: "In refusing to judge liberalism in terms of the ideas it espouses and inscribes in constitutions and in demanding that these ideas be compared with the prevailing relations between men in a liberal state, Marx is not simply speaking in the name of a debatable materialist philosophy—he is providing a formula for the concrete study of society which cannot be refuted by idealist arguments." Compare also Henri Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

[45] *Humanism and Terror*, p. xviii. As Hwa Yol Jung observes: "In Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Machiavelli and Marxism, it becomes apparent that the political problem is the problem of power and humanity." See his "The Radical Humanization of Politics," p. 243.

[46] Merleau-Ponty, "A Note on Machiavelli," in *Signs*, pp. 211, 215, 223.

[47] *In Praise of Philosophy*, pp. 33, 46–47.

Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment *

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People would stare to know on what slight single observations those laws were inferred which wise men promulgate and which society receives later and writes down as canons.

Emerson

Introduction

Procedural norms have long been considered a major component of political systems, particularly of democratic systems. Yet we really know rather little of these norms or of the role they play in political life; V. O. Key wrote in 1960 that "the procedural context of American public opinion has been little explored,"[1] and little has happened since to expand our knowledge. This paper reports a replication and extension of the few existing studies that have been influential in explanation of American politics but which suffer from both conceptual and empirical problems.

By procedural norms I mean rules governing the way in which political decisions are made; they are not concerned with the content of any decision except one which alters decision-making procedures. Three theoretically significant reasons for concern with procedural norms exist. First, procedural norms are basic to our understanding of what democracy is. Democracy is often defined in purely procedural terms.[2] Many argue that democracy is more than simply a set of procedures;[3] but it is not unreasonable to maintain that even if democracy is *more* than a system of government, it is nevertheless *at least* a system of government.[4]

Second, each of the two theoretically important aspects of procedural norms is central to understanding how political systems actually operate. *Objective* procedural norms are rules which describe how decisions are actually made in a political system; a system's objective procedural norms are a primary determinant of the content of political decisions in that they specify who actually makes decisions, who can try to influence decision makers, what political resources are legitimate, and how resources may be used. *Subjective* procedural norms, on the other hand, are attitudes about the way in which decisions *should* be made: these norms may be a means of evaluating the political behavior of others, a guide to how one should behave politically, a basis for orienting oneself towards both the political system as a whole and the outputs that it produces. Agreement by citizens on subjective procedural norms has been seen by many theorists as essential to political stability and, if the norms involved are democratic, to democracy.[5]

Third, procedural norms are particularly relevant to American politics of the early 1970s because they have themselves become the subject of political controversy. On the one hand, the left, students, and blacks have claimed that the nominal rules of American democracy are being consistently violated in the internal workings of government and political parties, the making of foreign policy, and political control of black communities; on the other hand, the demonstrations and occupied university buildings of the late 'sixties have aroused others who believe that new forms of political activity approach or exceed the rather vague outer limits of what the American democratic creed considers permissible. The second group assumed particular importance in 1970 with the emergence of what Scammon and Wattenburg call the "Social Issue," a set of attitudes "concerning the more personally frightening aspects of disruptive social change" of which the Vietnam protest movement was a major component.[6] The decision of the Republican party to run its 1970 congressional campaign against protestors is an indication that procedural norms are not the exclusive concern of academic political scientists.

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* This research is based on a larger study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center training fellows, under the direction of Norman H. Nie, in 1971. Training fellows other than myself were Kristi J. Andersen, Barbara Currie, Richard Daft, David Helfant, Wayne L. Hoffman, Sidney Hollander, Jean Jenkins, Marque Miringhoff, and Goldie Shabad. NORC itself provided time on its spring amalgam survey, and both it and the Department of Political Science at The University of Chicago provided money for computer analysis of survey results. Professor Nie, Paul E. Peterson, Marvin Zonis and Sidney Verba provided helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper; I, of course, bear sole responsibility for the final product.

[1] V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 553.

[2] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1950), chap. 22, especially pp. 269–70, 242. See also: Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 37–38, 63–89; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, Chap. 1; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 311; Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamanatz and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (March, 1956), 131–32; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June, 1964), 363; Jack Dennis, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September, 1970), 819.

[3] See Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), pp. 285–295; and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967). Bachrach, however, in arguing that persecution of Christians, etc., is inherently non-democratic is himself using a procedural definition; see p. 19.

[4] See Plamanetz in "Cultural Prerequisites . . . ," p. 115 and Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 1–16.

[5] See Dahl, *Preface*, p. 75–81 or David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, Knopf, 1964), especially chap. 4.

Procedural Norms and Civil Liberties

The Literature on Tolerance. The particular aspect of procedural norms of concern here is that associated with tolerance and civil liberties: the particular norms involved are those pertaining to minority rights, the ways citizens are to be allowed to participate in politics and how non-elites are to influence the behavior of authorities.[7]

Three major studies have dealt with the distribution of democratic or tolerant subjective procedural norms in the United States. Samuel Stouffer investigated the extent of concern with communism among Americans in the McCarthy period of the early 'fifties and how Americans reacted to a perceived Communist threat.[8] He asked both a national cross-sample and 1500 community leaders about extending civil liberties to admitted Communists, suspected Communists, atheists, and socialists. Each respondent was asked whether a book written by such a person should be allowed in the public library and whether a member of each group should be allowed to speak in public, teach at a college or university, or teach at a local high school.[9]

Stouffer found rather low levels of tolerance in the mass public: only 27 per cent of the sample would permit an admitted Communist to speak in public; only 37 per cent would allow an atheist to do so. Nearly one respondent in three would not *permit somebody who had merely been accused of* being a Communist to speak publicly.

The elite differed little from the cross-section on questions concerning firing a person from a job; on the explicitly political items, however, the elite was considerably more tolerant. Of the cross-sample, 58 per cent would permit a socialist to speak; among the elite, the figure is 84 per cent.[10] The finding is particularly interesting in that some groups represented in the elite sample, such as the DAR and American Legion leaders, would tend to be particularly concerned with the Communist threat.

Based on a Guttman scale of these tolerance items, the population was divided into "more tolerant" and "less tolerant" groups.[11] Although only 31 per cent of the cross-sample is considered more tolerant, 66 per cent of the elite is. Within the cross-sample, tolerance is highly associated with education: among college graduates, 66 per cent were more tolerant and 5 per cent less tolerant; among those with only a grade school education, 16 per cent were more tolerant and 22 per cent less tolerant.

Finally, Stouffer related perceived threat from Communists to tolerance of them. Within both elite and cross-sample, tolerance increases as perceived threat decreases. Although perception of Communist threat is slightly less among the elite than the cross-sample, the difference does not account for differences between the groups in tolerance: 57 per cent of the elite sample which sees a serious Communist threat is classified as more tolerant, compared to only 27 per cent of the cross-sample.[12]

A second study of procedural norms was conducted in Talahassee and Ann Arbor in 1960 by James Prothro and Charles Grigg; in each city they interviewed slightly more than one hundred people.[13] Prothro and Grigg's survey questions were more clearly tests of adherence to political norms than were Stouffer's; they consisted of two parts, the first being five general questions about democratic norms—one about democracy itself and two each about majority rule and minority rights. Because, however, "democratic ideas and rules of the game are ordinarily encountered not in pure form or in isolation but in substantive contexts that are bound to influence the ways in which we react to them,"[14] ten additional questions were asked: five each about application of majority and minority norms in specific situations.

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[6] Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 43. Kevin Phillips makes similar observations from a very different perspective in *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1970). My own analysis of the ICPR presidential election studies indicates that the social issue was quite prominent by 1968.

[7] As indicated above, this is but one of several theoretically significant questions relevant to procedural norms. For their role as an object of orientation for individual members of the political system towards the system itself, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), particularly chap. 12.

[8] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind* (Gloucester, Mass.: Smith, 1963).

[9] Of these acts, the first and second are clearly procedural norms related to minorities; teaching is clearly a political act only if the teacher tries, as some respondents must have assumed he would, to teach his own political ideas.

[10] Stouffer, p. 31.

[11] One-third of the population was classified as more tolerant and one-fifth as less tolerant.

[12] Stouffer, p. 194.

[13] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (May, 1960), 275–294.

Prothro and Grigg found near unanimity on their five general questions; the percentages agreeing with them ranged from 94.7 per cent to 98.0 per cent, indicating that there does exist a consensus on the most general principles of democracy. But a quite different pattern emerges from the ten specific questions. On these items there is a democratic majority on only four items and a democratic consesus (a majority of 75 per cent or more) on only three.[15] Prothro and Grigg found both education and income positively associated with tolerance; but even the most highly educated rejected five of the ten specific items.

A final source of data on adherence to procedural norms is a 1964 study by Herbert McClosky consisting of a national cross-sample and a survey of delegates to the 1956 political party conventions.[16]

Some of McClosky's individual items are somewhat ambiguous, as are his reasons for linking any individual item to the dimension it supposedly measures;[17] but marginals on several of them are interesting. McClosky finds consensus in both his elite (89.4 per cent) and mass (88.9 per cent) samples on a relatively general item: "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be." Two more specific items found both less agreement and increased differences between the elite and mass samples: 65.6 per cent of the elite and 47.6 per cent of the mass agreed that "people ought to be allowed to vote even if they don't do so intelligently"; and 36.7 per cent of the mass but only 17.3 per cent of the elite agreed that "a man oughtn't be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about."[18]

Conclusions about Tolerance. These few studies have produced four sets of conclusions that have been reported as valuable in themselves and as relevant to larger theories of American politics.

First, they are unanimous in maintaining that nothing approaching a *consensus* (75 per cent or more) on democratic procedural norms exists in the American public; on questions applying such norms to unpopular minority groups there is not even a democratic majority.

Second, there is great inconsistency between the norms people claim they adhere to in principle and those they are willing to apply in specific instances, at least to "controversial" issues or groups;[19] Prothro and Grigg found near unanimity (90 per cent or more) in agreement with their general procedural norms but tremendous fall-off in willingness to apply them to blacks, Communists, or socialists.

Third, the explanation for inconsistency is that citizens are unwilling to extend democratic rights to those they dislike or fear; tolerance is issue-related, or dependent on the situation in which it is to be extended. Stouffer found tolerance tied to perceived threat from Communists; although Prothro and Grigg do not explicitly examine this question, the specific groups and issues investigated in their study were selected precisely because it was presumed that an average citizen would be hostile to them.

Fourth, the data indicate that tolerance and respect for civil liberties are more common among those with high levels of education than among others: both Stouffer and Prothro and Grigg found tolerance positively associated with education.[20] Similarly, issue-relatedness, the sole basis in the studies for defection from tolerant general norms in specific instances, is more common among the less educated. Stouffer, in addition, found that his elite sample of civic leaders was more tolerant than the cross-sample, although he did not test whether it was more tolerant than non-elites of similar education levels.[21]

The Elite Theory of Democracy. These findings have been incorporated into an influential interpretation of American politics in which democracy is dependent on the adherence of elites to democratic procedural norms; a democratic system can survive the intolerant attitudes of the masses as long as they are balanced by the tolerant attitudes of the politically active. Stouffer observes that his elites are more likely than others to act politically, and that they are likely to serve as opinion leaders for others; in either role, their adherence to democratic norms helps preserve democracy.[22] McClosky, similarly, argues that those least likely to support democratic norms are also those least likely to participate in poltics: "Democratic viability is, to begin with, saved by the fact that those who are most confused [?] about democratic ideas are also most likely to be politically apathetic. . . ."[23]

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[14] McClosky, p. 376.

[15] Prothro and Grigg suggest the 75 per cent figure as a minimal definition of consensus.

[16] McClosky.

[17] A question such as "If Congressional committees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every witness his rights, they would never succeed in exposing the many dangerous subversives that they have turned up" is at least triple-barreled.

[18] McClosky (p. 365) also asks a question relevant to the role of procedural norms in legitimizing political decisions: "I don't mind a politician's methods if he gets the right things done." Disagreement with the item indicates that the procedures by which decisions are made *are* important; 57.6 per cent of the mass sample and 74.4 per cent of the elite disagreed.

[19] The characterization is from Bachrach, p. 52.

[20] Prothro and Grigg found the same for consistency, which is for them equivalent to tolerance.

[21] Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," *The New American Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion, 1955), pp. 149–150.

[22] Stouffer, p. 48.

V. O. Key and Robert Dahl have constructed more fully-developed arguments. Key suggests that, in the absence of a democratic procedural consensus, other attitudes may allow the system to function as if consensus existed. Among poltical activists, "a consensus does need to prevail on the technical rules of the game by which the system operates," although activists may disagree on substantive matters.[24] Because the activist elite constitutes the group that actually participates in politics, and because the non-elite ordinarily allows the elite great discretion in its actions, lack of adherence to democratic procedural norms in the mass public does not undermine democratic civil liberties.

Dahl, also, argues that lack of democratic consensus need not lead to lack of democracy.[25] Most citizens do accept the democratic creed at its highest level of abstraction, and most assume it to be operative in the United States. Disagreement with specific applications of the creed exists, but much more often in the mass public than in elites, who utilize their political resources relatively frequently and settle disagreements among themselves according to the democratic norms they support. As long as political controversy remains within the elite, lack of democratic consensus on specifics in the non-elite is of little consequence; "the beliefs of the ordinary citizen become relevant only when the professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace."[26]

Why Reassess? In light of the agreement among these three independently gathered sets of data and the ease with which their findings have been incorporated into larger theories of American politics, it is reasonable to question whether a reopening of the question of procedural norms and civil liberties is necessary. The serious conceptual and empirical problems with each of the studies on which the literature of procedural norms and civil liberties is based suggest that it is.

The weakest of the three studies is McClosky's. McClosky's article is largely atheoretical: he provides no justification for assigning individual questions to the theoretical dimensions he thinks they measure; many of the questions are themselves multi-barreled, irrelevant, or meaningless. Several individual items are interesting, but the article is primarily a collection of underanalyzed marginal distributions.

Furthermore, McClosky provides no contextual information with which to interpret his marginals: he wants to attribute intolerance to attitudes toward unpopular issues or groups, but he has no independent evaluation of the issues or groups involved (as Stouffer does); nor does he have an independent test of general norms (as Prothro and Grigg think they do) which would allow investigation of consistency.

Stouffer's study is more substantial. He demonstrates clearly that tolerance of politically unpopular groups was not great in the early 'fifties and that political elites and the more educated were more tolerant than others. Stouffer's study, however, examines only slightly more than McClosky the context within which tolerance and civil liberties occur. Stouffer does in part relate tolerance to the attitude one has towards the group (Communists) being tolerated or not tolerated, asking whether Communists are regarded as a threat to the United States and finding that as perceived threat increases tolerance decreases. But he fails to ask the simple question of whether Communists or the other groups are liked or disliked: each was in fact selected because it was *assumed* to be unpopular. Failure to determine this more general issue-orientation prevents Stouffer from identifying respondents who do not dislike Comunits, atheists, etc., and whose intolerance must therefore clearly be based on other grounds.[27]

Stouffer has no independent evaluation of the acts he asks about in connection with his groups. He provides no reason to assume universal approval of public speechmaking in the mass public and, therefore, no reason to attribute unwillingness to let Communists speak solely to hostility to them. A permissive position on the general norm of speechmaking is assumed, as is a negative issue-orientation; neither is explicitly examined.

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[23] McClosky, p. 376. Glazer and Lipset (pp. 159–164) are more generally concerned with factors intermediate to non-democratic attitudes and behavior; they attribute the relatively anti-McCarthy attitudes of the South, despite the region's low level of tolerance in Stouffer's study, to its Democratic party affiliation; general intolerance provided no guide to evaluation of McCarthy because opinion leaders in the McCarthy controversy were Democrats who opposed the Wisconsin senator on partisan grounds.

[24] Key, p. 555.

[25] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 314–325; see also "The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial," *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, ed. Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 34–69, esp. pp. 40–42, on the relationship between education and agreement with procedural norms related to civil liberties.

[26] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 324.

[27] Selection of more "popular" groups may have served the same purpose, as I suggest below. Stouffer's work is also vulnerable to the charge of being out of date: the groups investigated are of limited relevance to current problems of civil liberties. Also, Stouffer is concerned with only one explicitly political act, a problem made serious by Hyman and Sheatsly's finding that the public differentiated activities that Communists should and should not be permitted. See Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsly, "Trends in Public Opinion on Civil Liberties," *Journal of Social Issues*, 9 (1953), 11.

The most obvious problem with Prothro and Grigg's study is the reliability and generalizability of their samples; one should be cautious in generalizing from two university-town samples of under two hundred persons each. Three other serious problems also plague the study. First, Prothro and Grigg, like McClosky, employed some ambiguous items such as the question concerning the legitimacy of group voting.[28] Second, Prothro and Grigg provide no independent evaluation of the issues or groups involved in their applied procedural norms; respondents are again assumed to be hostile to the issues or groups involved. In Ann Arbor, in particular, the assumption that Negroes were disliked and that this dislike was responsible for their being denied civil liberties might be quite inaccurate. A third serious problem with Prothro and Grigg's study is their failure to independently evaluate the acts they ask about in their specific questions. They maintain that approval of these acts follows syllogistically from the universally approved general principles of democracy, but they provide neither logical nor empirical evidence for their claim.

Whether any particular combination of democratic principles and attitudes towards particular acts is in fact required by logic is perhaps best left to philosophers; but the question also has a serious empirical dimension. Two models could account for Prothro and Grigg's findings: first, respondents might approve of public speechmaking in general because of their commitment to minority rights, yet fail to apply it because of the issue or group involved; second, respondents, rightly or wrongly, might not see a commitment to minority rights as requiring approval of public speechmaking for any group. Prothro and Grigg, because they fail to independently test attitudes towards particular acts, confuse the two types of inconsistency: inconsistency in moving from general principles to a particular facilitating act cannot be distinguished from inconsistency in moving from the act to specific instances of that act involving particular issues or groups.

Prothro and Grigg's general questions are at point *C*, *A*, on Figure 1; they involve general principales and specify no particular issue or group. Their specific questions are at point *D*, *B*; they involve application of norms about specific acts to specific issues or groups. Prothro and Grigg, therefore, can state that inconsistency of some kind exists, assuming that they can demonstrate the



Figure 1. Two Dimensions of Specificity of Tolerance: The Literature

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[28] The question text asks whether professional organizations such as the AMA have a right to increase the influence of doctors by getting them to vote as a bloc. Such activity can be seen as democratic in that democracy certainly allows individuals to form groups to advance their common interests; yet it also suggests manipulation of individuals.

logical tie between the general principles of democracy and their particular acts; but they cannot demonstrate *where* inconsistency occurs or, therefore, what it means. They cannot determine whether inconsistency is due to increasing specification of act (axis *CD*) or to increasing specification of issue or group (axis *AB*).[29]

In addition to correcting for methodological shortcomings, a second reason for the re-opening of the question of subjective procedural norms and civil liberties is to look at the new acts, issues, and groups contained in Scammon and Wattenburg's "social issue." The social issue suggests that large segments of the American electorate are concerned with the subjective procedural norms relevant to civil liberties. Furthermore, unlike what Key and Dahl would have us expect, at least some political elites have not acted to defuse popular intolerance; Scammon and Wattenburg themselves urge politicians to take a hard line on demonstrations and other protest activity. To some extent this change in elite behavior is due to the emergence of new forms of political activity—disruptions and public demonstrations—which may exceed the vague outer limits of the democratic creed; or change may be due to emergence for the first time in twenty years of the possibility of partisan gain by taking a hard line on procedural matters. Whether or not the specific cases involved in the social issue are democratic or not is not of primary concern here; what is important is how citizens perceive these issues and how they relate them to other political attitudes and to political behavior.

Tolerance of Political Activism

Tolerance, Issue-Relatedness, and Consistency. Throughout the three studies under review, the three concepts of tolerance, issue-relatedness, and consistency are confused both conceptually and empirically; we can now begin to disentangle them.

By tolerance I mean willingness to allow others to engage in political activities, particularly those activities near the outer limits of what is generally defined as legitimate; such tolerance is indicated by responses to questions asking about application of procedural norms in specific situations. Although there has been ambiguity in particular questions, the studies have focused rather well on the extent to which tolerance exists and who is most likely to be tolerant, at least within a limited range of acts, issues, and groups.

Both issue-relatedness and consistency are related to yet distinct from tolerance; both are central to a comprehensive understanding of procedural norms and civil liberties, but both have been studied indirectly by means of rather questionable assumptions, rather than explicitly. By issue-relatedness I mean the relation between orientation toward a group or issue and willingness to be tolerant of an act involving it. Orientation toward an issue or group may mean simply whether it is liked or disliked, or it may be a more complex attitude involving procedural concerns as well. For example, Stouffer's Communists were presumably denied civil liberties not only because they were disliked, but also because they were perceived as hostile to democratic procedural norms.

Issue-relatedness could be related to tolerance in any of four ways. First, one might have a negative issue-orientation and yet be tolerant by applying a permissive general norm; these are Prothro and Grigg's consistent democrats. The second possibility is that one has a negative issue-orientation and is intolerant; this situation is often found in the literature and is attributed to the overriding of a tolerant general norm by the negative issue-orientation. Third, one might be favorably issue-oriented but not be tolerant; in this case there is presumably some reason such as opposition to the particular act involved which overrides the issue-orientation. Finally, one might have a favorable issue-orientation and be tolerant; in this case the issue-orientation is an alternative to the common explanation of tolerance—i.e., that a tolerant general norm is being applied consistently. The literature has focused on the first two possibilities, those in which issue-orientation is negative; but with the partial exception of Stouffer they have only assumed, not demonstrated, that issue-orientation is in fact negative.

By consistency we mean willingness to apply general procedural norms to specific issues and groups. Consistency is explicitly considered only by Prothro and Grigg, but it is implicit in all three discussions of tolerance in general and of issue-relatedness in particular. Each study assumes unanimity on democratic norms in general; it is this unanimity that gives issue-orientation its explanatory power in analyzing intolerant reactions to specific situations. If nondemocratic attitudes are held on the acts themselves, general norm position and issue-orientation become equally plausible explanations of intolerance in a particular context.

Prothro and Grigg escape this complexity by making consistency identical to tolerance; because they find unanimous approval of their general principles of democracy, the only consistent answer to a specific question is a tolerant one. If, however, the attitudes relevant in evaluating consistency are not the most general principles of democracy but, as argued above, specific acts through which these principles are realized, tolerance and consistency might be quite different. It is entirely likely that either because of faulty logic or because of legitimate disagreement about how to operationalize democratic principles, Prothro and Grigg would have found disagreement as well as agreement with allowing the particular acts in their specific questions to take place.

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[29] I in fact deal with both kinds of consistency, although the second is much more important here.

The type of consistency of primary interest here involves application of a general norm about a particular act to specific instances of that act: where the general norm is tolerant, application of it in a specific instance is to be tolerant; where the general norm is intolerant, however, a consistent application of it in a specific instance would of course require intolerance. Anybody who does not favor speechmaking in general would be acting consistently, if undemocratically, in refusing to allow Negroes, Communists, or little old ladies to make speeches.

The substantive conclusions of Stouffer, Prothro and Grigg, and McClosky are not necessarily wrong; their reinforcement of each other and the ease with which they have been incorporated into larger theories of American politics argue against easy dismissal of them. But the conclusions have certainly not been demonstrated: they have been based on unwarranted assumptions about general procedural norms and issue-orientation; each suffers from both conceptual and empirical failure to distinguish and relate the three dimensions of tolerance, consistency, and issue-relatedness. I can now describe the NORC study and report its data on tolerance itself; in the following sections I use the data to investigate issue-relatedness and consistency; finally, I present an analysis of tolerance involving general norms and issue-orientation simultaneously.

The NORC Study. The data reported here were collected by the National Opinion Research Center as part of a nationwide study (number 4119) in March 1971. The study did not examine the most general democratic principles investigated by Prothro and Grigg; they found nearly unanimous agreement with these norms, and we saw no reason to doubt their findings. The study did, however, ask for respondents' general attitudes towards four specific acts relevant to tolerance and civil liberties. In order to examine a broad range of subjective procedural norms, we chose acts which varied in hardness or softness: we wanted at least one act which almost all respondents would permit, one on which the public would be rather evenly divided, and one which few would permit. The four acts selected were (in order of presumably increasing hardness) circulating a petition, criticizing a government decision, holding a peaceful demonstration, and temporarily blocking entrance to a government building.[30] A general norm position for each act was determined through a closed-ended question about whether the act should always, sometimes, or never be allowed. These questions occurred very early in the questionnaire and were separated from others reported here by completely unrelated sections of the questionnaire.

We similarly wished to sample attitudes on a range of issues and groups which could be involved in tests of civil liberties. Again, we wanted items which would range along a continuum of hardness: those which would arouse the sympathy of most respondents and those for whom this would be unlikely. Two soft issues selected were whether the government should act to prevent pollution and whether or not crime is a serious national problem; the hard issues and groups were radical students, black militants, legalization of marijuana, and governmental action to prevent racial discrimination in sale or rental of housing.[31] The issues were selected to sample several different issue-areas as well as different levels of hardness.

For each issue, respondents were asked to place their opinion on a seven-point scale, both ends of which were defined for them; respondents were asked to place each of the groups on a one-to-five scale ranging from like very much to dislike very much. No effort was made to determine whether groups were liked or disliked because of their position on procedural norms; we dealt with the attitude toward them regardless of its cause. These questions were in the middle of the questionnaire; no tie to the general norms was suggested, and they were interspersed with items asking respondents what they believed President Nixon and the Democratic party leadership thought of the same issue.

Finally, we asked a series of questions analogous to those asked by Prothro and Grigg et al. designed to test tolerance itself: these questions were at the end of the questionnaire; they involved application of three of the general norms—petitioning, demonstrating, and blocking—in specific situations involving one of the issues or groups asked about previously.[32] Specific questions asked

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[30] For evaluative purposes, we assume that petitioning, criticizing, and demonstrating were within the limits of what is democratic.

[31] The housing issue is, of course, hard only for whites; only they were asked the relevant matrix item.

[32] Only data for demonstrating and petitioning are reported here. Matrix items on blocking were asked but are not reported here because of the very different nature of blocking as a political act. No matrix questions about criticizing were asked in order to reduce the total number of matrix items and to prevent both learning (i.e., seeing through the survey instrument and imposing an artificial pattern of consistency) or boredom (which led to random responses) which were found on earlier drafts of the questionnaire in pre-tests.



Figure 2. Two Dimensions of Specificity of Tolerance: The NORC Study

whether each of the three acts should be allowed to urge the government to legalize marijuana, to urge that something be done about crime in the streets, to call for government activity against pollution, and to urge the government to secure open housing for blacks. We also asked whether black militants and radical students should be allowed to petition, demonstrate, or block. A further set of questions asked whether "a group of your neighbors" should be allowed to engage in each act; this group was meant to be extremely soft, suggesting people like the respondent towards whom he would be favorably oriented. In each instance a respondent was asked to answer either "yes" or "no."

These questions yield what we call a "matrix" of twenty-one items which constitute the basic data of the study. Each of the twenty-one involves an act for which we have an independent evaluation given earlier in the interview; similarly, all but three[33] involve a specific issue or group for which we have an earlier evaluation. We can therefore control each matrix item by the appropriate general norm and the appropriate issue-orientation; we can investigate both the consistency with which general norms are applied in specific instances and the relationship, for both individuals and groups, between issue-orientation and tolerance.[34]

To express this graphically, Figure 2 is a replication of Figure 1 with Prothro and Grigg's points *C*, *A* and *D*, *B*, drawn in; what we have done is to draw in point *D*, *A*: We can therefore speak about increasing specification both of act (*C*, *A* to *D*, *A*) and of issue (*D*, *A* to *D*, *B*); we can observe both processes that occur as tolerance moves from the level of most general democratic principles to application of norms about specific acts in situations involving specific issues and groups.

The Extent of Tolerance. The first question raised by the literature is the simple one of tolerance itself, which is indicated by responses to the matrix questions. The percentage permitting each matrix item for demonstrating and petitioning is reported in Table 1: The extent of willingness to allow the two acts in context of specific issues and groups is surprisingly large. Majorities of the population were willing to allow demonstrations for each issue except marijuana; for that issue, the percentage tolerant is 41.3 per cent. The percentage allowing other demonstrations ranges from a high of 80.7 per cent for the soft issues of crime and

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[33] Those involving neighbors.

[34] Specific details of questionnaire design are available from the author.

Table 1. Percentage Permitting Demonstrating and Petitioning On Various Issues and by Various Groups

	Demonstrate	Petition
Because they were concerned about crime in their community	80.7%	94.6%
By a group of your neighbors	80.7%	94.6%
To ask the government to stop a factory from polluting the air	79.5%	93.2%
By a group of black militants	60.7%	69.0%
By a group of radical students	59.9%	71.9%
Calling for the legalization of marijuana	41.3%	52.0%
Calling for the government to make sure that blacks can buy and rent homes in white neighborhoods (whites only)	55.2%	69.9%

Entries are percentage of the population (of whites for open housing) who will permit each of the matrix acts in connection with each issue and group.

neighbors through 60.7 per cent for black militants to 55.2 per cent for open housing.

Tolerance of petitioning is even greater: respondents are nearly unanimous in allowing it on the softer issues; 94.6 per cent would allow it on crime or by a group of neighbors. Even on the harder issues a substantial majority would permit petitioning, although a sizable minority would not. The exception is again marijuana, on which only a slight majority of 52.0 per cent is tolerant; but 69.0 per cent would allow petitioning by black militants and 71.9 per cent by radical students.

The data certainly do not indicate anything remotely like a democratic consensus except on the softest act for the softest issues. But with the sole exception of marijuana, a majority of the population would permit both demonstrating and petitioning on each of the hard issues. Clearly, sizable intolerant minorities exist: three of ten would refuse black militants and radical students the right to petition, and four of ten would not let them demonstrate. Nevertheless, compared to Stouffer's findings and to those of Prothro and Grigg, our considerably harder acts and roughly comparable issues and groups indicate a surprisingly great amount of tolerance in the mass public. Prothro and Grigg found 44 per cent of their sample willing to allow a Communist to speak in public; we found 59.9 per cent willing to allow radical students to hold public demonstrations. Stouffer found 37 per cent willing to allow a speech against religion; we found 41.3 per cent willing to permit a demonstration in favor of legalizing marijuana.

The Effects of Education. We are also interested in the *distribution* of tolerance throughout the population. Ideally we would like to compare a national cross-sample with an elite sample similar to Stouffer's. Since we have no elite sample, however, we must test the parallel but less powerful finding that education is associated with tolerant attitudes. Table 2 presents the relationship between tolerance and education for each matrix item:

Table 2. Education and Tolerance of Demonstrating and Petitioning

		Percentage Tolerant			
	Somer's D	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating					
Crime	.08***	73.0	77.3	82.2	88.3
Neighbors	.09***	71.9	75.7	84.5	87.4
Pollution	.07***	72.1	77.5	80.4	86.1
Black militants	.16***	47.6	51.3	63.3	76.3
Radical students	.19***	44.7	48.0	64.8	76.3
Marijuana	.21***	24.2	31.3	39.6	63.9
Housing	.23***	33.1	47.1	57.5	75.8
Petitioning					
Crime	.05***	88.7	93.6	96.8	97.9
Neighbors	.05***	87.2	94.7	97.3	97.7
Pollution	.06***	85.4	93.7	94.3	98.2
Black militants	.17***	55.3	60.4	71.1	84.9
Radical students	.19***	53.2	64.6	76.3	88.3
Marijuana	.21***	32.7	44.9	52.8	73.0
Housing	.20***	50.6	47.1	57.5	87.5

*** Significant at .001 level.

The left column contains Somer's *D* (asymmetric) between education and tolerance of each matrix act; the other columns indicate the percentage of those at each level of education who will allow each matrix act.

Education is only weakly associated with tolerance of demonstrations of petitioning in connection with the softer issues. Large majorities of each education category are tolerant, although a tolerant consensus exceeding ninety per cent exists only on petitioning and only among the more educated.

Significant differences do occur, however, for both acts on the harder issues. Larger *D*s on the hard items are due to the relatively great fall-off in tolerance among the less-educated as the issue becomes harder, although even the college-educated fall off somewhat. On each of these issues a majority of the college-educated is tolerant of both demonstrating and petitioning; even marijuana produces tolerant majorities of 63.9 per cent on demonstrating and 73.0 per cent on petitioning, and percentages are considerably higher on the other hard issues. Grade school respondents, however, produce a tolerant majority on none of the hard matrix items involving demonstrations; the closest they come is 47.6 per cent permitting demonstrations by black militants. Small majorities of the grade school-educated, however, do permit each hard petitioning item except marijuana.

Issue-Relatedness of Tolerance

The Tie Between Issue-Orientation and Tolerance. The independent evaluations we have of respondents' attitudes towards the issues involved in demonstrating or petitioning permit us to test Stouffer's conclusions (and those implicit in other works) about issue-relatedness more rigorously than he did by examining the relationship between tolerance and issue-orientation.[35]

Responses to questions on issues and groups have been recoded into three categories: attitudes sympathetic to the goals of a matrix act or to those engaged in it, attitudes unsympathetic, and those neutral.[36] The first of these is referred to as a positive or permissive issue-orientation, in that it would presumably predispose a respondent towards allowing the matrix act, all other things being equal. The other orientations are referred to as negative and neutral. Each respondent has either a positive, neutral, or negative issue-orientation for each matrix item except crime, for which there is no negative issue-orientation: even those completely unconcerned with crime as a national problem would not as a result oppose demonstrations or petitioning to urge a reduction in it.[37]

Table 3 presents the relationship between issue-orientation and tolerance for each matrix item.

In the population as a whole there is considerable issue-relatedness of tolerance. Large consensual majorities of those favoring the goals of demonstrators or petitioners will allow the acts for all six issues. As issue-orientation becomes increasingly negative, however, the population becomes increasingly intolerant. On the soft issues, issue-relatedness is relatively small because a negative issue-orientation reduces the percentage tolerant only to around seventy per cent. On the hard issues, however, issue-relatedness can be considerable; a negative issue-orientation is relatively effective in generating intolerance. Large majorities of those who have negative issue-orientations are *intolerant* of demonstrations on marijuana (70.0 per cent) and open housing (59.1 per cent); on the two other hard issues the percentage tolerant falls to 56.3 per cent. Even on petitioning a negative issue-orientation produces an intolerant majority for marijuana (58.2 per cent), and a barely tolerant one for open housing of 56.4 per cent. The *D* between issue-orientation and tolerance is as high as .36 for demonstrating for marijuana, although for pollution, black militants, and radical students it is in the range of .10 to .17.

The Effects of Education. We can also examine the implication of earlier studies that increased education reduces the impact of issue-orientation on tolerance.[38] Table 4 presents the relationship between education and tolerance for each issue-orientation separately.

Table 4 indicates that association between education and tolerance persists on the hard issues at each issue-orientation separately. Clear majorities of the college-educated will permit demonstrations on each hard issue except marijuana (only 46.6 per cent tolerant) despite their negative issue-orientations; but in ten of twelve instances the less educated produce intolerant majorities where issue-orientation is negative.

Even on the softer act of petitioning, a negative issue-orientation on the hard issues produces regu-

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[35] For marijuana, open housing, and pollution we recorded respondents' attitudes on the issue involved in the matrix item; we asked respondents' views toward black militants and radical students; our issue-control for crime is less direct, consisting of whether respondents think crime is a particularly serious problem. The neighbors items are excluded from this phase of analysis.

[36] For marijuana, open housing, and pollution, the middle polition was considered to be neutral; the three categories on each side were positive and negative. For groups, a similar procedure was followed, although there were only two categories on each side of the mid-point.

[37] I exclude here the relatively small proportion of the population who are themselves criminals.

[38] For marijuana and open housing there is some possibility that the zero-order relationship between tolerance and education is due to the greater frequency with which the more educated have positive issue-orientations.

Table 3. Relationship Between Issue-Orientation and Tolerance

	Somer's D	Percentage Tolerance: Permissive issue-orientation (+)	Neutral issue-orientation (0)	Negative issue-orientation (−)
Demonstrating				
Crime	—	80.8	80.5	—
Pollution	.12**	83.9	74.5	70.4
Black militants	.17***	88.5	68.8	56.3
Radical students	.15***	81.4	70.0	56.3
Marijuana	.36***	74.6	68.2	30.0
Housing	.30***	77.7	66.4	40.9
Petitioning				
Crime	—	95.1	92.1	—
Pollution	.10***	95.7	92.1	73.1
Black militants	.15***	91.8	74.3	65.4
Radical students	.10**	82.4	78.2	69.7
Marijuana	.32***	81.1	77.0	41.8
Housing	.19***	88.7	80.5	56.4

*** Significant at .001 level.
** Significant at .01 level.

lar, if only small, intolerant majorities among grade school respondents. On the soft issues, education differences, although positive and for the most part statistically significant, remain small; large majorities of each education level at each issue-orientation are tolerant, although the more educated are more so.

While the educated are regularly more tolerant, their tolerance is not less issue-related. Table 5 presents the relationship between tolerance and issue-orientation for each education level separately: *D* in Table 5 is a measure of issue-relatedness of tolerance for each education group; the percentages on which *D* is based are not shown because they are the same as in Table 4, arranged differently.

On demonstrating, there is no systematic relationship between issue-relatedness and education. Those who attended but did not graduate from high school are the most issue-related, but there are no differences among the other groups over the range of hard issues. On petitioning, the top two education categories tend to be slightly less issue-related than the others, but there is no difference between the top two groups. The absolute amount of issue-relatedness is considerable for all education levels. The less educated are not less tolerant at negative issue-orientations because an increasingly negative issue-orientation affects them more than it does the more educated; rather, they are less tolerant at each issue-orientation, and as issue-orientation changes, all education groups are affected more or less equally.

Consistency in Applying General Norms

Consistency and Tolerance. Consistency is quite closely related to tolerance; they are either the same or opposite sides of one coin. If a general norm is permissive, a tolerant matrix response is consistent; if the general norm is negative, a tolerant matrix response is inconsistent. Prothro and Grigg finessed the complexities of consistency by asking a series of general norm questions so abstract and general that they found nearly unanimous approval of them. We accept Prothro and Grigg's finding that at the highest level of abstraction—the principles of majority rule and minority rights—a democratic consensus exists in the United States; rather than assume that our matrix items follow directly from these abstract principles, however, we asked respondents about their general views towards the acts used in the matrix.

Table 6 contains marginal distributions for demonstrating and petitioning, as well as for the two other acts.

Very few respondents (4.9 per cent) would completely forbid petitioning: 58.9 per cent would always allow it, and an additional 36.2 per cent would sometimes allow it. Nearly half the sample would allow criticism of the government and demonstrating under all circumstances, a finding unexpected in light of popular opposition to demonstrations supposedly underlying the social

Table 4. Relationship Between Education and Tolerance for Each Issue-Orientation

			Percentage Tolerant			
	I-O	D	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating						
Crime	+	.09***	73.2	77.4	82.2	89.1
	0	.05	75.2	75.9	81.5	84.2
	–	—	—	—	—	—
Pollution	+	.04	79.3	83.3	83.5	87.7
	0	.10**	65.8	68.1	77.8	82.8
	–	.06*	64.3	—	—	—
Black militants	+	.10	77.8	88.2	97.9	100.0
	0	.17**	57.0	63.8	75.8	86.0
	–	.19***	41.2	43.1	59.0	73.3
Radical students	+	.20**	62.5	72.2	75.0	97.5
	0	.18***	54.5	73.3	70.1	92.3
	–	.19***	41.0	41.9	63.3	71.8
Marijuana	+	.26***	43.5	50.0	75.0	88.8
	0	.15**	42.5	63.7	59.7	79.0
	–	.12***	21.1	22.8	29.9	46.6
Housing	+	.17***	57.1	74.5	76.3	89.6
	0	.18***	38.6	65.5	64.4	79.6
	–	.26***	24.2	29.1	45.6	62.3
Petitioning						
Crime	+	.05***	88.9	94.4	97.1	98.8
	0	.02	91.7	86.2	94.5	93.0
	–	—	—	—	—	—
Pollution	+	.03**	91.2	96.4	95.3	98.8
	0	.08***	83.9	90.0	94.8	97.8
	–	.13	63.0	—	—	—
Black militants	+	.09	81.5	91.2	93.9	100.0
	0	.14*	64.9	70.2	77.4	90.9
	–	.20***	48.9	53.7	67.6	82.9
Radical students	+	.24***	56.3	72.2	78.6	100.0
	0	.13**	66.2	82.6	75.8	97.4
	–	.20	49.6	60.6	76.1	85.8
Marijuana	+	.19***	56.5	66.7	81.3	91.3
	0	.16***	44.4	69.0	76.7	86.1
	–	.14***	30.3	38.9	43.2	59.2
Housing	+	.13***	75.5	84.3	85.5	99.1
	0	.17***	59.1	74.5	79.0	93.0
	–	.20***	39.2	46.4	62.7	74.5

*** Significant at .001 level.
** Significant at .01 level.
* Significant at .05 level.

Table 5. Issue-Relatedness of Tolerance of Each Education Group

	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating				
Pollution	.12*	.10**	.08**	.05
Black militants	.21***	.30***	.20***	.18**
Radical students	.15*	.29***	.08	.22***
Marijuana	.23**	.32***	.34***	.32***
Housing	.23***	.35***	.21***	.19***
Petitioning				
Pollution	.12***	.05	.03***	.02*
Black militants	.20***	.25***	.16**	.11*
Radical students	.13	.18*	.01	.12**
Marijuana	.21*	.28***	.33***	.25***
Housing	.27***	.29***	.16***	.17***

Entries are Somer's D (asymmetric) between issue-orientation and permitting a matrix act for each of the education groups listed; issue-orientation is independent.
*** Indicates significant at .001 level.
** Indicates significant at .01 level.
* Indicates significant at .05 level.

Table 6. Agreement With General Norms

	Always	Sometimes	Never
"Do you think people should be allowed to circulate petitions to ask the government to act on some issue?"	58.9%	36.2%	4.9%
"If the government makes a decision that most people think is a good one, do you think other people should be allowed to criticize it?"	48.4%	40.1%	10.2%
"Do you think people should be allowed to hold a peaceful demonstration to ask the government to act on some issue?"	46.8%	35.7%	17.4%
"Do you think people should be allowed to block the entrance to a government building for a period of time to get the government to act on some issue that they think is important?"	5.6%	16.4%	78.1%

issue; only 17.4 per cent would never permit demonstrating. Blocking is clearly seen as a different kind of act than these three: 78.1 per cent would *never* allow it.[39]

Although the data indicate widespread general acceptance of the four acts by the public, they nevertheless indicate a high rate of defection from general democratic principles once these principles are translated into specific political acts. Clearly, at least some of the inconsistency Prothro and Grigg found in applying general norms in specific instances occurs in the increasing specification of act and not, as they assume, because of increasing specification of issue and group.

Second, we are interested in the extent to which citizens apply their (not necessarily tolerant) general norms in specific instances. The relationship between general norm attitudes and each matrix item is presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Percentage at Each General Norm Position Permitting Each Matrix Item

	Always	Sometimes	Never
Demonstrating			
Crime	95.2%	85.3%	32.5%
Neighbors	94.8%	87.0%	29.6%
Pollution	93.4%	82.6%	35.6%
Black militants	81.4%	62.4%	2.7%
Radical students	82.2%	58.9%	3.1%
Marijuana	62.7%	32.5%	1.9%
Housing	77.3%	57.4%	1.7%
Petitioning			
Crime	98.2%	93.6%	59.7%
Neighbors	98.1%	93.1%	63.9%
Pollution	97.9%	89.9%	64.4%
Black militants	76.1%	62.3%	32.9%
Radical students	81.1%	61.9%	34.2%
Marijuana	65.9%	33.8%	19.2%
Housing	78.1%	60.9%	24.0%

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[39] The public clearly sees blocking as we did in constructing the survey.

Large majorities of the population in fact apply their tolerant general norms consistently on even the hardest matrix issues: only for marijuana do even a quarter of those who had said that they would always permit an act say they would not permit it in a specific situation, and even on marijuana more than sixty per cent remained consistent with the tolerant general norm.

There is, furthermore, considerable defection from intolerant general norms. Approximately a third of those who had said that they would never permit demonstrations in fact permit them on the three soft matrix items. On petitioning, this defection is even greater: majorities of those who would never in principle allow petitioning would in fact allow it on crime, neighbors, and pollution; for each hard issue except marijuana, defection from the intolerant petitioning general norm is more frequent than defection from the tolerant one!

The Effects of Education. General norm position on the two acts is itself related to education, as Table 8 indicates:

Table 8. Relationship Between Education and General Norm Position

			Percentage Tolerant		
	Somer's D		Always	Sometimes	Never
Demonstrating	.20***	gs	36.8	37.4	25.8
		shs	35.2	41.4	23.4
		hsg	44.6	41.1	14.3
		col	67.0	23.4	9.6
Petitioning	.23***	gs	39.5	49.0	11.6
		shs	48.5	46.1	5.6
		hsg	63.2	34.1	2.6
		col	78.8	19.9	1.3

D between education and a permissive general norm position on demonstrating is a fairly strong .20; for petitioning it is .23. A large majority of the college-educated, 67.0 per cent, would always permit demonstrations; only 9.8 per cent would never permit them. At each of the other education levels, however, the proportion with permissive general norm positions on demonstrations is less than half.

Table 8 indicates that as education increases citizens are more likely to translate their agreement with the most abstract principles of democracy into general approval of demonstrating and petitioning. We know from Table 2 that education is positively associated with tolerance on individual matrix items; Table 8 suggests that at least some of the differences in Table 2 are due to greater disagreement at the lower end of the education continuum with allowing the particular acts intermediate to the most general principles of democracy and application of these principles in concrete situations. Educational differences in tolerance may therefore not also be educational differences in consistency; even if educational levels are equally consistent in applying their general norms, tolerance will increase with education because the more educated have more permissive general norms.

Table 9 examines education differences in consistency: The left side of Table 9 presents *D* between education and tolerance at each general norm position. For those with permissive or negative general norm positions *D* in Table 9 is a measure of differences in consistency as well as of tolerance. A positive *D* indicates that tolerance increases with education: for positive general norm positions, consistency and tolerance are the same thing; for those who would never permit an act, however, a positive D means that the upper education groups are less consistent in applying their intolerant general norms.

Educational differences in tolerance are not an artifact of differing general norm positions; consistency in applying a general norm does increase with education. Among those who would always permit an act, education differences in tolerance/consistency are large: on the hard issues *D* ranges between, .15 and .25 on demonstrating and .18 and .23 on petitioning. In each case, college-educated respondents rarely abandon their tolerant general norm; even on marijuana more than eighty per cent of them answer the matrix item consistently. Among the less educated, however, inconsistency is far more common. Majorities of grade school respondents who had said that they would always allow demonstrations in fact will not allow them on marijuana and open housing; the same holds for petitioning on marijuana. On the soft issues these differences are smaller, but the

Table 9. Relationship Between Education and Tolerance for Each General Norm Position

	Demonstrating						Petitioning				
	Norm	D	gs	shs	hsg	col	D	gs	shs	hsg	col
Neighbors	+	.03*	93.7	89.4	95.9	96.5	.01	96.0	97.9	98.9	98.4
	0	.06	81.0	85.7	89.7	91.4	.05**	88.5	92.9	96.7	96.2
	−	−.05*	28.9	37.1	32.8	11.1	.16	53.8	81.3	66.7	—
Crime	+	.04**	92.8	93.1	92.7	98.8	.02*	95.2	97.5	98.9	99.3
	0	.02	83.9	84.1	85.9	88.2	.01	92.0	93.6	95.4	93.5
	−	−.06*	31.0	41.4	36.7	11.4	.13	52.6	64.7	66.7	—
Pollution	+	.05**	86.8	95.1	91.8	96.9	.02**	93.7	99.3	97.8	99.0
	0	−.00	84.7	80.6	81.6	83.9	.03	86.5	90.7	89.5	94.9
	−	−.06*	34.1	45.7	39.0	13.9	.21	53.8	70.6	75.0	—
Black militants	+	.15***	63.5	75.7	82.7	91.2	.18***	58.8	63.9	75.4	89.9
	0	.03	61.3	58.4	64.3	65.9	.06	52.4	66.2	65.4	68.8
	−	−.04	5.7	2.8	0.0	0.0	.05	35.9	23.5	41.7	—
Radical students	+	.15***	61.8	76.9	85.6	91.3	.18***	55.7	73.6	83.8	92.9
	0	.08*	54.5	50.0	65.1	64.4	.08	55.8	60.3	64.5	72.7
	−	−.04	6.9	2.8	0.0	0.0	.05	33.3	23.5	50.0	—
Marijuana	+	.25***	37.1	53.8	59.2	81.1	.23***	40.9	53.7	65.5	82.6
	0	.07	24.2	35.2	32.1	40.7	.03	29.0	38.7	31.1	37.7
	−	−.03*	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	−.00	20.5	11.8	25.0	—
Housing	+	.19***	48.9	73.3	77.6	88.6	.18***	58.3	66.9	77.4	90.9
	0	.14***	40.7	58.0	58.5	71.8	.12*	50.0	60.4	63.8	73.9
	−	−.03	4.2	1.5	0.0	0.0	.20*	16.7	14.3	37.5	—

Entries at left are Somer's D (asymmetric) between education and tolerance for respondents with each general norm position separately; education is independent.

*** Significant at .001 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

* Significant at .05 level.

less educated are nevertheless considerably more likely than others to abandon a tolerant general norm.

The *D*s between education and tolerance among those who would never allow demonstrations are quite small but regularly negative; as education increases, respondents are increasingly likely to remain consistent with their general norm even if it causes them to be intolerant on a matrix issue. On soft issues, considerable minorities of each education level other than the college-educated defect from an intolerant general norm; on the hard issues, none of the more educated and only a few of the less educated defect.

For petitioning, however, this pattern is reversed: only among those who would never allow petitioning are the educated *more* likely to abandon their general norm, although the finding is highly suspect. Only one of the six relationships is statistically significant; and the number of college-educated respondents who would never permit petitioning is so small that the relationship is due almost entirely to the pattern among respondents who had never been to college.

The Relative Impact of General Norms and Issue-Orientation

The Interaction of Norms and Issues. Tolerance is of course never a product of either general norms or issue-orientation alone; the effects of general norm position and issue-orientation on tolerance should be considered simultaneously. Doing so allows us to investigage the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation as determinants of tolerance in the population as a whole, providing a direct test of the conclusion that negative issue-orientation commonly prevents application of a permissive general norm in specific contexts; it also allows us to investigate the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation at different educational levels.

There are four ways in which general norm position and issue-orientation might be related to each other: first, they might reinforce each other; in a given instance both might be either permissive or negative. Second, one factor might be neutral while the other pushes in a certain direction: a neutral general norm might be paired with a positive or negative issue-orientation, or vice versa. Third, both general norm position and issue-orientation might be neutral. Fourth, general norm and issue-orientation could oppose each other: the general norm could be positive and issue-orientation negative, or vice versa. The last combination in a sense forces a respondent to choose between his general norm position and his issue-orientation; it may be taken as a particularly hard direct test of the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation.

These possibilities can be restated as in Figure 3; each situation corresponds to one or more cells in the Figure:

	General Norm		
Issue-Orientation	Always	Sometimes	Never
Positive	Cell 1 tolerant issue-related consistent	Cell 2 tolerant issue-related —	Cell 3 ? ? ?
Neutral	Cell 4 tolerant — consistent	Cell 5 ? — —	Cell 6 intolerant — consistent
Negative	Cell 7 ? ? ?	Cell 8 intolerant issue-related —	Cell 9 intolerant issue-related consistent

Figure 3. Combinations of General Norm Position and Issue-Orientation.

The first two possible combinations of general norm position and issue-orientation provide a more or less clear guide to matrix response. Cells 1 and 9 represent conditions under which general norms and issue-orientation reinforce each other: we would expect that in these cells matrix responses would conform quite closely to the direction indicated in the Figure—consistent, issue-related, and tolerant for Cell 1 and consistent, issue-related, and intolerant for Cell 9. The extent to which these expectations are accurate provides a test of the completeness and accuracy of our model.

The second pattern applies to Cells 2, 4, 6, and 8: either general norm position or issue-orientation provides a guide to matrix responses, but the other is neutral; the result is a weakly or partially determined matrix response. Cells 2 and 8 have a neutral general norm position: respondents in them would therefore be led by issue-orientation, which for Cell 2 is positive and would lead to tolerance and for Cell 8 is negative and would lead to intolerance; no respondent in either cell could be either consistent or inconsistent. Similarly, for Cells 4 and 6 there is a general norm position but no issue-orientation: matrix responses would therefore be guided only by the general norm, towards consistent tolerance in Cell 4 and towards consistent intolerance in Cell 6.

The second two types of combination of general norms and issue-orientation provide no guide to matrix response. Of these the less interesting occurs when both general norms and issue-orientation are neutral, as they are in Cell 5: a respondent in Cell 5 cannot be either consistent or inconsistent with a general norm, nor can his matrix response be either issue-related or issue-unrelated; in terms of the model, tolerance is completely undetermined.

Much more important is the situation in which general norm position and issue-orientation conflict with each other, as in Cells 3 and 7: in either cell one is in effect forced to choose between general norm and issue-orientation in responding to a matrix item. These cells in effect permit a respondent alternative types of consistency: in Cell 3 he could respond consistently with his intolerant general norm or "consistently" with his tolerant issue-orientation; in Cell 7 a respondent must choose between responding consistently with his tolerant general norm or consistently with his intolerant issue-orientation. Respondents in Cells 3 and 7 will therefore have their matrix response either consistent with their general norm or issue-related, but not both; tolerance will be determined by which type of consistency is chosen. Cells Three and Seven provide a direct test of the relative importance of general norm and issue-orientation in determining matrix response.

Table 10 presents the relationship between tolerance on each matrix item and the combination of general norm position and issue-orientation.

Table 10 reproduces Figure 3 for each matrix issue separately: each cell contains the percentage of respondents with a particular combination of general norm position and issue-orientation who will permit the matrix act; entries under each column are *D* between tolerance and issue-orientation for each general norm position.[40]

General norm position exerts a powerful independent effect on matrix response. A permissive general norm position is, with one exception, sufficient to produce a tolerant matrix majority regardless of issue-orientation; Cell 4 and even Cell 7 (with that one exception) generate substantial tolerant majorities. Similarly, a negative general norm position is on all but the softest issues on the softest act sufficient to produce an intolerant matrix majority.

Issue-orientation, also, has a powerful independent effect on tolerance, although the pattern of its influence is somewhat more complex. Changing issue-orientation while holding general norm position constant regularly changes the percentage tolerant in the manner that our model would predict. Furthermore, except for demonstrations to legalize marijuana, a permissive issue-orientation is sufficient to generate a tolerant majority on a matrix item when general norm is neutral. The effects of a negative issue-orientation are not so great, however: on both demonstrating and petitioning a negative issue-orientation will not produce an intolerant matrix majority unless the general norm is also negative.

Although both general norms and issue-orientation have a large independent impact on tolerance, when their effects are compared general norms emerge much the stronger of the two. The softer test is simply to observe the impact of each factor when the other is neutral: the percentages consistent with general norms in Cells 4 and 6 compared with those consistent with issue-orientation in Cells 2 and 8. A permissive general norm position is in fact slightly more powerful than permissive issue-orientation in causing tolerant matrix responses; a negative general norm position is considerably more powerful than negative issue-orientation in producing an intolerant matrix response.

The more powerful test of the relative strengths of general norm position and issue-orientation is to observe what happens when they conflict with each other, as they do in Cells 3 and 7: Cell 7 represents the classic situation of the tolerance literature, in which a tolerant general norm must be applied to an issue or group which the respondent does not like; Cell 3 involves application of an intolerant general norm to an issue or group that is liked.

The data indicate quite clearly that in Cell 7 most respondents remain consistent with their tolerant general norm even when asked to apply it to an issue or group they dislike. On both demonstrating and petitioning, clear majorities remain consistent with a positive general norm rather than negative issue-orientation except on demonstrating for legalization of marijuana, where a bare majority of 52.7 per cent defect from the general norm. Issue-orientation is not without effect: minorities as large as thirty-five per cent do desert the general norm on harder issues other than marijuana; but the overall pattern is clearly one of permissive general norms' dominating intolerant issue-orientation. A tolerant general norm is sufficient to produce a tolerant matrix majority regardless of issue-orientation.

For the most part, the intolerant general norms of Cell 3 also constitute a powerful predictor of matrix response. The exception is the softer issues on our softer act of petitioning. There a permissive issue-orientation is far more powerful than a negative general norm, with a clear majority abandoning the intolerant general norm to permit petitioning on pollution. Even on demonstrating, significant minorities defect from general norm position to permit acting on pollution and crime. Defecting from general norms in specific instances is in fact most likely to occur when intolerant general norms must be applied to "soft" issues rather than when a permissive general norm must be applied to an unpopular "hard" issue; inconsistency is more likely to lead to tolerance than to intolerance.

The Effect of Education. Our findings about differences in applying general norms in specific situations by different education levels and about the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation for the population as a whole can be combined to yield a series of expectations about the relationship between education and tolerance in each Cell of Figure 3. We know that the upper-educated are in general most likely to remain consistent with general norms, whether tolerant or in-

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[40] Tables or percentages based on extremely small numbers of cases per cell are excluded from the data reported.

Table 10. Tolerance Controlling for General Norm and Issue-Orientation Simultaneously

Demonstrations

Crime

	A	S	N
+	95.0	85.5	33.0
0	96.4	83.0	28.6
–	—	—	—

Pollution

	A	S	N
+	94.2	85.7	42.0
0	92.5	79.7	28.4
–	84.2	80.0	—
	.03	.06	.10

Black Militants

	A	S	N
+	98.7	86.1	—
0	83.3	81.7	7.3
–	70.6	56.0	1.9
	.12***	.26***	.04

Radical Students

	A	S	N
+	94.3	63.0	—
0	85.4	73.9	6.9
–	80.3	55.1	2.7
	.09*	.15**	.03

Marijuana

	A	S	N
+	91.6	44.7	0.0
0	82.8	52.0	0.0
–	47.3	27.8	2.1
	.35***	.20***	.02

Housing

	A	S	N
+	92.7	76.8	8.6
0	80.5	67.4	0.0
–	65.0	42.4	0.6
	.20***	.25***	.04**

Petitioning

Crime

	A	S	N
+	98.4	94.2	63.1
0	97.1	89.5	33.3
–	—	—	—

Pollution

	A	S	N
+	98.5	94.2	70.0
0	97.9	88.5	60.7
–	80.0	69.0	—
	.02***	.07***	.08

Black Militants

	A	S	N
+	98.6	86.8	—
0	80.2	72.1	—
–	73.0	57.3	21.3
	.15***	.19***	—

Radical Students

	A	S	N
+	90.1	72.0	—
0	88.8	71.9	—
–	79.0	59.0	33.0
	.10**	.12*	.03

Marijuana

	A	S	N
+	88.5	61.1	—
0	84.6	54.4	—
–	54.7	28.9	18.5
	.28***	.27***	.13

Housing

	A	S	N
+	95.5	79.4	—
0	86.3	74.0	—
–	64.4	47.2	20.7
	.23***	.25***	.07

A = always, S = sometimes, N = never; + = positive, 0 = neutral, – = negative.

tolerant; we also know that within the mass public there is considerable deviation from general norms once the effects of issue-orientation are considered. We might therefore expect that it is among the less-educated that issue-orientation is most effective in generating defection from general norms. The lack of systematic differences across education levels in the zero-order issue-relatedness of tolerance might conceal a complex pattern of differences that emerge only when we control for different general norm positions.

If these expectations are valid, we would expect there to be relatively small educational differences in tolerance of those in Cells 1 and 9 of Figure 3: even if the upper-educated are being driven by general norms and the less-educated by issue-orientation, they are at least being driven in the same direction. Cells 3 and 7 provide the sharpest con-



Figure 4. Average D: Issue-Relatedness of the Four Education Groups on the Four Hard Issues Among Those Always Permitting The Matrix Acts

trast to Cells 1 and 9. In them, general norm position and issue-orientation push against one another: the more educated would therefore tend to be pushed towards consistent tolerance in Cell 7, whereas the less educated would be pushed, at least relatively, toward issue-related intolerance. In Cell 3, on the other hand, the more educated would be pushed toward consistent intolerance and the less educated toward issue-related tolerance. The result would be relatively great educational differences in each of the Cells. We would expect moderate differences in the other Cells.

These expectations result from an assumption that issue-relatedness and education are negatively associated when we control for general norm position. If the less educated are *not* more likely to be affected by issue-orientation at each general norm position, we would expect to find similar educational differences in tolerance in each of Figure 3's nine cells; the greater tolerance of the more educated in Cells 1, 2, and 3 would merely be maintained, since all respondents are equally affected by increasingly negative issue-orientation.

The data reveal that the first set of expectations is substantially correct. Where general norm position and issue-orientation reinforce each other, either positively or negatively, the educated are very slightly more likely to apply the general norm consistently; in Cell 5, where both general norm and issue-orientation are neutral, educational differences are again small, and the more educated are not always more tolerant.

At least moderately large educational differences in tolerance occur in the six other cells for which there are adequate data. The largest differences, however, occur in only three cells, two of them involving direct conflict between general norms and issue-orientation. In Cell 3, where an intolerant general norm confronts a tolerant issue-orientation, tolerance of the soft matrix issues is negatively associated with education; the more educated respondents are more likely to apply their intolerant general norm despite a positive issue-orientation, although the pattern is almost entirely one involving differences between the college-educated and all other respondents rather than a monotonic relationship across the four education levels.

Even larger differences exist in Cells 4 and 7. Where a tolerant general norm is combined with a neutral or negative issue-orientation, tolerance varies directly with education; on the hard matrix issues, the less educated are considerably more likely than others to abandon their tolerant norm unless it is reinforced by a positive issue-orientation. On demonstrating, the large differences occur equally in Cells 4 and 7; on petitioning, they are greater in Cell 7. Cell 7 produces large tolerant majorities among the college-educated; majorities of the less educated groups, however, abandon their tolerant general norm on both acts.

The more rapid fall-off in tolerance of the less educated as we move from Cell 1 to Cell 7 is due to the greater issue-relatedness of the less-educated among those with positive general norm position. Figure 4 shows average *D* of issue-relatedness for each education group for the four hard issues: The pattern is not monotonic, since grade school respondents are less issue-related that we would expect; but over the three higher education levels and for the population as a whole the relationship holds. As education increases, the effectiveness of increasingly negative issue-orientation in causing defection from a tolerant general norm becomes smaller.

Where general norm position is neutral, however, there are no systematic differences in the issue-relatedness of different educational levels. Issue-relatedness is greater for all groups than it is when general norm is positive, as one would expect. But the increase is greatest among the most educated, thereby eradicating the pattern found when general norm is positive. It is only among respondents with a positive general norm that issue-relatedness decreases with increased education.

Conclusion

Conclusions about Tolerance. Five major substantive conclusions emerge from our data. (1) There was considerably more tolerance of political activity by unpopular groups or in connection with unpopular political issues in 1971 than one might have expected from earlier studies. Although intolerant minorities exist and are numerous, a majority of our sample will allow each matrix act except demonstrating to legalize marijuana. Where tolerance falls off on the harder issues and groups, it does so primarily among the less educated: sizable majorities of the college-educated will allow each matrix act, whereas a majority of the grade-school educated will not permit demonstrating in connection with most of the harder issues and groups.

(2) Tolerance is highly issue-related. Respondents who are sympathetic to the goals of demonstrators are considerably more likely than those neutral or hostile to permit the demonstration to take place. There is no pattern of association at the zero-order level between issue-relatedness of tolerance and education, however: as education increases there is no tendency for respondents to be decreasingly affected by their issue-orientation.

(3) Large majorities of respondents with tolerant general norms apply them consistently in specific situations, even on the hardest issues and groups. For petitioning, defection from intolerant general norms is more common than defection from tolerant general norms for three of the four hard issues and groups. Intolerance is as much due to failure to derive attitudes towards demonstrating and petitioning from general principles of democracy as it is to antipathy toward the issues and groups involved in demonstrations and petitioning. Consistency in applying tolerant general norms to unpopular issues and groups increases with education.

(4) Although both general norms and issue-orientation are of importance in determining tolerance in specific instances, general norms are clearly the more powerful of the two. General norm position is more powerful when it acts alone than is issue-orientation when it acts alone; and when the two conflict with one another general norm position is clearly dominant. Only for demonstrations to legalize marijuana does a majority desert a tolerant general norm to answer consistently with an intolerant issue-orientation, and there the intolerant majority is only 52.7 per cent. The only instance in which issue-orientation dominates general norm position is when a permissive issue-orientation is paired with an intolerant general norm on petitioning; in this case, inconsistency produces tolerance, not intolerance.

(5) Differences between educational strata are greatest where general norms are positive and issue-orientation neutral or negative. Where tolerant general norm and tolerant issue-orientation reinforce each other, differences in the tolerance of different educational groups are slight; as issue-orientation becomes increasingly negative, however, it is those respondents with relatively little education who are particularly likely to defect from the tolerant general norm.

Conclusions about Democracy. We can also ask what implications our findings about tolerance have for the "elite theory of democracy" discussed above, in which the greater tolerance of elites prevents the (relative) intolerance of ordinary citizens from determining government policy. Our data confirm certain elements of the theory: tolerance does increase with education, as does consistency in applying tolerant general norms in specific situations; we have no data for political activists, but we may assume that they, being disproportionately high in education and disproportionately steeped in American political culture, would also be more tolerant and consistent than the population as a whole.

But it does not therefore follow that the elitist theory of democracy is valid. Our data and the logic of the elite theory in fact produce no one determinate course for the future of civil liberties in the United States. The raw material exists for either erosion or preservation of effective democratic procedural norms.

Let us state the pessimist's case first: first of all, tolerance is not unanimous even among the elite; where intolerance is widespread, even a few non-tolerant members of the elite might see political gain in breaking with the previously complete agreement. Dahl writes that beliefs of ordinary citizens become relevant only when professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace;[41] emerging popular opposition to some aspect of civil liberties may crack the previously solid democratic elite. Second, even if the elite remains solidly on the side of democratic procedural norms, the public is always capable of producing new competing elites who are less tolerant. When procedural norms and civil liberties themselves become the substance of political controversy, as they did in the late 'sixties, on a series of political issues on which the public has an overwhelmingly negative issue-orientation, it is difficult to insulate decision makers from the intolerant demands of their constituents.

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[41] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 324.

If the elite theory of democracy does not seem as impressive a defense of civil liberties in 1974 as it did earlier, there is still not necessarily cause for despair among civil libertarians. First of all, the 1971 public is more tolerant than previous data would have led us to expect. In almost all contexts this tolerant portion of Americans constitutes a clear majority of all citizens; if they can in fact be activated when the need arises, as Truman suggests they can in his discussion of potential groups,[42] America can yet be kept safe for public demonstrations. Second, there is great slack in the system that can be exploited by civil liberties-oriented political elites: the large number of citizens with neutral general norm positions on demonstrating and petitioning could perhaps be moved toward the permissive position through an "education" campaign stressing the logical tie between the most general principles of democracy and always permitting demonstrations and petitioning; emphasis on the logical constraints between attitudes aimed at those who would always permit a political act could decrease still further the already reasonably small proportion of them defecting in specific situations.[43]

Scammon and Wattenburg's advice to liberal politicians to be hard on the social issue in order to advance their other concerns therefore may not apply to those aspects of the social issue involving explicitly political activity. By judiciously selecting the level of abstraction at which they appeal to the populace, or by exercising the "leadership" that civics textbooks often but behavioral scientists never urge upon them, political elites may well be able to improve the prospects for democratic procedural norms.

Finally, the general increase in level of education in the population may eliminate some of the intolerance and inconsistency reported above, although two factors argue against great optimism in this regard. First the mere number of years spent in a classroom explains only a part of the tie between education and tolerance; education is used here as a general indicator of social status as well as of education itself. Furthermore, to the extent that increased years of education are achieved by changing what goes on in the classroom, the effects of schools in the socialization process might also change; high schools graduating students unable to read may also be incapable of inculcating successfully principles of democracy.

Yet education does clearly serve some socializing function; and nearly half of our respondents who had not attended high school (47.0 per cent) were sixty-five or older. As these older, highly uneducated, highly intolerant respondents die and are not replaced by similarly uneducated young people, the overall level of tolerance and consistency in the population may well increase.

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[42] See Truman, chap. 6, on potential groups.

[43] See Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemna: An Empirical Test," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (August, 1965), esp. pp. 536–537, for evidence that when contradiction between liberal general principles and nonliberal specific attitudes is brought to a respondent's attention, he most often changes the specific attitude in the direction of greater tolerance.

Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power*

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Introduction

There are many suggested sources of presidential influence in Congress. Among these are the President's party leadership, messages to Congress, personal persuasion, status as Chief of State, "professional reputation," and prestige. This study deals with presidential prestige (or popularity, the terms will be used interchangeably) as a source of presidential influence in the House. The concern here is not with how a president becomes popular[1] but with the more important question of whether it makes any difference if the President is popular or unpopular.

It must be understood that when presidential prestige is discussed here, the reference is to general approval of the President and not to support for a specific policy. In other words, this study is concerned with the strategic and not the tactical level of presidential power.[2] It examines one possible factor (presidential prestige) which increases a president's chances of success in influencing congressmen in any instance and not in just one particular circumstance.

This paper focuses on the relationships among three central aspects of American government (the presidency, the Congress, and public opinion). Presidents expend considerable effort to encourage public support for themselves. Another large portion of their time is spent in developing, presenting, and advocating their legislative programs. Similarly, congressmen spend a large percentage of their time responding to presidential initiatives and to public opinion. On a broader scale, the response of congressmen to public opinion or to certain segments of public opinion is of central significance to democratic theory. Finally, the dependent variables (measures of presidential support in the House) represent clearly identifiable policies and not merely "interesting behavior" with no clear relationship to anything outside the institutional arena in which it takes place.

The most noted proponent of the view that presidential popularity engenders presidential support in Congress is Richard Neustadt, who cites presidential prestige as a central source of presidential power.[3] Many other scholars have argued that presidential popularity is a major source of presidential influence in Congress,[4] but they have based their conclusions on insight and selected examples and have not systematically marshalled

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[1] The best-known study of the sources of presidential popularity is found in John Mueller, *Wars, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), chaps. 9–10. For another interesting study see Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, September 7, 1972).

[2] The terms "power" and "influence" are used interchangeably throughout this research to denote the ability of the President to move congressmen to support him when they otherwise would not. It is quite clear that there are numerous and as yet unresolved problems with the concept of "influence." These include the relative costs to both parties of the use of influence and, more generally, simply proving that *A* caused *B* to do *X* at time *T*. We shall not be concerned with long-term costs here. Rather, the focus will be on the immediate effects of a power source while controlling for alternative explanations of those effects whenever possible. For some relevant discussions of the concept of power see Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), chap. III; Jack Nagel, "Some Questions About the Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, 13 (March, 1968), 129–37; J. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power," *Behavioral Science*, 7 (January, 1962), 67–80.

[3] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: The New American Library, 1964), chap. 5.

[4] For example see Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 273, 285; Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 295, 306, 350, 356; Pendelton Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), pp. 20, 46; Louis Koenig, *The Chief Executive*, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968), p. 184; Robert Hirschfield, "The Power of the Contemporary Presidency," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 353–377, esp. pp. 361, 369; James Sundquist, *Politics and Policy* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 488–89, 496; George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 45, 46, 81, 82, 130, 147 but see p. 49; Dorothy James, *The Contemporary Presidency* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 115; Rowland Egger, *The President of the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), p. 172.

For more skeptical views, see Philippa Strum, *Presidential Power and American Democracy* (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 6; Dale Vinyard, *The Presidency* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 22, 97, 98; Grant McConnell, *The Modern Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p.

empirical data to test their hypotheses.[5] Such an empirical assessment is what this research will attempt.

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in this study are Presidential Support Scores calculated by the *Congressional Quarterly*. Using them allows one to measure the level of support for the President's program manifested by each congressman or by any group of congressmen without having to limit oneself to a measure for the House as a whole.[6]

In addition, these indices of presidential support satisfy the test of reliability, since the same criteria for formulating them have been used since 1953. Separate indices of support based on roll-call votes have been calculated for each member of the House for each year. Thus, no sampling procedures were used or needed. We have a universe of congressmen with which to work in the 1953–1972 period. Furthermore, except for 1953–1954 and 1971–1972, separate indices for domestic and foreign policy have been calculated in addition to indices for overall presidential support.

The *CQ* analyzes all the public statements and messages of the President to determine what legislation he personally desires or does not desire. Only issues on which the President has taken a personal stand are included in the indices. Moreover, *CQ* includes votes only if the legislation the President originally supported is voted on in similar form. Likewise, issues are excluded if they have been so extensively amended that a vote can no longer be characterized as reflecting support of or opposition to the President. Furthermore, it is the position of the President *at the time of the vote* which serves as the basis for measuring support or opposition, because the President may have altered his earlier position, or he may change his view after the vote takes place. Finally, key votes to recommit, reconsider, or table are included while appropriations bills are included only if they deal with specific funds that the President requested be added or deleted. This latter point helps distinguish between the President and the institutionalized presidency. Thus, the indices of presidential support meet the test of validity.

Two further points need to be made. First, the visibility of these roll calls provides a link between the public and congressmen. Second, the indices of *aggregate* presidential support we are using take into account Neustadt's warning that "rarely is there any one-to-one relationship between appraisals of [a president's] popularity in general and responses to his wishes in particular."[7] Moreover, congressmen are likely to be more concerned about responding to constituency opinion on a string of votes than on most individual votes.[8]

Nevertheless, these indices of presidential support do present some problems. First, they are based solely on roll-call votes, and it is quite evident that not all important decisions in the House are made on roll-call votes. Many significant decisions are made by committees, party leaders, nonroll-call votes, etc.[9] The roll-call votes utilized here, however, are all significant decisions, and although there is no systematic evidence on this point, it is reasonable to argue the *most* important votes on a President's programs are roll-call votes. Moreover, roll-call votes provide the only systematic data with which we have to work, and they do cover a wide range of issues. The average number of votes included in the overall index in the 1953–1972 period for the House is sixty-three (ranging from 34 to 127 per year).

Another problem is that of nonvoting. Support scores are lowered by absences because the *CQ* makes no attempt to interpret nonvoting on the ground that most absences are due to illness or official business. This explanation may be generally correct, but some absences occur when congressmen desire to support or oppose the President but feel constrained from doing so publicly. There simply is no way to know how to interpret absences. Thus, we are forced to assume that reasons for nonvoting balance out and are evenly distributed throughout the House. This is probably a safe assumption since congressmen from each region have similar rates of voting participation on these sets of roll calls. Moreover, those who were unable to participate in voting because of prolonged illness, death, or resignation were eliminated from the analysis.

73; Elmer Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 302–03; and Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 309.

For an interesting approach between these polar positions see Stuart Gerry Brown, *The American Presidency* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 3, 4, 182, 183, 259; Brown differentiates between types of presidential popularity and finds the "partisan" type more useful than the "unpartisan" type in passing controversial legislation. Unfortunately, however, he fails to clarify the distinction between the two. For general agreement with this point see Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[5] For a brief but suggestive effort see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, September 16, 1966, p. 2173.

[6] It is important to reiterate that what we are examining here is the President's success in gaining support from congressmen for his legislative program and not his success in passing legislation per se. A measure for the latter would give us only one figure per session of Congress and would mask any variability in support between individual congressmen or groups of congressmen.

[7] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[8] John Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 41–42.

[9] See Aage Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 19–20 for the view that roll-call votes reflect less visible decisions.

A final concern is that of weighting. Both between sessions and within each session each vote is weighted equally with every other vote. The reason for this weighting is that even if we knew the President's complete set of priorities (which we do not) and even if he had a comprehensive set of priorities (which he does not), each member of the House responds to presidential requests with his own set of priorities (to the degree that the member has one). Thus, it seems wisest to treat each issue as equal while remaining fully cognizant that this assumption will be violated on occasion but also realizing that no satisfactory method of handling this problem has been developed and that there is no reason to expect any systematic error in measuring the variable.

Whatever the relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support, the overall figures may mask stronger or weaker relationships for different groups within the House. Thus, we might expect freshmen to be more responsive to public opinion in general and to presidential prestige in particular than nonfreshmen because of the relative insecurity of their positions and their lack of national experience and therefore alternative cues. "Freshman" will be operationalized here as any congressman who has not served, i.e., voted, in the immediately preceding Congress.

Likewise, those from competitive constituencies may be expected to be more responsive to public opinion about the President than their colleagues from safer seats because of the marginality of their electoral bases. Conversely, those from secure seats may have developed more cosmopolitan orientations (encouraging responsiveness to nationally oriented cues) in their generally long tenures than the conventional wisdom attributes to them, while those from marginal seats may be forced to be more attentive to purely local factors unrelated to presidential popularity. Or congressmen from noncompetitive constituencies may find it easier to discern voters' attitudes because the latter are more internally consistent than those in less homogeneous, competitive districts. Moreover, legislators from safe seats may know their constituents' views better than their less electorally secure colleagues because of their generally longer tenures. In addition, if a congressman from a noncompetitive seat votes against the majority opinion of his constituency, he will alienate more voters than similarly voting representatives from more marginal seats.

As there is no standard definition of "safeness," both 55 and 60 per cent of the vote were used as breaking points to designate electoral security. The 60 per cent figure was the more discriminating, and the results reported below are those using this measure.

It is also plausible to expect that members of the two major political parties may respond differently to nationally oriented public opinion. In a study that overlaps with much of the period under examination here, Mayhew has found that House Democrats were more inclusive and less ideological than House Republicans.[10] Therefore, although Mayhew does not make this argument, it is possible that Democratic congressmen are more responsive to broadly based indicators of public opinion than their Republican colleagues, as evidenced by the greater willingness of the former to support legislation which is not of direct interest to their constituencies.

The Independent Variable

We can make use of public opinion polls to serve as an indicator of the President's popularity with the electorate. The Gallup Poll[11] has been asking exactly the same question concerning the President's popularity for over two decades: "Do you approve the way President ______________ is handling his job?"[12] Clearly, this is not a precise question relating to specific policies. It does fit the nature of public opinion, however. As Neustadt has written, "Presidential standing outside Washington is actually a jumble of imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive men."[13] The wording of the question is also consistent with the general indices of presidential support discussed above. In other words, members of Congress can be expected only to respond in a general way to general levels of presidential popularity.

The question has been asked several times a year. In the period covered by this study the fewest times the question was asked in any one year was six (1955, 1956, 1957), and the average number of times per year the question was asked was nine. Thus, it seems likely that presidential popularity in any year has been tapped by our use of the Gallup Poll.

Since the *CQ*'s Presidential Support Scores are computed on a yearly basis, it is necessary to average the polls for each year to arrive at a comparable measure of presidential prestige. There is another good reason for averaging the polls. As Neustadt points out, "since the general public does not govern, presidential influence is shielded from the vagaries of shifting sentiment."[14] Thus, sharp short-term fluctuations are not likely to alter the basic attitudes of congressmen toward supporting the President.

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[10] David Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[11] The Gallup Poll data used here come from the *Gallup Opinion Index* and the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College in Williamston, Massachusetts.

[12] As Mueller points out, because the percentage of "no opinion" answers has little variation over time, the trend in the "approval" rating of the President is largely a mirror image of the trend in his "disapproval" rating. See Mueller, *Public Opinion*, p. 203.

[13] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

The question arises whether a president's popularity and public support for his programs are separate concepts. A number of political observers have argued that there is little connection between a president's prestige and the public understanding of and support for his program.[15]

Numerous authors have shown, however, that significant changes in presidential popularity occurred concomitantly with major events having widespread consequences such as unemployment, inflation, and war.[16] This is strong evidence that presidential popularity and policy are related. In addition, Neustadt points out that "sharp changes in the popularity of men whose public manners were substantially unaltered" have taken place. While the personality of a president can affect his prestige, serving as "a cushion and a prop," what people see happening to themselves is more important in altering the prestige of a president.[17]

On a more abstract level, Schlesinger, writing about President Kennedy, argues that his popularity "was packed with a whole set of intellectual implications which were preparing the nation for legislative change."[18] Moreover, Stokes writes that the candidacy of a particular man for President "has implications reaching beyond sheer popular appeal. A candidate for the nation's great office is a focus for popular feelings about issues and questions of group benefit as well."[19]

Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the Gallup Poll has tapped not only presidential popularity but also general programmatic views as well. Therefore, it would be logical for a congressman to use presidential prestige as an indicator of his constituents' views when he considers his votes on the President's requests.

Two Explanations for Congressmen's Responding to Presidential Prestige

Although numerous authors have argued that presidential prestige is an effective tool in influencing congressmen, they have provided only very general explanations of this relationship. I suggest that there are at least two explanations for a congressman's responding to an increase in presidential popularity by increasing his support for the President's legislative program. The first is derived from role theory. The second is based on the incentive for re-election. Davidson's study of roles in the Eighty-eighth Congress found that 82 per cent of the members of the House considered the primary or secondary aim of their activities ("purposive" role) to be that of a "tribune." In other words, the congressmen saw discovering and reflecting public opinion as a very significant aspect of their positions. Davidson also found that 69 per cent of the members of the House replied that at least to some degree they adopted the role of "delegate." That is, they felt they should accept instructions from their constituents.[20]

In addition, Davidson, O'Leary, and Kovenock show that "the public expects Congress to cooperate with the President and to expedite major aspects of his legislative programs."[21] Presumably, the strength of this expectation is related to the strength of the public's support for the President. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if congressmen respond to expectations (whether their own or the public's), they should increase their support for the President as the public increases its support for him.

There may be many other varieties of purposive and representational roles than those which have been examined in the literature. Moreover, the role studies on Congress have not shown that role perceptions necessarily lead to the behavior described by these roles. But the significant point is that role theory provides a plausible explanation for presidential popularity influencing support for the President's policies in the House.

The second explanation is based on a different motivation than the first. It is based on the incentive for re-election rather than the motivation of following expectations. In other words, if only for purposes of re-election, congressmen may desire to remain close to or independent of the President, depending on the latter's popularity.

The leading exponent of this view of presidential influence is Richard Neustadt. He argues that the "essence of a President's persuasive task with congressmen . . . is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his."[22]

Several components must fit together to make this a reasonable model. First, most of those involved in governing must have interests of their own which lie beyond the realm of policy objectives. This seems to be particularly true on the national level where political ambition has been a long-term concern of most of the participants, who, on the average, have long political careers.[23]

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[15] See for example Jewell and Patterson, *Legislative Process*, p. 309; Brown, *American Presidency*, p. 7; and those authors cited in Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership*, pp. 301–02 and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 714.

[16] Brody and Page, "The Impact of Events;" Mueller, *Public Opinion*, chaps. 9–10; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 96; Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 496–97.

[17] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, pp. 94, 98.

[18] Schlesinger, *Thousand Days*, p. 726.

[19] Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *APSR*, 60 (March, 1966), 19–28, at p. 26.

[20] Roger Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 79, 80, 117.

[21] Roger Davidson, David Kovenock, and Michael O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (New York: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), p. 64.

[22] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 53.

Second, congressmen must gauge and be concerned about the President's standing with the public outside of Washington.[24] One incentive for this is the lack of systematic indicators of public preferences. Few people communicate at all with congressmen, and few of the communications which are received are issue-related. Moreover, those that do deal with issues generally come from atypical sources and are frequently too obscure or too late to affect the behavior of a congressman.[25]

Furthermore, the views expressed in newspapers are no more representative than those received through the mail or in conversations, quality opinion polls cost too much for all but a few congressmen to make use of them, and questionnaires sent out under the franking privilege are frequently not reliable because the questions are sometimes "loaded" and there is usually an unrepresentative response. In sum, despite numerous sources of constituency information, members of Congress "suffer from an 'information gap'; they face grave difficulties in discovering what are the preferences of their constituents."[26]

In this situation the President's popularity provides a guide to the public's views. As the most central figure in American politics the President is the object of a constant stream of comment and evaluation by all segments of society including those who are unlikely to articulate specific policy preferences.

The third component of the incentive model is that congressmen must anticipate reactions from the public to their behavior towards the President and his policies. This is also true, according to Neustadt, because dependent men must take account of popular reaction to their actions.[27] Moreover, Davidson points out that "many congressmen are hypersensitive to anticipated constituent reaction, regardless of the real threat that may be involved." Therefore, "most members are keenly aware that constituents impose certain boundaries on their activities."[28]

Further evidence of congressmen's concern for public reactions to their behavior comes from research by Miller and Stokes and by Cnudde and McCrone. They show that even though the public is generally ambiguous about their policy preferences, its representatives in the House behave in accordance with what they believe its views are anyway.[29] Likewise, Kingdon argues that congressmen overestimate their visibility and the issue orientation of the electorate and therefore attempt to anticipate the reactions of the electorate.[30] Moreover, even though the electorate may be unclear about specific acts of congressmen, it may well hold images of them.[31]

Thus, given the visibility of the President and the potential importance of presidential prestige as an indicator of constituency preferences and given the phenomena of anticipated reactions, it is plausible that congressmen are concerned with public reactions to their behavior toward the President.

Finally, for the incentive model to hold, congressmen must *act* on the basis of the President's prestige. This is the major question of this study. At this point there is reason to believe that congressmen will respond to public opinion about the President because they feel they ought to, because it is in their interest to do so, or both.

A question relevant to both of the above explanations is that of how do congressmen learn of the President's prestige? While it is reasonable to assume that congressmen are aware of the changes in the overall level of presidential prestige because of the high visibility of the Gallup polls, the figures for presidential popularity among subgroups within the population may not be sufficiently visibile for us to assume that all congressmen could use them as cues in their voting on presidential requests. We can, however, view these results of the Gallup polls as indicators of what congressmen hear of presidential prestige from all sources including constituents, the media, and fellow party elites as well as from the polls themselves. While any of these additional sources of information may represent a biased sample, together they provide congressmen with a triangulation of measures of presidential prestige, increasing the reliability of what they hear.

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[23] Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 90–99; see also Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 54.

[24] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 88.

[25] Lewis A. Dexter, "What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (No. 1, 1956), 3–29; Donald Tacheron and Morris Udall, *The Job of a Congressman* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 282–83; Leroy Rieselbach, *Congressional Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 216; Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp. 56–57; Lewis Dexter, "The Representative and His District," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 419–20.

[26] Rieselbach, *Politics*, p. 218.

[27] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 88.

[28] Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 121.

[29] Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *POQ*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–46; Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress," *APSR*, 57 (March, 1963), 45–65; Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," *APSR*, 60 (March, 1966), 66–72.

[30] John Kingdon, *Candidates for Office* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 145. See also Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp.59–61.

[31] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," 55.

Analysis

Table 1 shows the relationships between overall presidential popularity as measured by the Gallup Poll and overall, domestic, and foreign policy presidential support, respectively, within the House as a whole and within the subgroups described earlier. Positive relationships are predicted here, i.e., the more popular the President, the more support he should receive in the House for his programs. (The direction of causality will be considered more fully below.)

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Table 1 is that it shows that foreign policy presidential support is the most highly positively related to presidential prestige. The overall relationship between support of the President's foreign policy in the House and his overall popularity is .40[32] while the similar correlation for domestic policy is only −.03.

Table 1. Correlation (*r*) Between Overall Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House for Overall, Domestic, and Foreign Policy

Congressmen	Overall Policy 1953–1972 (1)	Domestic Policy 1955–1970 (2)	Foreign Policy 1955–1970 (3)
All	.12	−.03	.40
Democrats	.10	.03	.32
Republicans	−.07	−.08	.12
Freshmen	.34	.07	.43
Nonfreshmen	.07	.02	.31
Marginal Seats	−.06	−.23	.14
Safe Seats	.19	.06	.48

The higher correlation for foreign policy matters is not surprising. The President has a more prominent role, relative to that of the House, in foreign than domestic policy. Therefore, congressmen have fewer vested interests involved in foreign than domestic policy making and should be more willing to accept "external" cues in foreign policy decisions. They also should defer more to the President. Moreover, while Miller and Stokes show that congressmen attempt to follow the desires of their constituents on foreign policy questions,[33] it is reasonable to believe that there are fewer constituency cues on these issues than on domestic policy due to the more direct and tangible nature of the latter.[34] Thus, with few cues as to constituency opinions and with the President playing such a significant role in foreign policy, it is understandable that congressmen appear to be influenced by presidential prestige in their voting on foreign policy issues.

One implication of this analysis is that the greatest casualty of a decrease in a President's prestige will be support for his foreign policy. A contemporary example of this was the action of the House moving for the first time to cut off funds for the war in Indochina as Richard Nixon's popularity dropped to the lowest levels in his tenure in office.

Aside from the relative strength of the correlations for foreign policy, it is important to note the weakness of the correlations for overall and domestic policy support. The weak correlation for overall support is a product of the fact that there are more domestic than foreign policy issues in the overall support score. The domestic policy support of the President is fairly stable (standard deviation of 4.79), particularly in Democratic presidential years. It appears to be immune to the rather sizeable alterations (standard deviation of 10.27) in presidential popularity that occurred in the period under study here. Thus, the correlation between overall presidential prestige and domestic policy presidential support is only −.03, and that for overall presidential support is only .12.

Turning to the subgroups of the House, we find that, as expected, Democratic presidential support is more positively correlated with presidential prestige than is Republican support for the overall, domestic, and foreign policy indices.[35] Likewise, the presidential support of freshmen is more positively correlated with presidential popularity than is that of nonfreshmen, also as expected. Although all these comparisons are true for all three support indices, the differences for domestic policy are minor.

Finally, the presidential support of congressmen from the most electorally secure districts shows stronger positive correlations with presidential popularity than does that of their colleagues from more electorally marginal districts.[36] This is at least partially explained by the fact that those from secure seats in the 1953–1972 period were disproportionately Democrats, while those from marginal seats were about evenly distributed between the two parties. Since there is a higher positive correlation between presidential prestige and Democratic than Republican presidential support, it follows that the correlations for those from safe seats would be higher than for those from marginal seats if district competitiveness itself did not counteract this party influence. This appears to be the case here. Moreover, district competitiveness seems to augment this relationship, possibly due to the reasons outlined earlier in the discussion of dependent variables.

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[32] Significance levels are not appropriate here because we are not dealing with a sample of members of the House. Thus, there is no possibility of sampling error. Also neither the dependent nor the independent variables take on extreme values which would bias the findings.

[33] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 45–65.

[34] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, *American Business*, passim; Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, pp. 223–24.

[35] When it is stated that the presidential support by one group of congressmen is more or less positively correlated with presidential prestige than is the support displayed by another group, this is not the same as saying that one group of congressmen has a higher or lower level of presidential support than another group. In fact, it is possible for the group of congressmen most responsive to presidential prestige to display the lowest level of presidential support.

The most significant fact about the preceding analysis remains that the relationship between the President's overall prestige and his support in the House is quite low for all but foreign policy issues.[37] This may be because congressmen simply do not respond to presidential popularity at all. Or it might be that congressmen or groups of congressmen only respond to the opinions of certain groups within the population.

This second possibility suggests a specific modification of the line of reasoning presented above. It has been argued that congressmen will respond to the President's overall prestige. Several authors have suggested, however, that congressmen do not necessarily define constituencies as all the voters who live within the legal boundaries of their districts. In effect, congressmen choose which groups within their constituencies they will represent. These groups will generally be part of their successful electoral coalitions. In addition, it is these groups with whom the congressmen are likely to communicate most frequently.[38] Thus, it may be that rather than responding to overall presidential prestige, congressmen respond to presidential prestige among the groups which are most likely to support them. They may do so because of role perceptions or for electoral security. Thus, this reasoning is congruent with both the role and the electoral incentive explanations discussed earlier.

For the period from 1965 through 1972 the Gallup Poll has made available the levels of approval of the President of various demographic groups in the population. This period covers full terms of President Johnson, a Democrat, and President Nixon, a Republican. The population breakdown is by sex, age, religion, education, occupation, income, local governmental unit size, region, and political party identification.

Because there are so many independent variables here (the levels of presidential prestige among demographic groups), it is necessary to weed out redundancy. First, the intercorrelations of the categories of each variable were examined to see whether they were sufficiently differentiated to warrant the use of the variable at all. A bivariate correlation of .85 or more was used as the standard to identify those categories which were not distinctive measures of public opinion. This figure is necessarily arbitrary, but it is high enough to weed out redundancy while not so high that truly different measures of presidential prestige will be excluded.[39] The remaining variables were placed in a correlation matrix to test for redundancy between variables.[40]

Thus, of all the original independent variables the only ones that remain are those for party identification and socioeconomic status. Since, however, these are both basic and politically salient demographic groupings, they should serve our purposes well.

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[36] This is consistent with Miller's finding that congressmen from safe seats are more likely to reflect what they understand to be constituency preferences than their colleagues from marginal districts. Warren Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 362, 363, 368.

[37] There does not appear to be a time lag between a rise or decline in presidential prestige and a commensurate rise or decline in presidential support. Although frequently the two variables do not appear to be related at all, they are more closely related as correlated here than if the presidential support measures were lagged one year on the possibility that it would take congressmen a year's time to become cognizant of presidential prestige.

[38] Dexter, "The Representative," pp. 3–29; Clausen, *Congressman Decide*, pp. 126, 127, 182, 188; Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, p. 34; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 215; Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 49–50; Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 264.

[39] For both the eight- and six-year periods under study here all the categories of the variables of sex and age failed the criterion of distinctiveness and were eliminated from the analysis. Moreover, for both time periods the categories of the variables which serve as indicators of socioeconomic status (education, occupation, income, city size) were partially intercorrelated. This occurred when there were more than two categories within a variable and some, but not all of the categories were related at .85 or more. In this case the most representative of the intercorrelated categories (the category most highly correlated with the others) was used and the rest were dropped from the analysis.

[40] Occupation, income, education, and city size were highly intercorrelated. Occupation was selected as the most representative and the most internally differentiated of these, and the other three variables were excluded. Occupation was then dichotomized as high and low socioeconomic status, and these terms are meant to signify general concepts and not precise delineations on the socioeconomic spectrum.

A similar situation occurred for the variable of religion (Protestant, Roman Catholic). The former correlated strongly with high SES while the latter did the same with low SES. Hence, religion was also eliminated from the analysis as SES is more politically salient.

Table 2 covers overall presidential support in the House for the period of 1965 through 1972. It shows the bivariate correlations between presidential prestige among segments of the public and the overall presidential support of members of the House as a whole and of significant groups in the House. These groups are the same as those utilized in the examination of the influence of overall public approval of the President on presidential support in the House.

Examining columns two and three of Table 2, we can see that the correlations between House Democrats and lower SES opinion and between House Republicans and upper SES opinion are positive and moderately strong—a finding that is congruent with the theory that members of Congress will respond to the views of those who form their electoral bases. As every student of politics knows, the Republicans draw most of their support from upper SES voters and Democrats from lower SES voters.

Moving down columns two and three, we note that the correlations become even more impressive. The correlation between the presidential support of Democratic congressmen and presidential prestige among Democrats in the public is .92, while that between Republican congressmen and Republican identifiers is .83. Conversely, the presidential support of Democratic congressmen shows a very high negative correlation with presidential prestige among Republican identifiers, and the same is true for Republican congressmen and Democratic identifiers. Thus, congressmen from the two parties appear to be responding to two clearly different sets of public opinion.

Since party identification of voters is an even better indicator of sources of support for congressmen than SES, the finding that congressmen seem to respond to identifiers with their own party is precisely what our theories predict. Congressmen from each party respond to the President's prestige within their electoral bases (i.e., Democratic representatives to Democratic party identifiers and Republican representatives to Republican party identifiers). The reasons for this may be role perceptions, pragmatic concerns about reelection, or both.

The fact that voters with no party identification occupy a middle position in regard to correlations with congressmen from the two parties lends further support to this explanation. Independents do not form a consistent base of support for one party, and, in general, they vote less frequently and have less well-developed ideas politically than members of either major party.[41] Thus, it is more difficult and less profitable for congressmen to respond to the views of Independents than to those of the supporters of their own parties. This is particularly so for Democratic congressmen, who are more likely to come from safe seats than are their Republican colleagues.

All of this also explains the figures in column one. The presidential support of the House as a whole correlates more highly with presidential prestige among Democratic party identifiers and low SES persons than their opposites because there were more Democrats than Republicans in the House in the 1965–1972 period.

As expected, the presidential support shown by freshmen is more positively correlated with presidential prestige among all the population subgroups here than is that shown by nonfreshmen, just as it was for overall opinion. Furthermore, the presidential support by congressmen from marginal seats is less positively correlated with presidential prestige than is that by congressmen from safe seats. This was also the case for overall presidential popularity.

Table 3 presents the correlations for domestic policy covering the period of 1965 through 1970. With one exception they follow the same general patterns and levels of strength as the correlations for overall presidential support. The exception is

Table 2. Correlation (*r*) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Overall Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1972

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.22	.30	−.41	.75	−.17	−.52	.62
High SES	−.22	−.44	.39	.20	−.41	−.48	.03
Democrats	.63	.92	−.93	.80	.34	−.01	.81
Republicans	−.51	−.85	.83	−.32	−.47	−.32	−.44
Independents	−.12	−.32	.29	.33	−.32	−.44	.14

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[41] Frank Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), p. 173.

Table 3. Correlation (*r*) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Domestic Policy Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1970

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.11	.05	−.26	.70	−.30	−.52	.53
High SES	−.14	−.44	.34	.29	−.35	−.48	.13
Democrats	.57	.85	−.90	.80	.22	.04	.78
Republicans	−.39	−.79	.74	−.15	−.39	−.40	−.28
Independents	−.04	−.35	.30	.38	−.27	−.42	.22

the correlation between Democratic presidential support and presidential prestige among those of low SES. Here the correlation is only .05. Thus, although the correlation between House Democrats and Democratic identifiers in the public is an impressive .85, Democratic congressmen were unresponsive to a group which has traditionally provided a large segment of their electoral support. And this group of voters includes many who supported George Wallace and not Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.[42] Nevertheless, the major finding remains that the presidential support of congressmen is highly correlated with the President's prestige among those citizens who are likely to support them.

Table 4 deals with support for the President's foreign policy. The correlations are generally stronger and in a more positive direction than those for domestic policy shown in the preceding table. The exception is row three (Democratic opinion) where the domestic policy correlations are the most strongly positive of any row in either of the tables. The reasons for the generally higher correlations for foreign policy support, as suggested above, are the President's more prominent role in foreign affairs relative to that of the House and the lack of alternatives to presidential prestige as an indicator of the public's views.

The finding of more positive relationships here reflects what seems to be a greater consensus among congressmen on foreign policy than on domestic policy. Thus, the differences between the correlations for groups of congressmen, including representatives of the two parties, are less extreme on foreign policy. This may be because of diminished party salience in foreign policy[43] or fewer divisive constituency cues, or both.

Despite these findings, the basic patterns of relationships which occurred for overall and domestic policy support also hold for foreign policy support. In other words, Democratic congressmen appear to respond most to Democratic identifiers and Republican congressmen appear to do likewise to Republican identifiers. Furthermore, freshmen and those from safe seats seem to be more positively responsive to presidential prestige than nonfreshmen and those from marginal seats.

In addition, the correlations between the presi-

Table 4. Correlation (*r*) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Foreign Policy Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1970

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.53	.42	−.15	.82	.13	−.23	.89
High SES	.40	.02	.37	.42	.17	−.08	.57
Democrats	.48	.82	−.73	.79	.20	−.07	.72
Republicans	.12	−.38	.70	−.04	.07	.01	.12
Independents	.45	.09	.34	.47	.21	−.06	.63

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[42] Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Jerold Rusk, and Arthur Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Elections," *APSR*, 63 (December, 1969), 1083–1105.

[43] Julius Turner and Edward Schneier, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, rev. ed.; (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 104; Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, p. 168.

dential support by Democrats in the House and presidential prestige among low SES voters are considerably higher on foreign than on domestic policy. This finding supports the contention that the Democrats lost the 1968 presidential election because they failed to satisfy many potential supporters on domestic policy (and not foreign policy).[44]

At this point it is important to discuss several possibilities which could lead us to modify the most significant findings noted above. First, we have assumed that congressmen follow public opinion about the President and do not lead it. If the reverse were true, then it would follow that presidential support could not be a response to presidential prestige. That there is some opinion leadership emanating from Congress, particularly from key members, seems plausible, but the extent is unmeasured and perhaps unmeasurable. Nevertheless, most members of Congress are not highly visible to their constituents[45] and are unlikely to influence very much the President's popularity among them.

Another possibility is that yet a third factor influences both presidential prestige and presidential support. In this case the relationship between the two variables would be spurious. One such possibility is that members of each party in the public react positively or negatively to the President because of his proposed legislative programs and so do members of each party in the House. Thus, presidential programs and not popularity would be responsible for presidential support.

This reasoning, however, assumes that both the public and congressmen respond similarly to presidential programs, which is unlikely given their differences in backgrounds, responsibilities, and access to information on presidential proposals. In addition, to accept this line of reasoning one must assume that public and congressional evaluations of the President are based solely on his legislative programs. Thus, one would have to assume that the President's failure to propose programs, his policies which are not voted on by the House (appointments, administrative decisions, much of our foreign policy, etc.), and his handling of other matters (Watergate, State of the Union messages, etc.) have little influence on presidential popularity or support. Again, it would be difficult to accept these assumptions.

An assertion that both the public and congressmen respond similarly to the President's general performance fares no better. Again, one would have to assume similar responses on the part of both groups. Moreover, congressmen would have to translate their general evaluations into specific votes on legislative proposals which in turn matched changes in the public's level of general presidential approval. This is hardly likely.

Another possibility—and one more worthy of testing—is that most of the variance in both presidential popularity and presidential support in the 1965–1972 period is due to the shift in the party of the President from 1968 to 1969. In other words, we might expect that the party of the President would have some influence on his public popularity and his congressional support.[46] Thus, the strong correlations between presidential prestige and presidential support might be due to the influence of presidential party on them both.

To test for this possibility we shall employ a "dummy" variable[47] to control for the party of the President in the theoretically significant relationships between presidential popularity among Democratic and Republican party identifiers and the presidential support by Democratic and Republican congressmen, respectively. The results of this procedure are shown in Table 5.

Examining the Democratic half of the table first and comparing columns one and two, we find that the original correlations are reduced. Nevertheless, the relationships remain strongly positive.

Table 5. Simple and Partial Correlations Between Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House

	Democrats		Republicans	
Presidential Support	Simple Correlation (1)	Controlling for President's Party (2)	Simple Correlation (3)	Controlling for President's Party (4)
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.92	.61	.83	−.41
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.85	.49	.79	−.49
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.82	.73	.70	−.12

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[44] Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), pp. 181–84.

[45] Stokes and Miller, "Saliency of Congress," pp. 531–46.

[46] I wish to thank Douglas Rose for his suggestions regarding this point.

[47] Presidential party is operationalized here with "1" representing Democrat and "0" representing Republican.

Thus, our earlier conclusions about the importance of presidential prestige in explaining the variance in presidential support in the House remain basically undisturbed for the Democrats.

Moving to the Republican side of Table 5 and comparing columns three and four, we find major differences between the simple and partial correlations. Not only are the original correlations reduced in strength, but more significantly, they become negative. *Clearly, Republican congressmen are not responding in their support for presidential policies to presidential popularity among the mass of Republican party identifiers in the public.*

It is still possible, however, that Republican congressmen are responding to presidential popularity, but among a more exclusive grouping of fellow party members than is the case for their Democratic colleagues. This possibility is suggested by a work of Converse, Clausen, and Miller which provides evidence that Republican elites may respond to the more "partisan" opinion within their party.[48] Furthermore, McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara have shown that the views of Republican party leaders are less congruent with those of the Republican rank-and-file than are the views of Democratic party leaders with the Democratic rank-and-file,[49] a finding that has been corroborated in a more recent study of mass and elite opinions.[50]

Within each individual there is a nonpartisan response to individuals and events in the political arena. For some, notably Independents, this is all there is. For those with partisan identifications, however, a partisan element is added to their responses. As an individual's partisan identification increases, the magnitude of the partisan element and of its domination of responses also increases—to the point that persons with extremely strong partisan identifications will have nearly totally partisan responses to political persons and events.[51] It is to the strongly partisan group of Republicans that we suspect Republican congressmen may be responding.

While ideally we could separate out this extreme group, this is not possible here because we only have data on presidential popularity among Republicans in their entirety. Nevertheless, it is possible to isolate partisan modes of responses *within* individuals. By controlling for presidential support among Independents (with nonpartisan responses), we can isolate the more partisan responses of Republicans, which we can reasonably expect to be concentrated among highly partisan Republican identifiers.[52] For comparative purposes this procedure will also be carried out for Democratic identifiers.

Table 6 presents the correlations for the relationships between presidential popularity among identifiers of each party and the presidential support by congressmen from each of the parties, respectively, while controlling for the less partisan component of presidential prestige.

Table 6. Correlation Between Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House Controlling for the Less Partisan Element of Presidential Popularity

	Partial Correlations	
Presidential Support	Democrats	Republicans
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.90	.96
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.90	.92
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.82	.78

Looking at the Democratic column, we find that the figures remain very nearly the same as the original correlations shown in column one of the previous table. Thus, it seems clear that Democratic congressmen are as responsive to Democratic identifiers in general as to the more partisan element of the party.

Conversely, the figures in the Republican column are considerably more strongly positive than the original correlations shown in column three of Table 5. Thus, they support the hypothesis that Republican congressmen are responsive to presidential prestige within the more partisan element of the party. Before reaching a conclusion, however, we must add the control of presidential party.

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[48] Philip Converse, Aage Clausen, and Warren Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *APSR*, 59 (June, 1965), 321–36.

[49] Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *APSR*, 54 (June, 1960), 406–27.

[50] William Shaffer, Ronald Weber, and Robert Montjoy, "Mass and Political Elite Beliefs about the Policies of the Regime" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, September 7, 1973, pp. 14–16). See also a mid-1974 column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which discusses "a potentially disastrous Republican syndrome of mistaking the blind pro-Nixon loyalty of precint workers for popular opinion. What's more, they press this misconception on congressmen. . ." " 'Potentially Disastrous' Republican Syndrome," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1974, sec. C, p. 7.

[51] Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 128–36.

[52] This is reasonable despite the fact that there are high correlations between Independent and Republican opinion (.74 for 1965–1972 and .83 for 1965–1970) while there are very low relationships between Independent and Democratic opinion (–.08 and –.02, respectively), because presidential popularity among Independents does not influence Republican presidential support (the partial correlation for overall support is –.86). It should also be noted that the correlations above tell us nothing about levels of presidential prestige.

The results of correlating presidential popularity among Republicans in the public with the presidential support by Republican congressmen while controlling for both presidential party and the less partisan component of presidential prestige, are shown in Table 7. The partial correlations are lower than the zero-order figures as well as those in Table 6 above. Nevertheless, the figures are strongly positive, as opposed to those in column four of Table 5, where the only control was for presidential party. Indeed, the correlations very closely resemble the Democratic figures in column two of that same table. Therefore, it appears as though Republican congressmen are responsive to presidential prestige in their decision making on presidential support—but to a more exclusive grouping of their partisan supporters than is the case for Democratic congressmen.

Table 7. Correlation Between Presidential Prestige among Republicans and Republican Presidential Support in the House

Presidential Support	Partial Correlations Controlling for Presidential Party and the Less Partisan Element of Presidential Popularity
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.61
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.49
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.68

Despite these findings, a caveat is necessary because of the multicollinearity between presidential party and presidential prestige. In the 1965–1972 period, the two correlate at .87 for Democrats and −.96 for Republicans. (The figure for the Republicans is negative due to the scoring of the dummy variable for presidential party.) For the 1965–1970 period, the figures are .80 and −.95, respectively. This makes it difficult to assess the relative importance of the two variables in their influence on presidential support.

Much of the relationship between presidential prestige and presidential support has been found to be closely tied to partisanship. What is unclear, because of the multicollinearity, is whether or not presidential party links the two in whole or in part. In other words, all, none, or some of the influence of presidential party on presidential support could work through presidential popularity. If none of this influence is indirect, i.e. through presidential prestige, then most of the relationship between presidential prestige and presidential support would be spurious.

Although it is not possible to reach a firm conclusion, it seems likely that at least some of the influence of presidential party on presidential support is indirect (see Figure 1). First, the findings above of relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support are consistent and reasonable. In addition, there is variance in presidential support even within the tenure of a single president, indicating that presidential party does not necessarily or soley determine presidential support.



Figure 1. Paths of Influence Between Presidential Party, Presidential Prestige, and Presidential Support

Moreover, while there is little question that congressmen respond to the party of the President when voting on some presidential requests,[53] it is also true that recent research has shown that this influence may be overrated. Clausen found that on most policy dimensions there was no shift in the policy positions of congressmen from either party when the presidency switched from Eisenhower to Kennedy-Johnson to Nixon.[54] Congressmen voted the same general way on policies no matter which party held the White House.

Thus, in the absence of variables other than presidential party which might affect the basic relationship,[55] it appears that presidential prestige has a significant influence on presidential support in the House.

The Findings in Perspective

The major findings of this research have their most direct implications for executive-legislative relationships and the separation of powers. "What the Constitution separates," writes Neustadt, "political parties do not combine."[56] Since the President is the primary initiating force in national politics, he must solve this problem inherent in our system of separation of powers if he is to see his programs enacted into law. Thus, a President interested in increasing his congressional support should not overlook the influence potential of his personal popularity. In other words, he should attempt to influence congressmen indirectly by strengthening his support among the American people. Moreover, he should be concerned with his prestige among members of both parties, because congressmen from both parties respond to his prestige, particularly his popularity among their electoral supporters.

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[53] Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp. 173–75.

[54] Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, p. 196.

[55] The independent variables which Mueller uses in his work on predicting presidential popularity on a near-monthly basis (see footnote one) are not useful here because they are largely invariate over the time period under study and/or because the dependent variables here are aggregated on a yearly basis. Moreover, doubt is cast on the explanatory value of Mueller's variables in Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time-Series Regression Models," in *Sociological Methodology 1973–1974*, ed. H. L. Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 252–308. While there are many other plausible reasons for congressmen supporting the President's policies in addition to presidential party and presidential prestige including ideological preference, patriotism, a desire for presidential favors, a desire to avoid presidential wrath, and presidential charm in personal relations, they should not systematically influence the relationships between presidential popularity and presidential support because they do not affect the former.

Presidential prestige, however, is not solely determined by the President himself. Such diverse factors as political scandals in the executive branch, the extent of his personal and media charisma, international events, and activities in the private sector of the economy can and do affect a president's prestige.[57] At the same time these phenomena may be largely beyond his control. Although the image of a president is fairly stable, "the values men assign to what they see can alter rather quickly."A president's prestige is threatened by people's frustration from what they see happening to themselves.[58] Thus, although presidential popularity appears to be an effective tool of presidential influence, it is not one easily manipulated by a president.

Moreover, there is nothing inherent in presidential prestige which makes it useful only as an instrument of presidential influence. It may also serve as a restraint on the President. Presidential policies which require positive congressional action such as providing the necessary authorization or resources may be constrained by the lack of presidential support in the public. Therefore, opponents of presidential policies should emphasize the meanings which the public places on presidential actions (which in turn affect presidential prestige) in addition to attempting to directly persuade congressmen to oppose the President.

In integrating these findings into larger theories of congressional voting, the first point to be made is that presidential prestige must be added to the list of variables which have been found useful in explaining roll-call behavior. Moreover, it is a more purely "political" variable than many of those which have served as indicators of popular demands such as the demographic characteristics of constituencies, states, and regions. Thus, it has greater value in explaining linkages between citizens and their elected representatives.

A second important finding concerning legislative voting behavior relates to constituency influence. It has been found that in making decisions on presidential support, congressmen seem to respond not to presidential prestige among the public as a whole but to presidential prestige among their electoral supporters. Thus, they appear to define their constituencies less comprehensively than the legal boundaries of those units imply. This is consistent with Kingdon's finding of closer relationships between the attitudes of the majority element in a congressional district and the voting of that district's congressman than between such voting and constituency attitudes as a whole.[59]

Nevertheless, members of the House do seem to respond to public opinion about the President, and those from both ends of the socioeconomic scale are included in winning electoral coalitions in different constituencies. Thus, presidential popularity provides a ready vehicle through which the public can express its general views to congressmen and can have an effect on congressional behavior without having detailed views on specific policies.

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[56] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 33.

[57] See Mueller, *Public Opinion*, chaps. 9–10, for example.

[58] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, pp. 95–96.

[59] John Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs and Voters," *APSR*, 61 (March, 1967), 137–45; see also Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 49–50.

Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review *

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Past Theories on Political Adjudication

As is commonplace, the Basic Law—the constitutional document of the German Federal Republic—conferred upon the newly created Federal Constitutional Court (in this study to be referred to henceforth as FCC) the power to examine and to adjudicate a variety of constitutional disputes. These include cases of alleged violations of and incompatibilities between the Basic Law and a federal law, a state law in conflict with a federal law, state laws in conflict with each other, controversies arising out of the application of an international agreement and the federal law.

This power, referred to in German as "*richterliche Normenkontrolle*" and "*Verfassungspruefungsrecht*," and broadly corresponding to the English concept of judicial review, has reopened in West Germany the discussion on the nature and implication of political jurisprudence (adjudication), specifically whether the courts could engage themselves with political, as distinguished from "strictly" legal, controversies.

It should be noted at the outset that there is a basic difference between the United States and the German system of judicial review: The FCC rules on the constitutionality of the law as such, whereas United States courts deal with the decision of a concrete case. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited by the definition of judicial power under Article III. On the other hand, the FCC is limited in its jurisdiction to dealings with constitutional questions (a jurisdiction which is entirely original), whereas the United States Supreme Court exercises an extensive appellate jurisdiction.

The principal, though widely divergent, positions toward political adjudication in the Federal Republic (besides those of Professors Werner Weber, Hans Schneider, Hans Nawiasky, and others) have been taken by Professors Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen, with Professor Gerhard Leibholz presently seeking to create a bridge between them. Under the influence of Guizot (*Des Conspirations et la Justice politique*, 1848), who held that a mingling of judication with politics would inevitably lead to a politicization of justice, and Montesquieu (*De L'Esprit des Lois*, 1758), who coined the much overquoted maxim that a judge was "*en quelque façon nulle . . . la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi*,"[1] Schmitt and his followers warned against any association between the political and judiciary branches and rejected emphatically the power of judicial review. Schmitt's most cogently formulated thesis is contained in his essay "Das Reichsgericht als Hueter der Verfassung," in *Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben* (*Reichsgerichtsfestschrift*, 1929) in which he asserted that only a higher echelon political institution, endowed with a specially intense political power, should be entitled to be the guardian (custodian) of the constitution. The judiciary, Schmitt held, was entirely unqualified to be this guardian, unless it was determined, of course, to surrender its judicial character altogether. As soon as the courts were entitled to decide on matters pertaining to contents of the constitution, they ceased to perform judiciary functions. It would then be more appropriate to speak of the courts as institutions engaged in legislative processes in the form of a judicial procedure. Being authorized to examine and, if necessary, to nullify legislative enactments, the courts were in fact performing the functions of law makers, not of law determiners. This would result, Schmitt concluded, in politicizing justice and in establishing a government of judges, with all the debilitating further consequences for a viable legislative system.[2]

Carl Schmitt was always an advocate of strong executive power, reacting strongly to the weakness of the legislative assemblies. For him the problem of judicial review was linked to the problem of the relationship between law and politics, and the relationship among separation of powers, pluralism, and popular sovereignty. Ultimately he ended up justifying the strong Nazi state, at least in its earlier phases. For Schmitt any form of insecurity and discord tended to open the doors to "state-neutral," anarchical, and pluralistic foces which would eventually split the state and tear it into pieces. A strong monist state alone was the *sine qua non* of any state's efficiency.[3]

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[1] Charles L. de Secondat Montesquieu, *De L'Esprit des Lois*, ed. Robert Berathé (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1973), book ii, chapter 6, pp. 173, 176.

[2] "Die Reichtsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben," *Reichsgerichtsfestschrift*, I, pp. 154–178. Cf. also Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* (1928; rpt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1954) p. 185. Note 1, Cf. Heinz Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess* (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1968) p. 275 f; Peter Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts?" in *Der Staat*, 8 (1969) 137–158; Ulrich Scheuner, "Probleme und Verantwortungen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt* 67, No. 10 (May 15, 1952), p. 293.

A counterposition was taken by Hans Kelsen who is his "Wesen und Entstehung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit" (Vol. 5, *Veroeffentlichung der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer*, 1929, pp. 30 ff.) and his "Wer soll Hueter der Verfassung sein?" (1931) asserted that, since all political actions of the state also had judicial aspects, Schmitt's distinction between law and politics was irrelevant, if not erroneous. No essential difference existed, according to Kelsen, between the functions of the judiciary and the legislature, except in a quantitative sense. Kelsen therefore endorsed the notion and institution of a political constitutional judicature, contrary to the teachings of Montesquieu and to the tradition of German political jurisprudence before World War II. For Kelsen it seemed irrelevant whether or not constitutional tribunals still dispensed "genuine justice." He assumed that intentially or unintentionally no gaps (*Lueckenprobleme*) existed in constitutions, except in a merely mechanical sense.[4] Kelsen denied that a dichotomy existed between the judiciary, parliament, and government, inasmuch as their functions and operations were organically intertwined. Because of this presumed interrelationship, Kelsen, in contrast to Schmitt, approved of a constitutional tribunal as guardian over the constitution (while Schmitt's thesis was appropriately referred to as "dezisionistisch," i.e., opposed to courts as decision-making constitutional entities). Kelsen's position may be explained by his having been Minister of Justice in Austria during the immediate post-World War I period, and his work on the Constitutional Court may be in some respects a specialized reaction to specialized conditions of post-Habsburg Austria.[5]

A more recent debate on the nature and function of constitutional adjudication, reminiscent of the Schmitt-Kelsen confrontation, has centered around Professors Erich Kaufmann, at one extreme, and Ulrich Scheuner, Hans Spanner, and others, at the other. Kaufmann's thesis, briefly summarized, was that only "genuinely" legal cases could be decided by the courts, that constitutional litigation, like all other litigation, was subject to the ordinary courts, provided it fitted into the category of "genuine" legal subject matters. The judges in those cases, Kaufmann assumed, were totally dependent upon, and acting with specifically circumscribed references to legal norms. Nongenuine constitutional subject matters, i.e., those which extended to political, not judicial, disputes, were normless and therefore unjusticiable. Constitutional tribunals, where they existed to supplement the regular courts, were competent only to hear cases which by their nature could be decided on "genuine" legal grounds, but not to render judgment on political controversies. To use Kaufmann's own concrete example, he objected to the jurisdiction of the FCC in cases of alleged unconstitutionality of a political party—for him a political, not a legal matter to decide. As to the tribunal's power of judicial review, Kaufmann reasoned, it had to be limited to cases of administrative enactments and to the rarer cases of a violation of the Basic Law by the Legislators, provided the constitutional tribunal operated within narrowly set confines.[6] Kaufmann, not unlike Schmitt, although politically disengaged, reacted against the weakness of parliamentary government in the era of the Weimar Republic, which tended to color his writing and thinking on constitutional law.

Professor Scheuner denied Kaufmann's distinction between legal (justiciable) and political (nonjusticiable) controversies. Scheuner reasoned that law and politics were in no way opposites, and that political questions, properly formulated, were equally justiciable. He drew the distinction between types of political controversies, such as (1) those which had political effects or were of some political interest, e.g., a criminal procedure against a politically prominent personality; (2) those controversies which were not concerned with the interpretation of an existing law, but rather with the change of a law or with questions which were still to be solved, e.g., as in changing a legal situation or adjusting stipulations of a treaty to changed conditions; and (3) those controversies that were political by virtue of their subject matter, such as constitutional law, which for Scheuner was "political law."[7]

Approaching the argument from a different angle, Professor Spanner took issue with Kaufmann's thesis that a wide discretion was vested in the legislature (a sort of "legislative review"), even in matters of treaties with foreign powers.[8] The competence of the constitutional court, as judicial reviewer, should extend, Spanner suggested, to all cases in which law and politics were inseparably linked. Furthermore, the court was entitled to base its decisions on political considerations, complex problems requiring complex approaches. He warned against putting a straitjacket on the constitutional court by limiting its decisions (as Kaufmann had insisted) to strictly normative legal considerations.[9]

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[3] Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (1928; rpt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1964), p. 109. Cf. Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935), p. 33.

[4] Kelsen, in discussion on "Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit," *Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, 5 (1929) p. 119; also Laufer, p. 278, "Wer soll der Hueter der Verfassung sein?" in *Die Justiz*, Vol. VI, p. 576 ff, particularly p. 183 f. Scheuner, p. 294.

[5] Kelsen, *Reine Rechtslehre* (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1960) pp. 100 ff. Cf. Martin Drath, "Die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," in *Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, 9 (1952) 17–111, at pp. 91–92.

[6] Senatspräsident Ule, "Die Entwicklung des Oeffentlichen Rechts: Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt*, 65 (1950), p. 748.

[7] Scheuner, pp. 295–296.

Most of the West German constitutional political scientists have refrained from identifying themselves very closely with the extreme positions of either Schmitt or Kelsen and have generally approved of constitutional adjudication within circumscribed limits. Leading among these "moderates" is Professor Leibholz, whose position is today most generally representative. In a recent symposium appraising the first twenty years of the existence of the FCC (on the bench of which he served from its beginning through 1971), Leibholz referred to the FCC as the instrument of "legal realization": the FCC had performed "genuine judicial decisions," not by limiting itself to the role of mechanical technicians, but by finding and probing into the constitution-makers' intention.[10] What mattered alone, according to Leibholz, was that the decision of the FCC conformed to legal standards; that there existed a genuine legal dispute; that the intention of the constitution makers, which was to be examined by the Court, was ascertainable by legal means; and that the constitutional judge was in the position to fill possible gaps left by the constitution-makers by specific points of reference, princple, or other criteria contained in the Basic Law.[11]

As I shall explain below, the contemporary discussion on the nature of judicial review has switched to a different level: instead of a highly abstract dialogue on the matter of approval and denial of political constitutionalism, along the lines of argumentation of Schmitt v. Kelsen or Kaufmann v. Scheuner et al., the discussion has moved to more concrete problems of the degrees and extent of political adjudication, a discussion which will form the bulk of this study.

Also the formerly much too theoretical discussion of whether constitutional adjudication was a proper single or collective designation is now considered as largely unnecessary: Professor Ernst Friesenhahn maintained that constitutional judicature was merely a collective term covering different types of adjudication,[12] while Professor Ulrich Scheuner affirmed the feasibility of constitutional judicature as a unified (unitary) designation, organically embracing various forms and aspects. Among them he distinguished the functions performed by preserving the peace in the Federal Republic and in the constitutional realm in general; by safeguarding the preeminence of the constitution over statutory enactments, by securing constitutionalism in a wider sense, and by guaranteeing the fundamental rights.[13] Instead of prolonging a rather inconsequential although highly sophisticated debate, Scheuner has proposed a greater concentration on the deeper immediate problems and implications of judicial review which he appropriately referred to as "the most sensitive and by the Basic Law least excogitated area" of all constitutional controversies.[14]

My research has also indicated that other sorts of reproaches, reservations, outright condemnations, and rebuttals of constitutional adjudication —at least with the former overemphasis on abstraction—have abated, perhaps because the FCC has been approved by the general public and has proved itself "a piece of social reality" in the Federal Republic.[15] Instead, the FCC has attracted a more wholesome, more technical attention, as evidenced by the wide discussion in the professional law and political journals, indicated at the time of the law case of the Southwest State, the Equality before the Law case, the Natural Law Guideline case, the atomic rearmament referenda cases, the outlawing of the Communist Party case, the Reich Concordat case, and the second German Television case.[16]

This evident change in the discussion, (from excessive abstraction to a greater measure of realism) and the growing acceptance of the FCC as an institution of judicial review do not mean that the FCC has come to form a third force, or third power factor in the Federal Republic, in the sense of having changed the original balance-of-power system. More appropriately one could speak of judicial review by the FCC as an indication that it has increased its control without thereby having transformed West Germany into a judge-dominated or authoritarian "Gerichtsstaat." The power of judicial review under the Basic Law and under the impact of the FCC decisions has been cogently referred to by at least one analyst as a "new type of democracy" in which the power of the state emanates from the people *and* the courts.[17]

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[8] Erich Kaufmann, "Normenkontrollverfahren und voelkerrechtliche Vertraege," in *Forschungen und Berichte aus dem oeffentlichen Recht*, ed. Otto Bachot (Munich: Guenther Olzog, 1955) pp. 445–446.

[9] Hans Spanner, "Verfassungsrecht und Politische Wirklichkeit der Rechtskontrolle von Staatsvertraegen," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, ed. Karl Bracher (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1966), II, 626.

[10] Gerhard Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 1951–1971*, (Karlsruhe: C. F. Mueller, 1971), pp. 31–57.

[11] Cf. also Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess*, p. 287.

[12] Ernst Friesenhahn, in *Handbuch des Bundes Deutscher Staatsrechtler*, vol. 2, p. 526.

[13] Scheuner, p. 296.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 297.

[15] Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten," p. 139. Cf. also Laufer, p. 19 ff.

[16] *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts* (abbreviated BVerfGE) 1, 14; BVerfGE 3, 182; BVerfGE 3, 225; BVerfGE 8, 104 and BVerfGE 8, 122; BVerfGE 5, 85–393; BVerfGE 6, 309 f.

Contemporary German Views on Political Adjudication

The contemporary discussion in Germany on aspects of political adjudication seems to have taken a more practical turn toward considering such questions as: Does political adjudication tend to expand into judicial innovation (activism)? Is there a causal relationship between democracy and judicial creativity and, if so, can a newly established democracy afford to engage in judicial neutralism? Has the dynamics of modern life eliminated the last shreds of difference between law and politics, i.e., has modern constitutional practice already turned into innovativeness and neutralism? Can boundary lines be established between objective and subjective methods and criteria of judicial interpretation? Can the FCC be expected to exercise self-denial, or would it not tend to seek an ever-widening competence and application? Is judicial positivism justifiable, or must the commonweal of the state take precedence over a rigid "Rechtsverpflichtung" (duty to conform to legal norms)? Do recent analyses of the sociological makeup of the judges justify entrusting to them the sacred task of determining the constitutionality of statutory enactments? Should they be arbiters on the compatibility of an international commitment with a national law, on determining the reliability of a political party, on alleged infraction of a person's fundamental rights, or on the omission or improper performance of a governmental obligation prescribed by the Basic Law?

After more than twenty years of the existence of the FCC, no neat classification of these issues can be made. A large literature exists, but it is far from clear and its polemical tone is often stronger than its persuasiveness.

Professors Willi Geiger and Martin Drath, two contemporary West German scholars, are among the most prominent and forthright in their endorsement of the nexus between political adjudication and judicial activism (and in advocating the desirability of judicial activism). Geiger's position may be summarized as follows:[18] In one of his lectures Geiger, who served on the FCC bench himself, suggests that to understand the Court one must realize that is essential function was not to act as a mouthpiece of a tight, complete, all-embracing, normative system, immune to the possibility of future contingencies. By its nature constitutional law (and those who interpret and apply it) is subject to change, and one must allow for implementation and expansion, rather than stifling constitutional growth in the name of a rigid *status quo*. Vast areas of politics are indeed deliberately left unregulated by norms. Among such uncharted courses are the practices of parliamentarism, in fact, the entire style of parliamentary performance and political decision making, and the broad political guidelines of government. Neither, Geiger maintains, does constitutional law prescribe to the lawmakers or government how they are to use their powers, how the government is to be formed, and its members recruited; nor does it regulate the conduct of an election campaign, the lobbies and other interest groups, etc. Constitutional law consists of general legal principles, of dicta which for their application require decisions on values, and depend on unstable political circumstances, changing constellations and the actions of pluralistic societal groups. At many times a constitutional norm only expresses a broader, vaguely formulated frame of aims and objectives which can be attained by more than one means, although in conformity to the constitution, or at least not in conflict with it. Reflecting the nature of constitutional law itself, the FCC must in exercising its jurisdictional power be given the freedom to acknowledge the variety of meanings and the changeability of circumstances. It should therefore be endowed with a large discretionary power of creative interpretation. The German judicial system should adopt, or at least approximate, therefore, Geiger believes, Justice Frankfurter's statement that the Constitution of the United States is what the Supreme Court says it is. As in the case of the United States, the German Basic Law should be understood, as the FCC has gradually come to realize, by means of decisions. That would mean that the Court could (and should) if necessary deviate from the intentions of the framers of the constitution, from the original political interest groups, and from the viewpoints of the political scientists.

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[17] Ekkehard Schumann, *Verfassungs- und Menschenrechtsbeschwerde gegen richterliche Entscheidungen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963) pp. 22 ff.

[18] Willi Geiger, "Verfassungsentwicklung durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," lecture at the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Vereinigung, Duesseldorf, October 28, 1965. Cf. also Geiger, *Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 12, Maerz 1951*. Kommentar, particularly "Normenkontrolle auf Antrag von Verfassungsorganen", (Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1952) pp. 238–353. Cf. also Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Bundesgerichtsbarkeit," in *Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung*, 5, No. 16 (August, 1952), 481–487.

Nevertheless, Geiger does not go as far as to equate the verdict of the constitutional judge with the legislative norm, except in his suggestion that over a long period of time, by acquiescence, the opinion of the court may develop into an opinion by necessity (*opinio necessitatis*), undergoing a transition from customary to constitutional law. The other organs of government and political groups will be inclined, because of the authenticity of the court's interpretation, to "adjust" themselves to the Court's decision; in short time a kind of *opinio communis* will be formed. Constantly reexamining its own decisions and recognizing the possibility of improving upon them would guarantee constitutional elasticity and organic growth without which, according to Geiger, a healthy society cannot be sustained.

A slightly different approach is taken by Professor Drath (a member of the FCC from 1955 to 1963) who is willing to concede that constitutional courts do not, in political reality as well as in the hierarchy of legal institutions, stand *over* the other constitutional organs, but by virtue of their political functions stand by their side in the order of arrangement ("neben-geordnet").[19] Drath admits that the decisions of constitutional courts are only as effective as the framework of constitutional norms within which they operate. He believes that Montesquieu's statement still applies to modern government, i.e., that the three powers of government are forced to advance in *unison* (*d'aller de concert*).[20] Furthermore, Drath realizes that the participation of the FCC in political and social development is curtailed by the FCC's not having the right in the Basic Law to originate a case on its own initiative.[21]

Nonetheless Drath approaches Geiger's view that the FCC does, indeed have the creative functions by emphasizing that frequently its decisions have been instrumental in concretely inducing, in fact compelling the legislature and the administration to act, and in bringing about practical changes of political attitudes.[22] This Drath attributes to the facts that the architects of the constitution cannot foresee or prevent all future constitutional contingencies, that constitutional norms are held in general proclamations of principle, and that these proclamations contain intentional or inadvertent gaps, if not clear contradictions. And even where clearly formulated norms exist, since for many cases in court the legal situation is unique, a strict application of existing norms can result in inequitable decisions.

From this Drath concludes that, although constitutional courts cannot freely and independently undertake any attempts to solve political and social problems, and although the constitutional judge is subject to the norm, he must provide for an interpretation relevant to the case at court and must concretize it by taking into consideration all the objective and subjective constitutional factors involved in the specific case.[23]

Above all, Drath continues, the constitutional judge has no choice but to take into consideration the *entirety* of the constitution, the rational and meaningful connection ("sinnvolle Zusammenhaenge") of norms and constitutional institutions, indeed, the entire reality of political life."[24] For Drath the constitution serves the constitutional courts as a sum total of more or less clearly defined fundamental concepts. These are inevitably accompanied by political, social, and other deficiencies and inadequacies. Therefore, the constitutional lawyer cannot refer to the constitution by simply and exclusively quoting from it.[25]

Drath emphatically notes that it is mistaken to assert, like Montesquieu, that judges were only to declare the law, but not to create it. Drath believes that the decisions of the constitutional courts have shown, in all significant cases, that the judges not only concretized the legal norms by formal interpretation, but also, by their far more independent and original creative action born out of the spirit of the constitution itself, helped to create it.[26] For Drath every decision of a constitutional court is "more or less" an independent act of participation in the formative process ("Gestaltung") of political and social life. Therefore, by participating in this manner, the FCC is "not only a constitutional organ in the formal, judicial sense, assumes not only a controlling and restrictive, but necessarily also an *active political function*."[27] Drath reaches the extreme further conclusion that the constitutional courts themselves must exercise (within the looser framework of the constitution) the *pouvoir constituant*, which need not even stop before the original (documentary) constitutional law.[28] While other courts are *bound* by the norms, the constitutional are *unbound*, as they become "legitimizing" powers.

According to Drath, more than the judge in a civil case who under certain conditions has to consider the consequences of his decisions, the constitutional judge is always under obligation to antipate the immediate political effects of a political order which may follow his decision. Drath sustains the theory that the power of decision, vested in the constitutional courts, confers upon them the obligation to decide also with a view toward the future; especially must the constitutional judge be concerned about the long-range social and political consequences of his decisions. In summary, the power of judicial decision is organically connected with its consideration of the *effects* the decision may have for the future. For most constitutional issues it can be said, according to Drath, that past constitutional conditions rarely apply to those of later times, except by vague approximation and analogy. For that reason alone the constitution must be kept from degenerating into a form of inflexible legal catechism.[29]

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[19] Martin Drath, "Die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 103.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 104–105.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 93 f.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

I want to emphasize that the positions taken by Professors Geiger and Drath are hardly representative of the majority views on judicial innovation. Most writers indeed who consider the FCC to be more than a "mere" custodian of the constitution prefer a moderate or pragmatic position which is willing to concede a mild political activism to the constitutional court but only within the confines of the normative system of the constitution and essentially still within the original division of powers.

One period in the history of the FCC, however, stands out for its receptiveness toward the pragmatic use of judicial review: Under the second presidency of the FCC since 1954, Joseph Wintrich, the President, Rudolf Katz, the Deputy-President, and Gerhard Leibholz, the Court came closer to accepting the theory expressed by the Brandeis Brief, i.e., to admit "extralegal" social and economic evidence for the Court's consideration.[30] Whether their ventures in federal constitutional theory amounted to an acceptance of a degree of judicial innovation is a matter of conjecture, although it may be reasoned that a court which expresses concern for human rights to the degree of judicially experimenting with the constitution, in actuality tends to contribute to constitutional innovation. At any rate, although the FCC continued to impose upon itself a measure of judicial restraint in avoiding interference into "non-justiciable" determination, it came very close to the notion of American pragmatic jurisprudence, particularly under Katz's presidency.

Another jurist who has contributed to the discussion of constitutional innovation is Gerhard Leibholz, who belonged to the FCC from its foundation until his retirement in 1971 and is a rather consistent albeit cautious advocate of the principles of judicial restraint, political neutrality, and constitutional conformity wherever possible. He nevertheless has recognized and evidently approved the Court's tendency to widen its sphere of competence. Leibholz contends that the Court's justiciability has extended not only to cases in which "rational standards" could be applied, but also to those containing "less concrete" principles (such as implied in and resultant from the Basic Rights).[31] The FCC, according to Leibholz, "has been able . . . to widen the constitutionally-protected freedom of profession that it has, in the area of judicial review, drawn in considerations which play a role in *actual law making*."[32]

Another roundabout way of demonstrating the West German inclination toward increased judicial innovationism through creative adjustment of old positive law rules is (or rather was) the discussion on the merits of dissenting opinions in rendering a court decision. This discussion was particularly heated during the time that the West German court procedure did not permit dissenting opinions to be publicly recorded and known (i.e., 1951–1970). In fact, only since 1970 has such recording been officially permitted, by an amendment to the original judiciary act of March 12, 1951 which set up the FCC. For instance, Professor Wolfgang Heyde, commenting on the excellence of an article written by Charles Aikin, "The United States Supreme Court: The Judicial Dissent,"[33] states that dissenting opinions not only promoted a sense of responsibility and prestige of the individual judge, but gave greater depth to the discussion about judges' arguments. Above all, recording the dissenting opinions put the legislature in the position of recognizing weaknesses and defects in statutory enactments, indicating areas of normative changes or at least emphasizing certain "new accents" and perspectives. Whatever was said in a dissenting opinion of the court, Heyde reasons, could serve later as a point of reference for changes, should they be needed. Yesterday's dissenting opinions, as has been seen in the United States, may become the accepted majority view of the court tomorrow.[34]

Peter Wittig, expressing his concern that as the result of legislative and executive pressure, the jurisdiction of the FCC might be curtailed, suggests building up the Court's resistance to such pressure by authorizing dissenting opinions "to personalize and politicize" the jurisdiction.[35] Similarly the constitutional judge's right to dissent is endorsed by Geiger when he points out the storm and stress which lead to the proper recognition of the right law, constantly going on and renewing it, and preventing it from ever being petrified to an immutable norm. Constitutional law, according to Geiger, is well equipped to play this role of a renewing force, particularly because it contains "an element of valuational decision, which ultimately could not be comprised rationally." It must respond to changing political conditions, political values, and general prevailing circumstances. By necessity constitutional law must leave legal matters "deliberately unregulated" (*bewusst rechtlichungeregelt*).[36]

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[30] Cf. Edward McWhinney, "Judicial Restraint and the West German Constitutional Court," *Harvard Law Review*, 75: 1 (1961/62), 5–38, at 18. Professor McWhinney suggests that this may be due to the fact that Judges Katz and Leibholz, as refugees from Nazi Germany, familiarized themselves with the legal practices of the United States and Bratin, to which they fled. p. 19, note 58.

[31] Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," in *Politics and Law*, ed. Gerhard Leibholz (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1965), p. 299.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 300, underscoring supplied.

[33] In *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 18 (1969), 467–474.

[34] Wolfgang Heyde, "Dissenting Opinions in der Deutschen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 19 (1970), 202.

Among those who approve of judicial innovation as a consequence, if not prime objective, of the practice of judicial review, a number of contemporary students of the subject have recommended that it should be encouraged because a direct relationship exists between constitutional jurisprudence and democracy. Geiger, for instance, deems them to be closely related, when he writes that "with the establishment of the Federal Republic, next to parliamentary democracy and presidential democracy, the liberal-constitutional democracy of the Third Power has made its entry."[37] Similarly Scheuner praises the British system in which, according to him, parliamentary self-restraint has been conditioned and perfected by a voluntary interplay of political forces, traditional moderation, mutual respect, and a common heritage. He holds it even more important that the British judge traditionally "has not been the servant of a norm, but the custodian and founder of the law and of the legal tradition."[38]

Freedom of decision may be vested in a sovereign parliament in a non-normative constitutional system; sovereignty may be functionally dispersed is a system of separation of powers which depend upon a higher constitutional norm under judicial control. In either case constitutional jurisprudence is, Scheuner concludes, fully consonant with the principles of the democratic state. It does not matter to him whether constitutional control is carried out through legislative self-control or whether it is transferred to a higher constitutional institution: As long as effective constitutional control is exercised the requirement of democracy is fulfilled. At the same time, however, Scheuner contends that no necessary nexus exists between constitutional adjudication and constitutional democracy. Constitutional adjudication depends "on the expression of a precise conception of the hierarchical relationship of the constitution and the means of adjudication, of the law as a normative expression, of the conceptual inclination of the judge toward normative law, and finally of the attitude of the courts toward the totality of the state."[39]

Considerable division exists among contemporary West German scholars on the degree of dynamics of innovation (constructivism or activism, as these terms have been employed interchangeably), and the degree to which constitutional judges should be requested to consider the long-range implications and effects of their judicial reviews. Thus, when Leibholz distinguishes law from politics, he finds them incompatible because politics was linked to the "dynamic-irrational" sphere, seeking to adapt itself to the ever-changing conditions of life. On the other hand, law was fundamentally "static-rational," seeking to restrain the dynamic elements for the sake of security which the law has the duty to guarantee. There exists for Leibholz, therefore, a latent conflict or inner tension ("Spannungsverhaeltnis") between the political forces which seek to adhere conservatively to the existing legal structure and those which prefer to shape society creatively (progressively), a conflict which Leibholz refers to as "Normativitaet" (normativeness) versus "Existentialitaet" ('existentiality,' if such word existed in the English language). However, Leibholz makes also the distinction between *purely* political disputes which he does not deem justiciable and other political controversies which can still be subject to the court's legal constitutional control, since conventional justiciable norms can be applied to them. For this latter category the "conflict of inner tension" can be removed.[40]

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[35] Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten," p. 158.

[36] Geiger, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit*, p. 15. Cf. also Edward McWhinney, "Federal Constitutional Courts and their Judges as Instruments of A Democratic Polity," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, II, pp. 513–530. After pointing out that the practice of dissenting opinions in the USA and Commonwealth countries has not always turned out to be an unmixed blessing, McWhinney concludes that judicial dissent or disagreement "has undoubtedly helped introduce a marked element of flexibility and fluidity into the constitutional law that those courts were interpreting and expounding, immensely increasing the opportunities for a subsequent judicial 'distinguishing' of unwanted earlier precedents" (p. 517).

[37] Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Bundesverfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 481.

[38] "Probleme und Verantwortungen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik," pp. 294–295.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 294–295. Cf. also Professor Apelt in *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1952, p. 733.

[40] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht und die Integrationsfunktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes," in *Integritas: Geistige Wandlung und Menschliche Wirklichkeit* (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1966), p. 215. Cf. also Leibholz, *Politics and Law*, p.

Despite his limited notion of justiciability, Leibholz must be counted among the more cautious advocates of the dynamics in constitutional adjudication. He is inclined to accept the views of self-restraint expressed in Justice Stone's dissent in *U.S.* v. *Butler* and Justice Frankfurter's statement in *American Federation* v. *American Sash and Door Co.*[41] There is, however, evidence that Leibholz, too, genuinely appreciates innovative dynamics, as for instance when he writes that "the judgments of a constitutional court have mostly a meaning which transcends the actual case itself and points to the future."[42]

Differing from Leibholz, Geiger may be regarded as more strongly in favor of recognizing and approving the dynamics in constitutional adjudication, provided also for him that the constitutional judge maintains at all time a proper minimum restraint. For Geiger the development of the Basic Law has given the FCC the "ultimately decisive" influence over the other constitutional organs of the government, whose competence and power it can determine. According to him the FCC has therefore taken a central position in the West German constitutional system and established a democracy which, built on the principle of the separation of powers, "dominates as *Third Power.*"[43] It is primarily in the exercise of the power to interpret the constitution. Geiger holds, that the vitally important innovation of policy can be accomplished, pointing to new avenues of reasoning and understanding how to adjust the objective law to political reality. By every act of interpretation a dynamic process, "a piece of unpredictability," is being performed by the FCC. Since human language was limited, and even the judicial language imperfectly precise, legal principles must be understood and applied in terms of concrete situations ("sachhaltsbezogen"). There is a reciprocal relationship between law and the nature of a specific case in court. Only rarely is there an entirely clear-cut, ultimate state of conditions for which only one absolutely definitive interpretation exists and to which all judges in a case could agree spontaneously.[44]

Several writers are willing to subscribe to the thesis of judicial dynamics, but not to the extent of permitting the constitutional court to pass judgment for the future. Among them Professor Friedrich Klein, while going beyond Leibholz's restriction of justiciability to cases which are not *purely* political, wants the Court's innovationism denied in cases involving future uncertain circumstances. He denies (somewhat vaguely) the Court's power to engage in political prognosis, without, however, excluding the power—in fact, the duty—of the Court to "project" the future.[45] Similarly, Wittig who fully endorses the power of the FCC to consider the political circumstances of the past in its decisions, identifies himself with an FCC decision according to which the Court cannot be guided by consideration of prognosis.[46] Wittig cites the Weimar Supreme Court decision of December 27, 1927, that it must limit itself to applying objective law only, without being permitted to consider the political consequences of its adjudication.[47] In the Saar Statute case, too, the FCC declared that prognoses for political development were outside the realm of constitutional jurisdiction.[48]

Related to the current discussion about how dynamically or statically the FCC should function is the question whether, and to what extent, the judges should be guided by the probable effectiveness of their decisions, immediate or long-range, as well as how *wirklichkeitsbewusst* (conscious of the reality) they ought to be. Klein supports the notion that this question has never been debated conclusively by West German scholars. The matter is complicated by two allegedly contradictory FCC decisions (of April 5, 1952, re: the Schleswig-Holstein electoral law of 1951, and of March 1, 1953, re: the EVG Treaty): In the former, the Court ruled that the FCC must consider the political consequences which might result from its decision. In the latter decision, the Court stated that possible political consequences which might result from its decisions must not play any role at all; the Court had to decide exclusively according to the normative prescription of the law.[49] Klein contends, however, that the second and apparently contradictory decision must not be interpreted as a categoric rejection of the principle of political reality and that it could still be taken into consideration in other types of disputes.

Leibholz, too, affirms the principle: "In the realm of constitutional law," he writes, " . . . the constitutional judge is compelled to relate each

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273. Cf. BVerfGE 1, 101; BVerfGE 2, 96; BVergGE 7, 188. Cf. also Laufer, "Typus und Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, II, p. 445.

[41] 297 U.S. 78 and 335 U.S. 542.

[42] G. Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 214. Also his "The Federal Constitutional Court in the Constitutional System of the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Politics and Law*, pp. 271–285.

[43] Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 482.

[44] Geiger, "Verfassungsentwicklung durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Bundesgerichts," p. 14.

[45] "Bundesverfassungsgericht und Richterliche Beurteilung Politischer Fragen," in *Schriften der Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Westfaelischen Wilhelms Universitaet zu Muenster*, No. 59, 1966, p. 24 ff.

[46] Wittig, pp. 147–148.

[47] Wittig, p. 148, footnote 35.

[48] BVerfGE 4, 157 at 175.

[49] BVerfGE 2, 143, at 181.

single clause of the constitution to political reality." The constitutional court cannot behave indifferently to the political order. Formalistic positivism is inadmissible. Instead, the judge must bring constitutional principles into a "reasonable relationship" with the given political order. He must therefore be fully familiar with the concrete facts and contemporary social forces as a "participant or even author of a continuous change in the meaning and effectiveness of the constitution."[50] More than having recourse to grammatical, logical, and historical methods of interpretation, the modern constitutional judge must grasp the sense of the constitution as a whole. This includes, Leibholz emphasizes, the duty to concern himself with the political consequences of his decision.[51]

As Laufer points out, contrary to the practice of the High Court of Justice during the Weimar Republic, the FCC has in fact taken into consideration the political circumstances and consequences of its decisions in a number of cases (e.g., in the decisions on the Saar Statute, 1955, the Electoral Apportionment case, 1963, and the so-called "All-Phases Income Tax" case in 1966).[52] Wittig emphasizes the need for setting up boundaries for the consideration of political consequences of the FCC decisions. He seems to identify himself with the view of the first President of the FCC, Hoepker-Aschoff, that the Court must be always concerned about the political consequences of its decisions and particularly of the possible effects these may have on the liberal, democratic, fundamental order of the state.[53] Yet he wishes to limit the consideration to those cases in which it was evident that economic, financial, domestic, and foreign consequences of the Court's decisions were liable to jeopardize the capacity of the state to function properly. In all other cases, he declares, the Court should not concern itself with the consequences of its decisions.[54]

A few writers who are not principally opposed to the idea of constitutional innovation object, however, to conferring upon the Court the power of considering the expediency (suitability) of a norm which it was about to review constitutionally. Their objections are echoed by a large number of FCC decisions.[55] The objectors identify themselves with Justice Stone's statement that "for the removal of unwise laws from the statute books the appeal lies not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government."[56]

Leibholz here again formulates the problem most cogently: In checking upon the legislative bodies the Court should impose upon itself a maximum of self-restraint and concede to them the greatest discretion. In case the question was raised whether the government or lawmakers had overstepped their legislative boundaries, they ought not to be authorized to question the use of the discretionary power vested in the legislative bodies on grounds of expediency, but maintain in its decisions an attitude of political neutrality. Under no circumstances should the Court substitute its own political consideration for that of the government and the lawmakers.[57] "Only if the government and lawmakers had misused their free discretion," Leibholz alleged in a memoir on March 21, 1952, "and the act of lawmaking or other forms of governmental measure coming before the Court can be characterized as arbitrary, can there be talk of a violation of a right which it is for the Federal Constitutional Court to correct."[58] Similarly, the FCC ruled on December 17, 1953, that the Court "has certainly not to find whether the lawmaker has in particular instances employed the most suitable, the most rational, or the most just solution."[59]

The discussion on the problem of expediency extends also to cases of alleged conflicts between international agreements and the national law. Professor Spanner raises strong objections to the conservative point of view: Commenting on a treaty between the Federal Republic and France (concerning the Saarland) of November 23, 1954, which the Court examined for its constitutionality in 1955, Spanner wrote that the judgment pointed to the fallacy of denying the Court the right to be guided by considerations of expediency—especially, Spanner contends, in disputes for which a "factual adjudication" was impossible. The dilemma of the requirement for constitutional conformity was most difficult when, as in the Saarland case, the Court found the treaty to be unconstitutional *per se*, but acknowledged at the same time that it had observed in the treaty a "certain approximation to a condition which the Basic Law endeavored to attain." This reasoning established the complex obligation for the Court, in this and in future cases, to examine the degree of the nearness and remoteness between a treaty stipulation and the Basic Law or statutory enactment: such an examination, Spanner holds, would inevitably lead to an ever-increasing consideration of political reality and expediency by the Court. In an extreme case the Court might even be compelled to rule that in the name of political reality and expediency and after having judiciously weighed the pros and cons of a treaty vis-à-vis the Basic Law, the Court should be prepared to sustain the treaty, e.g., to prefer the treaty to the Basic Law, striking down the allegation of unconstitutionality. At the same time, however, Laufer warns against the danger of conceding to the Court too large a discretion when deciding on grounds of political considerations and expediency.[60]

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[50] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 217.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 217. Cf. also Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1951–1971*, p. 41.

[52] H. Laufer, "Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Politische Kontrollen" in *Politisches Vierteljahrsschrift*, Sonderheft 2, 1970, p. 232. Cf. also Wittig, pp. 149–150. Cf. the cases BVerfGE 16, 139; 21, 12.

[53] Hoepker-Aschoff, *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht*, p. 3 f.

[54] Wittig, p. 149.

[55] Cf. enumeration in Laufer, "Typus und Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," p. 445.

[56] Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," p. 47.

[57] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 221. Cf. also Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," p. 297.

[58] *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 6 (1957), 120 ff; cf. also Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," p. 297.

[59] BVerfGE 3, 182.

Conclusions on Political Adjudication

The foregoing discussion should not make us forget that the problems pertaining to judicial review in the Federal Republic of Germany have not reached major proportions. Not only is the general public largely uninformed and unconcerned about it, but the voice of moderation which has characterized post-World War II West Germany (with minor exceptions) seems to have affected as well the debate on the FCC in its exercise of judicial review.

In addition, the consensus seems to exist among proponents of constitutional innovation that wherever feasible the Court should rule in favor of constitutional conformity. When it is possible for the Court to rule that a given statute was consonant with the constitution and could be interpreted in harmony with it, even in cases of substantial doubt, the presumption of constitutionality should prevail. As the Court has said in a number of cases, only when the presumption could *not* be possibly sustained, should a statute be designated as unconstitutional.[61] The Court cannot give a law an interpretation which was clearly not intended by the lawmakers. The overall necessity to abide by the principle of constitutional conformity is hardly contested in West German politico-juridical literature.[62] For the sake of legal security, continuity, and justice the greatest discretion for government and lawmakers is generally accepted.[63] The majority of writers, as I have indicated, maintain that questions of expediency, suitability, or necessity should not be the concern of the FCC, which is expected to refuse to hear such cases.

The decisions of the Court which indicate its voluntary self-restraint are too numerous to permit listing them here. Suffice it to say in summary that the FCC has decided from its beginnings that the discretion of the government and lawmakers can be limited only if the Basic Law itself has drawn these limits; in all other cases the discretionary power and freedom of action will be respected by the Court. It has declined to compel federal legislative bodies to provide for legislation in case of inaction, even when a need for such legislation was recognized or when state legislation was found incapable of dealing with a matter effectively.[64] With exceptions, the West German jurist is still essentially under the spell of Radbruch's classical dictum that the judge must interpret the law as the "objectivated" will of the lawmaker.[65] Accordingly, the FCC has normally followed the conventional grammatical, systematical, logical, and historical methods of statutory interpretation; this does not prevent the Court from repeatedly exercising a degree of subjective interpretation, particularly in borderline cases in which the meaning and intention of a statute were not clearly comprehensive and ascertainable. Justice Heck of the FCC recognized the existence of such borderline cases during the Heidelberg Colloquium on Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Present, when he raised the question of the limits to constitutional adjudication in cases where the Court would interpret a law in compatibility with the literal contents of the enactment, but clearly in incompatibility with the real intentions of the lawmakers.[66]

In summary, the FCC has in practice manifested self-restraint and, to borrow Justice Frankfurter's terms, "professional humility," has preferred inaction when it must have been tempted to act, has at times deliberately been circumscriptive when it could have been outspoken.[67] It has clearly proved that under no circumstances was a mere change in legal conceptions, specifically in the interpretation of uncertain legal terms, a sufficient ground for reopening a case that had been adjudged.[68] The FCC, as McWhinney writes appropriately, "sought to build for the future"; it has pursued a policy of "hastening slowly and non-involvement"; in brief, it has been conspicuous for a conscious judicial policy of delay.[69]

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[60] Spanner, "Verfassungsrecht und politische Wirklichkeit," 626–627. Cf. also Erich Kaufman, "Normenkontrollverfahren und voelkerrechtliche Vertraege."

[61] BVerfGE 2, 266 at 282.

[62] Cf. BVerfGE 8, 28 at 34; 2, 236 at 340. Cf. also Gerd Pfeiffer, *Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in der Praxis* (Essen W. Ellinghaus, 1959), p. 363.

[63] Cf. Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Politischer Prozess*, pp. 351–354.

[64] Hans G. Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *American Journal of Comparative Law* 9 (Winter, 1960), 29–47, at 38. Cf. Rupp, "Some Remarks on Judicial Self-Restraint," in *Ohio State Law Journal* 21 (1960), 503–515. Cf. also Gebhard Mueller, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Journal der internationalen Juristenkommission*, 1965, pp. 220, 230, 244. Cf. Wittig, pp. 145–146.

[65] Cf. Spanner, "Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 91 (1966), 510–511. Cf. E. Friesenhahn, "Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Verfassungesgerichtsbarkeit in der Gegenwart* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1962) p. 152.

[66] Spanner, "Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung," p. 514.

On the other hand, as this study indicates, a number of writers have expressed their preference for a less cautious, a more experimental, and active view of constitutional adjudication; the extremists among them, indeed, come close to preferring a "government of judges" to a "government of law." But even among this more "progressive" group of writers, the moderates seem to prevail. Their views were reflected in a significant speech by the former West German President, Gustav Heinemann, on December 8, 1971, at the occasion of introducing the new President of the FCC. President Heinemann emphasized that it was the special task of the FCC, over and above its formal obligations, to see that the "fundamental values" which formed the basis of the Basic Law were put into political practice. The Court had not yet overstepped the (narrower) boundaries of its prescribed competence. The judges, however, Heinemann asserted, should constantly recognize that they were themselves subject to the changing social climate, and that they must adjust themselves to it. As an example the President listed the guarantee of protecting private property which for him should not form an insuperable barrier to necessary, long over-due reform.[70]

If any generalizations can be drawn from the great variety of positions outlined in this study, they would include the following:

(1) Few West German scholars of political jurisprudence continue to maintain that the Basic Law was originally intended and should still be considered to be a rigid set of exclusive norms from which no deviations must be allowed.

(2) Constitutional norms and reality need not be incompatible. Gradual, organic adjustments can and must be made, as implied in Edmund Burke's notion of "prescription." The FCC would fail to perform its functions if it acted as a mere rubberstamp or neutral bystander. It is far more than an institution which registers and administers the legislative will in a fixed, normative constitutional system. Instead it must interpret and develop the constitutional norm with respect to political reality.

(3) The system of separation of powers has essentially proved and retained its validity and should not be thrown overboard nonchalantly. At the same time, however, the traditional system of the separation of powers, at least in its pure form, has ceased to be so compartmenalized in modern constitutional life and the judicial power, in due course, has now become extended to the legislative sphere.

(4) If one cannot substantiate any clearly recognizable trend toward a new judicial activism of the FCC, one can at least note the evidence for a widened competence of the Court. This widened power is transferred partly by lawmakers who have chosen to restrict their own discretion while conferring new powers upon the Court (e.g., by giving it the power to determine the principles of equality and universality of elections and in judging whether a splinter party may be a danger to political stability); the increased jurisdiction has also resulted from the FCC's attempt to seek new power.

(5) Although the Constitutional Court has turned out to be more than the mouthpiece (*la bouche*) of the government and of the lawmakers that Montesquieu had recommended, there is no justification for speaking of a domination by a "third chamber in perpetual session," a "*noblesse de robe*," or a judicial "*suprema potestas*." It has checked its exercise of power with a strong sense of self-restraint. There is no evidence that an alleged dichotomy between dynamic-irrational and static-rational forces have brought the Federal Republic to the brink of chaos. Self-restraint coupled with a limited creativity has characterized the performance of the FCC.[71]

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[67] Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess*, p. 361.

[68] BVerfGE 2, 395, 396.

[69] McWhinney, "Judicial Restraint," p. 12.

[70] Reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1971, No. 285, p. 7.

[71] Cf. Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," pp. 298–299. It may be deemed as a *non sequitur*, but we should like to point out here parenthetically that the limited acceptance of judicial activity and the small appreciation for the subjective importance of the West German judges are reflected by the quite embryonic literature and meagerness of behavioral and statistical data on the constitutional judges on the Federal Republic. A promising sign of beginning, at least for other higher judges, is Walter Richter's "Die Richter der Oberlandesgerichte der Bundedrepublik, eine berufliche und sozialstatistische Analyse," in *Hamburger Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, 5 (1960), 241–259, and Ralf Dahrendorf, "Deutsche Richter: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Oberschicht," in *Gesellschaft und Freiheit: Zur Soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwurt* (Munich: R. Riper & Co. 1962), pp. 176–196. Cf. also the highly sophisticated discussions on the newly created members of the FCC in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 8, 1971, No. 284. Of significance is also No. 294 of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of December 18, 1971, in which Friedrich Karl Fromme's article, "Ein neues Wahlverfahren fuer die Verfassungsrichter," p. 2, criticizes the

(6) The West German Constitution represents one of the more obvious successes in federalism of the postwar era. It has practically accommodated to the needs of effective leadership in a period of external political difficulties and of phenomenal economic-industrial growth. Thus the FCC has come to play a significant role as an arbiter between the government and the people and to serve as an excellent object lesson for students of jurisprudence in other countries.

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former Federal President Heinemann's statement that the several candidates for the FCC had been too much discussed in public. Fromme condemns any prohibition of public discussions on the personal background and make-up of prospective judges and considers a return to the old-fashioned "rein sachliche Richterbestellung" (purely factual appointment to the judgeship) obsolete and hypocritical, in view of the political criterion of their present form of appointment. For updated comments on literature on the problems discussed in this paper see Rudolf Schaefer, "Politikwissenschaftliche Analysen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Neue Politische Literatur*, No. 2, 1974, p. 209, and Theodor Maunz, *Deutsches Staatsrecht: Ein Studienbuch* (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1973), pp. 283–284.

Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process*

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An essential characteristic of any polity is the way that different groups participate in the process of policy formation. Previous analysis of strategies for influencing public policy has concentrated on the success and failure of attempts to influence decision makers' choices among policy alternatives. More recently the source of these alternatives and the processes by which they are defined for decision makers have been identified as crucial, if less visible, determinants of public policy.[1]

In most communities, the number of potential public issues far exceeds the capabilities of decision-making institutions to process them.[2] Issues or their proponents must consequently compete for a place on the decision-making agenda. The process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials can appropriately be called agenda building.

Agenda building is a process ideally suited to comparative analysis. All communities must decide which issues will be the concern of decision makers. At the same time, there is great variety in the ways this is accomplished, and in the proportion of potential issues which eventually are seriously considered by the community leaders. Our goal is to develop a model and propositions, useful both across and within polities, which can account for variation in the ways issues get on the agenda and in rates of success at achieving agenda status.

The Agenda-Building Perspective

The study of agenda building requires an understanding of the ways in which different subgroups in a population become aware of and eventually participate in, political conflicts, whether the issues are initiated by groups in the general public or by political leaders. The model must also account for strategies used to prevent the success of initiating groups.[3]

Two types of agendas can be distinguished: the public agenda consists of issues which have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility; the formal agenda is the list of items which decision makers have formally accepted for serious consideration. It can be found in such places as a court calendar, a legislative docket, or the list of cases to be heard by a tribal council. Not all items on the formal agenda receive serious attention from decision makers, however. For example, many bills introduced in the U.S. Congress have symbolic appeal for constituents, but are never considered in committees and consequently never reach the floor. Our interest in formal agenda items is limited to those issues that receive serious attention from decision makers, and does not include "pseudo-agenda" items.[4] Agreement that an issue merits serious consideration of course does not imply that the outcome of this conflict will correspond to the goal of the issue's proponents or even that the outcome will be action in any form.[5]

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* We wish to thank Barney Brown for his help in collecting and analyzing the case materials for this project.

[1] For example, see Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975); and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Powers," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (September 1962), pp. 947–952.

[2] As a result a system must develop filter or gatekeeping mechanisms which will determine which issues attain visibility. See David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. 87–96. The problem is further compounded by issues continuing to survive in different forms once the initial issue has been resolved. See Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

[3] Examples of strategies used for conflict containment include: Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1144–1158; Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 285–295; and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960).

[4] Cobb and Elder, pp. 14–16.

[5] See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1970); Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1063–1081; and Frederick W. Frey, "Comment," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1081–1102.

The public agenda consists of all issues which (1) are the subject of widespread attention or at least awareness; (2) require action, in the view of a sizeable proportion of the public; and (3) are the appropriate concern of some governmental unit, in the perception of community members. An issue requires the recognition of only a major portion of the polity, not of all its members. Operational referents of terms such as "wide-spread," "sizeable," and "major portion," will vary not only cross-culturally; but also from community to community.[6] Every local community will have a public agenda. If this community is subsumed in a wider political system there will be some overlap of items from the public agendas of communities at higher levels.

Issues typically arise in small groups. These groups are always concerned with expanding awareness of the issue, either because they want to promote expansion or because they want to prevent it.[7] Such characteristics as social status, economic mobility, length of residence in a community and degree of residential separation are latent resources which, given the right conditions, can be used to promote group interest, unity and action.[8] Given different resource bases, groups work to get an issue on the agenda in different ways.

The possibility of issue redefinition is an additional source of power inherent in the process of issue expansion. Redefinition involves the substitution of one issue for another, usually a more specific issue being redefined into a more general one.[9] An extended expansion process is likely to include several redefinitions of the issues, as increasingly diverse groups become involved.[10]

Expansion is far from automatic. Opponents will actively attempt to contain expansion, in particular if the status quo is to their advantage. Second, those initially committed to a cause may become disillusioned as they perceive the conflict being redefined away from "their" interests. Finally, the proponents of an issue in many political systems face overwhelming odds of apathy and inertia among those they seek to involve.[11]

Agenda building, then, is a problem particularly appropriate for comparative analysis. It occurs in every political system from the smallest to the largest, from the simplest to the most complex, while at the same time there are important variations in its form and structure. Despite the great variation possible in the history of any particular issue, we suggest four major stages which shape all issue careers: initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance. Three models of agenda building are also proposed to describe variation in origination of issues inside or outside government, and in the degree and direction of efforts to expand issues beyond the initiating groups. In the final section, we present two kinds of propositions: (1) cross-cultural propositions about agenda building which identify differences in the process across polities, and (2) intrasocietal propositions which identify effects on agenda building of different social, structural, and political positions within the same society.

Models of Agenda Building

Analytically we identify three different models of agenda building depending on variation in the four major characteristics of issue careers: initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance.[12] The first, the *outside initiative* model, accounts for the process through which issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are then expanded sufficiently to reach, first, the public agenda and, finally, the formal agenda. The second, the *mobilization* model, considers issues which are initiated inside government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. Successful implementation of these issues often requires, however, that they be placed on a public agenda as well. The mobilization model accounts for the ways decision makers attempt to implement a policy by expanding an issue from the formal to the public agenda. The third, the *inside initiative* model, describes issues which arise within the governmental sphere and whose supporters do not try to expand them to the mass public. Instead these supporters base their hopes of success on their own ability to apply sufficient pressure to assure formal agenda status, a favorable decision and successful implementation. In this model, initiating groups often specifically wish to prevent an issue from expanding to the mass public; they do not want it on the public agenda. A more detailed discussion of each of these models in terms of the four general characteristics of initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance, will provide a framework for cross-cultural investigation of these important variations in the policy-making processes.

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[6] See Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 88–91; and Cecile Trop and Leslie L. Roos, Jr., "Public Opinion and the Environment," *The Politics of Ecosuicide* ed. Leslie L. Roos, Jr., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 53–63.

[7] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chapter 1.

[8] For emphasis on a wide variety of characteristics, see: Robert L. Crain et al., *The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Dispute* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr. and Kenneth Prewitt "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June, 1969), 361–378; "Part II," 63 (September, 1969), 808–832; and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, "The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, 2, No. 01-013 (Beverley Hills, Calif., Sage Publishers, 1971).

[9] Schattschneider, chapter 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, chapter 4; James Coleman, *Community Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); Peter Bachrach and Elihu Bergman, *Power and Choice: The Formation of American Population Policy* (Lexington, Ma: Heath, 1973); Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); and Paul Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Reexamined," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (April, 1971), 381–402.

[11] Crain, *The Politics of Community Conflict*, pp. 226–227.

[12] Nelson Polsby has also investigated the sources of successful issue initiation and found two general strategies which he has called "inside" and "outside" patterns of access. Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Initiation in the American Political System," in *The Use and Abuse of Social Science*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971), pp. 296–308.

Outside Initiative Model.

(1) *Initiation* is the first phase of this model. It is the articulation of a grievance in very general terms by a group outside the formal governmental structure. For example, for many years old people in America complained about their generally poor financial condition, and in particular about the financial crises caused by extended illness. The degree of organization of a group which considers itself aggrieved is highly variable. Individuals who share concern about an issue may or may not be united by other concerns. They may also be more or less visible to others in the society as a distinct category. The degree of visibility may be related to the group's previous experience and success in articulating issues.[13]

(2) *Specification.* General grievances may be translated into specific demands in a variety of ways. Demand articulation may or may not be the basis of a specialized role. In Bushman or Pygmy society, for example, no individual specialists have the function of translating diffuse grievances into specific demands,[14] a role which labor leaders, for instance, perform in many industrial societies. Members of groups which share grievances may or may not be united in their articulation of them. Diverse demands can be derived from a common grievance and may be expressed by various members of a group.[15]

Precedence for specific demands by a group may have more than one source. The group itself may or may not have experience with the articulation of demands; and the wider society to which demands are expressed may or may not have heard similar issues expressed by other groups. In most African countries during the 1950s, for example, there were often many different groups presenting similar demands for political independence and competing with each other for public support.[16]

(3) *Expansion.* In order to be successful in getting on the formal agenda, outside groups need to create sufficient pressure or interest to attract the attention of decision makers. Typically this is done by expanding an issue to new groups in the population and by linking the issue with pre-existing ones. The dilemma for the group which originally initiates the issue is that while expansion is crucial for success, it may lead to losing control of the issue entirely as more powerful groups enter the conflict and the original participants grow less important.

In discussing issue expansion, Cobb and Elder identify four different groups that can become involved in a conflict as an issue expands beyond its original participants. Different strategies are necessary to involve each of these groups in the controversy, as they have different levels of initial interest in the particular issues and different levels of involvement and interest in public affairs in general.[17]

The first individuals likely to become involved in an issue as it expands beyond the immediate initial participants are the members of the *identification group*, those people who feel strong ties to the originators of an issue and who see their own interest as tied to that of those raising the issue. The members of the identification group are not only the first to be mobilized but are also most likely to support the position of the originators. At the same time, the identification group is not likely to be particularly large, and success in reaching the public agenda usually requires further issue expansion. A typical example of the expansion of an issue to members of an identification group is the definition of a controversy in terms of regional, ethnic, or religious interests.

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[13] For example, see James B. Christoph, *Capital Punishment and British Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp. 26–33; Jennie-Keith Hill [Ross], "The Culture of Retirement" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, 1968); and Jennie-Keith Ross, "Social Borders: Definitions of Diversity," *Current Anthropology*, 16 (March, 1975), 53–72.

[14] See Lorna Marshall, "Sharing, Talking and Giving: Relief of Social Tensions Among !Kung Bushmen," *Africa*, 31 (1961), 231–246; and Colin Turnbull, *The Forest People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961).

[15] See Crenson, *Un-politics-of-Air Pollution*, pp. 42–44; Josephs Himes, "The Functions of Racial Conflict," *Social Forces*, 45 (September, 1966), 1–10; and Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 991–1017.

[16] For example, see Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana: 1946–1960* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), and Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[17] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 103–109.

Attention groups are groups in the population which are likely to be aware of a conflict early on, and which can be mobilized relatively rapidly whenever an issue enters the group's sphere of concern. Whereas identification group involvement centers on the group affiliations of the combatants, attention group participation tends to be more dependent on the issues involved in a conflict.[18] Because attention groups are highly interested in public issues, they often become involved in controversies regardless of the wishes of the identification group. Thus, for example, an agricultural protection group in France may quickly become involved in a conflict which begins with a consumers' group arguing that agricultural protectionism increases food prices. From the perspective of the consumers' group the involvement of the agricultural group is a mixed blessing. Their entrance into the controversy is, needless to say, on the other side. At the same time, their interest and involvement is useful in attracting attention to the issue and in increasing public knowledge about it. In some controversies, expansion of an issue to various attention groups in the population is sufficient to attain formal agenda status and serious consideration from decision makers. In other situations, further expansion to the mass public may take place first.[19]

Within the mass public, Cobb and Elder distinguish between the *attentive public* and the *general public*. The former usually comprise a small minority of the population and include those people who are most informed about and interested in public issues. While they have strong views on many public issues, members of the attentive public may be far from united. Thus, as an issue expands and attracts more attention and as more members of the attentive public become involved, they are likely to be drawn into *both* sides of the controversy. Furthermore, because they have strong views on most public matters, they are likely to be among the least persuadable elements of the population once an issue gets defined in a particular manner, whatever the efforts of the early participants.

In contrast, the general public is the last group to become involved in controversies. Its interest in most issues is likely to be short lived; effective and sustained involvement of the general public in an issue is relatively rare. At the same time, when issues can be defined broadly enough, the involvement of the general public is often crucial in forcing decision makers to place an item on the formal agenda.[20]

A good example of an issue which was effectively expanded to the general public is that of independence in many African and Asian countries in the 1950s and early 1960s. In many countries, independence movements led by relatively small, educated elites were successful in forcing the colonial powers to consider seriously the possibility of political independence only after large numbers of the general public became involved in mass movements.[21]

In many traditional societies, disputes arising among community members provide a large number of issues which vie for a place on the formal agenda, and studies of the legal process by anthropologists provide a wide range of cases for comparative analysis. Among the Arusha in Tanzania, for example, individuals do not usually bring cases directly to the entire community for settlement. Instead they must expand their issue to other community members who might support their side in a dispute or present their case to a formal tribunal; these attention groups may be age-sets or kinship groups.

Among the Arusha, resolution of a case depends upon the relationship between the disputants. Cases involving age-mates are heard before an age-group enclave, intra-parish disputes are presented to the parish assembly, while disputes between members of the same lineage are heard by a lineage conclave. Finally, when disputes remain unresolved through all the lower levels, they may eventually be taken to the courts.[22] There are a number of potential arenas in which a dispute may be heard and resolved, or in our terms, within Arusha society there are a number of formal agendas. Once an issue is on the public agenda it can relatively easily reach the formal agenda also, probably in part because there are several of these available.

(4) *Entrance*. Success in issue expansion may place an issue on the public agenda. It then becomes a problem that concerns a relatively large number of people who view it as an appropriate focus for formal action. Entrance represents movement from the public agenda to the formal agenda, where serious consideration of the issue by decision makers can take place.

The difficulty of making this transition varies widely across political systems. For the Arusha, as we have seen, public agenda status makes highly probable formal consideration of an issue. Among the Bushmen entrance is such a minimal problem that the public-formal distinction almost disappears. An individual speaking loudly about some concern can attract the attention of others in a cluster of huts; and they will often join in immediately to try to resolve the problem.[23]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[19] Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Re-examined," pp. 381–402.

[20] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 107–108.

[21] For example, see F. M. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919–1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960).

[22] See Philip H. Gulliver, *Social Control in an African Society* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1963), pp. 173–275.

In many industrial societies, on the other hand, the movement between the two agendas is far from automatic, as some issues can remain stalled between the two for long periods of time. Particularly in situations where *any* decision is likely to arouse great opposition from the public, governments often refuse to give an issue any serious consideration whatsoever. In effect, there is a decision to make no decision, or what Bachrach and Baratz describe as a nondecision.[24] The idea of a nondecision, in our view, is most applicable to issues which achieve public, but not formal agenda, status. Issues which attain neither public nor formal agenda status can also be viewed as nondecisions in the sense that Bachrach and Baratz use the term, but in effect represent trivial and noninteresting examples. Questions such as the treatment of American Indians by the United States government for many years represent the latter, not in terms of the intrinsic importance of the issue. but because it was never expanded sufficiently to the public agenda and therefore never required any decision *not* to make a decision. In contrast, civil rights issues, or public financing of medical insurance were on the public agenda in America many years before attempts to place them on the formal agenda had any success. These two sorts of issues present very different problems in the study of agenda-building. In the case of the Indians, the question is why expansion to the public agenda was unsuccessful, while in the case of civil rights or public medical insurance we would be interested in the problem of moving from the public to formal agenda. Although we do not have the space to consider this problem here, such an analysis must include the resources, interests, and strategies not only of the proponents of an issue, but also of opponents seeking to contain the issue expansion and to keep the issue off the formal agenda.

Strategies. Strategies of conflict expansion are crucial to outside groups seeking to place their issue on the formal agenda. Two general problems of strategy are apparent in the stages we have identified: (1) the movement of an issue from a small core associated with the stages of identification and specification to a larger public associated with the expansion stage, and (2) the movement from expansion to entrance. Often the same strategies are used at both stages, although this is not always the case, and at times it is useful to distinguish between expansion strategies (associated with [1]), and entrance strategies (associated with [2]). Expansion to new groups enhances the possibility of attaining public agenda status, which will, it is hoped, create sufficient pressure on authorities to force their serious consideration of the issue. Groups seeking expansion of their issue must compete with other groups demanding attention for other issues, as well as with opposition forces trying to limit expansion.

Expansion strategies can aim at existing, relatively small groups in the population, such as interest groups, or they can work directly for mobilization of the mass public. Another variation is to create particular small groups whose goal is the promotion of a specific issue in the wider public. The major advantage of such a group is that it is not associated in the public mind with any other issues which may produce opposition by association. At the same time, because it is not associated with other pre-existing issues, its possibilities in terms of issue expansion are also more limited as it does not draw on pre-existing cleavages and combatants.

In seeking to achieve issue expansion a group with a grievance has two primary assets: (1) the characteristics of the issue itself, and (2) the financial and material resources as well as personal commitment of group members and their organization. Each provides different opportunities to groups seeking to place an issue on the public agenda.

Cobb and Elder offer a series of propositions suggesting how *issue characteristics* are likely to affect expansion. They suggest that the more ambiguously defined, the greater the social significance, the more extended the temporal relevance, the less technical, and the less available any clear precedent, the greater the chance that an issue will be expanded to a larger population.[25] Through public statements as well as private discussions, leaders of the grievance group, particularly at the outset of the conflict, have a great deal of freedom in their definition of the issue and in determining its characteristics.

At the same time there is no assurance that outside groups or the public will fully accept the grievance group's definition of the issue. There is virtually always some change in the definition of the issue as it expands to public groups.[26] One good example in recent years is the women's liberation movement which has usually tried to characterize its cause in terms of equality, human potential, and freedom. At the same time, opponents refuse to accept this definition and substitute such specific and negative symbols as "lesbians."

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[23] Marshall, "Sharing," pp. 231–246.

[24] Bachrach and Baratz "Two Faces of Power," pp. 947–952.

[25] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 112–113.

[26] Crenson, "Un-politics of Air Pollution," pp. 58–75.

An important strategy in issue expansion is to associate a particular issue with emotionally laden symbols which have a wide acceptance in the society.[27] In America both the civil rights and women's liberation movements have stressed the symbols of equality; in Ireland, groups seeking independence for Ulster have stressed the notion of a "united free country."

The use of these relatively familiar and positive symbols in connection with a new issue helps to develop an initial favorable reaction in the mass public, which might otherwise be hostile or skeptical. At the same time this is a way of saying to the established authorities that the group does not pose any particular threat to the government and in fact is working within the context of the existing framework. It is a way of preventing government harassment and opposition at a time when public support for the group or issue is not very strong.[28]

In addition to the issue characteristics and emotional symbols used in defining an issue, a grievance group has at its disposal the material resources as well as the energy and commitment of its members. How a group utilizes these resources in seeking to attain public agenda status can vary greatly. Some will choose to invest a great deal of their resources in trying to obtain widespread public attention through the mass media, while others are more likely to work in private for the support of existing attention groups. The use of expansion strategies is partially determined by the types of interests a group reflects. A group with a minimum of financial resources but with a large following tends to use the outside initiative strategy. Given no other resources, their only hope is to attract sufficient external support to reinforce their own position.[29]

In general, we would expect that the greater the resources a group expends, the greater its chances of success. At the same time, it is important to recognize that success is not likely to be a simple function of resources expended, and in fact, unless the issue characteristics are also considered, large resource expenditure can produce small returns. A striking example of this is the pro-United Nations campaign launched in Cincinnati in 1947. Despite a large number of messages in all the media, survey results showed that virtually no one in the city was even aware that the campaign was being waged, much less changed their views on the organization.[30]

One of the most frequent weaknesses of organizations seeking to expand an issue is that their campaigns "convince the convinced," rather than bringing in new groups who have no opinion on the issue or who see no connection between the issue and their own concerns. Frequently the commitment and enthusiasm of grievance group members blind them to the symbols which would be most effective in attracting additional supporters.

Strategic choices, not always consciously made, are also important as grievance groups, or more properly, coalitions working to expand an issue to the public agenda, also seek entrance to the formal agenda. At the same time, they must be aware that the strategy used in getting on the formal agenda may affect the way in which the issue is decided. Although we discuss four different strategies for attaining entrance, these may also be used in the expansion stage; in some cases the distinction between the stages is analytic rather than temporal, i.e., they may occur simultaneously. Four basic strategies are: (1) violence and threats of violence;[31] (2) institutional sanctions, such as withholding votes, money or work;[32] (3) working through brokers such as political parties and interest groups; and (4) direct access.[33] The method(s) a group chooses will depend on its position(s) in the society, the importance of the issue to the group, the length of time that an issue has remained on the public agenda without moving to the formal agenda; and the group's estimate of the probability of attaining a position on the formal agenda as a result of each strategy.

In evaluating the outside initiative model, three key considerations are: the type of issue being discussed (e.g., how threatening is it to the established groups in power), the extent to which a group is isolated in making its claims (e.g., is it running out of options to advance its cause?), and the length of time lag in attaining formal agenda status once it is on the public agenda. In general, we expect that a) the more important the issue, b) the more isolated the original grievance group, c) the longer the issue has been on the public agenda, and d) the lower the likelihood that the authorities will consider the issue on their own, the more likely that the entrance strategies will include the use of violence or threats of violence along with institutional sanctions, and the less likely that formal agenda status will be achieved through the use of brokers and direct access.

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[27] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964); and *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiesence*, (Chicago: Markham, 1971); and Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 548–561.

[28] For example, see William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968); and "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," *American Behavioral Scientst*, 12 (November–December, 1968), 15–21.

[29] Michael Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), p. 7.

[30] Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGill Hughes, "Report on an Educational Campaign: the Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (January, 1950), 389–400.

[31] See H. L. Nieburg, "Violence, Law, and the Informal Polity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (June 1969), 192–209.

[32] See, for example, Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics*, pp. 175–181.

[33] Cobb and Elder, *Participation*, pp. 151–159; and Crenson, *Un-politics*, pp. 133–158.

A good example to illustrate these points is the political conflict in France which culminated in the uprising of May, 1968. Students, some workers, and other left wing political groups had demanded a number of reforms in French society, particularly in its educational system, for a number of years. The government of General de Gaulle, which itself had instituted a number of changes and reforms in France since coming to power in 1958, was moving too slowly or not at all as far as these groups were concerned. Following the violence and the restoration of order in 1968, the French government moved quickly to initiate reforms in numerous areas of social policy. While the rioters and their tactics were widely denounced, there was a far greater acceptance of the need for widespread internal reforms which the uprising highlighted. Thus, violence and threats of its continuation were successful in placing on the formal agenda a number of issues which had been on the public agenda for years, but had never before received serious government attention, despite many earlier attempts through both brokers and direct access.[34]

Outside initiative model: summary. The outside initiative model applies to the situation in which a group outside the government structure 1) articulates a grievance, 2) tries to expand interest in the issue to enough other groups in the population to gain a place on the public agenda, in order to 3) create sufficient pressure on decision makers to force the issue onto the formal agenda for their serious consideration.[35] This model of agenda building is likely to predominate in more egalitarian societies. Formal agenda status, it should be recognized, however, does not necessarily mean that the final decisions of the authorities or the actual policy implementation will be what the grievance group originally sought. Quite the contrary, either outright rejection of the grievance group's position or its widespread modification are not only possible but frequently occur.

Mobilization Model. The mobilization model describes policies and programs which decision makers want to move from a formal to a public agenda. These issues have been placed on the formal agenda either by the decision makers themselves, or by people with direct access to them: there has been no preliminary expansion to various publics. This expansion becomes necessary, after some decisions, in order to implement them. The mobilization model, employing the same stages as the outside initiative model, describes the process through which decision makers try to promote the interest and support needed for implementation of these issues. Mobilization is necessary when a policy requires widespread, voluntary compliance. Decision makers may lack the resources, institutional or financial, or both, to implement their policy without mobilization. Mobilization may be needed because in a given cultural context, coercion in inappropriate, impractical, or simply too expensive. In a mirror image of the outside initiative model, then, the mobilization process shows decision makers trying to expand an issue from a formal to a public agenda.[36]

(1) *Initiation.* When a new program or policy is announced by a prominent political leader, it is automatically on the formal agenda; in many political systems this announcement also represents the end of the formal decision-making phase, since the new program is also official government policy. While there may be a good deal of debate within the government before announcement of the new program, there is typically little public interest or knowledge. The source of the initiative is the political leader. This model is often found in countries where great social distance between leaders and followers is expressed by differences in education, speech, life style and world view, or by attribution of supernatural powers to the authority.

Obvious examples are government initiated development programs found in most countries in Africa and Asia. President Julius Nyerere's Arusha Declaration in Tanzania in 1966 presented both the ruling political party and the nation as a whole with a sweeping set of proposals which, in effect, became official government policy at the moment they were announced. Nyerere argued that industrial development in Tanzania could not be achieved in the near future. Instead the party and government needed to recognize that the country's greatest need and greatest potential were in village development.[37] Programs of self-reliance for both the nation and local communities were required, and there would be severe restrictions on capital accumulation and wealth, particularly by politicians. Large banks and businesses within the nation were to be nationalized and the capital they produced used in financing local development.[38] "Other nations aim for the moon, while Tanzania aims at the village," concluded the President.

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[34] For a review of the events, see Bernard E. Brown, *The French Revolt: May, 1968*, (New York: McCaleb-Seiler Publishing Company, 1970).

[35] The stages we identify in each model are analytic and not necessarily temporal. For example, efforts to achieve entrance may in fact occur prior to expansion, although successful entrance usually requires that expansion take place before it. This argument is similar to Smelser's "value added" model for studying collective behavior. See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[36] For illustrations, see Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and *Modernization Among Peasants: the Impact of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[37] For a presentation of his views, see Julius Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy of Socialism

Another issue which requires mobilization of the public is population planning. Often there is widespread ignorance of a plan even after it is announced. The problem for the nation's leadership is making the plan visible to large segments of the population.[39]

(2) *Specification*. The announcement of a new policy, such as the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania or the War on Poverty in the United States, usually provides few concrete details. Following the initial announcement political leaders and their associates begin spelling out what is expected of the public in terms of cooperation or support, material resources, work, or changes in behavior patterns. Through specification the leaders hope to make the program clearer to the public, at the same time both building support and letting citizens know what is required of them. In a study of Tswana in South Africa, Schapera reports that chiefs often presented to the public assembly laws drawn up in prior consultation with their advisers.[40] In one particular case, Isang, chief of the Kgatla, felt that there was an excess of beer drinking. He called a meeting of his close advisers and the local ward-heads who voted to support the chief's proposal to curb beer brewing and drinking. The decision was then presented to the public, although the popular assembly was not asked to discuss and approve the law. It was assumed that its acceptance by the ward leaders represented public approval.[41] Compliance with the law depends upon the local actions of the ward-heads as the chief alone is unable to implement new law effectively. Thus, in this situation, a political leader places an issue on the formal agenda and insures that it will be heard. Then, before a group of lower political authorities, the public specification takes place. Its implementation, however, will further depend upon local actions and public support.

(3) *Expansion*. Even though the new programs may become government policy as soon as they are announced, implementation is often contingent on public acceptance and changes in behavior, which may range from the payment of new taxes to the donation of labor to the community. Under Nyerere's program, rural communities in Tanzania were asked to hold meetings to discuss ways in which they could meaningfully implement programs of self-reliance.[42] Rural meetings and resulting programs required a prior support for the program in general, and an understanding, at least by local leaders, of ways in which it could be implemented. The problem is not at all trivial, because one of the most important barriers to the implementation of general development programs on the most local level is that no one is very sure what they mean in local terms. There may be several political meetings where everyone applauds the leaders for their new policy, but no consequent tangible changes at the village level.

To attempt to combat this problem, political leaders who initiated the new program try to expand the issue to new groups in the population in the same way that outside grievance groups seek expansion of their issue in the outside initiative model. The purpose is the same. It is an attempt to draw additional participants into the effort to implement the program, as particular groups are shown how the program is relevant to them. The issue begins with the identification group, which in this case consists of political leaders who announce the new program. They first take the issue to attention groups, seeking their public statements of support as well as explaining in a more private setting what the new program means, and how the group should participate in its implementation. Attempts at informal and formal cooptation of leaders of specialized elites are often part of mobilization efforts.[43]

This aspect of mobilization can also be illustrated in Tanzania. In the period immediately following the announcement of the Arusha Declaration, local branches of the political party, as well as women's organizations, labor unions, ethnic groups, and other existing groups in the society pledged both their public and private support to the program and began taking steps to implement it. This is not to suggest there was no opposition. Because of Nyerere's control of the party and government as well as his widespread popularity, however, opposition was more private than public. For example, many political officials

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and Self-Reliance," in *African Politics and Society* ed. Irving Leonard Markovitz (New York: Free Press, 1970).

[38] See John Hatch, *Tanzania: A Profile* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 195–197.

[39] For a description of such a campaign, see Jason Finkle, "Politics, Development Strategies and Family Planning Strategy in India and Pakistan," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 3 (December, 1971), 259–295.

[40] See Isaac Schapera, *Tribal Innovators: Tswana chiefs and social change, 1795–1940* (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

[41] Schapera, p. 27.

[42] Hatch, *Tanzania*, pp. 197–198.

[43] For example, see Frederick J. Fleron Jr., "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change," *Polity*, 2 (Winter, 1969), 176–201.

privately grumbled about their salary cuts and the restriction on house ownerships. Nonetheless, they publicly supported the policy and personally complied with it.[44]

Often, the opposition of a crucial attention group can mean the failure of a mobilization effort. In the instance of birth control, the position of key religious groups, particularly the Catholic Church, can determine the program's fate. Church opposition in Malaysia led to the ultimate failure of the program in the late 1960s, even though less than 2% of the population was Catholic. The Church was highly mobilized, had articulate leaders and was strong in urban areas where the program was focused. Even the opposition of a major attention group, however, does not guarantee defeat for a program. In the Philippines, a birth control campaign also launched in the late 1960s was more successful even though the Church did not endorse the endeavor. While the percentage of Catholics was higher in the Philippines than in Malaysia, the Church was undergoing a series of power struggles which meant that all other issues were subordinated in importance. The government was able to exploit a power vacuum by encouraging different factions in the Church to vie for power while implementing its population program.[45]

A second target for issue expansion is the attentive public. In situations where policies are initiated by political leaders, as we have outlined in the model, expansion to a well-informed attentive public is relatively easy. The announcement of a new program almost always attracts the attention and interest of members of the attentive public. Prominent officials have much easier access to the agenda of public discussion than outside grievance groups. What is more problematic, however, is how the attentive public will react to the new program. The French Education Minister knows that a series of proposals for educational reform will be a topic of discussion and concern among the attentive public, while at the same time, he is far less sure of their support for his proposals.

The presentation of the new program to the attentive public, as well as to various attention groups, is crucial, because in effect they become the links between the political leaders and the mass public. These people are likely to be key opinion leaders who channel not only information, but, even more importantly, their opinions about the worth of the program to the rest of the population. For the government program to be implemented successfully, efforts both by attention groups and by the attentive public are necessary. Their acceptance of the program followed by inaction is the equivalent of a nondecision to ignore the government's priorities and, in effect, to kill the program.

(4) *Entrance.* The problem of entrance is one of moving from the formal to the public agenda, as a significant portion of the public comes to recognize the program of the government as dealing with an important problem (even if they disagree with the specific ways in which the government proposes to deal with this problem).[46]

Strategies. The same strategic assets are available to the government, as it seeks to expand the issue to the public agenda, as are open to grievance groups in the outside initiative model: (1) issue characteristics, and (2) material resources.

While the material resources of governmental groups initiating a policy are almost always larger than those of outside grievance groups, the characteristics of the issues as they are presented to the public remain a crucial element in whether or not the policy is successfully implemented. Of great importance is the association of the new program with known and accepted emotional symbols while, at the same time, the public is persuaded that the new program "is not just more of the same old thing." It must be new enough to be exciting, but traditional enough to be understood and to produce positive affect in the population. In India and Pakistan, attempts to win public support for a population control effort in the 1960s were largely unsuccessful because of the type of campaign used. The issue was defined in terms of long range gains focusing on complex statistics which made it difficult to gain public acceptance.[47] What may have been needed was definition of the issue in terms of more immediate benefits, such as better nutrition for a smaller number of children.

In addition to the problem of issue definition, mobilization efforts may fail because of faulty planning. Often, bureaucrats in various parts of the country have insufficient information about national issues to gain access to public agendas at the local level. Bureaucrats may also become jealous of their prerogatives and maintain their power at all costs. Mobilization efforts can fail if if there is a poor information exchange and if national leaders are unable to convince bureaucrats that local level implementation of programs would be in their own self-interest.[48]

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[44] Hatch, pp. 199–205.

[45] For example, see Gayl Ness and Hirofumi Ando, "The Politics of Population Planning in Malaysia and the Philippines," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3 (December, 1971), 296–329.

[46] Expansion from formal to public agenda on the national level may be followed or accompanied by a public to formal agenda-building process as the issue is placed on lower-level agendas.

[47] Finkle, "Development Strategies" pp. 259–295.

[48] See Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Planning Fails in Nepal," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17 (December, 1972), 508–528.

Organizational structure also influences the extent to which mobilization efforts are successful. If there is some structural mechanism which enables leaders to meet with representatives from the various groups or regions frequently, it can help bridge the gap between formal announcement and public awareness. In Liberia, the government announced a Unification Policy in the late 1960s and it was able to reach local public agendas in part because the local chiefs had access to the government through frequent Executive Council meetings and served as a bridge between national and local officials. The campaign also stressed the use of positive symbols such as "equality" and negative symbols referring to the enemies who were opposed to the Unification Program.[49]

Mobilization model: summary. The mobilization model describes the process of agenda building in situations where political leaders initiate a policy, but require the support of the mass public for its implementation. Announcement of a new program automatically places an issue on the formal agenda, and in fact may represent the end result of governmental decision making as well. The crucial problem is to move the issue from the formal agenda to the public agenda. The mobilization model is most likely to appear frequently in more hierarchical societies, and in those where supernatural powers attributed to the leader emphasize the distance between him or her and the followers.

Inside Access Model. A third model describes the situation in which it is easiest to be successful in achieving both formal agenda status *and* implementation of the proposed policy with the fewest changes. In this model policy originates within a governmental agency, or within a group which has easy and frequent access to political decision makers. As in the mobilization model, the issue reaches the formal agenda relatively easily because of the position of the initiating group.

The inside access model significantly differs from the mobilization model, however, in that the group originally articulating the policy does not seek to expand the issue to the public agenda—i.e., it does not try to force decision makers to place it on the formal agenda (as in the outside initiative model) or to build support for its implementation (as in the mobilization model). Instead expansion is aimed at particular influential groups which can be important in the passage and implementation of the policy, while at the same time, the initiators try to *limit* issue expansion to the public because they do not want the issue on the public agenda. Instead they seek a more "private" decision within the government, and generally stand to be defeated when the issue is sufficiently expanded to include public groups that might be opposed to it. Bureaucrats are also often afraid that the public will misunderstand a technical problem if it becomes a matter for public debate.[50]

This strategy, for example, was used in the early phases of the American supersonic transport (SST) conflict in 1971 and is often attempted by groups seeking potentially controversial defense contracts in the United States. Similarly, highly placed bureaucrats in developing countries often adopt this attitude. They suggest that the public does not (and cannot) understand the technical issues involved in development planning; development is then best left in the hands of those people who do know what is going on (themselves).[51]

(1) and (2) *Initiation and specification.* An "inside" group, meaning a group or agency within the government, or a group with close ties to governmental leaders, may articulate a grievance or a new policy proposal. Following the initial statement of a problem, which is aimed primarily at other governmental leaders and decision makers, the originating group or agency makes a series of concrete proposals. Despite their close ties to the decision makers, the originating group is not yet assured of success, for typically, more issues are presented to top leaders than they can possibly consider. Thus, in order to give their issue a higher priority, its initial advocates seek limited issue expansion. Groups using the inside access model tend to be more homogeneous than groups attempting to advance their cause using the other two patterns. Because of their privileged position, inside groups tend to be closer knit in background, mores and goals; such congruence is an asset in attempts to attract support.[52]

(3) *Expansion.* Limited issue expansion means that the policy initiators might seek to involve an identification group and selected attention groups, both of which may help create the feeling of urgency and importance necessary to attain a quick and favorable response from decision makers. This is done in a relatively private setting as the attentive

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[49] Thomas P. Wrubel, "Liberia: The Dynamics of Continuity," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9 (July 1971), pp. 189–204.

[50] For example, see Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 305–324.

[51] See, for example, Lucien W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building:* Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); and James Scott, *Political Ideology in Malaysia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968).

[52] G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 111–155.

public may be only dimly aware that the issue is being considered at all, and the mass public is totally unaware of its existence. The supporters of the proposal feel that selective pressure from groups close to the decision makers is preferable to public pressure, which may create a situation in which they lose control over the issue.[53]

In a parliamentary system, for example, one ministry can easily become involved in a problem that concerns one or more additional ministries. High-ranking civil servants, or even the ministers themselves, may then approach officials in the other ministries seeking support for their proposals. A second example is the efforts of an interest group seeking special favors from government to approach either officials in a ministry where it has particularly close ties or members of the legislature who can be expected to work behind the scenes in its interest.

(4) *Entrance*. Entrance means attaining formal agenda status. It does not mean that the issue is on the public agenda. In general, entrance is not spectacular and public. Violence and threats of violence are almost never employed. The preferred strategies for attaining entrance are through direct access or through brokers. Institutional sanctions may be used against individuals resisting the program, although what is more likely is the use of special favors and the payment of money to those who cooperate.[54]

Strategies. Expansion strategies are aimed at bringing in identification and attention groups which can be crucial in assuring support for the program, and at the same time, avoiding expansion to the attentive and mass publics. The road to the formal agenda is not through the public agenda. In Illinois, for instance, the Corps of Engineers planned to build a dam site which would require bulldozing certain property valued by conservationists. Conservationists found out about the intentions of the Corps and made the issue public, stressing that other alternatives were not explored, that the benefits did not override the costs, and that the proposed dam was not economically justified. As a consequence, the Corps retreated and proposed a more limited alternative. Ordinarily, those trying to reach a formal agenda through inside channels will not fare as well if the issue becomes public, regardless of the symbolic ploys at their disposal.[55]

In comparison with expansion strategies under the outside initiative and mobilization models, the inside access model places greater emphasis on tangible, as opposed to symbolic, rewards for those groups and individuals supporting the proposals.[56] In attracting support, the initiating group employs bargaining and administrative language styles, as opposed to hortatory and legal ones. At the same time there may be a large-scale organizational commitment to behind-the-scenes action to obtain support for the proposal. Logrolling, or agreements between groups to support each other's proposals, also occurs.[57] Not all policies that originate within the governmental units necessarily fit this model. When governmental leaders as well as civil servants, believe that passage and implementation can only occur if sufficient pressure is brought from outside on other political leaders, they will attempt to involve the public in an issue through the processes described in the outside initiative model.

Inside access model: summary. The third model describes a pattern of agenda building and policy formation which attempts to exclude the participation of the public. Proposals arise within governmental units or in groups close to the government. The issue is then expanded to identification and attention groups in order to create sufficient pressure on decision makers to place the item on the formal agenda. At no point is the public greatly involved, and the initiators make no effort to get the issue on to the public agenda. On the contrary, they try to keep it off. The inside access model will occur with greatest frequency in societies characterized by high concentration of wealth and status.

Agenda levels and combinations of agenda-building models. In the previous discussion, and in the propositions which follow, the models are treated separately. These are conceptual rather than empirical models; most occurrences of agenda building will certainly be more complex, combining models as well as levels of agendas. In most societies, an issue may potentially appear on many agendas. Attempts to achieve agenda status for any issue may be aimed at one of these agendas at a time, in different possible sequences, or at some or all of them simultaneously. Since the three models of agenda building may also occur in various combinations during the history of any issue, many permutations of agendas and agenda building are possible. An issue which reaches higher level decision makers via either inside access or outside initiative, for example, may in a second stage be transmitted by them, through mobilization or inside access efforts, to lower level agendas of local communities or associations. Many issues take the opposite route, from lower level to higher level agendas; and some groups try to put their concerns before several different sets of decision makers at the same time.

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[53] For example, see Cobb and Elder, pp. 71–77.

[54] This resembles very closely the literature on political corruption; for example, see James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 91–113; Arnold Heidenheimer, "The Analysis of Administrative Corruption," in *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1970); and Jeremy Boissevain, "Patronage in Sicily," in Heidenheimer.

[55] See Bruce Hannon and Julie Cannon, "The Corps Out-Engineered," in *The Politics of Ecosuicide*, pp. 220–227.

[56] For examples of such cases, see Andrew Hacker, "Pressure Politics in Pennsylvania: The Truckers vs. The Railroads," in *The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in American Politics*, ed. Alan Westin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962); and Edward Furash, "The Problem of Technology Transfer," in *The Study of Policy Formation*, ed. Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen (New York: Free Press, 1968).

[57] Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Re-examined," pp. 381–402.

III. Agenda Building and Comparative Politics

The outside initiative, mobilization and inside access models describe three ways in which the public can influence the structure of political agendas. Initially, we hypothesize that examples of all three models can be found in any society, although there will be clear tendencies for some types of polity to favor one of the models over the others. A second area for comparative analysis is variation in the rates of success at achieving agenda status in different political systems, a variable which we would also expect to be related to the model of agenda building predominant in a system. A third important problem in agenda building is variation in the process within a single political system, which then can be compared to patterns in other polities. Here research might focus on the strategies that different groups utilize depending upon their position in the social structure. A fourth area of concern is development of generalizations about the agenda-building process across both polities and models in order to identify common factors influencing conflict expansion, mobilization of group interests, and ultimate success or failure in attaining agenda status. Some examples of these four types of propositions follow.

Occurrence of the models across societies

Are there agenda-building styles that tend to dominate in different political systems? We think so, although we are less certain about the exact nature of this dominance. In addition, if it exists, this dominance will probably be more marked in distinguishing successful attempts to achieve formal agenda status than those which fail. As mentioned earlier, one of the most important clusters of variables is the structure of wealth and status in a society; agenda access is expected to vary with patterns of stratification:

(1) The more egalitarian a society, the more likely that the outside initiative pattern will predominate;
(2) The greater the concentration of wealth and status in a society, the more likely that the inside access pattern will predominate:
(3) The greater the social distance between political leaders and followers, or the more political leaders are seen as endowed with special insight or supernatural powers, the more likely that the mobilization pattern will predominate:
(4) The more complex the social structure and economy of a society, the less likely that any single pattern will predominate.

Variation in success rates across societies

Success refers to placing an issue on the formal agenda for serious attention by decision makers, not necessarily to emerging victorious after the decision-making stage. So far our reading of case materials suggests that achieving agenda status is more problematic in modern nations than in small face-to-face communities. In addition:

(1) The greater the social homogeneity of a community, the higher the success rates in achieving agenda status;
(2) The greater the rate of internal migration and population increase in a community, the more difficult it will be to attain agenda status;
(3) The greater the number of potential agendas on which an issue can be placed, the more likely that success rates will be high;
(4) The less potential issues require redistribution of material resources in a society, the higher success rates will be.

Intergroup variation in patterns within societies

Some of the most important variations in the agenda-building process are a result of differences in social and political positions across groups within any society. As a result, these groups utilize different means of trying to achieve agenda status.

(1) Groups that are relatively weak in material resources, but potentially large in numbers are most likely to succeed in using the outside initiative pattern:
(2) The more isolated the original grievance group (i.e., identification group), the more likely the group will be to utilize violence or threats of violence in trying to place the issue on the agenda;
(3) The greater the extent to which regions or neighborhoods are economically or ethnically homogeneous, the more mobilizable their residents will be in agenda conflicts;
(4) The more a group represents lower status interests in a society the more likely it is to use the outside initiative pattern; the more it represents upper status interests, the more likely it is to use the inside access pattern.

Cross-model generalizations

Finally, there are aspects of the agenda-building process that hold across models and across societies.

(1) Issues may move from the public agenda to the formal agenda after a time lag under the outside initiative model. The relationship between the length of time an issue is on the public agenda and the probability of its reaching the formal agenda is curvilinear;
(2) The greater the proportion of unsuccessful issues (issues not achieving formal agenda status), the higher the level of discontent and political instability in a community;
(3) The greater the time gap between the achievement of public agenda status and the achievement of formal agenda status, the greater the level of political instability in a community.

These hypotheses about agenda building remain untested so far, although we hope that they will eventually be examined through two major strategies. The first is the coding of existing cases from a wide number of political systems ranging from traditional societies studied by anthropologists to small community studies in western societies, to studies of national policy making. Building up a large sample will permit relatively rapid confirmation or refutation of the hypothesized relationships in our scheme. Second, the development of an adequate understanding of agenda building requires the collection of original data in a wide variety of settings chosen to make possible development of generalizations on both cross-cultural and intrasocietal levels.

Although the effort needed is great, it is important. Previous studies of participation in policy formation have focused on the success or failure of attempts by various groups in a population to influence decision makers' choices among policy alternatives. The concept of agenda building makes possible investigation of participation in the less visible but crucial processes by which these alternatives are defined for decision makers. The strategies used by various groups competing to place issues on the agenda and the factors which influence their success or failure reveal patterns of participation in policy formation obscured by a focus on the decision-making process alone.

APSA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1976

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture

AUSTIN RANNEY

Introduction

Pendleton Herring

Princeton, New Jersey

When one admires and respects the accomplishments of a friend it is difficult to condense the thoughts and happy associations of many years into a brief introduction. And when the individual in question has covered a lot of ground both intellectually and geographically it is no easier to be concise. Austin Ranney's career as a student took him to Northwestern for his B.S., to Oregon for a M.A. and to Yale for his doctorate. Then teaching and administrative duties at the University of Illinois 1947–61, more than a decade at Wisconsin, this past year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and now on to Berkeley.

Research pursuits have meant inquiry into the politics of candidate selection in Great Britain and in another vein, inquiry into vintage selection in the Burgundy district. The field work in both instances was stimulating and rewarding. The very years of his work abroad are thus recorded in the vintage charts of Burgundy: of 1961—"sensationally good; GRANDE CLASSE;" for 1962—"a very great vintage, wines at their peak." To be laboring in the vineyard of research in a great vintage year: How explain such a coincidence! What a sense of timing, or what a streak of luck! But then our man had been appointed to a full professorship at Illinois in 1959, a year known in Burgundy as the Vintage Year of the Century.

Austin Ranney ranks with those who have given hard thought to the direction and systematic development of our field. I am particularly mindful of his long standing professional concern with why American political parties behave as they do and with his analysis of proposals for responsible party government. The debate over these matters has lent a focus and useful continuity of attention in our discipline. I find particularly relevant his insistence that problems of "party reform are bound up with some of the most fundamental, difficult and unresolved issues of political theory." In his writings over the years he has exhibited a command of empirically and quantitatively oriented research methodology and a sensitivity to political thought historically viewed.

I find refreshing his capacity for combining realistic detachment and analytic skill with a cheerful readiness to engage in efforts at reform. As a member of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection he demonstrated how successfully to function as a political activist on occasion and still preserve his scholarly role.

I think of his leadership in the Social Science Research Council and of efforts to stimulate the study of policy content and of the impact of public policies.

There is much more that could be said about his distinctive research, his success as a teacher, his congeniality as a colleague and his administrative talents, but I want to take this occasion to emphasize his service to the profession of political science and his concern with the problems and growth of the discipline as such. After several years as Book Review Editor, he became Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review* over the five year span of 1966 through 1970. This was a period of rapid change and growth. The editorial load was heavy and included service on the Executive Committee of the Association. And now as he completes his term as President this ceremony today offers a most appropriate opportunity for me to express, on behalf of all of us gathered here, our deep sense of appreciation. Above all I stress the generous and sustaining spirit with which he has contributed to the advance of our discipline and won in full measure our confidence, respect and affection.

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture*

AUSTIN RANNEY

The University of Wisconsin, Madison

Like my seventy-one predecessors, I hold the presidency of the American Political Science Association for one year. My term ends on September 5th, it is not renewable, I cannot be impeached, and my duties are largely ceremonial—for example, addressing such learned convocations as this. That being the case, I am especially sensitive to the fact that, by Act of Congress, the nation's official celebration of its two-hundredth birthday began on March 1st of this year.

Since the creation of the United States of America was, above all, a *political* act, it seems to me that we political scientists have a special obligation to celebrate the Bicentennium. *But how*? For guidance on this question, I turned to *Webster's Unabridged* to see just what a "celebration" is. As in previous safaris into that work, I found several meanings, and there is some question about which is most suitable for political scientists. One meaning is: "to honor by conducting religious, commemorative, or other solemn ceremonies or by refraining from ordinary business." Not bad—especially if it means refraining from grading bluebooks or serving on committees; but would our institutions continue to pay our salaries if we engaged in that kind of celebration? Another meaning is: "to demonstrate grateful and happy satisfaction [in a past event] by engaging in festivities, indulgence, merry-making, or other similar deviations from accustomed routine." That is more like it; yet I doubt that all political scientists would go along with the part about "grateful and happy satisfaction" in the past event. Even more promising is a third meaning: "to observe the occasion of an achievement, reunion, anniversary, or other notable occasion with gaiety [by engaging] in hilarious festivities, usually including drinking." Now *that* is not merely beguiling; it is empirically descriptive. But could we get our institutions to reimburse our expenses for celebrating in *that* manner, however traditional it may be for our profession?

So in the end I conclude we must settle for a fourth kind of celebration: "to portray [an event] in a way to contribute to public awareness [and] edification. . . ."[1] I want to suggest in this paper that one way we can contribute to such a commemoration is to portray the creation of the American polity as history's first great political experiment and massive effort at political engineering. And by "political engineering" I mean the application of empirically derived general principles of individual and institutional behavior to fashion institutions intended to solve practical political problems.

Let me begin by explaining why that portrait, while certainly not the only one possible, is both accurate and useful.

The American Polity as an Experiment

Before the 1770s, with a few minor exceptions, no political system had ever been deliberately created at a single point in time to maximize certain general principles. All systems had "emerged" in the mists of history; they had evolved and changed; some had grown, others had declined, and some had died or been swallowed up. Consequently, all the people eager to *change* their systems—and there were many such before the 1770s—were constrained by multitudes of givens and enjoyed only small areas of freedom for maneuver.

But the visionaries who established "the first new nation"[2] in 1776 felt no such constraints. Anyone who reads their public broadsides and private letters cannot help being struck by how vivid was their sense of facing a *tabula rasa*, of having complete freedom to sweep away all the errors and injustices of the past and fashion *de novo* a truly just and enduring order. For example, in January, 1776, John Adams wrote to George Wythe:

> You and I . . . have been sent into life at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children! When, before the present epocha, had three

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* Many of the ideas presented here were generated in talks with various colleagues at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during 1974–75. In addition, I am grateful to Joseph A. Ranney III for reading the manuscript and making many welcome contributions. All share much of the credit but none of the blame for its final version.

[1] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1965), p. 359.

[2] This is, of course, the felicitous title of Seymour Martin Lipset's study of the creation of the American nation: *The First New Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books edition, 1967).

> millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive?[3]

And the Reverend John Witherspoon, President of the College of New Jersey and teacher of James Madison, declared:

> All the governments we have read of in former ages were settled by caprice or accident, by the influence of prevailing parties or particular persons, or prescribed by a conqueror. Important improvements indeed have been forced upon some constitutions by the spirit of daring men, supported by successful insurrections. But to see government in large and populous countries settled from its foundation by deliberate counsel, and directed immediately to the public good of the present and future generations . . . is certainly altogether new.[4]

How, then, did the nation's founders use this new and exhilarating freedom? If I am correct, they used it to create a new polity and thereby launched the world's first large-scale political experiment. Let me briefly list the reasons why I characterize the situation in these terms.

First, the new nation's political institutions were deliberately created at particular identifiable points in time—e.g., 1776, 1783, and 1787. Second, the new institutions' forms were the products of highly self-conscious efforts to apply to particular situations principles held to be universally valid. And third, those principles were derived largely from observations of and reflections upon historical and contemporary *experience.*

Yet the nascent American polity was not unique in any of these respects. Over a century earlier Oliver Cromwell's Puritans replaced the ancient political order they had smashed at Naseby and Marston Moor with England's first and only effort at a written Constitution. Their Instrument of Government was also promulgated at a single point in time (1653); and it too was based upon a series of universal principles, those which had won general acceptance in the parliamentary army's debates of the 1640s.[5] But not only did that Constitution survive for only seven years; its Article XII institutionalized a principle entirely foreign to the ideas and institutions cherished by the men of Philadelphia in 1776 and 1787: ". . . the persons elected shall not have power to alter the government as it is hereby settled. . . ."[6]

The designers of the American polity had much in common with Cromwell and his Ironsides, but in at least three respects they went much further and thereby gave the world a kind of political system it had not seen before. First, they did not regard the success or failure of their new institutions as matters to be deduced from First Principles or reaffirmed by declarations of faith; rather they were matters to be continually considered and reconsidered in the light of *experience.* Second, they both wished and expected that the institutions and their underlying principles would be changed if subsequent experience so indicated. And third, they built into their constitutions and charters orderly procedures for making whatever changes experience might require.

Thus the new American system was truly an experiment where Cromwell's Commonwealth was not. To be sure, if judged by the canons of twentieth-century social science, which require for an experiment the prior specification of all relevant variables, the exact matching of experimental and control groups, and the careful isolation of cause-effect relationships from all others, it was neither well designed nor complete. But even by those demanding (and seldom fulfilled) standards, the new polity was nevertheless experimental in spirit as no other had ever been: future generations of *people,* not divine forces, were to be its judges; change, not petrification, was its expectation; and, above all, a political *science* provided its intellectual foundations.

The Political Science and Engineering of America's Designers

The Designers' Belief in "Political Science." To begin with, anyone who reads widely in the writings of the Republic's designers will be impressed, as I was, by how often and approvingly they spoke of "the science of politics." John Adams did more than any other to popularize the term. In 1774, for example, he wrote in his first pamphlet on politics: ". . . as the divine science of politics is the science of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on the constitutions of government . . . there can be no employment more agreeable to a benevolent mind than a research after the best."[7] Moreover, the phrase meant to him very much what we mean by it; for he identified its basic goal and main procedures thus: " . . . aim at an exact knowledge of the nature, end, and means of government; compare the different forms of it with each other, and each of them with their effects on public and private happiness."[8] And he added a remark about the divine science that only some of us will approve but all will recognize. In 1774 he wrote to James Warren: "You and I have too many cares and occupations, and therefore we must recommend it to Mrs. Warren, and her friend Mrs. Adams, to teach our sons the divine science of politics; and to be frank, I suspect they understand it better than we do."[9]

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[3] In Charles Francis Adams, ed., *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1856), Vol. IV, p. 200.

[4] Quoted in Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), pp. 414–415. The mood persisted: David Ramsay, a historian writing in 1789, said of the Revolution: "In no age before, and in no other country, did man ever possess an election of the kind of government under which he would choose to live. The consituent parts of the ancient free governments were thrown together by accident. The freedom of modern European governments was, for the most part, obtained by the concessions of liberality of monarchs or military leaders. In America alone, reason and liberty concurred in the formation of constitutions," *History of the American Revolution* (1789), I, 356, quoted in Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), fn. 39, p. 273.

[5] The document's origins and political theory are described in C. H. Firth, *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902); and Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).

[6] The Instrument of Government (1653), Article XII, in C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660* (London: H. M.'s Stationery Office, 1911), II, 813–822.

As Bernard Crick has correctly, though disapprovingly, pointed out, both the label "political science" and the ideas it represented were embraced by most of the new polity's designers. The times, Crick suggests, demanded it: "In a young Federation of States, where many were fully conscious of how much its tenuous national unity depended upon deliberate political arrangements, it would not have been unexpected to see such a study at once spring forth, like a new Pallas Athene from the brow of Zeus, adult and fully armed."[10]

Most of the designers not only believed that a science of politics was possible and desirable; they were convinced that it had developed so much in their time that it had become the most reliable source of basic principles for engineering the new political institutions. Thus, Hamilton wrote in the Ninth *Federalist* paper:

> If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks . . . are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.[11]

The other designers agreed with James Wilson's admonition that "the foundations of political truth have been laid but lately: the genuine science of government, to no human science inferior in importance, is indeed but in its infancy. . . ."[12] But they also agreed with Hamilton's judgment that the new political science was a good deal better than any other foundation available for building the new institutions. As he put it in the Thirty-First *Federalist*:

> Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty as those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject.[13]

George Washington, indeed, regarded instruction in the science of government as the most important mission of the national university he asked Congress to establish in 1796. He told them: "The more homogeneous our citizens can be made in these particulars, the greater will be our prospect of permanent union; and a primary object of such an institution should be, the education of our youth in the science of government."[14]

Congress did not follow Washington's advice. In our own time, sad to say, university budgets and foundation grants do not reflect the wisdom of the Father of Our Country any better. But at least Washington and his colleagues left us a good statement of educational priorities we may yet follow!

Indeed, some of them founded a short-lived but intriguing organization that might well be called the first American political science association. It called itself the Society for Political Enquiries. It was founded in Philadelphia in February, 1787, and it was in many respects the true philosophical ancestor of associations like this one. Its Charter proclaimed its central purpose to be "mutual improvement in the knowledge of government, and . . . the advancement of political science."[15] And it declared this purpose to be of the highest order, because "the moral character and happiness of mankind, are so interwoven with the operations of government, and the progress of the arts and sciences is so dependent on the nature of our political institutions, that it is essential to the advancement of civilized society to give ample discussion to these topics."[16]

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[7] *Works*, IV, 193.

[8] *Ibid.*, II, 59.

[9] *Ibid.*, IX, 339.

[10] Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 4.

[11] *The Federalist Papers* (McLean ed.; New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 72–73.

[12] Quoted in A. J. Beitzinger, *A History of American Political Thought* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1972), p. 233.

[13] *The Federalist*, p. 194.

[14] Address to Congress, December 7, 1796, quoted in Crick, *The American Science of Politics*, p. 3. For Washington's other declarations along similar lines, see Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 155.

[15] Quoted in Beitzinger, *A History of American Political Thought*, p. 232.

We can mark how much our discipline has grown by observing that the Society for Political Enquiries had forty-two members, compared with the twelve thousand individuals who now belong to the APSA. We can also see, with some pain perhaps, what has happened to the quality of the discipline's *leaders* by noting that the President of *that* association was Benjamin Franklin. And we can learn a lesson—though I am less confident of this—from the fact that the Society did not last very long nor do very much. Nothing I have read *completely* explains its early demise, but one of Franklin's biographers gives us a clue in his comment that "although the society had forty-two members, the meetings were only sparsely attended, since one of their number monopolized the proceedings with his incessant talking [although] Franklin said but little after a subject was broached."[17] He does not identify the incessant talker—a type which still injects an element of hell into our divine science—but the only other two Society members he names are James Wilson and Thomas Paine. We may all form our own hypotheses.

But then as now, the science is more important than the scientists. Accordingly, I turn now to a description of the origins and main characteristics of the designers' political science and engineering.

The Origins of the Designers' Science of Politics.

1. *In Western Europe and England.* Despite Professor Crick's expectations, the designers' approach to politics did not "spring forth" instantaneously, "adult and fully armed." It emerged from a philosophical milieu which had developed in Western culture for three centuries. The epistemological and political consequences of the waning of the middle ages have been exhaustively analyzed by many great scholars, including Huizinga, Allen, Gierke, Lovejoy, McIlwain, and Sabine; and their accounts are far too complex to be discussed in any detail here. For my purposes, however, I have found particularly useful W. H. Greenleaf's brilliant work, *Order, Empiricism and Politics*,[18] and the next few paragraphs are heavily indebted to his analysis.

In political thought as in all other aspects of intellectual life, the medieval world was a world of authority and order based on divine revelation interpreted and expounded by the clergy of the universal church as the only source of truth. This world was shattered both by the Reformation, with its repudiation of the authoritative Church and clergy, and by the discoveries of the rapidly developing natural sciences, particularly astronomy and physics. Out of the debris emerged what Greenleaf identifies as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' three competing ways of viewing politics.

The first, he says, was the *theory of order*. It was expounded by such varied theorists as James I, Richard Hooker, Edward Forset, and Sir Robert Filmer. It rested upon revelation and metaphysics, and it sought truth mainly by the method of "argument by correspondence" or "analogy." In politics its devotees generally supported claims of divine right and royal prerogative.

This outlook was challenged in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by what Greenleaf calls the *theory of empiricism*. This new way of looking at things was first advanced by Francis Bacon and later by James Harrington, Sir William Temple, and Sir William Petty. It was based on the inductive analysis of facts observed from both history and the experience of contemporary governments. Its adherents were highly skeptical that valid or useful truth could be discovered by *any* form of purely deductive reasoning. And in politics they generally supported the ideas of "balanced government" and "limited monarchies."

As one of their principal tools the English empiricists developed "statistics" in the original meaning of the word. The point is worth noting briefly. The empiricists sought to foster what they called "statists"—that is, men who had had wide personal experience in and knowledge of political affairs and had, as a result, gained skill in their management. So the "statists" developed "statistics"—which, in its original seventeenth-century usage, meant simply "an empirical, comparative approach to the study of politics without any necessary or exclusive numerical emphasis."[19] As William Kruskal points out, "This activity gradually centered on numerical tables of economic, demographic, and political facts, and thus 'statistics' came to mean the assembly and analysis of numerical tables."[20] But up to the mid-nineteenth century it continued to mean *any* systematic collection of facts about governments.[21]

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[16] Quoted in Paul W. Conner, *Poor Richard's Politicks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 106–107.

[17] Alfred Owen Aldridge, *Benjamin Franklin, Philosopher & Man* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p. 390.

[18] W. H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought, 1500–1700* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[20] In David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), XV, 209.

[21] M. G. Kendall in Sills, XV, 224.

The empirical persuasion persisted through the eighteenth century and beyond, and those of its later adherents best known to the designers of the American Republic included Blackstone, Hume, Bolingbroke, Vico—and, above all, Montesquieu. It is the direct ancestor of the American science of politics, and one important element, though by no means the only one, in the ideology of the American revolution.

It was accompanied, and in some respects superseded, by a third way of looking at politics—that which Greenleaf calls the *theory of radical rationalism.* This approach was most prominent in the *Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke's *Two Treatises on Government*. It moved away from the empiricists' sole reliance on the analysis of experience for the reasons most succinctly stated by Hobbes: " . . . the records [of experience], seeing they are of things done only, sometimes justly, sometimes unjustly, you can never by them know what right they had, but only what right they pretended."[22] Hobbes adds that from history, only "examples of fact" can be derived. and not "any argument of right."

Radical rationalism relied mainly on deducing descriptive and prescriptive truths, not from divine revelation, but from First Principles, especially the Law of Nature. Historical and contemporary experience were considered not the sole source of truth but merely a quarry from which illustrations could be mined to clarify and lend persuasive force to the truths deduced by Right Reason from First Principles.

2. *The Ideas of the American Revolutionists.* It would be highly misleading to portray the men who made the Revolution of 1776 as single-minded disciples of empiricism or of radical rationalism. Most scholars agree with Gordon Wood's view that they drew their ideas from a mélange of sources. They both drew conclusions and bolstered their polemics from the empiricism of Bacon, Hume, Montesquieu, as well as the radical rationalism of Locke and Rousseau, and even the Puritan theology of Jonathan Edwards. Wood sums it up thus:

> However imprecise, confused, and eclectic the colonist's gleanings from history and quotations from philosophers may seem to us, they represented to eighteenth-century Americans the experience and reason of the Western world. To most of the Revolutionaries there was no sense of incompatibility in their blending of history, rationalism, and scripture; all were mutually reinforcing ways of arriving at precepts about human and social behavior, ways of discovering those fundamentals "applicable to every Sort of Government, and not contrary to the common Understanding of Mankind." The coherence and significance of the Americans' incredible jumble of references from every conceivable time and place come ultimately from the overriding purpose to which these references were put—the understanding of what John Adams called "the divine science of politics."[23]

All very true; and Bernard Bailyn calls our attention to another significant characteristic of the Revolutionary pamphlets and broadsides:

> " . . . for all their variety they have in common one distinctive characteristic: they are, to an unusual degree, *explanatory*. They reveal not merely positions taken but the reasons why positions were taken; they reveal motive and understanding: the assumptions, beliefs, and ideas—the articulated world view—that lay behind the manifest events of the time."[24]

When at last the Revolutionary authors and their readers broke free from the dominion and institutions of England, a new need—and a new mood—arose in the land. The need was to construct new institutions to replace the old, and it was accomplished by the new state constitutions written and rewritten from 1775 on, by the Articles of Confederation, and, above all, by the new Federal Constitution written in 1787 and promulgated in 1789. While these needs were being faced and met, the nation's mood shifted more and more from the headiness of radical rationalism to the sobriety of empiricism.[25]

Out of this confluence of Western intellectual heritage, revolutionary zeal, and pressing institutional necessities arose the new American political science and the institutional engineering based on it. That "divine science" and its application to the era's problems not only created the new polity. It also launched a faith in political and social engineering that has persisted ever since as one of the main elements in American political culture and one of the prime forces in American political behavior. I shall conclude this paper by assessing the problems and promise of this faith for our own time. But it seems to me we can understand it best by first examining its original version. I shall therefore now outline what seem to me to be the principal characteristics of the "divine science of politics" as preached and practiced in the 1770s and 1780s.

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[22] Quoted in Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics*, pp. 274–275.

[23] Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 7–8. For other expressions of this view, see Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, passim.*; Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic, passim.*; Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, chap. VI; and Randolph Adams, *Political Ideas of the American Revolution* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1922), *passim.*

[24] Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, p. vi.

[25] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 231.

Characteristics of the "Divine Science of Politics."

1. *Empiricism.* The political science of the nation's designers was, in the first instance, fundamentally *empirical.* That is, it was rooted in the conviction that the truth of propositions about politics is best tested by checking them against carefully observed experience. This note is sounded repeatedly in the Federalist papers. In the Twentieth paper, for example, Madison declares, "Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred."[26] And in the Fifty-Second paper, Madison, after posing the difficult practical question of how frequently elections should be held, avows, "Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found."[27]

But what if experience contradicts well-established maxims? Hamilton faced just such a situtíon in the Thirty-Fourth paper when he confronted the clash between the new federal principle of coordinate status between states and nation on the one hand and on the other the often-cited maxim of Bodin that sovereignty is indivisible. In such a situation, Hamilton said:

> To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot exist would be to set up theory and suppositions against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing *ought not to exist*, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it *does* not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself.[28]

What kinds of experience provided their data? The answer is: any they could lay their hands on. For example, the discussions of the Articles of Confederation, the deliberations in the Constitional Convention, and the ratification debates were all loaded with references to the experience of the Amphyctionic Council and Achaean League of classical Greece, the Roman republic and empire, the medieval German states, the constitutional history of England, and the more recent experiences of such confederations as Poland, Switzerland, and the United Netherlands. But the experience most often cited was that of the various states under their post-Revolutionary constitutions and the nation under the Articles of Confederation.[29]

2. *Primitive Methods.* The analytic and synthetic methods of the 1780s were pretty primitive by the severe standards insisted on by Blalock, Tufte, and the article referees of our contemporary political science journals. The technique most often used was what C. B. Macpherson calls "the indolent inductive."[30] That is, both in making up their own minds and in arguing with others, the men of the 1780s typically ruminated on what they remembered from their history and travel books, the works of the great philosophers, their own experience in state governments, the reported experience of others, the state of affairs under the Articles, and a good deal of plain introspection.[31]

We modern political scientists, peering down at them from our lofty perch built on multiple regression, path analysis, polynomial conjoint analysis, and the like, may be inclined to view our forebears' primitive methods condescendingly (after all, none of them had the benefits of a Yale Ph.D.). We might even deny their claim to be developing a true "science of politics." But then there are today many physicists, microbiologists, and—God save the mark—*economists* who are just as ready to dispute *our* claim to be called "scientists." Condescension can be a double-edged sword. And in any case, I believe we should say of the men of the 1780s what Macpherson said of Sir William Temple and the English empiricists: "It is the kind of questions [they asked] and the way [they believed] they are to be answered, rather than the very imperfect way [they answered] them, that place [them] among the 'political scientists.' "[32]

3. *Eagerness for Engineering.* Political scientists during the past thirty years have done a good deal of agonizing over whether the discipline can or should devote much of its talent and energy to developing knowledge immediately useful for the solution of practical social problems. The nation's designers were free of such agonies. They had no doubt that the purpose of the divine science was to develop ever better institutions, and they were confident that the state of the art was already well advanced and capable of achieving that purpose far better than it could be achieved by any other means. Indeed, they were always eager to take the best possible immediate action rather than eschew all action until they could be sure that what they did would survive unchanged for all time.[33] That,

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[26] *The Federalist*, p. 138.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 206, emphasis in the original.

[29] Cf. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1888), I, 35–37. For many specific illustrations, see Arthur Taylor Prescott's useful speech-by-speech account of the Constitutional Convention: *Drafting the Federal Constitution* (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), for example, pp. 64–82, 211–212.

[30] C. B. Macpherson, "Sir William Temple, Political Scientist?", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 9 (February, 1943), 39–54, at p. 46.

[31] For an account of how important introspection was to John Adams, see John R. Howe, Jr., *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 16.

[32] C. B. Macpherson, "Sir William Temple, Political Scientist?", p. 47.

[33] Cf. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 300–301; and Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787*, pp. 594–595, 613–614.

I think, explains why they were often impatient with critics who attacked the new institutions because they were less than perfect. In the Thirty-Seventh *Federalist*, for example, Madison reviewed many of the difficult conflicts the Constitutional Convention had confronted and resolved, often by compromise. He added, with an understandable testiness, this comment: "[It is not surprising that] under the pressure of all these difficulties, the convention [was] forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagination . . ."[34]

4. *Experimentation and Revision.* Of all the leitmotivs sounded in the divine science, the most often heard was the theme that all political institutions should be viewed, not as sacrosanct in every detail forever, but as best approximations of the moment, which should be revised as experience, improved science, and changed circumstances dictate. That is how they viewed the institutions they were revising. For example, Edmund Randolph, in presenting the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention, "professed a high respect for the authors [of the Articles of Confederation], and considered them as having done all that patriots could do in the then infancy of the science of constitutions and confederacies. . . . "[35] And John Jay observed in the Second *Federalist* that the authors of the original union

> . . . formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at that a government instituted in times so inauspicious should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.[36]

Moreover, the framers of the Constitution viewed their own handiwork in exactly the same experimental mood. In the Convention and afterward they repeatedly stressed the importance of building into any constitution mechanisms for review and amendment. Madison put this crucial point in the Thirty-Seventh *Federalist* as follows:

> It has been shown in the course of these papers that the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the convention could do in such a situation was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own, *and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them.*[37]

5. *Model for Mankind.* The final characteristic of the designer's political science is their conviction, permeating everything they did, that the principles they were discovering and the institutional experiments they were launching provided a model for the rest of mankind. There are many expressions of this conviction, but the following statements by three of the divine science's greatest practitioners should give the flavor:

The first paragraph of the First *Federalist* paper, written by Alexander Hamilton, declares:

> It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important questions, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.[38]

In the same vein, George Washington in his First Inaugural Address said: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as *deeply*, as *finally*, stated on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."[39]

And James Madison, reflecting in his twilight on the significance of the system he had helped so much to create, wrote to a friend: "The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation and a desire of imitation. . . . Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the [workshop of liberty], to the Civilized World, and do more than any other for the uncivilized."[40]

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[34] *The Federalist*, p. 230.

[35] Prescott, *Drafting the Federal Constitution*, p. 47.

[36] *The Federalist*, p. 39.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 226, emphasis added. For an overview of the Framers' experimental mood, see Adrienne Koch, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Great Seal Books, Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 1, 131–132.

[38] *The Federalist*, p. 33.

[39] Quoted in Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic*, p. 351, emphasis in the original.

The Problems and Promise of Political Engineering Today

That is how it seemed to the men who first developed and applied the divine science of politics. And that is how they came to embark upon their great experiment, the American way of government. Today, two hundred years later, that experiment and its consequences are still being praised, condemned, and—above all—*studied* all over the world.

And so they should be. Whatever else it may be, the Bicentennium is surely a time for students of government to ask questions of far more than antiquarian interest: How has the experiment worked out? But what standards should we evaluate it and all other experiments like it? What modifications in the original design have been made? With what consequences? What further modifications should be made? At what costs and with what anticipated benefits?

Prudence and compassion alike restrain me from using the few remaining pages of this paper to dispense my own answers to these tough questions. I want instead to suggest that whatever we may think of their craftsmanship, the Republic's designers launched a new faith in political engineering that has persisted strongly in American culture ever since. The main articles of that faith still hold that for every problem there is a solution. That it is better to do something about a problem than to do nothing even though the something may be less than perfect. That, above all, if we can figure out and establish the right *institutions*, the right policies are bound to follow.

That faith has animated our history's most powerful political movements. It sparked the Jacksonians' drive for long ballots, rotation in office, and convention-based parties. It undergirded the adoption of the Civil War constitutional amendments and the civil rights acts of the 1870s. It inspired the Progressives' crusade to cure the ills of democracy with more democracy, in the form of the initiative, the referendum, and the direct primary. And in my own lifetime it has stimulated and sustained the reforms of the New Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society.

It is, I suspect, a faith to which most in our profession still cling. Yet many of us today view it and its origins through the smoked glasses of Vietnam, Watergate, inflationary depression, and the other great public failures of our grim times. Is it any wonder that we question, as our forebears seldom did, the whole idea of political and social engineering? We have too often seen how vast and disheartening are the gaps between the rich promises and the poor payoffs of so many of the public institutions and policies we count on most.

For example, who in my generation can ever forget the exaltation we felt when we heard John Kennedy declare in his inaugural: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[41] But also who among us can forget that Rusk, Rostow, MacNamara, and the other knights of Kennedy's Camelot joined with Lyndon Johnson to convert that noble sentiment into an ignoble war—a war which not only failed to secure either survival or liberty in South Vietnam but shook our confidence in ourselves and the world's confidence in us as never before?

By the same token, who can forget the excitement and hope with which we hailed Johnson's massive commitment of federal resources to a much nobler War on Poverty in 1964? Yet who can deny that eleven years later the modest gains for the poor have been matched or exceeded by the increasing tax burdens of the middle and working classes?

Then came John Mitchell, Spiro Agnew, and Richard Nixon. "Judge us by what we do, not by what we say," they said. Fair enough. By that standard, while they *spoke* often and eloquently of the need to restore law and order to America, what they *did* was to perpetrate the most corrupt and criminal national administration in our history.

With such enormous failures all too fresh in our minds, what place can we honestly give *today* to our traditional faith in political engineering? I, for one, feel that faith still merits a judgment once made by a wise man about the process of growing old: "It's not for sissies," he said, "but it beats the alternative." If the alternative in this case is the resigned acceptance of human impotence and passivity in the face of human misery, then surely political engineering, with all its faults and failures, beats that.

But perhaps we can improve it. Perhaps we can modify some of its flaws so as to narrow future gaps between promise and performance. Perhaps, for one, we can supplement the faith with an article of the physicians' creed: *first, do no harm.*

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[40] Quoted in Koch, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers*, p. 128. For other descriptions of the Framers' millennial sense of providing a model for the world, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955), pp. 37–38; Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 139–140; and Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic*, p. 415.

[41] John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, in Jay David, ed., *The Kennedy Reader* (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), p. 8.

Perhaps our leaders can present their programs as reasonable probabilities to alleviate some evils, not as moral certainties to end them forever. Perhaps we ordinary citizens can help our leaders achieve this enlightenment by paying more attention to what our political candidates have done and less to what they say they will do—and to how they say it. If you and I stop yearning for ideal leaders who sound like Churchill in the Battle of Britain, perhaps our actual leaders will less often seem like Hitler in the Battle of the Bunker.

Above all, perhaps we can recapture the *experimental* mood of the men who created the divine science, and constantly remind our students and ourselves that *every* institution and program is at best a reasonable guess about what might work; that we must constantly check experience to see how well or badly it is working; and that we must always stand ready to preserve what is working and change what is not.

Like every people and every polity, we must, in the end, risk our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor upon faith, not certainty. But let that faith rest on Madison's conviction that *experience* is "the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found."

Conclusion

Finally, then, what can we in the long night of Vietnam and Watergate say about the birth of the divine science of politics in the golden age of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution? Looking back on that epoch through the dimness of our remoteness and our disillusion, perhaps we can say of it only what the elderly Wordsworth said while musing on his youthful enthusiasm for the French Revolution:

> Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
> But to be young was very heaven.[42]

I think we can do better than that for our own Revolution. I think we might well give the final say to the *Fourth* President of the American Political Science Association. The first words of James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* do very well as the last words of this paper:

> The institutions of the United States are deemed by inhabitants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more general interest than those of the not less famous nations of the Old World. . . . They represent an experiment in the rule of the multitude, tried on a scale unprecedentedly vast, and the results of which every one is concerned to watch. And yet they are something more than an experiment, for they are believed to disclose and display the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.[43]

And he added: "American history, of which Europeans know scarcely anything, may be wanting in colour and romance when compared with the annals of the great states of the Old World; but it is eminently rich in political instruction."[44]

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[42] William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Book XI, lines 108–9.

[43] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, I, 1–2.

[44] *Ibid.*, I, 6.

COMMUNICATIONS

Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality

TO THE EDITOR:

In testing a social stratification explanation of "governmental inequality," Richard Hill employs the median family income as a measure of a municipality's capacity to produce public goods and services.[1] Hill admits that median family income is a crude indicator of a municipality's capacity to generate public goods and services, since family income ignores other municipal resources. Hill proceeds, nevertheless, to examine the correlates of inequality in the distribution of family income, presuming thereby to be shedding light on governmental inequality in metropolitan areas.

My contention is that Hill's use of family income to measure fiscal capacity is irreparably deficient as a test of the complex social stratification model he poses. To capsulize his theoretical discussion: Hill contends that social classes are increasingly differentiated in urban space, and that this segregation along primarily racial and economic dimensions is reinforced by the use of suburban municipal incorporation. A by-product of this process has, according to Hill and others, resulted in public resources being increasingly insulated from those who most need them. Metropolitan areas are, in other words, characterized by increasing race and class segregation, actuated and maintained by the operations of the increasingly smaller and more homogeneous suburban municipality. The process is then viewed as the cause of the isolation of resources from those most in need of them. Social inequality, according to the social stratification theory promulgated by Hill, leads to governmental and public policy inequality, which, in turn, reinforces social inequality. Hill's statement regarding this is worth noting:

> Residential segregation by class and race shapes interaction patterns, friendship ties, marital selection, and social consciousness. The distribution of income and residential location shapes political relationships between collectivities with discordant interests and creates differential access to public goods and services. Access to public goods and services—in particular, education and cultural facilities—controls access to jobs and income. In this manner an interdependent set of local institutions gives rise to the structure of inequality in the modern metropolis.[2]

Hill is stating that social inequality *causes*, at least to some significant degree, governmental inequality, and that over time social inequality is also buttressed by governmental inequality. Yet, Hill uses median family income as the basis for his measure of *governmental* inequality, despite its prima facie appeal as a measure of *social* inequality. The major dependent variable of Hill's analysis is operationalized by measuring one of its presumed causes! Notwithstanding Hill's caveats, income cannot be blithely assumed to accurately measure the capacity of a municipality to generate services. Unless there are sound data indicating that family income is positively correlated with support levels for municipal government policy, no reasonable confidence can be invested in the assumption that low family or personal income means low levels of support for government policies.

My contention is that instead of *assuming* that social stratification directly measures capacity to support public services, a superior strategy is to develop *separate*, non-tautological measures of both social stratification and capacity to support government services. It is then possible to examine more closely some key propositions implicit in Hill's use of family income as a proxy for more direct measures of governmental inequality.

The present analysis involves 39 suburban municipalities in the suburban fringe of the Milwaukee SMSA. Narrowing the analysis to one SMSA from the 127 involved in Hill's paper may appear to some as a dramatic reduction of generality. The narrower focus is compelled, however. As will be shown shortly, I measure support for government services *directly*, instead of using family income as a surrogate for capacity to support government policy. Several studies have dramatized and verified that state-local relations vary considerably.[3] Unfortunately, despite rather conclusive evidence concerning the effects of interstate variations in formal state-local relations, there are as yet no available indexes or scales measuring these differing relations, and it is, therefore, currently impossible to adjust for them. Yet, without such adjustments, statements concerning the interstate differences in local policy support may be quite unreliable. Under these circumstances, it is better to examine municipalities within given SMSA's independently of those in other metropolises. Finally, the Milwaukee SMSA has been the focus of several studies, each making a rather strong case that the Milwaukee SMSA is typical of the metropolitanizing process. There is no evidence, in any case, that Milwaukee is in some way deviant.[4] It should be mentioned, in conclusion, that the City of Milwaukee is excluded from this analysis. I strongly agree that substantial differences exist among metropolitan-area municipalities and that previous research was preoccupied with aggregate central city and suburban differences. Nevertheless, central cities are still different from their suburban neighbors in important ways. And, in any case, if the Hill formulation applies, my findings should not be influenced by deletion of the City of Milwaukee from the analysis. Deleting the central city from the analysis provides a more stringent test of Hill's contention that the relationship between social stratification and governmental inequality is general among metropolitan municipalities and is not solely a central city versus suburban issue.

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[1] Richard Child Hill, "Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December, 1974), 1557–1568.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1558.

[3] Y. H. Cho, "Effect of Local Government Systems on Local Policy Outcomes in the United States," *Public Administration Review*, 27 (March, 1967), 31–38.

For a municipality to be included in this analysis, it was required to have, at the time of the 1960 census, at least 1500 residents.[5] Thirty-nine of the Milwaukee SMSA municipalities met this criterion, and data for three sets of measures were gathered. One set of data contains four measures of *social stratification*, as conceptualized by Hill. The second set has two measures of nonincome based measures of municipal *capacity* to support public services (as distinguished from actual resources extracted for public service support). The third set has two measures of municipality *support* for services and two indicators of *effort* required to attain given support levels.

The following are the social stratification indicators employed here:[6]

(1) Percentage of owner-occupied housing in the municipality having a market value of $14,999 or less, 1970 (low status measure).
(2) Percentage of families in municipality with annual incomes between $10,000–11,999, 1970 (low status).[7]
(3) Percentage of residents categorized as professional, technical, and kindred, 1970 (high status).[8]
(4) Percentage of families in municipality with annual incomes of $25,000 or more (high status).

Table 1 reports the intercorrelations among the measures of social stratification. The findings strongly support the conclusion that Milwaukee SMSA municipalities are marked by substantial stratification and differentiation, based on the economic and social standing of their respective residents. The measures of high and low status respectively are positively and strongly correlated, while the high and low status measures are substantially and negatively correlated. This is as it should be, if Milwaukee-area municipalities are socially stratified and if the social stratification measures are, in fact, tapping what we claim they are.

Table 1. Zero-Order Correlations Among Social Stratification Measures for 39 Milwuakee SMSA Suburbs

	1	2	3	4
1. Per cent owner-occupied housing with market values of $14,999 or less.	1.000			
2. Per cent of families having anual incomes between $10,000–11,999.	.623	1.000		
3. Per cent of residents categorized as professional, technical, and kindred.	−.712	−.846	1.000	
4. Per cent of families with annual incomes of $25,000 or more.	−.423[a]	−.753	.634	1.000

[a] This correlation is significant at the .01 level, and the other cells have coefficients that are all significant at the .001 level.

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[4] Remi Boelaert, "Political Fragmentation and Inequality of Fiscal Capacity in the Milwaukee SMSA," *National Tax Journal*, 23 (March, 1970), 83–88; Donald J. Curran, *Metropolitan Financing: The Milwaukee Experience, 1920–70* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).

[5] The municipalities are: In Milwaukee County: Bayside, Brown Deer, Cudahay, Fox Point, Franklin, Glendale, Greenfield, Oak Creek, St. Francis, Wauwatosa, West Allis, Greendale, Hales Corners, River Hills, Shorewood, West Milwaukee, and Whitefish Bay. In Ozaukee County: Cedarburgh, Mequon, Port Washington, Grafton, and Thiensville. In Washington County: Hartford, West Bend, and Kewaskum. In Waukesha County: Elm Grove, Hartland, Menominee Falls, Mukwonago, and Pewaukee.

[6] These data were collected from U.S. Census Bureau information provided to the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission and aggregated by the latter organization to the municipal level.

[7] The validity of this measure being interpreted as a measure of low status is heightened because it is positively correlated with lower categories of income and is negatively related to higher measures of income.

[8] This measure of upper status is negatively and significantly related to other measures of lower status, such as the percentage of community residents in various blue-collar and other working class occupations. Write author for supporting data.

The measures of municipal resources to support public services were incorporated because it is not valid to assume automatically that social stratification generates inequality respecting capacity to support public services. The inclusion of more direct measures of resource capacity reflects my dissatisfaction with Hill's notion that income measures resource capacity. I adopt Donald J. Curran's view:

> One might think that the income level of a community should be listed as a resource. This view is based on the oft-repeated statement that all taxes are ultimately paid out of income. Although there is much truth in the statement at the macro or national level, the relation between public resources and income can be somewhat strained at the state level, and thinner still at the local level of government. Thus the use of income as a measure of resources is often worse than uninformative; it can all too easily be the source of serious error.[9]

Two measures of muncipality resources are included here:

(1) Percentage of municipal land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes, 1970.[10]
(2) Per capita market (not assessed) value of real property in the municipality.[11]

These measures of capacity to support public services are examined for their relationships with our measures of social stratification. According to Hill's social stratification thesis, the measures of high status should be related positively to the measures of resource capacity, while resources should be negatively related with the low status measures. Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of relationships between status and municipal capacity to support public services.

The findings do not support Hill's social stratification thesis. The data, in fact, suggest the opposite from what would be expected on the basis of Hill's theoretical formulation. Lower status communities, apparently, have substantially more industrial-manufacturing than do higher-status communities. The importance of this relationship is heightened by the significant relationship between amount of land zoned for industrial-manufacturing the greater the market value of municipal prop- of municipal property; specifically, the greater the amount of land zoned for industrial-manufacturing the greater the market value of municipal property ($r = .504$; significant beyond the .001 level). To the extent that lower-status municipalities are disadvantaged by lower incomes and less valuable residential property, they may be enabled to overcome their disadvantage by containing within their municipal boundaries higher proportions of valuable industrial manufacturing realty.

Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations[a] between Measures of Social Stratification and Public Service Support Capacity

	Per cent land zoned industrial and manufacturing	Per capita market value of real prop.
1. Per cent owner-occupied housing with-market values of $14,999 or less.	.537 (.001)	−.006 (.486)
2. Per cent of families in municipality with annual incomes of $10,000–11,999.	.466 (.003)	−.159 (.184)
3. Per cent of residents who are professional, technical, and kindred.	−.603 (.001)	−.053 (.383)
4. Per cent of families in municipality with annual incomes of $25,000 or more	−.349 (.022)	.150 (.198)

[a] Level of significance in parenthesis.

In defending his use of median family income as the basis for measuring unequal municipal capacity to support public services, Hill argues, ". . . median family income only captures part of the real tax base of municipalities. Because it fails to take account of industrial and commercial property values directly, this measure probably understates the severity of governmental inequality in the metropolis."[12] The opposite is suggested by my analysis; Hill's use of income to measure public service capacity probably *overstates*, rather than mutes, the level of resource inequality.

Although the social stratification and fiscal capacity measures are not related in ways *assumed* by Hill, it is not clear how social stratification and capacity to support public support levels interact (i.e., the transformation of municipal wealth into revenue for public services). In order to examine the relationship among social stratification, fiscal capacity, and public service support levels, a stepwise regression model is applied.[13] The social stratification and resource measures are posited as independent variables that influence actual support levels for public services. Two dimensions of public service levels are examined. One is the support *level* of resources allocated; the other is the support *effort* involved in extracting municipal resources.[14] Support level is measured by:

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[9] Curran, *Metropolitan Financing. . . .*, p. 52.

[10] A direct measure of the amount of land used for industrial and manufacturing use was not available at the data-gathering stage. Subsequently, it was determined that there is a very high correlation between the amount of land zoned industrial and the amount of land actually used for this purpose. Obviously, some amount of land zoned for this purpose is not used at all, while other land is zoned for some other purpose, but is actually used for industry or manufacturing.

[11] The term market or "real" value is a term used to distinguish the equalized assessment by the state of local property for state purposes, and is not meant to suggest that this value of housing is the selling price of homes. This data, as well as the data for land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes, was also obtained from the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission.

[12] Hill, "Separate and Unequal," p. 1562.

(1) the per capita general property tax for municipal purposes, 1970;
(2) the per capita revenue raised by the municipality for the local school district, 1970.

The support effort measures are:

(1) the property tax rate on the real market value of property for municipal purposes, 1970;
(2) the property tax rate on the real market value of property for school purposes, 1970.

Results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3. In the case of the two measures of property taxes, or the amount of resources extracted from the municipal tax base, the regression model indicates the overwhelming importance of available resources. Indeed, the findings do not indicate any general, patterned relationship between social stratification and public service support levels. The data indicate that for municipal purposes the property tax revenues extracted are somewhat influenced by the low status indicator, the percentage housing with values of $14,000 or less. This suggests the oft-cited observation that municipalities with less expensive housing tend to require higher municipal services.[15] But clearly the impact of the

Table 3. Step-wise Regression of Measures of Public Policy Support Levels and Support Effort on Measures of Social Stratification and Resource Measures[a]

	R	R^2[b]	Per cent housing valued at $14,999 or less	Per cent family income $10,000–11,999	Per cent municipal pop. with professional occupation	Per cent with family income of $25,000 or more	Per cent zoned indust. and manuf.	Per capita real market value of property
1. Per capita property tax for municipal purposes	.802	.643	.319[c]	—	—	—	—	.738
2. Per capita tax for schools	.941	.885	—	—	—	—	—	.941
3. Tax rate for municipal purposes	.650	.423	—	.411	—	−.338	—	—
4. Tax rate for school purposes	.387	.150	.715	—	—	—	−.458	—

[a] Empty cells indicate that the variable did not add at least five per cent to the amount of explained variance for that regression.

[b] R^2 here is based solely on the variables included in the regression. The values of R^2 using standard regression, where all the variables are included (stratification and resource capacity) are .702 (for per capita tax for municipal purposes, .911 (for per capita tax for schools, .427 (for municipal tax rate), and .216 (for school tax rate).

[c] The values in the columns other than R and R^2 are standardized regression coefficients (beta-weights). Partial correlation coefficients are not reported, because they are redundant of the results revealed by the beta-weights. All the betas are at least 1.5 times their standard error and are considered significant.

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[13] A variation of multiple regression, stepwise regression provides a means of choosing independent variables which will provide the best prediction possible with the fewest independent variables. This regression routine chooses the single variable that best predicts the value of the dependent variable, and then proceeds to select other variables in order of their ability to predict the dependent variable best, in conjunction with variables already included in the model. In this instance, variables are no longer included, once they no longer add five per cent explained variance to the equation. See Norma H. Nie, Dale H. Bent, and C. Hadlai Hull, *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 180–181.

[14] The following items were gathered from sources published by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Municipal Audit Division.

[15] Dick Netzer, *The Economics of the Property Tax* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966); Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

per capita tax base is dominant for municipal and school support levels.

In the case of the indicators of effort required to raise revenue, we find mixed evidence. The regression for the municipal-purpose tax rate suggests that both measures of lower status lead to higher tax rates. The upper-status measure, on the other hand, suggests that as the status of the municipality increases, there is a corresponding tendency for tax rates to decline. Some may prematurely embrace this datum as support for Hill's stratification thesis. After all, this finding would be consistent with the idea that lower-status communities need to spend more with lower levels of resources (hence, a higher tax rate). Unfortunately, other explanations not consistent with the Hill formulation are also possible. It has been shown that there is a moderately strong relationship between lower status and the amount of industrial and manufacturing base in the municipality ($r=.537$ and .466 respectively for both low status measures). For at least some lower-status municipalities, higher tax rates fall not only on residences but also on valuable industrial-manufacturing property. In cases where the total amount of industrial-manufacturing realty value is a significant proportion of the total property value, the revenue gained from industrial-manufacturing property may more than outweigh the burden imposed on residents by the rate on their homes. This is particularly true since industrial-manufacturing property generates more in revenues than is required for such property in the way of public services.[16] Such inferences are, however, mainly speculative, since greater assurance would require data indicating the relative contribution of different classes of property to the total tax base.

The regression for school-purpose tax rates indicates that the lower-status measure of low residential values is positively related to the tax rate. On the other hand, the much larger beta-weights for the effect of industrial-manufacturing property suggests lower tax rates. And since there is a positive and significant correlation ($r=.537$) between our measure of less valuable housing and industrial-manufacturing property, it is reasonable to argue that some poorer communities can apparently obviate the effects of this low residential tax base through access to a lucrative industrial-manufacturing base. This is some tentative support for the preceding speculation.

This issue is dramatized by Table 4, which reports the average per capita tax base for two classes of communities in our sample. One class is virtually entirely residential and upper status, while the other class is is lower-status and generally zoned heavily for industrial and manufacturing use. The industrial suburbs clearly outstrip the higher-status communities in the value of their tax base. Yet, the industrial suburbs have much lower proportions of upper-income families. Such relations as these are the reason that serious reconsideration has occurred in a number of states about the assertion that property tax systems are inequitable in favor of higher status municipalities. It has been found in California that lower-income communities are often the greatest beneficiaries of the "inequitable" workings of the property tax system, respecting school revenues. Great harm to lower income communities, who rely on valuable non-residential property for generating public service revenue, can result if analysis and policy are premised on the idea that low income necessarily indicates low levels of public service capacity.[17]

Table 4. Mean Values for Property and Income Measures of Milwaukee SMSA Suburbs

	Per capita real market value of municipal property	Per cent families with annual incomes of $15,000 or more
1. Residential, high status suburbs ($N=10$)[a]	$10,964	48.5
2. Industrial suburbs ($N=8$)[b]	$15,187	26.5
3. All suburbs ($N=39$)	$11,525	35.7

[a] This class of communities has the following zoning characteristics: At least 20 per cent of the municipality's residential land is zoned for low density; that is, for lots of 1 acre or more.

[b] Industrial suburbs are those where land is zoned for industrial and manufacturing use for at least 20 per cent of the land area.

Source: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission.

Insofar as our Milwaukee SMSA suburban sample is typical of national trends, Hill's social stratification thesis cannot rest on family income as a measure of governmental inequality. The analysis here suggests there is no direct, simple translation of social stratification into governmental inequality. Nevertheless, this discussion should not be viewed as a debunking of the social stratification theory, since there is great merit in and need to explore the impact of social structure, particularly the inequalities of social structure, on political institutions and public policy. Let us conclude, then, with some necessarily brief and selective thoughts concerning a more constructive research agenda for those interested in the interplay between social stratification and the workings of the political order.

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[16] Netzer, *The Economics of the Property Tax.*

[17] "Serrano's Potential Victims," *California Journal,* 5 (May, 1974), 169–170.

First, Hill's interest in social stratification appears to derive from a prior, unarticulated stance against social and political inequality. His critical tone, however, is not adequately grounded, not theoretically and certainly not empirically. For example, in dealing with social stratification and inequalities in the metropolitan arena, the so-called public choice theorists argue that social and governmental stratification is the natural consequence of households and other social units moving into locales and organizing into political jurisdictions (generally municipalities) on the basis of life style and public service preferences, as well as on the basis of their personal resources. These theorists contend that people are where they are and maintain their particular life-style and public-service mix either because they want these things or that is all they can afford. Attempts to provide or argue in favor of more benefits for people than they can pay for is viewed as income redistribution and a "negative externality" imposed on the haves for the benefit of the have-nots. In other words, does the social stratification theory posed by Hill argue for the inherent evil of social inequality, regardless of how it came about, or is Hill critical because social stratification is inevitably linked to the birth of political processes, institutions, and decisions that worsen the inequality of society's distribution of advantages and disadvantages?

Let us assume that Hill takes the latter position (although it is not obvious that he does), i.e., that social stratification is pernicious because of its instrumental relation to further levels of stratification. This formulation raises two rather complicated issues. First, it forces the researcher to isolate and define institutions and policies that presumably reinforce and enhance the position of society's upper social strata. Even when these are defined, however, there remains the need to empirically verify that social stratification is significantly affected by such institutions and policies. It is insufficient to argue that social stratification is associated with unequal distributions of private and public advantages. What is necessary is to indicate that political advantages stem from social advantages, that, in turn, exacerbate social stratification. At the urban and local level, research would involve the workings of such institutions as annexation and municipal incorporation law, zoning and other land use regulations, state and federal aid to local political jurisdictions, administration and support of transportation networks, property, and tax administration.

The second, related problem arises from the causal sequence implied by the social stratification thesis. The thesis is a dynamic one in the following sense. Hill argues that social stratification at a given *time* (t) later leads to social and political arrangements (at $t+1$) that subsequently reinforce and increase social stratification (at $t+2$). Longitudinal analyses, using data with appropriate time properties, are necessary to provide long-term confidence in the expected, theoretically derived propositions. This is complicated by the fact that one must obviously expect social stratification, independently of its relation to political factors, to be an *independent* cause of social stratification at a later period, without considering the effects of political institutions and public policy. The independent effect of prior stratification on future stratification must be discounted. The issue for political scientists, then, is not whether social stratification leads to differential distributions of advantages and disadvantages, but to what extent social stratification gives rise to race- and class-biased systems of access to political institutions and public policy, and how these, in turn, affect social structure.

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The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent paper in this *Review*[1] I argued that political incorporation by class and status into municipal enclaves is an important institutional mechanism for creating and perpetuating inequality among residents in metropolitan communities in the United States. Inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in metropolitan areas, I suggested, is an integral part of an evolving stratification system. My specific purpose in that article was to examine the pattern of empirical relationships between governmental inequality and other salient dimensions of the structure of urban inequality. With this objective in mind, I assumed median family income to be a "very rough indication of the fiscal capacity and the level of service needs" in a municipality.[2] I then conducted a comparative investigation of factors associated with inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in metropolitan areas in the United States in 1960. The empirical results of that investigation, I concluded, offered support for the thesis that governmental inequality plays a reinforcing if not a determining role in a structured system of urban inequality in the United States.

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[1] Richard Child Hill, "Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December, 1974), 1557–1568.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1562.

Max Neiman questions my conclusions on logical, empirical, and normative grounds. I will treat each facet of his critique in turn. In the process I will demonstrate, I believe, that Nieman's analysis cannot support the weight of his argument.

Neiman argues that measuring governmental inequality by the distribution of family income among municipalities is tautological since median family income has "*prima facie* appeal" as a measure of social inequality. The dependent variable is measured by "one of its presumed causes." What is needed, he argues, is the construction of non-tautological, "independent" measures of both social stratification and the capacity to support government services among municipalities. Thus, Neiman apparently wishes to treat the distribution of fiscal resources, expenditure levels and tax effort among local governments as logically independent of the urban stratification system. But in my paper institutions of local government are by definition part of the urban stratification system. Since local governments accumulate and allocate scarce resources among metropolitan residents, they cannot be treated as if they were independent of the structure of urban inequality. My thesis is that the unequal distribution of fiscal resources among local governments both is determined by and reinforces economic, political and social inequality in the metropolis. Yet if local governments redistributed resources from the more to the less advantaged citizens in the metropolis they would still play an important role in "who gets what and why."

Second, Neiman suggests that industrial concentration and per capita property values are "non-income based measures" of municipal capacity to support public services and therefore do not embody the tautological measurement flaws of median family income. But this argument is misleading. All individual and family income is ultimately derived from returns to property owned, or from labor expended, or from government transfer payments. Therefore, taxes on industrial and commercial firms must ultimately come out of lowered profits and dividends to property owners, out of lowered wages and salaries to workers, or through price increases passed on to consumers lowering their real income. The income effects of taxation on property are complex, and may or may not be absorbed by the taxing jurisdiction, but this does not divorce property relationships and taxation policies from the distribution of income nor negate the salient role they play in the urban stratification system.

Finally, measuring local government fiscal capacity by median family income, and exploring the empirical relationship between inequality in the distribution of income among families in the metropolis as a whole and inequality in the distribution of income among municipal governments, is not tautological. The positive empirical relationship between these two variables revealed in my study is not a logical necessity but rather reveals municipal institutions as instruments of class segregation in the metropolis.

Neiman's empirical critique is potentially more damaging to the argument presented in my paper. He correctly asserts that I assumed but did not attempt empirically to demonstrate: (1) a positive relationship between municipal fiscal capacity and municipal revenue and expenditure levels; and (2) an inverse relationship between municipal fiscal capacity and municipal tax effort. Neiman measures municipal fiscal capacity by the percentage of land zoned industrial and the per capita market value of real property and attempts to test these assumptions through a correlation and regression analysis of 1960 data on suburban municipalities in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. The findings revealed in his stepwise regression analysis support both assumptions.

Neiman's analysis also reveals, however, (1) an inverse, *zero-order* correlation between various socioeconomic characteristics of Milwaukee suburbs and the percentage of land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes; and (2) essentially no *zero-order* relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of Milwaukee suburbs and the per capita market value of their real property. On the basis of these findings Neiman speculates that the fiscal capacity of low-income suburbs is likely to be bolstered by concentrations of industrial property. Therefore, median family income in a municipality is an "irreparably deficient" predictor of fiscal capacity, tax effort, and revenue and expenditure levels of local government. Finally he suggests that the assertion that metropolitan property tax systems are inequitable in favor of higher status municipalities merits serious reconsideration. If Neiman's interpretations of his data are correct, and if the findings from his case study of Milwaukee can be generalized to other metropolitan areas,[3] he has cast serious doubt upon the conclusions presented in my paper. The generality of Neiman's conclusions can only be demonstrated through comparative research. There are clear grounds, however, for questioning the validity of Neiman's argument as it applies to metropolitan Milwaukee.

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[3] There is a longstanding and continuing theoretical debate in the public finance literature over the most appropriate indicators of fiscal capacity among local governments. This debate, I might add, Neiman chooses to ignore. For arguments in support of personal income as a measure of fiscal capacity, cf. Robert Reischauer and Robert Hartman, *Reforming School Finance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 32–34, 69–72.

A number of factors warrant caution in accepting Neiman's interpretation of his empirical findings. First, percentage of land zoned industrial and per capita property values may be valid indicators of the level of fiscal resources in a municipality. But they must be interpreted with care. Property values are translated into actual fiscal resources through assessment procedures. And the correspondence between assessment valuations and the real market value of property are frequently shaky at best. Gaffney's research in metropolitan Milwaukee, for example, indicates that industrial land is not only underassessed but regressively assessed.[4]

Second, Neiman's revenue indicators are difficult to interpret because he appears to lump capital and operating revenues together. During any given year, some municipalities are mustering large sums for new capital construction projects. Therefore, combining capital and operating revenues yields misleading comparisons of the actual level of services provided among muncipalities.

Third, merely comparing revenue levels among municipalities does not provide an accurate indication of how municipal revenues are actually spent. Evidence on the Milwaukee metropolitan area, for example, indicates that industrial suburbs allocate a larger share of their revenues to infrastructure services that facilitate profitable conditions for private industrial and commerical capital accumulation (e.g., sanitation and fire services), while residential suburbs allocate a larger share to consumption expenditures more directly tied to the life-style of their residents (e.g., education).[5] Clearly, municipalities with comparable revenue levels may vary markedly in actual services provided and thereby structure the life chances of their residents in quite different ways.

Fourth, Neiman's central thesis is that the concentration of industrial land and business property in low-income suburbs bolsters the tax base of low-status municipalities, vitiates family income as an accurate clue to fiscal capacity, and renders the property tax system much less inequitable that is commonly supposed. Now there is no question that casual observation of any given metropolitan area is likely to reveal the presence of working-class, industrial suburbs. But the key issue is whether this phenomenon is sufficiently widespread to justify accepting Neiman's conclusions. Testing Neiman's thesis requires a distinction between industrial and residential suburbs and an investigation of the relationship between level of income and salient fiscal characteristics among municipalities *without* significant concentrations of business property. This method of analysis would specify whether Neiman's conclusions constitute a qualification to my argument or, as he appears to suggest, merits it's rejection *in toto*. Unfortunately, Neiman does not perform the kind of analysis necessary to resolve this issue for Milwaukee.

John Riew, however, has conducted a systematic investigation of the fiscal structure of metropolitan Milwaukee which provides evidence directly pertinent to the points at issue. Riew investigated the fiscal characteristics of the 29 incorporated municipalities in the Milwaukee SMSA in 1960. Riew classified the 29 municipalites by economic function and by income. The functional classification of incorporated suburbs is based on the ratio of business property to total real property within each municipality. *Industrial municipalities* are those in which total equalized value of business real properties (mercantile, manufacturing and utility properties) constituted more than 60 per cent of total real property in 1966. *Balanced municipalities* are those in which this ratio was between 40 and 60 per cent. *Residential municipalities* are those in which the business to total real property ratio is below 40 per cent. Riew divided residential municipalities into high-, medium-, and low-income suburbs on the basis of 1965 adjusted gross income per state income tax return. Riew's classification yielded the central city, 5 balanced municipalities, 2 industrial municipalities, and 21 residential municipalities. The latter group was further divided into 6 high income, 7 medium income, and 8 low income suburbs.

At the outset it is worth noting that Riew classifies more than 25 per cent of the incorporated suburban municipalities in the Milwaukee SMSA as low-income residential suburbs without significant concentrations of business property. This finding casts a pall over Neiman's speculation that the fiscal capacity of low-income suburbs is largely compensated by concentrations of industrial property.

Second, Neiman's argument that family income is an "irreparably deficient" clue to the fiscal capacity, tax effort, and service level of suburbs implies essentially no relationship between family income level and salient fiscal characteristics among the residential municipalities (which constitute 75 per cent of the incorporated suburbs in the Milwaukee SMSA). The findings from Riew's

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[4] Mason Gaffney, "What is Property Tax Reform?", *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (April, 1972), and "Adequacy of Land as a Tax-Base," in Daniel Holland, ed., *The Assessment of Land Value* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

[5] John Riew, "Fiscal Disparities in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Metropolitan Area," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), Table 20, p. 299.

Table 1. Selected Fiscal Characteristics Among Types of Municipalities, Milwaukee SMSA

				Residential			
	Central City	Balanced	Industrial	High Income	Medium Income	Low Income	Total
1. Mean, per capita adjusted gross[a] income, 1965	$2387	$2446	$2046	$7180	$3146	$2490	
2. Total, mean, per capita equalized[b] property values, 1966	$5454	$8982	$25239	$10937	$7180	$5799	
3. Mean, full value local+school[c] tax rates, 1966	30.3	20.1	17.7	20.5	20.9	22.0	
4. Mean, per capita total municipal[d] operating expenditures, 1966	$81.30	$62.50	$142.90	$118.50	$55.80	$47.90	
5. Mean, per pupil school operating[e] expenditures, 1965–66	$508	$636	$630	$762	$642	$578	
6. Mean, per capita shared taxes,[f] 1966	$39.05	$48.10	$174.56	$109.75	$40.59	$33.10	
7. Mean, per capita total state transfer[g] payments, 1966	$87.70	$113.80	$314.60	$161.40	$103.80	$90.40	
Number of Municipalities	(1)	(5)	(2)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(29)

Source: John Riew, "Fiscal Disparities in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Metropolitan Area," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, volume 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 278–324.

[a] Riew, Table 18, p. 297; [b] Riew, Table 11, p. 292; [c] Riew, Table 5, 286; [d] Riew, Table 24, p. 302; [e] Riew, Table 25, p. 303; [f] Riew, Table 28, p. 305; [g] Riew, Table 36, p. 314.

investigation, however, do not support Neiman's conclusion. As indicated in Table 1, among the 21 residential suburbs there is a direct relationship between level of municipal income and salient municipal fiscal characteristics. Next to the central city, low-income residential suburbs have: (1) the lowest equalized property values; (2) the highest overall tax rates; (3) the lowest level of per capita municipal operating expenditures: (4) the lowest per pupil school operating expenditures; (5) the lowest per capita shared taxes; and (6) the lowest per capita state transfer payments in the Milwaukee metropolitan area.

In sum, Riew's study rather conclusively demonstrates that: (1) far from being an "irreparably deficient" clue to fiscal capacity, the income level of residential suburbs is directly related to salient fiscal characteristics in the manner assumed in my paper; (2) that industrial concentration does not compensate for low income for the majority of working class suburban municipalities; and (3) that *both* income and business property value indicators are necessary to provide a complete picture of the distribution of fiscal resources among municipalities in the Milwaukee metropolis. In sum, Neiman's "closer empirical look" simply isn't close enough.

Finally, Neiman is disturbed by the critical tone permeating my paper. My critical stance, he speculates, is derived from a prior, unarticulated posture against social and political inequality which is neither adequately grounded in theory nor in the empirical evidence at hand. By way of response, Neiman expresses his own attachment to the normative position of the so-called "public choice theorists." From that ideological perspective, governmental inequality is the "natural consequence of households and other social units moving into locales and organizing into political jurisdictions . . . on the basis of life style . . . public service preferences . . . [and] personal resources." Accordingly, in the contemporary U.S. metropolis, "people are where they are and maintain their particular life-style and public-service mix either because they want these things or that is all they can afford." Attempts to redistribute resources from the more to the less privileged are most appropriately viewed as "negative externalities" imposed on the haves for the benefit of the have nots.

I will leave it to the reader to assess the merit of the theoretical and empirical conclusions presented in my article. But since Neiman's concluding remarks raise the fundamentally important issue of the social uses and political implications of social science theory and research, and since he presents a particular ideological perspective, I am obligated to respond briefly to his normative criticism of my paper.

To "articulate" my own position on the issue of inequality, let me simply state that I oppose social, economic, and political arrangements which function to rob individuals of their dignity by denying them the institutional capacity to determine their own fate collectively and democratically. As in other areas of social inquiry, conflicting perspectives on the structure and functioning of institutions of local government both express and help shape ongoing struggles among social classes in the United States. In particular, the urban literature reveals three contending perspectives on the structure of local government in urban areas in the United States: laissez-faire capitalist, state capitalist, and socialist. Each perspective is rooted in the material and symbolic interests of particular class segments of the population.

The model of the "public choice theorists," briefly outlined by Neiman, takes the parameters of the capitalist market as given, conceives of local government as a species of business to be regulated by the forces of the market, and thereby transforms the meaning of local citizenship into a "species of real estate consumerism." Equating political sovereignty with consumer sovereignty, "public choice theorists" perceive the city to be a purveyor of commodities like any other business firm and the allegiance of citizen-consumers to be properly transferred from one residential subdivision to another much as trade is shifted from store to store.[6] If faced by a serious dilemma, and if in possession of sufficient resources, local citizens are encouraged to solve their problems individually and privately by "voting with their feet" rather than collectively through political struggle. Those unable or unwilling to escape frequently find themselves fighting an uphill battle against demoralization and alienation from a deteriorating central city or inner-ring suburban environment.

This is not the place to recount the theoretical and empirical inadequacies of the "public choice" model.[7] Suffice it to say that to equate the complex institutional consequencies stemming from the strikingly unequal distribution of market capacities among social classes with the concept of *public* choice, and to suggest that governmental inequality is a *natural* consequence of geographical mobility, merely demonstrates the historically specific, ideological content of this perspective. Rooted in the domain assumptions of laissez-faire capitalism, the public choice model reflects and legitimates the material and symbolic interests of the suburban middle class in the United States.

Since World War II, however, the competitive, market-dominated path of urban development and the proliferation of fragmented, class-segregated institutions of local government have increasingly come into conflict with the imperatives of a political economy distinguished less by individual competition than by shared monopoly. While political fragmentation and government segregation continue to satisfy the consumption demands of a large share of the middle class, they simultaneously pose significant barriers to the profitable accumulation of capital and threaten the legitimacy of local institutions of government. In an increasingly interdependent metropolitan space economy, political fragmentation and government segregation: (1) frustrate efficient coordination and allocation of resources; (2) prevent the possibility of local solutions to a diverse range of externality problems; (3) prevent important conflictual issues from being placed in any political arena; and (4) increasingly relegate impoverished segments of the working class to segregated and relatively powerless political reservations.

In response to these disaccumulating and destabilizing urban tendencies, urban planners and other groups reflecting the interests of large-scale corporate capital have pushed for the creation of state capitalist urban governmental arrangements. The state capitalist model combines state, metropolitan, municipal and special district forms of government into a centralized urban political system governed from the top down by principles of corporate planning. Productivity in government becomes the rallying cry for a fundamental alteration in the relations of revenue accumulation and production and distribution of government goods and services in the metropolis. The inadequate handling of spill-overs, inequities in service and tax levels among local governments, and the fiscal imbalance among levels of government are to be reduced by shifting the fiscal burden to higher levels of government. A centralized government budget is to be used to set goals and translate them into efficient and effective activities geared to the twin imperatives of private capital accumulation and political stability.[8]

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[6] Norton Long, "The City as Reservation," *The Public Interest*, (Fall 1971), 23.

[7] For incisive criticisms of the "public choice" model see, for example, Dick Netzer, "Is There Too Much Reliance on the Local Property Tax?" in George Peterson, ed., *Property Tax Reform* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1973), pp. 13–23; Ann Roell Markusen, "The Economics of Social Class and Metropolitan Local Government" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1974); and K. Newton, "Social Class, Political Structure, and Public Goods in American Urban Politics," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, forthcoming.

The transfer of fiscal responsibility and managerial initiative to state and metropolitan governments implies the destruction of the political autonomy of suburban fiefdoms. It also implies a considerable increase in the level of taxation experienced by suburban white collar groups and some segments of the organized working class.[9] The price paid for a measure of resource redistribution is centralized rule according to the imperatives of state planning for private profit and the political impoverishment of the mass of metropolitian residents.[10] Large-scale corporate capital, in combination with some executive agencies of federal and state governments, has taken steps toward regional government and regional planning. But the fragmented system of local government is entrenched in law and tradition, and powerful suburban-rural coalitions dominate the legislatures of most state governments. Unsurprisingly, the history of comprehensive metropolitan reform attempts to date has largely been one of failure[11] meeting "the opposition of the majority of Congress, clientele agencies in the federal executive, local business, branches of organized labor, white collar and middle-class suburban governments, and minority and radical community organizations and groups."[12]

The emerging socialist model of the city contrasts sharply with the state capitalist perspective. The immediate problem for adherents to the socialist perspective is to devise alternatives to the market mechanism which allow for the transfer of productive power and the distribution of the economic surplus to areas where the unfulfilled needs of deprived and impoverished urban residents is so starkly apparent. Over the long haul, urbanization governed by socialist parameters involves the redefinition of social needs and the concept of surplus itself. In the mature socialist city, socially necessary labor produces socially beneficial use values for present and future residents. The surplus arises out of unalienated labor and loses its class content as city residents yield their surplus labor for socially defined and agreed upon purposes.[13]

Thus the transition to socialist urban forms portends radical transformations in the relations of revenue accumulation and the production and distribution of public goods and services. Revenue accumulation is governed according to the principle of community ownership of the community's wealth.[14] Relations of production and distribution are governed by the principle of social production to meet social needs. The market is replaced by a decentralized planning process rooted in the neighborhoods.[15] Technology is demystified, all claimed economies of scale are challenged, and science and technology are put in the direct service of human needs, aspirations, and imagination.[16]

As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, I believe that only the socialist model approximates a conception of urban institutional arrangements conducive to the realization of human dignity and freedom.[17]

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[8] In particular see The Committee on Economic Development, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York, 1970); The Committee on Economic Devvelopment, *Modernizing Local Government* (New York, 1970); The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *City Financial Emergencies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

[9] For the case of education, see Reischauer and Hartman, *Reforming School Finance*, p. 82.

[10] For a more detailed analysis of the state capitalist urban model see Richard Child Hill, "State Capitalism and the Urban Fiscal Crisis in the United States," unpublished ms., Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, July 1975.

[11] For a comprehensive review of metropolitan reform attempts, see John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, *The Metropolis*, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1970), chapter 11.

[12] James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), p. 103.

[13] David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 235.

[14] See, for example, Edward M. Kirshner and James Morey, "Controlling a City's Wealth," *Working Papers for a New Society* (Spring 1973), pp. 10–19.

[15] For an excellent discussion of this issue see Lewis Friedman, "City Budgets," *Municipal Performance Report* (August, 1974), pp. 1–30.

[16] For one fascinating discussion of efforts in this direction see Nicholas Wade's discussion of Community Technology, in *Science* (January 31, 1975), pp. 332–334.

[17] Richard Child Hill, "Black Struggle and the Urban Fiscal Crisis," paper delivered at the Conference on Urban Political Economy, New School for Social Research, New York, N.Y., February 15, 1975.

"Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics"

TO THE EDITOR:

Recently in the pages of this journal, Douglas Rose argued that the American states are not sufficiently independent of national and regional forces to serve as appropriate units of analysis in comparative policy research.[1] If such a devastating charge is true, it might well signal the end of a heretofore blossoming field of inquiry or, at least, result in far-reaching changes in the approach so heavily used by practitioners of aggregate output research. But we believe the following analysis demonstrates that Rose did not really make his case and that, in fact, the states are important analytic units that possess meaningful independent variation in areas of interest for political scientists.

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[1] Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1162–1173.

Essentially, Rose seems to be saying that since the American states exist within a federal system, the socioeconomic and policy differences that appear unique to the states are really the result of either national trends and pressures, regional effects, or variation that exists at a substate level. The states, he insists, are not political systems, only parts of a political system that increasingly are dominated by national norms in such a way that there is great policy similarity among states. These arguments have intuitive appeal and undoubtedly merit careful consideration.

Policy decisions, while formally the product of one level of government, may not be solely due to forces operative at that particular level. State policy scholars have not been particularly sensitive to the limitations of single-level analysis, with some exceptions to be noted below, and the effects of federal leadership, sometimes bordering on coercion, have perhaps not been fully represented in such policy studies. Much state and local policy analysis has nonetheless included the impact of federal grants-in-aid on various policy areas, normally treating this effect as a separate independent variable along with various socioeconomic and political characteristics.[2] Apparently the influence of federal grants on state and local affairs has increased over the past thirty years to the extent that it undoubtedly limits the effects of state-level variables in determining state and local spending. Stephens has recently argued, however, that the real losers in this increasing centralization process are the local units of government, not the states.[3] Thus, we are not convinced on the basis of this type of research that states should be abandoned as a focus for policy analysis.

The influence of region on state affairs is not a new issue. In 1968 Sharkansky reported that measures of regionalism could account for considerable policy variation among the states after the effects of three economic characterstics had been considered.[4] And, as Rose points out, a year later Walker made an important contribution when he identified regional patterns of leadership among states in the area of policy innovation.[5] Despite these valuable results, the use of region as an explanatory variable in the social sciences has been seriously questioned. As Bertrand observed in response to Sharkansky's article above, "To say that regionalism contributed to or 'causes' these policies to be similar, is to me, misconstruing cause and effect."[6] This regional sociologist preferred to conceptualize region as an end product of homogeneities that develop as a result of a variety of social and economic forces. As Lineberry and Fowler also noted in their response to Wolfinger and Field's attempt to use region to explain differences in local government structure, ". . . we have grave reservations that the substitution of the gross and unrefined variable of 'region' for more refined demographic data adds much to our knowledge of American cities."[7] These authors, correctly it seems to us, insist that region, as an undifferentiated potpourri of socioeconomic, attitudinal, historical, and cultural variations, is too complex an indicator to use as a primary explanatory factor in accounting for political variation.

A third aspect of Rose's argument concerns intrastate variation. He insists that more differentiation on characteristics of interest to political scientists occurs within states than among states. Before taking up his endeavor to confirm this statistically, we might again acknowledge that he addresses a proposition that needs to be considered more carefully by those engaged in comparative policy research. Nonetheless, just how much variation exists at the substate level and whether it is of such magnitude to effectively preclude state-level analysis remains to be seen.

We must now deal with the issue of how to determine systematically the variation unique to the states in contrast with other levels of aggregation. Rose employed a standard one-way analysis of variance to reveal the amount of independent variation represented by states (as opposed to the population as a whole) for a group of 24 policy, policy-impact, and socioeconomic variables. The tabular entries for each of his measures express the amount of ". . . national policy differences [that] are reflected in state average policy differences." He purports to be dividing the total population into two parts: "differences among individuals within a state (deviation from the state mean) and differences among states (deviation of the state average from the national mean)."[8] As a result of this division he finds that the states account for almost no variation on the policy and policy-impact measures and very little variation on the socioeconomic variables. While the amount of variance attributable to among-state differences is presented in several tables, he does not specify precisely which measure of association is being used. It is apparently Eta^2 or E^2 (correlation ratio),[9] which is similar in nature to R^2. He finds that states can explain from absolutely nothing for rapes per capita ($E^2 = .00$) to a high of 7.65 per cent for urbanization per capita. The highest proportion of explained variance for a policy measure is only 2.34 per cent for state and local taxes per capita. On the basis of these extremely low E^2's, Rose concludes that "Policies are the same across states; they differ almost entirely within states."[10]

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[2] Ira Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 60–66; Roy W. Bahl, *Metropolitan City Expenditures* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969); and Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[3] G. Ross Stephens, "State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy, *Journal of Politics*, 36 (February, 1974), 44–76.

[4] Ira Sharkansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of American States," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (June, 1968), 9–26.

[5] Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 880–899.

[6] Alvin L. Bertrand, "Comments by a Regional Sociologist," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (June, 1968), 36.

[7] Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September, 1967), 701–716.

We do not object to the use of analysis of variance as a way of assessing variation peculiar to the states. Nonetheless, we have serious reservations about the particular way in which Rose has used this technique. As best we can determine, Rose calculated "variation" among individuals within a state by measuring each person's deviation from a particular state mean. This was done, apparently, by placing individuals into dichotomous categories—those that either "receive" a policy or those that do not. For example, if 7 per cent of the population in Oklahoma receive public assistance, this figure would represent the mean for Oklahoma on that measure. This percentage becomes the point from which individuals in that state deviate. But in this case, they can only deviate dichotomously—they either are or are not on welfare. By assigning everyone in the state a 0 (not a recipient) or a 1 (recipient), and measuring the extent to which these two groups depart from the mean (7 per cent), Rose arrives at a within-state sum of squares. This way of calculating within-state variance is equivalent to $\sigma^2 = n(PQ)$ or $n(\%)(1-\%)$. The next step is to use the deviation of means of all states from the national mean in calculating between-states sum of squares. A standard one-way analysis of variance routine follows, using only a national mean, state means, and state populations to arrive at between and within sums of squares.

If this is what Rose has done, and we see no other alternative given the source of data he cites, we reject it as an inappropriate use of analysis of variance. Aside from the violence this approach does to common sense notions of variation, the more fundamental problem lies with the use of a dependent variable that has been dichotomized. We can find no justification for the use of anything but real interval-level data as a dependent variable when using ANOVA. When true interval-level dependent variables are used, E^2, the statistic used to demonstrate the power of the independent variable (states), becomes larger as individual cases cluster around their category means. In fact, E^2 indicates how much reduction in "error" (variance) would occur by knowing the mean for the category (state) rather than just knowing the mean for all states (grand mean) in a particular case. Take welfare payments, for example—E^2 would become larger (indicating states account for more variance) as states differed in their average payments and individuals within a given state receive similar amounts. Under such conditions. E^2 would indicate the extent to which knowledge of the state in which a recipient resides would aid us in predicting the level of payment for that individual.

The interpretation of E^2 for the kind of dichotomous dependent variables used by Rose is quite different. If the variable is coded only 0 or 1. these values cannot cluster around the category (state) mean in any realistic way unless the category mean approaches 0 or 100 per cent. The within sum of squares becomes totally a function of the size of the category mean (e.g., per cent). The E^2 with such data can only tell us how much the knowledge of the state within which a person resides helps us in predicting whether the person is or is not on welfare, for example. The algebraic cards are stacked against finding any meaningful "reduction in error" in this instance. To illustrate, if the national percentage possessing an attribute was 50 per cent and a state's mean was 40 per cent, "error" would be reduced by the amount (E^2) that $n\,(.4)(.6)$ is less than $.4n(.5)+.6n(.5)$—i.e., 4 per cent. Thus, if in half the states containing half the people, 60 per cent of the population possessed this attribute, while in the other half of the states 40 per cent of the population had the same characteristic, E^2 would be only 4 per cent, leaving 96 per cent of the variation "unexplained." We believe this way of conceptualizing variance is basically nonsensical. The only acceptable approach to assessing within-state variance, in our opinion, is to find a meaningful and policy-relevant unit of analysis below the state level which also manifests socioeconomic and policy variation, and to calculate how much the

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[8] Rose, "National and Local Forces," p. 1164.

[9] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 354–355. The correlation ratio E^2 involves taking the ratio of the explained to the total sum of squares:

$$E^2 = \frac{\text{between } SS}{\text{total } SS}$$

[10] Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics," p. 1166.

means of those subunits vary from the state mean.

This is more than a debate about levels of analysis. While Rose purports to be measuring individual variation, the use of only state means and dichotomous dependent variables does not permit us to say anything meaningful about how people in a state differ except as they may belong in one of two basic categories (they either are or are not police officers, for example). Surely we should reserve the term "individual variation" to apply to differences in degree among real people as derived from survey research rather than relying on aggregate information from the *Statistical Abstract* for that purpose.

We should also emphasize that there is nothing inherently defective about using per capita measures as dependent variables in state policy analysis. For example, in 1971 the selective service exam failures per examinee in the state with the highest rate of failures (Mississippi) was almost 200 times greater than the state with the lowest rate (Oregon)—21.1 per cent compared to .1 per cent. This would suggest that states vary considerably on this measure, but the Rose technique produces a proportion of explained variance for the states of only 2.13 per cent. While in some cases per capita variables may not differ that much by state, it is not the use of these measures that is the real problem, it is rather the peculiar results obtained when they are subjected to this abnormal use of ANOVA.

At this point we present a reanalysis of certain policy and socioeconomic measures using one-way analysis of variance and employing where possible the same indicators used by Rose. Two separate substate units of analysis are included to represent within-state differences—all counties in the U.S. and all cities of more than 25,000 population.[11] While our primary focus is on the share of variance common only to the states, this seems best derived by letting the substate level account for variation and considering that which remains as peculiar to the states. Thus, state variation is considered to be that over and above the variance attributable exclusively to city or county. The test statistic, E^2, indicates how much policy variation is attributable to states compared to those subunits within the states.

Table 1. State Share of National Variance, One-Way Analysis of Variance for Selected Policy, Policy Impact, and Socioeconomic Variables:[a] Rose E^2 and E^2 from Reanalysis

	Rose E^2	E^2 (reanalysis)
Policy		
State and Local Taxes, per capita	2.34%	64.2%[b]
State and Local Employees, per capita	0.10	51.2[b]
Old Age Assistance Recipients, per capita	0.74	[c]
Average Old Age Assistance Payments, per recipient	NA	65.9
AFDC Recipients, per capita	0.27	[c]
Average AFDC Payments, per recipient	NA	55.9
Policy Impact		
Rape, per capita	0.00	NA
Burglary, per capita	NA	24.7[b]
Hospital Beds, per capita	0.03	07.4[b]
Socioeconomic Variables		
Urbanization, per capita	7.65	11.9
Income, dollars per family	2.48	41.4
Education, years per person over 25	2.46	NA
Education, median school years	NA	48.9

NA not available.

[a] Source: *County and City Data Book, 1972;* data for within-state variance are for counties (1970) unless otherwise noted ($N = 3141$).

[b] For all cities over 25,000, 1970 ($N = 845$).

[c] Not calculated; average payment levels used instead as more indicative of a "policy" than number of recipients per capita.

The results of our initial one-way analysis of variance and the corresponding figures from Rose are shown in Table 1. The E^2 coefficient is the percentage of variation explained by the states and is apparently the measure originally used by Rose. Only a few variables available in the *County and City Data Book* are identical with those used in the earlier study. Therefore we also report (Table 2) ANOVA results for additional measures similar to ones used by Rose. But first, it should be noted that the difference in Table 1 between our findings and Rose's are dramatic. Obviously, our results indicate that states are responsible for considerable variation when only among- and within-state differences are compared. Where Rose finds almost minuscule state-attributable variation, as with state and local employees per capita (.10 per cent) or state and local taxes per capita (2.34 per cent), we indicate that states explain considerable variation (64.2 per cent and 51.2 per cent respectively). Other results are similarly divergent. We should note that several of our policy variables are measured as average payments per recipient which we believe are far better for policy analysis purposes than the measures used by Rose.

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[11] These data from the *County and City Data Book 1972*, are on tape and were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan. We would like to thank Sam Kirkpatrick for assisting us with data interpretation.

Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of eight additional policy and socioeconomic variables that were not included in the original article. The purpose is to further reveal the striking differences between our results and those reported by Rose. The relatively high E^2s demonstrate that states *do* represent an important independent source of variation, at least when the variation within their respective boundaries is considered. It should also be noted that the states generally account for more variation with respect to the policy measures as opposed to the socioeconomic variables. Not only is this finding at odds with the earlier study, but it further emphasizes the importance of states as policy-relevant units of government. The lowest level of explained variance is consistently found in the policy-impact category, which we offer solely to make our results more comparable with the earlier study.

Table 2. State Share of Variance for Additional Policies, Impacts, and Socioeconomic Variables[a]

	E^2
Policy	
Average benefit per retiree	57.1%
Policy Impacts	
Crime per capita (city)	20.9
Robbery per capita (city)	12.5
Assaults per capita (city)	20.8
Auto theft per capita (city)	15.9
Socioeconomic Variables	
Per cent less than 5 years of school	53.6
Per cent more than 4 years of high school	54.7
Per cent with over 4 years of college	18.3

[a] Source: *County and City Data Book, 1972;* data for within-state variance are for counties unless otherwise indicated ($N = 3141$).

In our research in progress, we are also attempting to sort out the independent contribution made by each of the three levels of analysis—region, state, and local—to explaining socioeconomic, policy, and policy impact variables. At this point, however, we are convinced that states do account for important variance and that, while the effects of regional and substate variation should not be ignored, states can continue to be profitably employed as units of analysis for comparative policy research.

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The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics"

To the Editor:

The relative impact of state and national forces was considered in a recent article[1] by Professor Douglas D. Rose in which he called into question the rather widespread notion that states are useful and meaningful units of policy analysis. On each of twelve "policy" measures and five indices of "policy impact," he performed a one-way analysis of variance on individual-level data using states as the classification category. On none of the seventeen measures did states account for more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total variance, and on fourteen of the seventeen, states accounted for less than 1 per cent of the variance. Having thus displayed the dismal showing of the states, Professor Rose left his seventeen policy related measures to argue *on other grounds* for the importance of federal forces on state politics.

We feel Rose's argument lacks a needed symmetry. To make his point not only must one show the weakness of state level forces on a given set of policy measures but one must also demonstrate the strength of national forces *on the same set of measures.*

This research note will briefly outline why Rose's methodology precludes assessing the impact of federal forces on his set of seventeen policy related variables. It will then develop an approach that allows the simultaneous appraisal of state and national forces on the same data. Finally the technique will be applied to evaluate the relative salience of state and national forces on selected policy related measures.

The approach used by Rose was to decompose population variation into two parts, variation among individuals within states (as measured by deviation from the relevant state mean) and variation among states (as measured by deviation of the state means from the national mean). If i indexes the individual and j indexes the states, this population variation is usually expressed as:

$$(1) \quad \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}_{..})^2 = \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}_{.j})^2 + \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}_{.j} - \bar{X}_{..})^2,$$

where $\bar{X}_{..}$ is the national mean and $\bar{X}_{.j}$ is the mean in state j. In other words the total sum of squares consists of the within sum of squares plus the between sum of squares. Because the state mean is used to represent the whole state, the between sum of squares measures the impact of the states. This suggests why the national impact cannot be measured by Rose's formulation of population variation. In no part of equation (1) is the national mean, the representation of national impact, expressed as a deviation from some base point. It is, in fact, used as the base point. Hence national impact on the variation cannot be judged by this approach.

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[1] Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *APSR*, 67 (December, 1973), 1162–1173.

However, there is no intrinsic reason why, in a decomposition of variation, the mean has to be used as the base point. Although tradition points to the mean, any fixed point will do. When data are interval level, have a wide range, or lack some empirically nice base mark, the mean has certain very desirable characteristics. But in Rose's study, sixteen of the seventeen policy related variables are dichotomous, e.g., either a person is an AFDC recipient (coded as a 1) or is not (coded as a 0). Either of these values can function as a base point, although the "0" value facilitates algebraic manipulation. More importantly it is substantively imperative to use zero as the base point since we are interested in accounting for the incidence of some policy related characteristic (such as AFDC recipient) which is coded as a "1." Therefore the base point obviously must be different from "1." Moreover, to use "1" as the base would imply we are seeking to account for the incidence of "0," those not on AFDC. We now derive a decomposition of total variation about zero that allows assessing both state and national effects.[2]

Consider an individual score expressed as follows:

$$X - 0 = X - \bar{X}.. + \bar{X}.. - 0$$

squaring,

$$(2) \quad (X - 0)^2 = (X - \bar{X}..)^2 + 2(X - \bar{X}..) \cdot (\bar{X}.. - 0) + (\bar{X}.. - 0)^2$$

$$X^2 = (X - \bar{X}..)^2 + 2(X - \bar{X}..) \cdot (\bar{X}..) + \bar{X}..^2$$

Summing over all individuals in all states,

$$(3) \quad \sum_j \sum_i X_{ij}^2 = \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}..)^2 + 2\sum_j \sum_i \cdot (X_{ij} - \bar{X}..)(\bar{X}..) + \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2$$

Note that when summed, the middle term on the right hand side of equation (3) equals zero, leaving

$$(4) \quad \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij})^2 = \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}..)^2 + \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2.$$

The total variation about zero is thus expressed as a sum of the variation of individual scores about the mean and the variation of the national mean about zero. By substituting equation (1) in equation (4) it is possible to further decompose the total variation about zero into national, state and other (or perhaps individual) sources of variation.

$$(5) \quad \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij})^2 = \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}._j)^2 \quad \text{unexplained effects}$$
$$+ \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}._j - \bar{X}..)^2 \quad \text{state effects}$$
$$+ \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2 \quad \text{national effects}$$

The impact of the state and of the national effects can be gauged very simply by taking the ratio of the relevant term on the right-hand side of equation (5) to the left-hand member.

Because the data in sixteen of seventeen of Rose's policy related variables are coded 0 or 1, computational difficulties are minimized. Let there be a total of N persons in the population, N_c of which possess a policy characteristic, such as being an AFDC recipient, and hence are coded as 1. The remaining $N - N_c$ members of the population are coded as 0. It follows that the total variation is simply N_c. To ease computation of the state effects one need only note that $\bar{X}.. = N_c/N$ and that $\bar{X}._j = N_{cj}/N_j$, where N_{cj} is the number of people in state j possessing characteristic "c" and N_j is the relevant population in state j. Similarly it follows by elementary algebra that the national effects (i.e., the sum of squares of the national mean about zero) equal N_c^2/N.

By the computations above, it is clear that the proportion of the total variation about zero attributable to the national level effects is simply N_c/N, the ratio of those possessing the policy characteristic to the total population. Because for many of the policy related measures used by Rose the ratio N_c/N is very small, the analyst is led to suspect that national level forces may not be very important, although they may, as he suggests, outweigh state level forces. To test that conjecture, data were collected from the 1973 *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* for variables comparable to those used by Rose, and their variation about zero was decomposed according to equation (5).

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[2] Donald Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas, The Arnold Foundation, 1965), p. 65, suggests the possibility of this basic approach at one point, althought he does not himself use it.

Table 1 displays sixteen of the seventeen policy related variables used by Rose to demonstrate the weakness of state level forces. These data clearly support Rose's contention that state level forces lack explanatory power. In all instances the proportion of variation attributable to national level forces is greater than the variation attributable to state level forces.

Table 1. Decomposition of Variation on Selected Variables

	Percentage of Variation Attributable To:		
	State Level	National Level	Unexplained
"Policy Measures"			
Selective Service Exam Failures 1972 (population is those taking the exam)	.94%	46.98%	52.08%
Selective Service Exam Failures 1972 (population is total population)	.00	.10	99.89
Auto Registration 1972	.65	46.77	52.59
State Employees 1972	.11	1.42	98.48
Divorces 1971	.05	.36	99.59
State and Local Police 1971	.02	.22	99.76
Old Age Assistance Recipients 1972	.60	.92	98.48
AFDC Recipients 1972	.41	5.15	94.44
Aid to Blind Recipients 1972	.01	.04	99.95
Disabled Assistance Recipients	.13	.55	99.32
General Assistance Recipients 1972	.15	.28	99.57
Unemployment Compensation Recipients Weekly 1972	.19	.86	98.95
Infant Deaths per Live Births 1968	.01	1.92	98.07
Rapes 1971	.00	.02	99.97
Physicians 1971	.01	.15	99.83
Hospital Beds 1971	.03	.74	99.23
Mental Health Inmates 1972 (Public Facilities)	.03	.13	99.54

Due to rounding, entries may not sum to 100%.

The most striking aspect of these data, however, is the fact that most variation is unexplained by either state or national level forces. In only two cases do national level forces account for a sizable amount of variation, and both of these cases are somewhat unusual. The high proportion of variation at the national level for auto registration (46.77%) is easily explained. Large numbers of people in every state own automobiles and every state requires these vehicles to be registered, therefore there is not likely to be much state by state variation.

Selective Service Exam failures per examinee can be largely explained by national level forces (46.98 per cent); however, failures in the total population cannot. This suggests that by the time the registrants are screened (or screen themselves) and eliminated from contention, only certain types of people remain. The characteristics of these remaining few are apparently relatively homogeneous and evenly distributed throughout the states. The point is that in neither case would one expect there to be much interstate variation.

For the remaining variables, rarely do national forces account for more than 1.00% of the total variation. It is ironic that Rose has commented on a similar situation:

> While ultimately political science ought to explain nearly all policy, a sense of priorities should lead us to deal first with the 98–100 per cent of the policy variance which is not accounted for by state differences. Similarly, statistical theory and practice indicate that we can have little confidence in our variables that account for only 1 per cent or even 10 per cent of the variance.[3]

Given the lack of explanatory power of both state and national forces, one is faced with at least two possible conclusions. First, it may be that these governments have little or no impact on individual behavior. Perhaps it is as Samuel Johnson has said,

> How small of all that human hearts endure
> That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.

This does not appear to be a very defensible conclusion, especially based on such meager evidence. In addition, it is a somewhat self-destructive conconclusion for political scientists. A more plausible conclusion is that Rose has merely chosen inappropriate measures of "policy" and "policy impact."

Rose begins his analysis with a discussion of what constitutes policy and the problems with previous conceptualization and measurement in this area. After arguing that the use of per capitized payment averages for certain policies might be conceptually and statistically misleading, Rose proceeds to calculate the state share of national variance for certain measures of policy and policy consequences with no discussion of why these particular variables are more valid indicators of the concepts in question than per capitized payment averages.

We would argue that if one is going to examine and compare the relative effects of levels of government on certain public policies, one must *a priori* select variables that theoretically or plausibly could be affected by governmental actions. For example, why should one expect either state or national government policies to affect infant mortality in this country? Rose implies that infant mortality is a "consequence" of some unspecified policy or policies; however, neither state nor national government provide any services that might *directly* affect pre- or postnatal care. One would also be hard-pressed to discover what impact either state or national government might have on the number of physicians. We would hypothesize that state and national policies would not greatly affect the number and distribution of physicians in this country, and our analysis tends to support the hypothesis. (One might hypothesize that within-state variation will be greatly dependent on certain nongovernmental factors such as relative wealth or size of population in counties or cities within the state. Doctors in our "free enterprise" system tend to go where they are likely to find a high proportion of wealthy sick people.)

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[3] Rose, p. 1164.

In regard to Aid to the Blind recipients, it would seem that only a blind person can get Aid to the Blind assistance and blindness is hopefully not a result of government action. Perhaps the incidence of the blind availing themselves of governmental aid would be a better measure of policy impact than the incidence of aid to the blind recipients in the total population. Similarly, the number of recipients of social welfare aid is a function of the number of disadvantaged, their knowledge of availability of assistance, the mixture of private and public charitable associations, discretion of program administrators, and the nature of the governmental aid available. Finally, while state law may ease or hinder divorce and while a national ethos may generate a uniformity of attitude toward divorce, the decision to divorce will fundamentally be based on interpersonal reasons. In these and other variables examined by Rose, it is likely that nongovernmental factors will have more impact than governmental forces.

The implication of Rose's approach is that the research goal of political scientists is to explain incidence of infant mortality, divorce, rape, OAA recipients, selective service exam failures, etc. Rose is apparently interested in explaining why some people become doctors and others do not, or why some infants die and others do not, or why some applicants fail the selective service exam and some do not. These are certainly legitimate concerns and worthy of scientific research, but if one is concerned with policies of governments and the possible impact of these policies, one will try to answer different questions. As students of state-local government and politics we are interested in the collective behavior of these territorial units of government and how and why they behave differently, and how these behaviors might affect the citizens within their boundaries.

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State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan

TO THE EDITOR:

Wanat and Roeder, Morgan and Lyons, and myself report such conflicting variance shares that the reader may doubt our claim to be working from the same data. Tables 1–4 show why and how we arrive at contrasting results. As Table 1 implies for an illustrative variable, the *actual* variance attributable to any level is fixed. We do not differ on actual variance calculations. We even would agree on the results for assumed or hypothetical variance using three base points. The actual figures are quite clear: regional, state and local variance are very small compared to individual variance or any assumed variance. The assumed variance varies enormously depending on the base point.

The single major source of conflict is what variance levels are included in analysis, as indicated in Table 2. A state systems analysis includes only state and regional variance, hence is analyzing only a small amount of variance. Lyons and Morgan add localities to the traditional analysis but still are using only a small amount of variance. When, as in my article, all the variance within the U.S. is analyzed, there is an enormous jump in how much variance is being examined. The further addition of assumed variance changes this amount by a great deal or little at all depending on the particular assumptions. Thus, we differ not on actual variance but in what variance we include.

The inclusion or exclusion of variance affects the *percentages* of variance attributed to the levels. A small actual variance can be a large percentage of a small, exclusive total, as is the case for states in the state systems analysis, or a small percentage of a large, inclusive total, as is the case for states in Wanat and Roeder's *a priori* analysis. The percentages in themselves have no meanings unless you know: percentage of what? The conflict is over what *should* be the "what." The conflict is not over the data, but over what data should be examined.

Finally, a complete sorting of variance among levels was not performed in any of the analyses. As Table 4 indicates, the state systems study allocates the regional variance to the states, as do Lyons and Morgan. I allocate local variance to individuals, as well as regional variance to the states, and

Table 1: Allocation of Variance among Levels for State & Local Employees, 1971

	Assumed			Actual			
Level:	National A Priori #3 (base 1)	National A Priori #2 (base ½)	National A Priori #1 (base 0)	Regional	State	Local	Individual
	900,945[a]	201,764	2,583	30	18	46	48,142

[a] Entry is variance (times one million)

Table 2: Inclusion of Variance in Six Analyses, by Level and Total

Variance (times one million)						
	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x[a]	30	18	x	x	48
State & Local (Morgan & Lyons)	x	30	18	46	x	94
U.S.A. (Rose)	x	30	18	46	48,142	48,236
A Priori #1 (Wanat & Roeder)	2,583	30	18	46	48,142	50,819
A Priori #2 (Rose)	201,764	30	18	46	48,142	250,000
A Priori #3 (orphan)	900,945	30	18	46	48,142	949,181

[a] Level not included in this analysis

Table 3: Allocation of Included Variance among Levels, Six Analyses, in Percentages

	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x	61.9%	38.1	x	x	100.0%
State & Local	x	31.7%	19.5	48.8	x	100.0%
U.S.A.	x	.1%	.0	.1	99.8	100.0%
A Priori #1	5.1%	.1	.0	.1	94.7	100.0%
A Priori #2	80.7%	.0	.0	.0	19.3	100.0%
A Priori #3	94.9%	.0	.0	.0	5.1	100.0%

Table 4: Allocation of Included Variance Among Collapsed Levels, Six Analyses, in Percentages

	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x	x	100.0%	x	x	100.0%
State & Local	x	x	51.2%	48.8	x	100.0%
U.S.A.	x	x	.1%	x	99.9	100.0%
A Priori #1	5.1%	x	.1	x	94.8	100.0%
A Priori #2	80.7%	x	.0	x	19.3	100.0%
A Priori #3	94.9%	x	.0	x	5.1	100.0%

the *a priori* models allocate in the same fashion. This deflates the regional and local figures and inflates the state and individual percentages, though the inflation is trivial except for the state systems and Lyons and Morgan analyses.[1] At the end of this process, as indicated in the "State" column of Table 4, the percentage "results" vary as much as they possibly could in the six analyses, though the actual state-level variance remains exactly the same in the six analyses.

The main argument is about what variance should be included in analysis.

(1) Should local variance be included? The "no" position is not represented here, so my original critique of the traditional pôsition is not contested.

(2) Should individual variance be included? Lyons and Morgan take the "no" position, saying that differences at the individual level on dummy variables are not "differences in degree among real people." I shall take up this argument below, showing that it rests on a misconception of variance. Note here, though, that Lyons and Morgan have not objected to the inclusion of all individual-level variance, only individual-level variance on dummy variables. Thus they would accept the original results I reported for education in years (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.46 per cent), income in dollars (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.48 per cent), and state and local taxes paid in dollars (state percentage of U.S. variance = 2.34 per cent).[2] They appear to believe these results *must* be higher than those using dummy variables, such as selective service failures (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.1 per cent), urbanization (state percentage of U.S. variance = 7.65 per cent), and congressional election turnout (state percentage of U.S. variance = 4.28 per cent)[3] Obviously, I think they have not examined the matter thoroughly.

(3) Should national variance be included? Wanat and Roeder and myself would answer "yes," because the national pattern affects the other levels.

(4) Should assumed variance be included? Wanat and Roeder answer "yes," but they do so only for instrumental reasons. What they would like to do is measure national variance, and to do this they need some pool of variance larger than the nation. This does not mean that the pool has to be assumed; the pool could be cross-national variance or variance over time, both based on actual rather than assumed variance. It is not clear why Wanat and Roeder reject the empirical approach, which leads to different results from their *a priori* approach.

(5) Does the national impact reduce or increase variance? In my article, I indicated that the national impact reduced variance, as in *a priori* #2 analysis. That is, we are more similar to each other as U.S. citizens than we would be if we had no national society in common. Wanat and Roeder, on the contrary, assume that there would be no difference between people except for the impact of nationalization, as in *a priori* #1 and #3 analyses.

(6) Finally, in deciding between *a priori* #1 and #3 analyses, Wanat and Roeder must decide whether the policy is one of *doing* as much as is done or *not doing* more than is done. The issue arises only for the national impact and only in their model. Though the amount done and the amount not done are logically equivalent and perfectly negatively related, Wanat and Roeder come out strongly against "seeking to account for '0,' those not on AFDC." In their approach, unfortunately, these opposite sides of the same policy yield totally different conclusions about the national impact, as Table 4 shows.

Below I take up the issues raised by Lyons and Morgan, then the national impact issues of Wanat and Roeder.

Lyons and Morgan wish to consider some types of variance illegitimate, and their exclusion of individual level variance rests on the validity of their view of variance. They distinguish variance between states (groups) from variance between individuals, and they distinguish variance for graduated variables from variance for dichotomous variables. They declare that the combination of individual-level variance and variance for dichotomous variables is illegitimate, while approving of the three other combinations. Below I show that all variance is reducible to individual-level variance on dichotomous variables; if this combination is illegitimate, then so are all combinations.

According to the conventional formulas given for variance, the mean is an essential part of variance, since variance is measured as the average squared difference of cases from the mean. Lyons and Morgan state that they know no other way to compute variance than by using the mean. In fact, the mean is merely a computational shortcut in calculating variance and has no import in variance formulas aside from the individual scores it represents.

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[1] Lyons and Morgan are correspondingly at pains to deny that geographical proximity of states (region) has any consequences for the behavior of states or cities. I disagree with their absolutist position and believe proximity is often a facilitator and sometimes a necessary condition of types of interactions among states. I agree, however, that region cannot be used analytically unless its role is carefully modeled. For a further discussion, see my "Citizen Preference and Public Policy in the American States," in *Perspectives on Public Policy-Making*, William B. Gwyn and George C. Edwards III, editors, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. XV (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1975), 55 ff., and "Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March, 1975), 126, 130.

[2] "National and Local Forces in State Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1164–1165.

[3] *Ibid.*

In Table 5, four variance formulas are equated. Two of these formulas (the third and fourth) use the mean and are the standard formulas given for computing variance. The other two formulas do not use the mean. The second formula appears (in incorrect form) in Hays in a section on "meanings of the variance," where the prime interpretation of variance is in terms of this formula: "variance summarizes *how different the various cases are from each other*" and is "*the average squared difference between all pairs of observations.*"[4] The first formula does not appear anywhere, as far as I know. The first and second formulas are not used in computation because they are more tedious than the third or fourth formula.

All four formulas are equivalent. Any point about variance which is true must be true for all. Particularly, any point giving the mean any other role than as a computational shortcut is not a point about variance. The mean has no substantive interpretation or role apart from the cases it represents. It has no "power" over individual scores.

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[4] William L. Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 180.

Table 5: The Equivalence of Four Variance Formulae[a]

Operation	Formula 1	Formula 2	Formula 3
Verbal Interpretations:	Average product of a case's differences from each of a pair of cases	Average squared difference between pairs of cases	Average squared difference between a case and the mean
Formula:	$\dfrac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{k=1}^{N} (X_i - X_j)(X_i - X_k)}{N^3}$	$\dfrac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} (X_i - X_j)^2}{2N^2}$	$\dfrac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (X_i - \overline{X})^2}{N}$
Multiplying out:	$\dfrac{\sum_i \sum_j \sum_k (X_i^2 - X_iX_j - X_iX_k + X_jX_k)}{N^3}$	$\dfrac{\sum_i \sum_j (X_i^2 - 2X_iX_j + X_j^2)}{2N^2}$	$\dfrac{\sum_i (X_i^2 - 2\overline{X}X_i + \overline{X}^2)}{N}$
Moving constants outside summations:	$\dfrac{N^2 \sum_i X_i^2}{N^3} - \dfrac{N \sum_i X_i \sum_j X_j}{N^3} - \dfrac{N \sum_i X_i \sum_k X_k}{N^3} + \dfrac{N \sum_j X_j \sum_k X_k}{N^3}$	$\dfrac{N \sum_i X_i^2}{2N^2} - \dfrac{2 \sum_i X_i \sum_j X_j}{2N^2} + \dfrac{N \sum_j X_j^2}{2N^2}$	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \dfrac{2X \sum_i X_i}{N} + \dfrac{\overline{X}^2 N}{N}$
Dividing and dropping redundant notation	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \overline{X}\overline{X} - \overline{X}\overline{X} + \overline{X}\overline{X}$	$\dfrac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_i X_i^2}{N} + \dfrac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \overline{X}\overline{X}$	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - 2\overline{X}\overline{X} + \overline{X}^2$
Summing:	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \overline{X}^2$	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \overline{X}^2$	$\dfrac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \overline{X}^2$
Equals Fourth (Computational) Formula?	yes	yes	yes

[a] The substitution of "N" for "$N-1$" in the denominator makes no difference in the equivalence of the four formulas. Formula 2 makes clear why the "$N-1$" adjustment occurs: each case gets compared with itself. Since the results of these comparisons must be zero, and since there are as many self-comparisons as there are cases, the maximum nonzero comparisons number $2N(N-1)$ rather than $2N(N)$. Only the comparisons across cases can produce differences, so only these comparisons are included and averaged. If the self-comparisons were to be included, the measured variance would tend to decrease as sample size decreased (more zeroes per total pairs for smaller samples), making variance from samples of different sizes noncomparable.

If an individual score changes, the mean and variance change; without an individual score change (any individual), the mean, and variance will not change.

For any group, the total variance is the variance within that group, that is, the average squared difference between cases in the group. The variance within New York is calculated exactly the same way as the variance within the U.S. When, as with states and the nation, one group is a subset of another, the variance within the states is a part of the variance within the nation; it is the part which considers pairs of cases which come from the same state. The within-state variance in a one-way analysis of variance is simply the average across individuals of the average squared difference between one individual and the other individuals in the same state. This within-state variance is computed the same way as total variance, the only change being the pairs of cases considered: all possible pairs (total variance) or all possible pairs within the same state (within-state variance). The state means are not involved, except for computational shortcuts. Both total and within variance have clear meanings in terms of original individual scores, and these original scores are all that is necessary to calculate these two variance figures.

The second variance formula can be rearranged to reflect the fact that all individuals are part of some state (subgroup):

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{50}\sum_{i=1}^{N_s}\sum_{t=1}^{50}\sum_{j=1}^{N_t}(X_{si}-X_{tj})^2}{2N^2}$$

Statistically, this can be arranged as:

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{50}\sum_{t=1}^{50}(\text{Variance within } s)\frac{N_s}{N}+(\text{Variance within } t)\frac{N_t}{N}}{2}+\frac{\sum_s\sum_i\sum_t\sum_j(\bar{X}_s-\bar{X}_t)^2}{2N^2}$$

which is the normal partitioning for within and between variance components. The unsophisticated reader might think that "within-state variance" was the part of the total occurring among individuals in the same state and that "between-state variance" was the part occurring among individuals in different states. In fact, some statistical juggling is required to get "between-state variance" from the individual scores, and the "within-state variance" based on individual pairs within states is extrapolated to all pairs. When state "*s*" is the same as state "*t*," pairs of cases within the state are being compared: that is within variance. When state "*s*" is different from state "*t*," the individual differences are broken into two parts: those expected from the within-state variances and those not expected. This requires dividing individual scores into state mean and deviation from state mean components. The state mean portions alone are counted as contributing to between-state variance.

The between-state variance is the difference between the total variance (which has an individual-level meaning) and the within-state variance (which has an individual-level meaning); but the between-state variance does not have an individual-level meaning in terms of individual scores, aside from being a residual. The between-state variance can be expressed in terms of the state means and their difference, but these in turn are no more than the "unexpected" parts of the total, i.e., a residual after statistical operations. At this point, most analysts, including Lyons and Morgan, succumb to the notion that the mean is a real cause and component of individual scores and discuss the "power of the independent variable (states)."

A moment's reflection should prevent drawing this conclusion: in variance itself, individual scores are prime, undetermined by anything else. A shift of one individual's scores, with no other individual-level changes, will affect *all* the variance measures because it will affect that individual's relationship to individuals everywhere—within his own state, in other states, and in the nation as a whole. Because the variance measures merely average and allocate such individual differences, the whims of one individual can change them all. A number of causes unrelated to states (except in a statistical sense) affect the score of at least a few individuals and so potentially affect the between-state variance. In relative terms, this potential is at its peak when there is great variation at the individual level but when there is little between-state variance. Thus, a shift involving a relatively minor share of the within-state variance could produce a shift of a relatively large share of the between-state variance. Suppose, for example, that the within-state variance was 99 per cent of the total; then a shift of 1/99 in the within-state variance could either double or eliminate the between-state variance. Even if we could explain 98/99 of the within-state variance, we still might not be able to explain the individual-level changes that eliminated or doubled all differences between states.

With dichotomous variables, the mathematical computations involved in calculating variance are greatly reduced. As each score can have only one of two values, for example, $50 and $0, the squared differences between cases can only have two values, $2,500 and $0. The former occurs whenever cases are different, the zero whenever cases are the same. Computationally, the zeroes add nothing, so the variance formula reduces to the difference squared times one-half the probability that cases differ.

A dummy variable is a dichotomous variable with values of zero or one (presence or absence of some trait). The squared difference for dummy variables is one, so the variance of dummy variables is simply one-half the proportion of case pairs which are different. A dichotomous variable's variance is simply the dummy variable's variance (representing frequency of differences) times some weight squared. Note that the variance of a dichotomous variable depends on the variance of the accompanying dummy variance representing frequency: if the dummy variable has zero variance, so will the dichotomous variable. For the dichotomous variable to be meaningful, the underlying dummy variable must be meaningful.

The between-state variance corresponds to the variance in a dependent variable (individual scores) "accounted for" in a regression on all the states (subgroups). The model is the familiar

$$Y_j = \sum_{i=1}^{50} b_i X_{ij} + e_j$$

where "X_i" is a dummy variable for the presence or absence of state "i," and "b_i" is the regression coefficient for that dummy variable, which turns out to be the state mean score on Y. Thus, the between-state variance reduces to a function of a series of dummy or dichotomous variables representing states (subgroups). The variance of each of these dummy variables is simply one-half the probability that citizens differ on whether they live in the state. If dummy-variable analysis at the individual level is nonsensical, as Lyons and Morgan believe, then the between-state variance is nonsensical, because the between-state variance is a summary of individual-level dummy-variable analyses. Of course, between-state variance and dummy-variable analysis at the individual level *are* nonsensical when the independent variables (living or not living in a particular state) do not have any effect on the dependent variable, but otherwise they are quite sensible. If between-state variance is sensible, then dummy-variable analysis must be sensible; and states must have an actual, not merely statistical accounting, impact on their citizens' scores.

Take the above model and change the meaning of X_i to make it a dummy variable for the presence or absence of a particular score, and change the meaning of b_i to the regression coefficient of that variable, which turns out to be the score itself. This is now a model of variance as a function of the frequency of particular scores. The variance of each of the components is one-half the probability that individuals differ on possessing a particular score. Again, the variance itself has no meaning unless these dummy variables have meaning at the individual level. Of course, in this case the "independent" variables do have an impact on the "dependent" variable. The point is the same as in the between-state variance cases: if dummy variables at the individual level do not make sense, neither does their aggregate, the variance of a graduated variable.

Because total, between-state, within-state, graduated variable and dummy variable variance all depend on the validity of dichotomous variables at the individual level, the distinctions among them do not rest on a dummy variable versus interval variable difference. The differences lie in whether such dichotomous variables are aggregated or not. For between-state variance and graduated variable variance analysis, a great number of dichotomous variables are lumped together, so that it is unclear what is statistically producing the variance. Many of the concerns of variance analysis trace to this problem: if, for example, a few "outliers" produce the variance, great care must be taken in its use and interpretation. The stress on graphing data is a stress on sorting out the dichotomous variables which have been lumped together. Thus, a between-state variance of graduated variable variance score is much more ambiguous than a within-state variance or a dichotomous variable score, where the individual level contributions can be more easily seen. Lyons and Morgan thus have things backward when they say that a dichotomous variable analysis "does not permit us to say anything meaningful about how people in a state differ except as they may belong in one of two basic categories." In fact, this is the most complete information possible, and it is precisely the lack of this meaning that makes between-state and graduated variable variance difficult to interpret. Sorting out the dichotomous variable frequencies for various inputs into variance is so important that we make heavy use of assumed distributions—such as the normal distribution—which can pinpoint the frequency which accompanies each score. These distributions are based on assumptions about the frequencies of dummy events. The information that Lyons and Morgan reject is the basic and most desirable information in a variance analysis.

In terms of variance itself, Lyons and Morgan are misguided in their notions that the mean has some power over individual scores, that between variance can be calculated when individual variance cannot, that graduated variables are superior to dichotomous variables, that dummy-variable analysis at the individual level can be discarded without discarding all other analysis, and that dummy-variable analysis at the individual level is less revealing than other types of analysis. What is involved is not what they or I would like to be true but mathematical proofs on formulas that they accept.

Lyons and Morgan believe that the "algebraic cards are stacked" against between-state variance on dichotomous (or dummy) variables. From what I have said above, it is obvious that if the cards are stacked for dummy variables, they are stacked in all instances. Mathematically, all other instances are reducible to the "stacked" instance. The example of stacking given by Lyons and Morgan is also somewhat misleading. The *maximum* variance accounted for by the states on a dummy variable is equal to the maximum difference between state means. If the maximum difference between states were 50 per cent or 100 per cent, then states could account for a maximum of 50 per cent or 100 per cent of the variance.

Lyons and Morgan's problem is that, in order for states to account for large amounts of variance, the difference between states must be sizable even if the differences between individuals are fairly small. That is, states must truly account for some variance, not merely reflect some of the other influences around. In fact, states seem to reflect whatever else is going on: as the total variance increases, so does the between-state variance; as the total variance decreases, so does the between-state variance. Thus, between-state variance is fairly accurately reflected simply as a percentage of total variance. The cards are not stacked against states.

This belief in card-stacking leads Lyons and Morgan to prefer graduated variables, such as welfare payment amounts, over dichotomized variables, such as welfare recipients, to measure policy. At one level, the argument is a nonissue since governments both give to selected persons and give various amounts; as separate aspects of government action, both measure policy and neither is superior. If, however, we conceive of the policy as encompassing both aspects—giving nothing to some people and varying amounts to other people—then we can ask which is a better policy indicator. Which accounts for more of the variance in the total policy?

Table 6 divides the variance of public assistance (AFDC, OAA, General Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Disability) into two components, the dichotomous recipients-nonrecipients share of the variance (mean payment squared times variance of recipients) and the graduated-payment levels share of variance (mean recipient times variance of payments among recipients). As the table indicates, Lyons and Morgan are incorrect; the dichotomous variable accounts for much more of the variance and is the better indicator of total policy.

Table 6. Variance in Public Assistance per Family, 1969, Allocated by Recipient Status, in Percentages[a]

	Percentage of Variance
Between Recipients and Non-Recipients	58.9%
Among Recipients	41.1
Total	100.0%

[a] Data source: *Sources and Structure of Family Income, 1970 Census of Population, Subject Reports* PC(2)-8A, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973, Tables 1, 4, 7.

The above does not indicate which measure is better for indexing the state role in total policy, however. There are two questions: (1) is there a total policy in the states to be indexed? and (2) which measure accounts for more variance? If there is no state-level interaction among recipients and payments, there is no total policy as an empirical reality and the whole question is meaningless. If the cards are stacked against states for dummy variables (recipients), then states should show much less variance on the per recipient measures than on the payment measures. As Table 7 shows, there does not seem to be a total policy, as there is little interaction between payments and recipients; and (the table does not show this) the interaction which occurs follows no consistent pattern across states. On balance, not even considering the much larger size of the AFDC program, the variance accounted for by states through the dummy variable (recipients) is slightly more than the variance accounted for by states through the graduated variable (payments). Thus Lyons

Table 7. Variance Allocated to States in Two Welfare Programs, by Payment and Recipient Source, in Percentages[a]

	AFDC	OAA
Between Recipients and Non-Recipients		
Due to States	13.3%	5.1%
Not Due to States	80.1	83.7
Among Recipients		
Due to States	5.5	10.9
Interaction Between Payments and Recipients		
Due to States	1.1	.3
Total	100.0%	100.0%

[a] Data source: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1973*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, Tables 12, 488–490.

and Morgan are incorrect in stating that payments are a better policy measure than recipients because (1) there is no overall policy to measure, and (2) payment variance is not a greater source of total variance than is recipient variance.

Lyons and Morgan are wrong on both the mathematics and the empirical realities. Therefore whatever interest their measure of the region and state share of region and state and local variance may have for other purposes, it is not a valid basis for disputing my original conclusions.

Measuring the national impact on policy is a major problem, and Wanat and Roeder have invented a measure which is both elegant and easy to apply. However, I do not think it is a good measure.

The general thrust of *my* remarks on national impact was that a single national society produced similarities among citizens, that the particular American national government produced commonalities in the effects of states on their citizens, and that this national impact was highly complex. Wanat and Roeder do not address themselves to any of these topics. Indeed, their approach measures national impact only under the assumption that I am wrong.

Wanat and Roeder assume that, without a national impact, there would be *no* dissimilarities or variance among individuals. The national impact moves the society toward dissimilarity by moving the mean from zero (or one). For an equivalently simple measure, I would assume the opposite: that the national impact instead reduces variance which would otherwise occur. Operationally, this is equivalent to *a priori* #2 analysis, where a base-point of one-half, corresponding to maximum pre-national variance, is assumed. As the reader may remember from Table 4, the assessment of national impact depends strongly upon which assumption is used. My assumption is that state and local government employment would increase without a national society: states would take over defense, postal, veterans, resources, economic regulation and other functions of the present federal government. Wanat and Roeder's assumption is that without a national society there would be no state and local government employment (hence no state and local governments, hence anarchy).

In splitting variance into three separate components (national, state, individual), Wanat and Roeder also imply that the national society has no impact on the states. While I shall point out below that this is a misreading of their own model mathematically, consider the substance of the assumption. The fact that all states and localities have little military, postal, and diplomatic employment and much educational, highway, police, fire, and sanitation employment is taken to be unrelated to the fact that the federal government has the reverse pattern of employment. I would have thought the two were related.

In Wanat and Roeder's approach, the national impact is the same for every citizen in every state; it is always the national mean. There is no relation between the national impact on one variable and another variable at the citizen, local, or state level. The national impact on employment is to give each citizen part of a job and the national impact on income is to give each citizen some money, but the two are not related. Consider a contrary view: the national impact is not the same for all citizens (though its overall trend is toward similarity, e.g., widespread unemployment in an economic boom); the national economic impact on one variable is, at subnational levels, related to the national impact on other levels; and the national impact is redistributive among states and localities. It cannot be measured in the simple Wanat and Roeder format.

The assumption underlying Wanat and Roeder's measurement of national impact—i.e., that without an American national society, the scores of all variables would be zero—runs contrary to fact. There is no society with zero infant mortality. Non-national societies, even those contaminated by the importation of elements of a national society (doctors, medicines, anthropologists), have *higher*, not lower, infant mortality rates than national societies. Among national societies, the U.S. has relatively *low*, not high, infant mortality —less than $\frac{1}{5}$ of many societies and twice the rate of no societies.

For almost all of their variables, deriving even crude estimates of national impact from a model which did not grossly violate what is already known would be a great deal of work. If Wanat and Roeder do not want to do the work, that is fine with me; but they should not report conclusions without doing the chores involved.

Leaving aside for the moment state impacts (whose analysis does not affect estimates of the national impact), there are three sources of scores at the individual level in Wanat and Roeder's model: the base point, the national mean, and some unexplained sources. The base point indicates what would happen without a national society; since it is constant for all individuals on all variables in all national societies, it does not affect variance and can be forgotten. National forces are indicated by "the national mean, the representation of national impact." The remaining sources of scores are a problem.

At the individual level in Wanat and Roeder's model, the remaining sources are dependent on the national impact. Further, at the aggregate level, these additional sources always sum to zero, whatever the national mean, and they contribute


National Force
$2\overline{X}$
1 $2\overline{X}$
Measured National Impact
Measured Sub-National Impact
1
1
Total Variance

Figure 1. Wanat and Roeder's Approach as a Causal Model

no variance independent of the mean, the national impact. In a word, the national impact on variance is the only impact in their model. If we wish to calculate the share of the variance attributable to "the national mean, the representation of national impact," it is simply 100 per cent. For example, if the national mean is zero, all scores are zero and the variance is zero. The national impact is always the total impact.

In causal model terms, Wanat and Roeder's analysis is indicated in Figure 1. The national impact is, in their discussion, split into two measured components, then re-united. Both variance components are completely dependent on the national mean and, aside from the 1:1 impact of the mean on variance, perfectly negatively related. Given the logical relationship between the two parts, it is impossible to give them independent meanings or indeed any substantive meaning at all; the splitting is spurious, the distinction meaningless.

The lack of meaning, though not lack of statistical results, may be seen when two logically equivalent consequences of national impact are considered. If some percentage of the population are employed as state government employees, than that figure represents the national input in such employment in Wanat and Roeder's model. Consider two consequences at the individual level: a person is so employed or he is not so employed. The two consequences are perfectly negatively related, logically equivalent. The measured national impact on these equivalent consequences is quite different, as shown in Figure 2, and the total national impact via the two routes is also quite different. Specifically, the measured national share of the variance on unemployment due to the same national force will be one minus the employment share, or 99 per cent. As the national employment policy impact on employment increases, its impact on unemployment decreases by the same amount. I do not recommend trying to make sense of this. The logical contradictions, by the way, do not exist if a base point of .5, assuming national impact reduces variance, is used, in which case the measured national impact on both consequences is 94 per cent, not 1 per cent.


National Employment Force
$2\overline{X}$
$1-2\overline{X}$
$2\overline{X}-2$
Measured National Impact, Employment
Measured Sub-National Impact, Employment or Unemployment
Measured National Impact, Unemployment
1
1
1
1
Total Variance Employment
Total Variance Unemployment

Figure 2. Impact of a Single National Force on Two Logically Equivalent Variances, Wanat and Roeder's Approach

The problems with Wanat and Roeder's approach to national impact are, in summary: (1) they get the wrong results, because (2) they make dubious assumptions, which (3) ignore what empirical evidence already exists, and involve (4) spurious distinctions and logical contradictions.

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The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent article of this *Review* (69, March 1975, 132–40), Mr. Peritore advances the thesis that, in spite of his elaborate and "the most consistent" attempt at a philosophical grounding of social science methodology, Schutz's sociology lacks, in the end, a rigorous foundation and allegedly "avoids the epistemological (first-level) problem" (p. 133). Peritore further argues that Schutz essentially failed to provide a theory of intersubjectivity because of an inadequate account of his "general thesis of the alter ego" for the social sciences. What is needed and what Schutz's sociology lacks for providing an epistemological certitude, Peritore asserts, is a "rigorous philosophical foundation in an eidetic science of the social" (p. 140), which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is claimed to provide. Measured in the light of Husserl's "promise," or "phenomenological ideal of science" as the norm, Schutz's phenomenology consequently leads to a type of *Weltanschauung* analysis, "a naive empiricism," or "a methodological individualism" (pp. 137, 136, 134).

In this brief note, I wish to refute Peritore's thesis which entails certain glosses and misreading of both Husserl and Schutz (this is, I think, due partly to leaving out Schutz's later works from Peritore's consideration in his article) and to advance the following observations which bear the counterevidence to Peritore's contentions. In what follows, I would like to point out the source of Peritore's confusions: I will show, first, that Schutz's phenomenological description of the meaningful experience is carried out within the natural (and not the naturalistic) attitude and not to be confused with the objective, or scientific standpoint; secondly, that Schutz well realizes that the problem of intersubjectivity cannot be resolved by the transcendental ego as Husserl proposed; and thirdly, that Schutz's phenomenology cannot be construed as "a methodological individualism" as Peritore alleges.

In essence, Peritore confuses Schutz's elucidation of human subjectivity with the epistemological status of science (i.e., the problem of observation). That means that Peritore's misinterpretation is due to his failure to appreciate the radical nature of phenomenological empiricism and to distinguish it from a traditional empiricism of Lockean type, a *Weltanschauung* analysis, Dilthey's method of empathy, or an introspective psychology, which leads Peritore to the confusion of the natural attitude with the scientific (theoretical) attitude. Peritore criticizes Schutz in the following way:

> Schutz's case for a mundane sociology is further weakened by his admission of a realm of 'intimate personal experiences' in the observer, which cannot be reproduced with clarity and are given merely as 'there.' He includes pain, movement, sexual sensation, mood, feeling, and affect in this category of lived but unthinkable experience. Obviously, this range of intimate experience is not available to the observer for his analysis of the other if it cannot be made choate or thematic within himself. Now, phenomenology should be able precisely to thematize such experiences and extract their essence under the discipline of the *epoché*. Herein lies its prime *raison d'être* as opposed to that of ordinary introspection (p. 138).

Furthermore, concerning Schutz's phenomenological analysis of the meaningfulness of experience, Peritore accuses Schutz of maintaining the proposition that

> . . . only past experience in meaningful, Schutz must reject the *noematic* element in the intentional stream of consciousness, which gives the 'object-of-consciousness' meaning 'as such' during the time it is being revealed in intentional perspectival variation within an Act of attention. As expected, Schutz rejects the *noema* on Bergsonian ground (p. 138).

It must be stressed, first of all, that Schutz's analysis of the "meaning-structures" of human experience and action is the immanent description of subjectivity prior to the scientific observer (the theoretical attitude). His discussion here is strictly concerned with the actor's perspective of how he (the subject) himself makes his lived experiences thematic or meaningful. To say that "a realm of intimate personal experiences can only be lived but never thought" is to assert that experience in the flow of duration (*durée*) is a state of living in that experience and is not yet thought by the experiencing self. This experience is *not*, as Peritore charges, "unthinkable": on the contrary, it is thinkable but only when the experiencing self stops the flow of duration through a reflective act or glance. The *noema* as a revealed experience by the subject is the result of his act of attention (i.e., reflection) which constitutes the *noetic-noematic* correlation of consciousness. Thus experiencing itself is meaning*less* (unthematized) and only through the actor's attentive or reflective glance can it be made meaningful (thematized). As Schutz explicitly states:

> The simple experience of living in the flow of duration goes forward in a unidirectional, irreversible movement, proceeding from manifold to manifold in a constant running-off process. Each phase of experience melts into the next without any sharp boundaries as it is being lived through; but each phase is distinct in its thusness, or quality, from the next insofar as it is held in the gaze of attention. However, when, by my act of reflection, I turn my attention to my living experience, I am no longer taking up my position within the stream of pure duration, I am no longer simply living within that flow. The experiences are apprehended, distinguished, brought into relief, marked out from one another; the experiences which were constituted as phases within the flow of duration now become objects of attention as constituted experience.

> Meaning . . . is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude. As long as I live *in* my acts, directed toward the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any meaning. They become meaningful if I grasp them as well-circumscribed experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospection. Only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are, therefore, subjectively meaningful.[1]

Contrary to Peritore's assertion, then, Schutz does *not* "reject the *noema* on Bergsonian grounds" (p. 138). Schutz shows that the *meaningfulness* of experience does not pertain to the ongoing process of experience, but it becomes meaningful only through a reflective glance. Here Schutz for analytic purposes differentiates and elucidates the two inseparably linked *noetic-noematic* structures of consciousness in which lived experience is rendered meaningful through a reflective act (the intentional act of consciousness). Schutz's effort is to clarify Weber's ambiguous notion of meaningful action in order to give the latter's *verstehende Soziologie* a philosophical foundation. Without this insight into subjectivity[2] the observer (the observational understanding) may hazardously impute his own meaning to the actor (the motivational understanding) under observation.[3]

Second, the most crucial gloss upon which Peritore's thesis is based is to have mistakenly pitted Husserl's transcendental phenomenology against Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. Schutz rightly makes the strategic move for the methodology of the social sciences when he realizes the insurmountable difficulty that transcendental phenomenology encounters in the issue of *social reality*. Schutz makes this point most clearly when he says:

> In summing up, we may say that the empirical social sciences will find their true foundation not in transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. Husserl's signal contribution to the social sciences consists neither in his unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of the constitution of the transcendental intersubjectivity within the reduced egological sphere, nor in his unclarified notion of empathy as the foundation of understanding, nor, finally, in his interpretation of communities and societies as subjectivities of a higher order the nature of which can be described eidetically; but rather in the wealth of his analyses pertinent to problems of the *Lebenswelt* and designed to be developed into a philosophical anthropology.[4]

In keeping with Husserl's philosophical insights into an ontology of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) for the empirical social sciences, Schutz undertook to describe the meaning-structures of the social world, social action, and the social distribution of knowledge—to name just a few—which provide the social sciences with a much needed philosophical foundation.[5] Nor does Peritore, on the other hand, mention the fact that Husserl in his philosophical career became increasingly aware of the immense difficulty and problems involved in the constitution of intersubjectivity by way of the transcendental ego. It is more correct to say, *contra* Peritore, that Husserl, in the last analysis, anticipated Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. In his later career, Husserl spoke of it:

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[1] Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. F. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 51, 45–53; *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 210; with Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. R. Zaner and T. Engelhardt, Jr. (Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 52–56.

[2] For the most elaborate description of the phenomenological notion of subjectivity and its cardinal importance and implication for the social science methodology, see Hwa Yol Jung, "The Crisis of Political Understanding: An Insight into Subjectivity in Political Inquiry," a paper delivered during the APSA Annual Meeting in Chicago, September 24–30, 1974.

[3] Schutz, *The Phenomenology* pp. 86–96. It is important to note that Schutz has elaborated in his *Phenomenology* Weber's inadequate distinction between action and behavior according to which only the former is sufficiently considered meaningful whose main characteristic is the presence of a project. See pp. 57–63, esp., p. 61. Peritore criticizes Schutz's procedure (a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude) as divesting "himself of the discipline of the *epoché*" through which, Peritore contends, an "ideation of the essence of 'the social' must be found (133). While Schutz never rejected the possibility of 'objectivity' or making the social world thematic, Peritore simply "prefers with Husserl" (p. 137) insisting an edietic science of the social which is in fact based on an idealization of "pure intersubjectivity" (133). The preference without critical inquiries into the nature and the problem of intersubjectivity (which Schutz has done) hardly gains any epistemological status for science! In fact, a citation from Zaner (in Peritore's article, p. 133) contradicts Peritore's position with Husserl and renders Schutz's efforts more comprehensible.

[4] *Collected Papers*, I, 149.

[5] For the fundamental agreement of Schutz with Husserl, see *The Phenomenology*, pp. 44, 97 note 2, 171; *Collected Papers*, I, 132, 139, 149; *Collected Papers*, III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 83. In Schutz's phenomenological investigations of the methodology of the social sciences, one can find, for instance, the most elaborate asymmetry thesis of social and natural sciences, and an important distinction between common-sense (the first-order) and scientific (the second-order) constructs of social phenomena. Cf. "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," and "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," in *Collected Papers*, I, 48–66, and pp. 3–47; *The Structures of the Life-World*, Chapters 3 and 4 and p. 156 for his explicit statement on the nature of knowledge. For an interesting discussion on a different methodological perspective between Schutz's phenomenology and Garfinkle's ethnomethodology, see Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and Social Role," in his *Phenomenology, Role, and Reason* (Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1974), pp. 190–204.

> We have already spoken of the possibility and the significance of such an ontology of the life-world on the natural ground, i.e., outside the transcendental horizon of interest, and we shall have occasion to speak of it again in another occasion.[6]

Thirdly, since Peritore misconceives the radical empiricism of phenomenology, his conclusion concerning Schutz's methodology is erroneous. Let me here cite in full Peritore's position:

> Moreover, Schutz's methodological individualism, because not grounded in an eidetic or essential science of 'the social,' fails to cut through mere synchronic empirical regularities to the subtle and dark forces underlying social interaction. Relying solely on observational empiricism, it fails to ask questions which might lead to knowledge of those cultural and historical forces that twist rationally projected action into unintended forms. An elaborate Schutzian analysis of a woodcutter's acts reveals the structure of a role and its necessary ideal motivation, but ignores what could well be historically crucial circumstances, for instance, the alienation and reification of wage labor at a certain stage of capitalism. Schutz's method can treat such historical forces only by reducing them to biographical-situational 'because-motivation.' History would then be studied only as reflected in individual consciousness, in order to save its "subjective meaning" and assert "the unity of social world" (p. 137).

What confuses Peritore throughout his analysis of Schutz's phenomenology is the phenomenological notion of "subjective meaning" which must be given an elucidation in relation to social reality, intersubjectivity, and history. As Schutz repeatedly states, the notion of 'subjective' is not meant as a solitary, pure interiority enclosed in the psyche, but is at the outset the intersubjective, incarnate subject living in the socio-historico-cultural world (*Lebenswelt*). Precisely because, according to Schutz, each one of us lives in the intersubjective nexus of social reality (the nexus of predecessors, consociates, contemporaries, and successors), his phenomenology is an attempt to describe the meaning-structures of social reality—the phenomena of our meaning-giving (*Sinngebung*) without reducing them to "a garb of ideas."[7]

Social reality, for Schutz, is neither the sum of individuals locked in "a collective soul" or "a collective consciousness" nor individuals without intersubjective relations with others. To define social reality either as the work of individuals alone or as the product of collective conduct alone would be to fall into the false option of methodological individualism or methodological holism. Indeed, Schutz does not reject or ignore the "inter-individual" process of history. In this sense, Schutz insists that "social relations are always interindividual," and that

> . . . for these sciences [the empirical social sciences] do not have to deal with the philosophical aspects of intersubjectivity, but with the structure of *Lebenswelt* as experienced by men in their natural attitude, by men, that is, who are born into this socio-cultural world, have to find their bearing within it, and have to come to terms with it. This world is pre-given to them and taken for granted—"unquestionably" in the sense that it is unquestioned until further notice but may be called into question at any time.[8]

Under whatever circumstances we may live, the world-meaning must be above all revealed by the living subjects themselves. As Natanson succinctly puts it: "As an interpreted reality, the world is meaningful in the first instance to those who intend it as *world* . . . it is the actor on the social scene rather than the observer who is the primary source and locus of meaning."[9] With these insights, Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude is anchored in the analysis of the structure of the life-world, whose nature, I repeat, cannot be reduced to a constitutive element of the transcendental ego. Nor can the notion of "subjective" be construed as a "biographical situational because-motivation" in the introspective sense, but it must be seen in the sense of the "interindividual." Peritore's misnomer of "observational empiricism" is derived from his misconception of Schutz's radical empiricism, which is a philosophical groundwork, *par excellence*, of the "interpretive sociology" enunciated by Max Weber.[10]

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[6] *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr (Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 173. More on this point, see pp. 124, 132–5, 140–1, and more importantly, chapter 51. It is true as stated by Peritore that Schutz discredited the possibility of accounting for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity in the transcendental sphere (i.e., the reduced ego). But, Schutz was careful to add that "It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology. As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence." Cf. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," *Collected Papers*, III, 51–91, at p. 82. Concerning a theory of embodiment, Schutz did not delve into developing 'an eidetics of expression' although he was aware of its importance for the phenomenological problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity, i.e., intercorporeality which is extensively analyzed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For Schutz's further reflection, see his *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by R. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 171–4, 179; *The Structures of the Life-World*, pp. 5, 62, 66, 70, 73, 101–3, 106. Nevertheless, Peritore must be reminded (see his article, p. 138) here that if one evokes a theory of embodiment for the constitution of intersubjectivity, one may have to give up Husserl's egologism.

[7] Schutz, *The Phenomenology*, pp. 207–14, 54, 244, and Husserl, p. 51.

[8] *Collected Papers*, I, 144, 145.

[9] M. Natanson, *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of the Infinite Tasks* (Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 108, emphasis in the original.

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[10] For further discussion and elaboration on the relationship between phenomenology and the social sciences and particularly political science, see Hwa Yol Jung, "An Introductory Essay: The Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology," in *Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory: A Reader* ed. Hwa Yol Jung (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), pp. xvii–lv.; and (see) my "The Present State of American Social Science," *Gendai-Shiso: Revue de la pensée d'aujourd'hui*, 3 (February, 1975), 190–203.

TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to address myself to what I consider the misinterpretation of Husserl's program which lies at the base of Professor Okuda's critique of my recent article on Schultz, "Some Problems in Alfred Shutz's Phenomenological Methodology" [*APSR*, 69 (March, 1975)]. My purpose in writing the article was to furnish an example of radical criticism by showing the problems involved in ignoring the ultimate philosophical questions raised in methodology. Okuda's critique generates three areas of contention: the transcendental ego problem, theory of meaning-giving, and Schutz's notion of "intimate personal experiences."

First, the problem of the transcendental ego and intersubjective constitution is absolutely central for the Cartesian-Kantian-Husserlian tradition of idealism because it is this *ego cogito* which provides the foundation for knowledge of others and of the world. It is true, as Okuda said, that I "fail to appreciate" "phenomenological empiricism," or "radical empiricism," because phenomenology is no such thing. Phenomenology is monistic transcendental idealism; Husserl remained an idealist from the second volume of *Logical Investigations* to the end of his life. As he said in the late preface to *Ideas I* (W. Boyce-Gibson, trans., Collier Books, 1962),

> I am the Ego who invests the being of the world . . . with existential validity, as an existence (*Sein*) which wins for me from my own life's pure essence meaning and substantiated validity . . . (p. 11) . . . this Ego, as the presupposition of the knowledge of the world, cannot be and remain presupposed as having the existence of a world and must therefore, in respect of the world's being, be brought to its pure state through phenomenological reduction. . . . (Ibid., p. 12)

This transcendental *ego cogito*, the condition of the possibility of all consciousness of the world and the ultimate ground of truth for all phenomenological statements, cannot airily be dismissed without the collapse of Husserl's philosophy into a species of naive realism. Nor can the social sciences ignore the ultimate epistemological problems of "other minds," "embodiment," etc., raised in regard to the transcendental ego, without forfeiting their claims to science, and thus remaining ideological.

Therefore, Okuda should not applaud Schutz's "strategic move" from the phenomenological to the natural attitude if it involves, as it does, dogmatic transference of structures of consciousness discovered under the *epoché* from one sphere to another. Transcendental alterity-constitution is the precondition for positing the philosophical validity of insights in both the phenomenological and natural attitudes. As Schutz himself said, "Hand in hand with the solution of this problem will come the solution of the intersubjective validity of our experience of the world in general" (*Phenomenology of the Social World*, Walsh and Lehnert trans. Northwestern University Press, 1967). Schutz later discovered that Husserl's solution of this problem in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* was unsatisfactory, and turned to the position that intersubjectivity is a given (*Gegebenheit*), ". . . the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world" (*Collected Papers* Vol. III, p. 82).

But this shift of position does not solve the problem, and in addition turns one of the most crucial areas of phenomenological clarification into an opaque *Ding-an-sich*. Pure phenomenology, on the other hand, in order to avoid Kantian dualism, refuses to accept ontological entities except as constituted by intentional consciousness under the *epoché*. Because, to Husserl, only the pure *ego cogito* has being, the world has "being" only as intended by this active ego; in Husserl's terms the world has its "being" as the noematic correlate of noetic judgment-forms which specifically posit the "being" of the *noema*—the *Urglaube* or *Urdoxa*. Husserl said, ". . . only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being, that it only is nonrelative . . . the real world exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and . . . it can have its meaning as existing (*seiende*) reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity" (*Ideas I*, p. 14). This being so, Okuda is wrong in thinking that analysis of the ontological structures of the lifeworld ". . . cannot be reduced [sic] to a constitutive element of the transcendental ego." Indeed, Landgrebe said of the lifeworld:

> Only when this predelineation is also exhibited in its

> origin as deriving from accomplishments on the part of the transcendental ego—only then has the task been completed. Only then can we say that the origin of the world as horizon has been clarified, and that our transcendental constitutional analysis has fully displayed the sense of the world as something fashioned in transcendental subjectivity (Ludwig Landgrebe, "The World as Phenomenological Problem," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1, 1940).

Husserl's lifeworld represents preconstitutive "reality" which, under the *epoché*, becomes phenomena constituted in the noetic-noematic structures of consciousness, the apodictic ground of which is the transcendental ego. Thus, the lifeworld is itself a philosophical problem, not a solution as Okuda seems to think. (On this point see J. N. Mohanty "Consciousness of Life-World," *Social Research* 42.1, 1975 pp. 147–66.) Okuda's quote from the *Crisis* section 51 (his footnote 6) gives him no support because it is out of context and needs to be considered in relation to the entire section.

Contrary to Okuda's position, the "empirical" social sciences cannot merely describe lifeworld structures, but must instead ground themselves in Husserl's *mathesis universalis.* This "science of essences" is made up of a system of noetic judgments (pure apophantics) and correlative pure noematic "objects" of judgment (pure or regional ontology), both within the intentional stream of consciousness. This "eidetic science" is ultimately grounded, in respect of truth-value, in the transcendental ego. It serves, in turn, as the conceptual framework and hypothesis generator of the "empirical sciences," giving truth value, within a founded deductive system, to the merely nominal statements derived from empirical methods. This unified eidetic science (sketched in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*) is absolutely central to Husserl's program; it is the "telos of Western man" in his unique development of Reason. It is no mere idiosyncratic addition to empiricism but the very foundation which unifies and gives sense to the "empirical sciences." A descriptive, empirical science without this ground is naive *τέχνη*, not *ἐπιστήμη*. Okuda's social science is thus distinguishable from ordinary functional or behavioral "science" only in its utilization of phenomenological terminology without the philosophical groundwork which warrants its adoption.

I am well aware both of Husserl's inability to escape transcendental solipsism and of Schutz's excellent critique of the effort. But the problem remains for those who count themselves phenomenologists: all ontic givens require ultimate intersubjective constitution. My article merely showed the ways in which Schutz's failure in this regard vitiates much of his methodological system. It was written not to provoke defense, but to encourage philosophical consideration of a vital problem.

Second, the issue Okuda raises in regard to Schutz's theory of meaning rests on a inaccurate equation of attention and reflection with meaning-giving (see Okuda's fourth paragraph); probably the result of reading Husserl through Schutzian eyes. It is phenomenologically incorrect to speak of ". . . the act of attention (i.e., reflection) . . ." or to equate attention or reflection with the thema, or the thema with meaning-bestowal. These terms must be differentiated. (A) "Thematic is that toward which man's attention is turned" (E. Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer, Harper, 1965, p. 166). (B) Attention is ". . . the wandering glance, which alternately enlarges and restricts its mental span, signifies a special dimension of correlative modifications noetic and noematic . . ." (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Attention delimits the background out of which intentionality will raise the figure. It does not signify specific contents but ". . . describes ways in which the pure Ego in . . . the general mode of the cogito, lives therein as the 'free essence' which it is" (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Note that "The attending ray gives itself out as radiating from the Pure Ego . . ." (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Thus, attention does not constitute meaning, although it plays a role in transformation of polythetic into monothetic syntheses, which process cannot however be confused with meaning-giving. (C) Meaning is given in the *noema*, the "thing" which consciousness is "consciousness of," the core of identity around which perspectivally varying phenomena are clustered in their "sameness." "The meaning (*Sinn*) . . . is this Noematic 'object in its modal setting' . . . (*Ideas I*, p. 339). ". . . 'meaning' figures as a basic portion of the noema. . . . It cannot be lacking in any noema, nor can its necessary center, the point of unification, the pure determinable X" (*Ideas I*, p. 339). (D) Reflection is a phenomenological problem for Husserl and clearly does not replace the noema's function of meaning-giving. (See *Ideas I*, sections 77–79 and 108.) As Husserl states, ". . .it would be absurd to suppose that experiences are epistemologically guaranteed only in so far as they are given to us in the reflective consciousness of immanent perception. . ." (*Ideas I*, p. 204). Thus, Okuda's critique is ill-founded because it confuses important phenomenological distinctions in the theory of meaning-giving.

Third, my critique of Schutz's notion of "intimate personal experience" (*absolut intime Person*) criticized in Okuda's paragraph three, is directed against Schutz's own claim that ". . . those internal perceptions that lie close to the absolute private core of the person are irrecoverable as far as their How is concerned. . . . That which is irrecoverable . . . can only be lived but never 'thought': it is in principle incapable of being verbalized" (*PSW*, p. 53). Schutz's mistaken theory of meaning-constitution leaves a core of opacity around moods, feelings, affects, and corporeal experiences. Husserl would not agree with this assessment of phenomenology's incapacity to research personal experiences. See for example his remarks on "background experiences" in *Ideas I*, section 84, and his phenomenology of "the joy of thought" in section 77.

In sum, I am aware of the problems in Husserl's doctrine of transcendental egology, and in fact now hold that this notion is a fatal hypostatization of the very intentionality of consciousness which is an unexplicated presupposition of the entire phenomenological approach, i.e., it is an elaborate *petitio principii*. I am also aware of the effect of Gödel's Proof on the Hilbertian formalism which underlies Husserl's theory of mathematics and science. There are historico-philosophical reasons for this contemporary crisis of idealism (see Georgy Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, fourth essay). But the crucial point is that philosophy does not allow one to choose only those concepts which are pleasing and discard their attendant problems—problems which arise from their systematic connection to a corpus of ideas progressing logically from ground to consequent. The current social scientific style of work (eclecticism, pragmatism) which is merely sterile in its own field becomes absolutely meaningless when transferred to philosophy whose concern is truth not "results."

N. Patrick Peritore

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EDITORAL COMMENT

Milestone. This *Review* is edited and published in a nation now celebrating the 200th anniversary of its political independence. With predictable contentiousness, scholars have divided over the question of whether they can add anything to the occasion. Some argue that the proper role of the political scientist is to stand outside the dominant ideologies which sustain the state and act as critic and goad in behalf of higher, unrealized ideals. Others maintain that the nation is entitled to command the highest loyalties and best efforts of all its people, not least those among its people privileged to be called to the study and teaching of the arts of statecraft and the duties of citizenship.

This is a useful battle, since it helps scholars to clarify their own views on a matter of the utmost moral urgency. There is such a thing, however, as measure and moderation in the application of even the sternest injunction. Anniversaries and other festive occasions ought to provide moments of relief. On this occasion—and without prejudice to any side in the ongoing controversy about the ordinarily proper stance for the scholar—an editor of a scholarly journal may be pardoned for taking note of certain officially protected conditions of freedom and tolerance that prevail in the United States. It is conditions such as these that make possible the receipt and dissemination of all sorts of ideas about politics, the steady maintenance of untrammeled conversation among scholars and students, and the nurturance of the life of the mind.

Freedom of inquiry and advocacy, within very broad limits, are a part of what American citizens celebrate on the bicentennial of independence. American scholars—and especially political scientists—are perhaps less inclined to celebrate than to use freedoms such as these. It is therefore worth reminding ourselves that not all our colleagues the world around are so free to pursue our calling. It is for their sake, as well as for our own, that we remember the good fortune that permits us to write and publish about politics as our consciences and our knowledge dictate.

Reminder. All new editorial correspondence should go to Professor Charles O. Jones, Managing Editor Elect, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213.

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Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan and Bert A. Rockman, University of Pittsburgh, "Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy"

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Richard M. Bank, University of California, Santa Barbara and Steven R. McCarl, University of Denver, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics Revisited"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Norman I Fainstein, Columbia University and Susan S. Fainstein, Rutgers University, "The Future of Community Control"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

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Fred M. Hayward, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

David K. Hildebrand, University of Pennsylvania, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Prediction Analysis in Political Research"

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Benjamin I. Page, University of Chicago, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Michael J. Robinson, The Catholic University of America, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of *The Selling of the Pentagon*"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of *The New Atlantis*"

Lynn T. White III, Princeton University, "Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives*

ROBERT GILPIN

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The books considered in this review essay address themselves to the relationship between the multinational corporation (MNC) and the nation-state, illuminating the three prevailing perspectives on the relationship between international economics and international politics.**

My intention in this review essay is to contrast the varying positions of these three books on the implications of the rise of the multinational corporation for the nation-state system. This is perhaps the most critical issue in the burgeoning literature on the multinational corporation and the political economy of international relations.[1] Moreover, I shall set forth reasons for the success of the multinational corporation and discuss its probable future as a so-called transnational actor.

First, however, what is a multinational corporation? Definitions of the multinational corporation are numerous; it is sufficient to note a number of its characteristics. In the first place, multinational corporations make direct investments in foreign countries. In contrast to portfolio investment, which involves the purchase of equities in a firm, direct investment is the establishment of a foreign subsidiary or branch, or the takeover of a foreign firm. The goal of the investment is managerial control of a production unit in a foreign country.

Second, an MNC (multinational corporation) is characterized by a parent firm and a cluster of subsidiaries or branches in various countries with a common pool of managerial, financial, and technical resources. The parent firm operates the whole in terms of a coordinated global strategy. Purchasing, production, marketing, research, etc., are organized and managed by the parent in order to achieve its long-term goal of corporate growth. Through vertical integration and centralization of decision making, the parent corporation seeks to perpetuate its monopoly position with respect to technology, access to capital, and so on.

The differences between portfolio investment, loans, and similar forms of capital export practiced by British and European capitalism in the last century, on the one hand, and the more recent American emphasis on direct investment, on the other, are of immense political importance. In the first, the underlying motive is largely financial, that is, to obtain a higher return on investment capital; managerial control in general continues to rest with the borrower, and the liabilities incurred by debt borrowing can be liquidated through repayment. The motivation for direct investment and for the possession of foreign subsidiaries or branches, on the other hand, is primarily the acquisition of markets and managerial control. A permanent position and source of income in the foreign economy are desired. As a consequence, even though mutual economic benefit may result, direct investment creates economic and political relations that are more permanent and significant.

American corporations began to expand abroad as early as the 1890s; this process was accelerated during the interwar period. Following the Second World War, and particularly after the creation of the Common Market, the magnitude, direction, and character of this American direct investment abroad changed. Starting in 1946 with an initial accumulated investment of only $7 billion, by 1970 American direct investment abroad totaled nearly $80 billion. And while before the war, Latin America accounted for most of this investment, after the war, Canada, Western Europe, and other industrial areas absorbed the great bulk of it. Furthermore, although investment in the production of raw materials and traditional manufacturing industries has remained strong, a large fraction

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**Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada.* By Kari Levitt (New York: Liveright Press, 1970).

Economics and World Order: Fom the 1970's to the 1990's. Edited by Jagdish Bhagwati (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972).

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. By Raymond Vernon (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

** The ideas and argument of this article are further developed in my book, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[1] In its classical meaning, the term "political economy" referred to the proper management of the national economy. This, however, is not the focus of the current revival of interest in political economy; instead contemporary writers are concerned with two rather different subjects. One subject is the application of economic models to an understanding of political phenomena: voting, bureaucracy, arms races, etc. For an excellent presentation of this conception of "political economy," see, William Mitchell, "The Shape of Political Theory to Come: From Political Sociology to Political Economy," in *Politics and the Social Sciences*, ed. Seymour Lipset (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 101–36.

The other conception of political economy is the interaction of economics and politics. What, for example, is the relationship of the international economic system (including trade, monetary affairs and investment) and the international political system? The present article falls within this latter meaning of "political economy."

of postwar investment has gone into advanced manufacturing industries. Another large fraction of U.S. foreign direct investment is in petroleum; this $20 billion investment accounts for about 40 per cent of American direct investment in the less-developed countries.

In 1970, the output of American overseas subsidiaries was approximately $200 billion—representing several times the amount of goods that American corporations exported abroad—and the ratio of foreign sales to exports continues to grow rapidly. Obviously, the United States has become more a foreign investor than an exporter. Moreover, approximately 25 per cent of all American exports are really intracorporate transfers. Thus, the multinational corporation looms large in America's economic and political interaction with the rest of the world.

These, then, are the facts. What such facts may mean for the international system and the future of the nation-state is a matter of intense controversy. Although writers on the multinational corporation may accept a common set of data, they differ profoundly in their interpretations of the data. The books under consideration in this review essay represent the three dominant perspectives on the significance of the multinational corporation, reflecting three differing conceptions of the nature of political economy. The first position, liberalism, is represented by Raymond Vernon in his influential book, *Sovereignty at Bay* and by several contributions to the Bhagwati volume. The second, Marxism, is the position taken by Stephen Hymer in his original and stimulating article in the Bhagwati volume. And, third, mercantilism is represented by Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender*.

Three Conceptions of Political Economy

These three prevailing formulations of political economy differ fundamentally on the nature of economic relations, the goal of economic activity, the assumed nature of the actors in international economic relations, and the relationship of economics and politics (see Table 1).

The basic assumption of liberalism is that the nature of international economic relations is essentially harmonious, a view given its first full expression by Adam Smith. Disputing his mercantilist predecessors, Smith argued that international economic relations could be made a positive sum game. Following Smith, liberalism assumes that there is a basic harmony between true national and cosmopolitan economic interests. Thus, in response to the radical critique of a liberal international economy, a prominent member of this school of thought has written that the economic efficiency of the sterling standard in the nineteenth century and of the dollar standard in the twentieth century serves "the cosmopolitan interest in a national form."[2]

Liberals argue that given this underlying identity of national and cosmopolitan interests in a free market, the state should not interfere with economic transactions across national boundaries. By means of a free exchange of commodities, the removal of restrictions on the flow of investment, and an international division of labor, everyone will benefit in the long run because the world's scarce resources will be more efficiently utilized. The national interest will therefore be best served, liberals maintain, by a generous and cooperative attitude in economic relations with other societies. In essence, the pursuit of self-interest in a free, competitive economy achieves the greatest good for the greatest number in the international, no less than in the national, society.

Both mercantilists and Marxists, on the other hand, begin with the premise that economic relations are essentially conflictual. There is no underlying harmony; indeed one group's gain is another's loss. Even where all may gain in absolute terms through economic intercourse, members of these schools of thought emphasize relative gains. What is most important, they believe, is the distribution of wealth and power in society. Thus, in the language of game theory, whereas liberals regard economic relations as a nonzero-sum game,

Table 1. Comparison of the Three Conceptions of Political Economy

	Liberalism	*Marxism*	*Mercantilism*
Nature of Economic Relations	Harmonious	Conflictual	Conflictual
Nature of the Actors	Households and firms	Economic classes	Nation-states
Goal of Economic Activity	Maximization of global welfare	Maximization of class interests	Maximization of national interest
Relationship of Economics and Politics	Economics *should* determine politics	Economics *does* determine politics	Politics determines economics

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[2] Charles Kindleberger, *Power and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 227.

both Marxists and mercantilists view economic relations as essentially a zero-sum game.

For the liberal, the goal of economic activity is the optimally efficient use of the world's scarce resources and the maximization of world welfare. While most liberals refuse to make value judgments about income distribution, Marxists and mercantilists stress the distributive effects of economic relations. For the Marxist the distribution of wealth among social classes is crucial; for the mercantilist, the distribution of wealth and power among nation-states is most significant. Thus, the goal of economic (and political) activities for Marxists as for mercantilists is the redistribution of wealth and power.

These three perspectives differ even more decisively in their views about the nature of the economic actors. In Marxist analysis, the basic actors in both domestic and international relations are economic classes; the interests of the dominant class determine the foreign policy of the state. For mercantilists, the real actors in international economic relations are nation-states; national interest determines foreign policy. National interest, they believe, may at times be influenced by the peculiar economic interests of classes, elites, or other subgroups of the society. Yet factors of geography, external configurations of power, and the exigencies of national survival are primary in determining foreign policy. Thus, whereas liberals speak of world welfare and Marxists of class interests, mercantilists recognize only the interests of particular nation-states.

Although liberal economists such as David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter recognized the importance of class conflict and although neoclassical liberals analyze economic growth and policy in terms of national economies, the liberal emphasis is typically on the individual consumer, firm, or entrepreneur. The liberal view is summarized in Harry Johnson's statement that "the nation-state is ceasing to be a relevant form of social organization. . . ."[3] Liberals believe that the nation-state, because of its manifest inability to satisfy the economic needs of the modern world, has been placed on the defensive by the multinational corporation. In the oft-quoted words of George Ball, "[w]hile the structure of the multinational corporation is a modern concept, designed to meet the requirements of a modern age, the nation-state is a very old-fashioned idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present complex world."[4]

Finally, these three perspectives differ on the relationship of economic and political activities. For both liberalism and Marxism, economics is primary; for mercantilism, politics is primary. In the view of liberals, the exigencies of economic efficiency and production *ought* to determine political organization. Marxists, however, go one critical step further and argue that the necessities of production *do* determine political organization, at least in the long-run. Mercantilists, on the other hand, hold that the *political* struggle among nation-states determines the economic organization of the world.

The Liberal Conception of the MNC

Most contemporary writers on the multinational corporation take the liberal view, a perspective that is consistent with much recent theorizing on the nature and future of international relations. Since World War II, many writers on international relations have assumed that the nation-state is fading away or at least, that it is being seriously circumscribed by various processes and institutions. Although writers have assumed that the age of unchallenged national sovereignty was ending, they have identified differing agents as the probable cause of the demise of the nation-state. Thus, two decades ago, the emphasis was on universal international organization. Subsequently, regional and functional organizations were thought to be the appropriate agents. And, today, the transnational actor in general and the multinational corporation in particular are said to be undermining the nation-state.[5] After three centuries of the dominance of national sovereignty in international affairs, sovereignty is said to be at bay because the multinational corporation, which can outperform the nation-state, will so enmesh nation-states in an interdependent world economy that they will no longer be able to pursue their destructive ways.

The compression of time and space arising from revolutionary changes in transportation and communications has opened the globe to the activities of multinational corporations. Liberals differ in their explanations of why American and other corporations have taken advantage of this technological shrinkage of the world. Yet Vernon in his *Sovereignty at Bay* is representative of this liberal emphasis on economic and technological factors.

For Vernon, the rise and success of the multinational corporation is explained by the operation of the so-called "product-cycle." In its essentials, the product-cycle theory, holds that development of a product requires: (a) the introductory phase; (b) the maturing phase; and (c) the standardized phase. Because of the scale of their home market (demand) and the resources available for research and development (supply), American corporations have a comparative advantage over their foreign competitors in the introductory stage, i.e., the development of new products and production processes. During this stage of the product-cycle, American corporations enjoy a monopolistic advantage arising from their technological sophistication, marketing experience, patent rights, etc. Initially, therefore, American corporations can satisfy the rising foreign demand for the product through exporting. But as the foreign market for the product grows and as the technology identified with the product diffuses abroad to potential foreign competitors, the strategy of the American corporation changes. During this maturing phase of the product-cycle, an American firm begins to lose the comparative advantage identified with its technological lead. As the technology becomes available through diffusion or imitative development, the advantage shifts to foreign production partly because of proximity to the local market and because of lower labor costs. Therefore, according to Vernon's thesis, if the American corporation is to maintain a profit on its investment and to forestall competition, either it must establish foreign subsidiaries (as American corporations have done in Europe) or it must sell its license to a foreign corporation (as in Japan) which will pay royalties to the American corporation. In short, the threatened loss of an export market and the rise of foreign competitors is the all-powerful stimulus for the establishment of foreign subsidiaries.

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[3] Harry Johnson, "World Trading and Monetary Arrangements," in *Economic and World Order*, ed. Bhagwati, p. 180.

[4] George W. Ball, "The Promise of the Multinational Corporation," *Fortune*, 75, (June 1, 1967), 80.

[5] Though Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane do not take this extreme and normative position themselves, their writings provide the best analysis of the importance today of transnational actors and processes. See in particular their introductory section to *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

Understood in Vernon's terms, direct investment and the establishment abroad of subsidiaries by American corporations are largely defensive. In order to forestall the rise of foreign competitors producing at lower costs and to maintain its market position, the American corporation feels obliged to begin manufacturing abroad. According to this concept of defensive investment, therefore, the multinational corporation is a response to a world in which all the factors of production other than labor have become increasingly mobile and comparative advantage has become increasingly dynamic and transitory. Advances in transportation and communication have increased the flow of raw materials, capital, and technology. In order to extend the life of its product and to maintain (or increase) its share of world markets, the multinational corporation goes abroad where it too can enjoy the benefits of low-wage labor or proximity to the local market or both. Thus, while there is an expansionistic element in the rise of the American multinational corporation, Vernon believes that investment is more importantly a response to threatened *relative* industrial decline.

The liberal proponents of multinational corporations like Vernon or Johnson see very little relationship between politics and economics. Government and corporations are said to "hold each other at arm's length."[6] In this view, the MNC, freed from the confining jurisdiction of individual nation-states, is regarded as an increasingly independent actor on the international scene. Since these corporations take a global view of research, marketing, and production, the policies of these transnational actors are circumscribing the sovereignty of nation-states with an ever widening web of economic and technological interdependence. In essence, for this position, the MNC represents the transcendence of politics in the interest of world peace and development. In the interest of world efficiency and welfare, therefore, the nation-state's control over economic affairs is giving way as it should, to the multinational corporation and eventually to other international institutions better suited to a highly interdependent world economy of which the multinational corporation is the predominant expression.

The Marxist Conception of the MNC

Marxist economists of the sort represented in the Bhagwati volume share this vision of an increasingly interdependent non-Communist world economy dominated by the multinational corporation rather than by sovereign nation-states. But, whereas the liberal believes the multinationals will radiate development and raise the standard of living throughout the globe, Marxists believe the MNC's represent merely the latest expression of capitalist exploitation and imperialism. Like the nation-state itself, the multinational corporation is held by them to be an instrument of the international class struggle supplanting the bourgeois nation-state precisely because it is a more efficient means by which the capitalistic economies can dominate and exploit the less-developed economies.

Undoubtedly, the best and most vivid presentation of this view is that of the late Stephen Hymer in the Bhagwati volume. Hymer analyzes the rise and importance of the multinationals in terms of what he calls the two laws of development: The Law of Increasing Firm Size and the Law of Uneven Development. The Law of Increasing Firm Size, Hymer argues, is the tendency since the Industrial Revolution for firms to increase in size "from the *workshop* to the *factory* to the *national corporation* to the *multi-divisional corporation* and now to the *multinational corporation.*" The Law of Uneven Development, he continues, is the tendency of the international economy to produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as well as development. Together these two economic laws will produce the following consequence:

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[6] Vernon, p. 213.

> [A] regime of North Atlantic Multinational Corporations would tend to produce a hierarchical division of labor between geographical regions corresponding to the vertical division of labor within the firm. It would tend to centralize high-level decision-making occupations in a few key cities in the advanced countries, surrounded by a number of regional sub-capitals, and confine the rest of the world to lower levels of activity and income, i.e., to the status of towns and villages in a new Imperial system. Income, status, authority, and consumption patterns would radiate out from these centers along a declining curve, and the existing pattern of inequality and dependency would be perpetuated. The pattern would be complex, just as the structure of the corporation is complex, but the basic relationship between different countries would be one of superior and subordinate, head office and branch office.[7]

The Marxist or radical critique of the MNC, well represented by several of the contributions to the Bhagwati volume, may be summarized as follows: (1) Because of internal contradictions in the American capitalistic system, the large corporations are forced to expand outward in search of new markets, investment opportunities, and sources of raw material; (2) the foreign policy of the United States reflects the expansionist interests of this dominant capitalistic class; and (3) the foremost interest of this corporate elite is to eliminate all obstacles (e.g., the nation-state) to corporate expansionism and to increase at the expense of less developed countries. From this set of premises, it is a short step to viewing direct investment as imperialism and to regarding the underdevelopment of the southern half of the globe as the consequence of this corporate drive for power and profits. One man's transnationalism after all is another's imperialism.

In fact, one can make a very strong argument that there is an institutional imperative for particular corporations to expand abroad. This is certainly the implication of Vernon's product-cycle theory. The basic problem, the economist Richard Caves and the political scientist Theodore Moran have pointed out, is that there is "low inter-industry mobility of capital" in the American economy.[8] The experience and technology of corporations create "sector specific capital." This is to say, a corporation tends to have diminishing returns unless it invests in areas with which it has had experience. For such a firm—and this is characteristic of the large oligopolies—the choice is frequently between investing abroad in areas it knows well and therefore obtaining a relatively high rate of return, or investing in the home market with a relatively lower rate. As a result, foreign investment is very attractive for these corporations even though there may be domestic investment opportunities in other sectors that they are ignoring.

Although neither Caves nor Moran are Marxists, the argument that there is an "institutional necessity" for foreign investment is fundamental to the Marxist theory of imperialism. The search for foreign investment outlets is held to be a function of the law of the falling rate of profit, which is due in turn to the accumulation of surplus capital in mature capitalist economies. In the Marxist theory of imperialism, the struggle among mature capitalist economies for outlets for their surplus capital is the cause of imperialism and international conflict in the capitalist era. Marxists hold that Cold War in general and the Vietnam War in particular are explicable in terms of this outward thrust of American capitalism for investment outlets.[9]

The difficulty with this thesis is its failure to show empirically how this "necessity" is translated into foreign policy. In specific cases, it certainly can be done. But there are too many important examples of conflict between corporate interest and American foreign policy. For example, Marxist theory cannot explain major American economic concessions to Japan at a time when American corporations were pressing the United States government to force the Japanese to open their economy to American investment. What the Marxists attempt but fail to elucidate can be far better explained through reference to the mercantilist position on the relationship of economics and politics.

The Mercantilist Conception of the MNC

The argument of Levitt (which I share in part) is that mercantilism provides a more meaningful interpretation of the relationship of the MNC and the United States government than does either liberalism or Marxism. In character, as Levitt argues, the multinationals are more similar to the trading corporations of the mercantilistic era such as the British East India Company than to the free traders and finance capitalists that characterized British enterprise in the nineteenth century. In short, the giant American corporations which comprise most of the world's multinationals are the descendants of the East India Company and other mercantile enterprises that dominated the world economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

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[7] Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in Bhagwati, p. 114.

[8] Richard Caves, "International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment," *Economica* 38 (February 1971) 1–27, at p. 2; Theodore Moran, "Foreign Expansion as an Institutional Necessity' for U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model," *World Politics* 25 (April 1973), 369–86.

[9] Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). For an excellent critique of Marxist and other theories of imperialism see Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973).

> The central thesis of our argument is that the subsidiaries and branch plants of large American-based multinational corporations have replaced the operators of the earlier European-based mercantile venture companies in extracting the staple and organizing the supply of manufactured goods. In the new mercantilism as in the old, the corporation based in the metropole directly exercises the entrepreneurial function and collects a "venture profit" from its investment. It organizes the collection or extraction of the raw material staple required in the metropolis and supplies the hinterland with manufactured goods, whether produced at home or "on-site" in the host country.[10]

According to this mercantilist argument, the multinational corporation reflects a contemporary form of the economic expansion of particular nation-states. In other words, only *particular* nation-states have been on the defensive, not the nation-state as a political entity; indeed some nation-states, especially the United States, have been on the economic *offensive*, expanding at the expense of other nation-states. As a Canadian nationalist, Levitt in her volume calls for a strengthening of Canadian nationalism and a counteroffensive against these corporations and the nation-states which stand behind them.

In Latin America, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, a burgeoning literature (represented above by Levitt and several of the contributors to the Bhagwati volume) has begun to attack these "new mercantile mini-powers." Both Marxists and conservative nationalists have risen in defense of the nation-state as a means to protect weaker people against economic exploitation, political dependence, and cultural inundation. According to this view, the MNC is an instrument of expansion of particular powerful nation-states which seek to compromise the sovereignty of lesser states. For these critics of the MNC, the nation-state is a necessary counterbalancing institution.

One need not go as far as Levitt and accept entirely the mercantilist critique against the multinational corporations in order to acknowledge the basic premises of this position: the emphasis on the nation-state and the close identity of interest between the multinational corporations and their home governments. This essentially political perspective is in my view far more enlightening than either the liberal or the Marxist positions.

The government of the United States and its foreign policy are not the instruments of these powerful corporations; rather, political and corporate leaders in the United States tend to share overlapping interests and perspectives. Frequently, of course, as in the case of the policy toward Japan, the views of corporate and national leaders have diverged. In certain cases the power of the corporations to influence decisions in a direction which favors their interest has prevailed: ITT in Chile appears to be a case in point. But in general the role of the MNC has been viewed by political leaders in the mercantilist terms of maintaining America's share of world markets, of securing a strong position in foreign economies, and of controlling access to raw materials. Even more important, the MNC is judged to be a major generator of the foreign earnings required to ensure national prosperity and to finance American military and political commitments overseas.

The most explicit acknowledgment by an American official of the political importance of the MNC was perhaps that of Henry Fowler, made in 1965, when he was U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and quoted by Levitt. In referring to these "mighty engines of enlightened capitalism" he declared that for the United States, "they have not only a commercial importance but a highly significant role in the United States foreign policy that has met with general approval by the Atlantic countries." He then added that in order to finance its military position overseas "the United States government has consistently sought, and will continue to seek to expand and extend the role of the multinational corporation as an essential instrument of strong and healthy economic progress through the Free World."[11]

The underlying rationale of this position has been based on the assumption that the multinational corporation is the most dynamic sector of the American economy; these corporations represent America's greatest economic assets. Given her high wage structure and the rapid diffusion of her technological superiority, the United States, it has been argued, could not compete against other expanding industrial powers without the multinationals. To survive economically, therefore, American corporations must go abroad to forestall the rise of foreign competition and to maintain their relative position in world markets.[12]

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[10] Levitt, pp. 23–24.

[11] Quoted in Levitt, p. 100.

[12] These themes underlie the two most extensive and important official studies of American foreign economic policy carried out in recent years. U.S. Council on International Economic Policy, *The United States in the Changing World Economy, A Report to the President*, 1971 (The

This is not to argue, however, that an absolute identity of purpose exists between corporate managers and the managers of the national interest. While these political and corporate elites have interests in common, they also have divergent interests. At the same time, therefore, that public officials attempt to utilize corporate power to advance perceived national objectives, the corporate executives seek to maximize their freedom from *all* government restrictions and to utilize national power for corporate advantage. But generally, in the relationships between American business and government the activities of the corporation are seen by public officials to advance the larger security and economic interests of the nation.

In the pre-1914 world, mercantilism was characterized primarily by the desire for an export surplus or for the income from portfolio investments. In the contemporary world of highly mobile technology and dynamic comparative advantage, a mercantilist position would require that the U.S. maintain its share of world markets and its control of decisions over the distribution and location of economic activities, industrial production, and technological development through the multinational corporation. Among extractive industries, American multinationals until recently have largely controlled the non-Communist industrial world's access to petroleum and many other raw materials; they have also determined who would reap the monopoly rent and have been a source of political leverage. Thus, through the instrumentality of the MNC, the U.S. has sought and will seek: (1) to prevent America's exclusion both from world markets and from sources of raw materials; (2) to maintain a favorable balance of payments; and (3) to enhance its power position with respect to other states. If British global hegemony in the nineteenth century was based on the doctrine of free trade, then one can argue that America's in the twentieth has been based on that of free investment.

In conclusion, the argument of Levitt and of this review essay has been that the MNC exists as a transnational actor today because it reflects perceived national interests of the world's dominant power, the United States. This view does not discredit the analyses of economists who argue that the MNC is a response to contemporary technological and economic developments. The argument is rather that these economic and technological factors have been able to exercise their profound effects *because the United States*—sometimes with the cooperation of other nations and sometimes over their opposition—*had created the necessary political framework.*

Today, however, the political order established by the United States at the end of World War II is seriously disarrayed. The growth of powers hostile to the United States (the Soviet Union and China), the rise of strong foreign competitors (Western Europe and Japan), and the emergence of new centers of economic power in the so-called underdeveloped world (the Arabs, Iran, Brazil, etc.) challenge the political and economic framework which has benefited the American multinationals. The diminution of what has been a *Pax Americana* and the rise of powers hostile to the global activities of American multinational corporations threaten these MNC's reign over international economic relations. Again, in the words of Fowler (quoted by Levitt) "... it is impossible to overestimate the extent to which the efforts and opportunities for American firms abroad depend upon the vast presence and influence and prestige that America holds in the world."[13]

If, as many believe, the "presence and influence" of the United States are now on the wane, what does this portend for the multinational corporation? On the one hand, to some analysts the cresting wave of economic nationalism directed against American foreign investment and the counteroffensive of the nation-state as in the case of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggest a continuing diminution of the power of the multinational corporations.[14] Vernon, on the other hand, regards this eventuality as highly unlikely. In his view, the multinational corporation represents a response to inexorable economic and technological forces; the costs of rejecting the benefits of the capital, technology, and know-how conferred by the MNC's would be too great. The MNC is simply too entrenched in world economic affairs to be dislodged at this late date. General Motors will not follow the flag in retreat. There is no Nixon Doctrine of American overseas retrenchment for IBM.

One need not, however, agree that the only alternatives are either the demise or the enthronement of the multinational corporation. As Samuel Huntington has argued, both the nation-state and the multinational corporation are here to stay.[15] But the terms of their relationship are changing, and changing to the advantage of host nation-states. No one can yet forecast what the terms of

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Peterson Report); and U.S. Commission on International Trade and Investment, *United States International Policy in an Interdependent World*, Washington, 1971, (The Williams Report).

[13] Levitt, p. 100.

[14] See, for example, C. Fred Bergsten, "Coming Investment Wars?" *Foreign Affairs* 53 (October 1974) 135–52.

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, (April 1973) p. 361. For my own position, see Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973) pp. 215–262.

their relationship will be. But surely one thing is clear, as exemplified in the case of Middle Eastern petroleum and the restrictions now placed on manufacturing investment in Canada. Increasingly host governments will force the multinationals to serve their interests. From this perspective, one can expect that with the relative decline of American power and influence, a larger and larger share of the benefits from foreign investment will flow to the host governments and consequently, that the role of the multinational corporation as an instrument of American foreign policy will diminish.

Moreover, as foreign corporations owned and managed by Japanese, Arab, and German investors penetrate the American economy, reservations regarding foreign investment and the multinational corporation will receive greater attention in the United States. Already Congress has established a study of foreign investment in the United States and legislation has been introduced to restrict investments in this country. There is an amazing parallel between the U.S.'s growing fears about foreign ownership and those expressed by other nations that one encounters in Levitt and Bhagwati.

But most important of all, as American foreign investment is increasingly forced to serve the interests of *other* nation-states, one will witness a reassessment of American public and official attitudes about the MNC's usefulness to the U.S. As Americans become more concerned over high unemployment, inflation, industry, there will be increased pressures to restrict the outflow of American capital and technology. More and more groups will join American organized labor in challenging the thesis that what is good for Exxon and IBM is good for the country. The issue of the multinational corporation will become increasingly politicized both domestically and internationally.

The Great Nuremberg Trial*

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Professor Weinberg, an authority on World War II and its documentation, and the AMS Press merit great credit for republishing this principal source material on the trial of the 22 "major" Nazi leaders by the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Although during the two and one half years after the case against Hermann Goering *et al.*, twelve other trials against a total of some 200 defendants—most of them also of high position and vast power—were held in the same ornate courtroom by tribunals composed exclusively of American judges, it is the IMT case, as the most historic of these altogether 13 trials, with which the name of Nuremberg (previously identified with Hitler's pomp-and-frenzy rallies) has been linked ever since.

The original official 42-volume publication on the IMT trial (known as "blue series" because bound in blue) has long been out of print. Of poor quality paper and binding, the sets that are still available are falling apart. As Telford Taylor, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor after Justice Robert H. Jackson, recently said, "Nuremberg" has become a myth. The myth adds to the ominous confusion concerning essentials of international behavior. Because "Nuremberg" remains relevant, and factual knowledge about it should be spread, the publisher's suggestion that libraries (even those still holding an original set or what may be left of it) acquire the new edition and that interested parties acquire individual volumes while available, is well taken.

The trial was, of course, unique in its sheer magnitude.[1] The record is unique as the authentic tale of history's worst war and of its *antecedents;* unique as a battle of wits about trends, concepts and forces that were at work then, and have largely remained determinative since; unique as documentation of the degradation to which ideological obsession can lead; unique in showing the psychology, personalities, and the unassailable immutability of most (but eventual contrition of some) of the protagonists. Even a reader who merely scans this record will be impressed by the vistas which "Nuremberg" opens.

Also those who do not wish to study the trial more thoroughly, should become acquainted with its flavor—the dimensions of the matters it dealt with—as an antidote against the glibness with which "Nuremberg" has been variously invoked or criticzed. Because it was a major, many-faceted event, "Nuremberg" can legitimately be viewed from various perspectives; and there is no need to defend it in each and every aspect. Yet, even a small degree of familiarity with its record cannot but inspire an elemental feeling of awe in the face of so much evil and tragedy—and heroism, and render to specialists in politics, international law, and related fields a heightened sense of their responsibilities for the shaping of the future.

Since this series is a reproduction, and not a revision, of the original edition, it contains the shortcomings of the original. Those shortcomings, the editor's very informative 20-page introduction frankly admits. A fully satisfactory revision would require a very large research project in order to give, *i.a.*, completely adequate Indices and cross-references, as well as explanatory annotations (allusions to the period up to 1945 are becoming decreasingly self-evident), and to provide information on pertinent developments *after* the I.M.T. trial. For example, in order to evaluate the testimony of top-ranking defense witnesses, the reader should be told where to find the record of (or still better, be given quotations from) what they said and what transpired when they themselves were afterwards tried as suspected war criminals by American, British, Polish, etc. tribunals. Until such data will become easily available, the present edition remains indispensable; and while seeming a little overwhelming at first sight, it has a good logic of its own.

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* *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946.* With a new Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Reproduction of the English Language Edition published at Nuremberg, 1947–1949, 42 volumes, and 2 supplements: The Indices of the German language edition (Vol. 43, 637 pp.) and *Report of Robert H. Jackson* [on] *The International Conference on Military Trials. London, 1945* (Vol. 44, 441 pp.). New York (56 East 13 Street)—London: AMS Press, 1971. $1,300.00 (buckram), $1,150.00 (paperback). Single vols., $31.00 (buckram), $27.50 (paperback).

[1] Statistical data about "this gigantic trial," given in Justice Jackson's final report to President Truman, include: Over 100,000 captured German documents were screened or examined; "about 4,000 were translated . . . and used, in whole or in part, in the trial as exhibits." Sections from "[m]illions of feet of captured moving picture films" and over 1,800 from over 25,000 captured still photographs were used as exhibits. "The U.S. staff . . . , including lawyers, secretaries, interpreters, translators and clerical help numbered at its peak 654 . . . British, Soviet and French delegations aggregated approximately the same number." ("Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, in: Supplement Vol., *Report of Robert H. Jackson . . . , l.c.*, 432–440, at 434, 433.)

Structure of the Set

The set falls into four parts of unequal length: (*a*) Volume 1 contains the basics of the IMT trial, such as the composition of the Tribunal, the Prosecution, and the Defense; the 4-power (U.S.-U.K.-Soviet-French) Agreement and Charter for the I.M.T.[2]; the 4-power Indictment; essential procedural rules and initial decisions;[3] the Judgment[4] (pp. 171–341); the Soviet Judge's dissent from some of the Judgment's findings (pp. 342–364); the sentences and acquittals. (*b*) For anyone wishing to delve more deeply, or concerned about any of the enormous political, military, ideological, legal, economic, and other issues debated at the trial—which neither could nor needed to be *completely* covered in the Judgment[5]—Volumes 2 through 22 give the full official *transcripts*, in English, of the proceedings. (*c*) Two volumes (no. 23 and 24) contain some 1,600 pages of Indices. (*d*) Eighteen volumes (no. 25 through 42) reproduce Nuremberg documentary evidence, mainly in the original German.

The Transcripts of the Court Proceedings

The transcripts (volumes 2–22) begin with the Preliminary Hearings, the Opening Statement on November 20, 1945 by the President of the Tribunal, Lord Justice Lawrence (U.K.), and the famous opening oration (vol. 2, pp. 98–115) by the U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert M. Jackson ("this trial represents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of law to statesmen who have used their power of state to attack the foundations of the world's peace . . . "). They go through to the Tribunal's adjournment on October 1, 1946.

In a total of some 215 sessions—a record for concision—the four Prosecutions, by pre-arrangement, and the Defense developed their cases on the charges: aggressions, and conspiracy to commit aggressions; the slave labor program; the genocidal measures against Jews, Poles, other Slavs, Gypsies;[6] the starvation and exploitation of occupied territories; the concentration and extermination camps; the slave labor program; etc. All of those policies, carried out on enormous scales, involved complex arrangements between governmental, party, police, and military agencies, which also had to be unravelled in the trial and are very instructive for the political scientist.

The Tribunal was able to base its findings on contemporary documents, in the light of testimony not only by the indicted protagonists themselves but by other top-ranking decision makers.[7] No such evidence—laying bare the inner workings of a regime whose impact on the future is still unpredictable—had ever before been available to any court anywhere.

The nine-day testimony of Goering covers almost 400 pages (vol. 9, pp. 235–657, interrupted on pp. 457–491 by testimony of his witness, the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus on Dahlerus' last-minute efforts in summer 1939 to bring about a German-British understanding.) Less lengthy but also of great historical importance are the testimonies of the Chief of the High Command of the *Wehrmacht*, Keitel (vol. 10, pp. 468–647; vol. 11, pp. 1–28); Keitel's Chief of Staff, Jodl (vol. 15, pp. 284–561); Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (vol. 10, pp. 223–444); *Reichsbank* President Hjalmar Schacht (vol. 12, pp. 417–602, vol. 13, pp. 1–49); Arthur Seyss-Inquart, master of occupied Poland, and then of the occupied Netherlands (vol. 15, pp. 610–668, vol. 16, pp. 1–113); Hitler's Vice-Chancellor and ambassador Franz von Papen (vol. 16, pp. 236–422), etc.

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[2] One of the two supplemental volumes in this series reproduces Mr. Jackson's Report on the 4-Power London Conference of July 1945 (originally published by the State Department in 1949). It shows the evolution at that Conference of the Nuremberg Charter which formed the basis of the IMT and the other 12 Nuremberg trials, as well as of the Tokyo international trial of the major Japanese War Criminals, and of what became known as the Nuremberg Principles. A *caveat* must be expressed concerning this printed version of the minutes of the London Conference. They constitute transcriptions of the stenographic notes taken in English by Mr. Jackson's secretary, and hence include translations of the statements by the Russian (Judge I. T. Nikitchenko, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof A. N. Trainin) and French (Judge Robert Falco, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof. André Gros) delegations. As pointed out in the Foreword, "The minutes [were] *not* submitted to the French, Soviet or British Delegations for verification or editing [before being printed in this volume]." (p. xiii; italics added).

[3] Including severance of the case of old Herr Krupp von Bohlen (too senile to stand trial) but not of Rudolf Hess (able to stand trial). The respective medical reports are also reproduced in vol. 1.

[4] The reading of the Judgment in open court took the last two days of the trial (Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1946). Its text therefore also appears in the record of those days (vol. 22, pp. 411–589), and shows how the four Judges alternated in the reading. This has been of interest to analysts who believe (with certain internal justifications, but without proof) that each Judge read the sections about the topics primarily assigned to him.

[5] The arch-major criminals, Hitler and Himmler, escaped the trial through suicide. Nevertheless, Nuremberg had to deal with them, especially insofar as their orders concerned the defendants. The supersecret documents emanating from them reveal their policies and intentions in dimensions of enormity still largely not realized. On the other hand, the Nuremberg materials also throw light on various other aspects stressed by the Defense—such as the support certain Nazi aims received from important non-Germans.

[6] The *term* "genocide" does not occur either as formal charge or in the Nuremberg Charter or Judgment. This would have been retroactive, as the crime was technically defined only in the Genocide Convention of 1948.

[7] "Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or particular events" (Ruling by the President, 22 March 1946, vol. 9, p. 673).

Among the defense witnesses were several surviving German Fieldmarshals, some of whom were themselves subsequently tried and convicted as war criminals: von Brauchitsch (vol. 20, pp. 567–594); von Manstein (vol. 20, pp. 594–646, vol. 21, pp. 3–17); Milch (vol. 9, pp. 44–133); von Rundstedt (vol. 21, pp. 21–50); Kesselring (vol. 9, pp. 174–234). Fieldmarshal Paulus, the Commander in the battle of Stalingrad, was a Prosecution witness (vol. 7, pp. 253–304), as was Intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg (vol. 4, pp. 374–385).

Other witnesses for the Defense—who, incidentally, were more numerous than those for the Prosecution—included the powerful Hans Heinrich Lammers, Hilter's right-hand man as Chief of the Reich Chancellery (vol. 11, pp. 28–154); Rudolf Franz Hoess, Commandant at Auschwitz during part of the war (vol. 11, pp. 396–422); the Acting Minister of Justice, Franz Schlegelberger (vol. 20, pp. 263–278); top Foreign Office men such as State Secretaries Adolf Freiherr Steengracht von Moyland (vol. 10, pp. 106–157) and Ernst von Weiszaecker (vol. 14, pp. 277–297); and the former high Gestapo officer Hans Bernd Gisevius who had participated in the plot against Hitler's life of 20 July 1944 (vol. 12, pp. 167–305).

The panoroma of the trial was wide, covering as it did the evolution of National Socialism; its gradual undermining of Weimar Germany and then the Versailles system; the nazification of German political, constitutional, social, and economic life, and the organization of a warfare state; relations with Germany's allies and their leaders, especially Italy and Mussolini; the evolution and implications of an ever more integral racism, spreading over ever wider territories; the use of foreign peoples as "colonials" and of foreign countries as resettlement areas for ethinic Germans; the extent and excusatory weight, if any, of collaboration by the Vichy regime in France or the Quisling regime in Norway; the multiple horror, especially in Yugoslavia, of triangular war involving two warring factions plus foreign invaders.

The transcript also gives a picture of the range which the Tribunal granted to the Defense for the presentation of their arguments, and thus allows the reader to form his own opinion about the fairness of the trial. Undeniably a high point of the trial was the elaborate attack by Professor Hermann Jahrreiss (Defense Counsel for Fieldmarshal Jodl) on behalf of all defendants against what he termed the concept of "war as a function forbidden by international law" and on such other basic issues as responsibility for crimes committed under superior orders (vol. 17, pp. 458–494).

For a variety of reasons, the doctrinal and factual presentations, as well as examinations by the four Prosecutions, and especially the final statements by Justice Jackson, Sir Hartley Shawcross, M. Champetier de Ribes and General Rudenko (vol. 19, pp. 397–618) are of great interest.

In order to find his way among these 21 volumes of transcripts, the reader has to consult vol. 23, the first of two fat index volumes. In its 70-page "Chronological Index of the Trial Proceedings" Vol. 23 gives capsule information for each of the IMT's sessions, such as names of witnesses heard, topics discussed, rulings, etc.

Documents. Essential to the understanding of the IMT trial is the fact that it was based on the availability of a mass of contemporary German documents, of high (*Geheim*) and highest (*Geheime Reichssache: Nur durch Offiziere*; etc.) secrecy ratings, which had fallen into Allied hands and which often emanated from, were addressed to, or referred to individual leaders in the dock. These conference minutes, letters, orders, reports, official files, etc. cover every aspect of the trial.

Much of the second main part of this set, namely, the 18 document volumes (no. 25 through 42) are given to the reproduction in full or in part of the most significant of those documents[8] in their German original. In precise, archival rendition, they show, for example, handwritten marginal notations, abbreviations, "receipt" stamps, and other indicators of their probative value—essential also to professional research. Because of space limitations, only some of them can be illustratively listed here: the minutes of the conferences at which Hitler revealed his initial war plans (including the "Hossbach" conference of November 5, 1937, 386-PS. Exh. USA-25, vol. 25, pp. 402–413 and the Schmundt minutes of the conference of May 23, 1939, 079-L, Exh. USA-27, vol. 37, pp. 546–556); Hitler's instructions to his Supreme Wehrmacht commander Fieldmarshal Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military deployment area for Germany; what parts of Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed of "Jews, Polacks and trash"—("*Juden, Polacken und Gesindel*"); etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609, vol. 26, pp. 377–383); Hitler's instructions for the subsequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20 Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries (440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37–40), and culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec. 1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47–52); minutes of secret conferences involving, among others, Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the lynching of downed American "terror pilots," and Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not shoot" them ("*jeden amerikanischen Terrorflieger aufhaengen, nicht erschiessen*") (3780-PS, Exh. GB [Great Britain]-293, vol. 33, pp. 74–80, at 79) about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1 April 1946 (vol. 10, at 384).

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[8] Not *all* documents accepted in evidence at Nuremberg (and certainly not, all that were available) are reprinted in this set. Many more of them are contained in the U.S. Government publication prepared at Justice Jackson's initiative, "*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*" (Washington, D.C., 1946–1949; known as the "red series"). In these bulky 10 volumes. all documents are given in English, but the translations, done at Nuremberg under great pressure, are not completely reliable. Finally, it should be noted that the 15-volume "green series" edited by Drexel R. Sprecher and myself, "*Trials of War Criminals Before the* [U.S.] *Nuremberg Military Tribunals*" (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1950–1953), covering the 12 subsequent trials of altogether almost 200 defendants (cases against Krupp; I. G. Farben; Fieldmarshals and generals; Cabinet ministers and diplomats; the Acting Minister of Justice and high judges; *Luftwaffe* and other physicians involved in the "medical experiments," "euthanasia," castration programs; leaders of the concentration camp system, and of extermination units; etc.) contain many documents (all in carefully checked English translations) that had been used by or were available to the I.M.T. Unfortunately, it was not possible to provide the "green series" with indices.

Numerous other documents show the still unfathomable, continent-wide program of the "final solution of the Jewish question"; and the connection between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the doctrine of Jewish Satanism—*die Lehre jüdischer Satanei*," Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936 Olympiade Party Rally, Nüremberg) (2283-PS, Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General of occupied Poland, 1939–1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29, pp. 356–725); the complete transcript of the trial before the notorious "People's Court" of Fieldmarshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Wartenburg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS, Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299–509; full text of the "People Court's" judgment, pp. 510–530); and SS General Stroop's report on the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto, "*The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More*" of 16 May 1943 (1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628–642).

The reproduction of these documents in their original German puts them beyond the reach of many American readers. However, the most telling parts of the most significant documents were the core of the trial; cited in court in all four official languages, they are to that extent recorded in English in the Transcripts, part of the present series (Vols. 2–22). For example, the British Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P., in cross-examining Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's Race Research agency *Ahnenerbe* (Ancestral Heritage Society), about the most gruesome medical experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20, pp. 516–553) large sections of documents which in the full German texts appear in vol. 38.

It is also of some help that each German document has been given an English title, and English capsule description. Furthermore, some important Nuremberg documents are in English in their *original*, and hence are reproduced in English in Vols. 24–42. For example: Reports by the Duke of Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the latter's landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (116-M to 119-M, vol. 38, pp. 174–184); numerous affidavits, including those by two American diplomats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H. Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 & 2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295–311, 311–328); a Report by the Judge Advocate Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS, vol. 30, pp. 158–164); Report of a special 12-member bipartisan Congressional Committee headed by Senate majority leader Alben W. Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal inspection (requested by General Eisenhower) of Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concentration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp. 605–626); and the official English text of the "Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91, vol. 26, pp. 429–522). English defense documents include, *e.g.*, the written testimony by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, on the principles concerning the rescue of survivors of sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108–111). Some documents are in French. For example: the official French government report on the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political parties and workers' organizations, Jews, and other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF [République Française]-301, vol. 37, pp. 116–188); list of 29,660 fusillaled French hostages (420-F, Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211–212); sworn statements of French and Belgian concentration camp survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261–387).

Indices. A publication of this complexity requires some comments on its indices, and their quality.

First, there is a large *Subject Index*, consisting of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably, it was prepared from the *Transcripts* of the court proceedings *alone*. Hence, the Subject Index covers only matters that were discussed in court and, as far as the documents are concerned, therefore refers only to the topic(s) on which a document, or some passage from it, was *quoted in court*. Any *other* topics contained in the document are not picked up in the Subject Index, although they may be of much greater significance for the researcher.

Even within this limitation, the Subject Index is incomplete. For example, one of the trial's main issues was the treatment of, and the law concerning partisans (or guerrillas, maquis, resistance fighters). Yet, the subentry "International law [concerning] partisan warfare" gives altogether two citations: one on "German *adherence*" (ital. supplied) to that law, the other on "Violations committed during" partisan warfare. Both citations refer to altogether two pages in the court transcript (vol. 21, pp. 293 and 292, respectively) which reproduce a defense counsel's argumentation about the probative value of certain prosecution and defense evidence on partisan warfare, but there is no reference to any of the documentation showing German mass atrocities against partisans, partisan suspects, partisans' families, villages hiding partisans, etc. Similarly, readers interested in the Tribunal's handling of the French Maquis question will find under "Maquis movement, French" only: "see France; occupied territories; Resistance"; and none of these entries has a subentry for "Maquis."

The Subject Index pedantically records many unimportant items, but omits matters which are crucial for the understanding of Nazi war policies and postwar plans. For example, the entry "Slavs" omits references to one of Himmler's most horrifying speeches (Poznan, 4 Oct. 1943, 1919-PS, US Exh. 170, vol. 29, pp. 110–173): the Russians are not the "noble people" ("*edles Volk*") described in German soldiers' letters home (p. 117) but "human rejects" ("*menschliche Minderware*") (p. 118), "human animals" ("*Menschentiere*") (p. 123); "We need slaves for our culture . . . Whether in the building of an antitank ditch 10,000 Russian females (*Weiber*) collapse from exhaustion (*aus Entkraeftung umfallen*) interests me only insofar as the ditch be finished. . . ." (p. 123).

Similarly, the Subject Index has no entry on the *future wars* for which Himmler, in this and other programmatic statements, made far-reaching plans: the ultimate Armageddon to be between a biogenetically strengthened Germany reaching beyond the Urals, in combination with a racially-cleansed German-dominated Europe, against the "1 to 1.6 billion hordes (*Masse Mensch*)" of Asia (vol. 29, p. 172). If readers relying on the English summary title locate the document, they will hardly be able to guess Himmler's relentlessly pursued visions from the tepid English summary, "plans for the future" (vol. 29, p. 110).

The entry "Children" does not even contain a subentry on the major Nuremberg topic of the systematic kidnapping of foreign children of "good blood" by a special Himmler organization. Himmler expected the policy (one of his obsessions) to yield eventually 30 million additional Germans, and discussed it not only in his 1943 Poznan speech but elsewhere and much earlier (for example, nine months before the start of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in his "Otherwise Germany will not be able to dominate the earth" speech of 7 September 1940, 1918-PS, U.S. Exhibit 304, vol. 29, pp. 98–110).

Of overriding significance is the Nuremberg evidence about the Third Reich's "extermination of Communism" policies, which the Subject Index (vol. 23, p. 193) correctly spells out as extermination of Communists ("Communists, Extermination.") but for which it gives only six secondary references. Actually, this war aim was fully discussed, as recorded, by Hitler, Fieldmarshals, the SS and SD leadership, even prior to the start of the attack on the USSR on June 21, 1941, and was often linked with plans for depriving the USSR, after conquest, of its main food supplies. (Example: "Many tens of millions of people . . . will [thus] die or have to emigrate to Siberia"—for which migration no trains will be available. (Economic Policy Directions for "Economic Organization East," of 23 May 1941 Doc. 126-EC.) The famous memorandum of 25 Oct. 1942 by a top official in Rosenberg's East Ministry criticizing the atrocity policies in the occupied Soviet areas as adverse to the German war aims of "annihilation (*Vernichtung*) of Bolshevism"[9] and "obliteration (*Zertrümmerung*)" or "dissolution (*Auflösung*)" of the Soviet Union (294-PS, Exhibit USA-185, vol. 25, pp. 331–342, at 332) is only mentioned, without capsule contents, in the Name Index under the memorandum's author, Minister Dr. Braeutigam (vol. 24, p. 316) but is omitted, like many other documents frankly discussing German war aims, in the Subject Index short entry, "War Aims, German" (vol. 23, p. 716).

The second Index volume (no. 24) opens with a *Document Index*, which lists the documents exhibited by the four Prosecutions and the Defense, but only by numbers, and without thumbnail descriptions. The bulk of the volume, almost 500 pages, contains the *Name Index*. But like the Subject Index, the Name Index is culled from the transcripts only. It merely refers to the persons appearing, or mentioned, in the proceedings.

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[9] Among various statements to the same effect, see, for example, Directives by the Economic Staff East (*Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost*) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) of September 1,1942: "Germany must be the power that obliterates (*zertrümmert*) Bolshevism, and the Führer must be celebrated (*gefeiert*) by the peoples of the Soviet Union as the liberator from the bolshevist yoke." (347-EC, Exh. USA-320, vol. 36, pp. 331–355, at 346). There is no entry, "Bolshevism" in the Subject Index.

Again, within this restriction, the Name Index is not complete. To illustrate: The inclusion of Rudolf Hess (as Hitler's former Deputy, the highest-ranking defendant) in the trial has been criticized in view of his "amnesia." Strangely, his sensational admission in court on 30 Nov. 1945, of having simulated ammesia (recorded in vol. 3, p. 496: "Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world . . . The reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature . . . I also simulated loss of memory [to] my . . . defense counsel. . .") is omitted in the Name Index, under "Hess, Rudolf," subentries "Health" and "Mental condition" (vol. 24, p. 424) and there is no subentry for "simulation" or for "amnesia." (Incidentally, although his amnesia and simulation were carefully discussed subjects, there are no such entries in the Subject Index, either.)

I must agree with Professor Weinberg, who says in his Introduction (p. xxiii) that whereas the Index volumes provide "fairly" good orientation for the *Proceedings*, "the indexing of the *documents* (ital. supplied) is wholly inadequate." To remedy this shortcoming, he added to this reprinted edition, as a supplemental volume, the single combined Index of the (1949) *German*-language edition of the "Blue series." He finds it better organized, and containing more document references, albeit by document number only. Alas, this supplement volume indicates the (parallel but of course not identical) pages and volumes of the *German* edition. If all this seems complicated, it at least gives an inkling of some of the linguistic and logistic difficulties of an international trial conducted in four official languages.

All this, too, pales in the light of the significance of the Principles, or message, of Nuremberg,—that in order to prevent the disasters of *governmentally organized international mass criminality*, the individual policy makers are bound by the fundamental rules of the world community. This record shows the reasons why, and the way in which, the Tribunal unanimously—and, in the end, with the consent of at least some of the defendants and their counsel,—reached that conclusion; as well as the precautions it added so as to make obedience to the Principle neither "unpatriotic" nor demanding martyrdom. Also, for example, in an era when organized terrorism has become an increasingly dangerous threat, attention should be paid to the criteria by which the Tribunal declared certain entire "organizations," for example, the Gestapo to have been "criminal organizations"—so that voluntary membership constitutes in itself a legal (but, as the Judgment underscores, individually disprovable) presumption of a punishable offense.

The series, then, has many uses. One, highly desirable beyond academe in view of the widespread confusion about the crucial meaning of the trial, is to get acquainted with what the trial was really about. The Nuremberg courtroom drama gives a picture, unavailable elsewhere, of the antecedents of World War II and of the Third Reich's conduct and policies during it. In a strictly chronological sense, those events lie now more than a generation behind us. But their effects and repercussions are still with us. And these materials, by showing as they do the nature and impact of Hitler's onslaught, also explain the depth of the trauma which the cataclysm created in the different nations involved (including the Americans and the Germans).

That trauma—further intensified by the profound political changes in Europe as result of the war—has by no means been overcome; indeed it explains much that has happened since and is still leading the world on an increasingly ominous course.

In other words, the Nuremberg materials allow us not only to evaluate the factual findings, and the law of Nuremberg, but beyond that to understand the psychological and ideological *aftereffects* which Hitler's onslaught continue to exercise on world politics. Such understanding may be vital; and this exploitation of the Nuremberg materials has hardly begun.

Those interested in specific subjects, on the other hand, find here information never meant to be disclosed, on matters ranging from propaganda to high finance, from military history to euthanasia, and learned debates about the criminality or not of aggressive war, about the main defense objections ("retroactivity"; "the victors tried the vanquished"; "duty to obey even criminal orders"), to the skillful attempts to justify, or make plausible, the Nazi policies including the wars themselves; and why the entire Nuremberg effort consisted in denying such justifications, in memory of the victims, and out of worry for our own future.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. By Benjamin R. Barber. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, Pp. 302. $12.50.)

It is rather unusual to find a picture of a beautiful mountain valley on the jacket of a political science book. Professor Benjamin R. Barber obviously likes to support his arguments with illustrations. The main argument of the book is contained in two pictures with the titles "Direct Democracy" and "Representative Democracy." The picture representing direct democracy depicts serious men participating in an outdoor political meeting with the snow-covered mountains in the background. The picture illustrating representative democracy is much less peaceful: An ugly demonstration in rainy weather with two policemen fighting with a young demonstrator.

The two pictures make clear where the sympathies of Barber are. He first experienced representative democracy in the United States and found it unsatisfying in many respects. He then went to the Swiss mountain canton Graubünden, first as a student and later as a teacher. Here he found many forms of direct democracy and was enthusiastic about them. Barber does not try to hide his normative bias; he makes explicit that his study is "guided by a normative focus and an engaged passion" (p. 8). He does not want to be objective, he has "neither pretensions of nor aspirations toward social scientific 'objectivity' " (p. 8).

What then, is the goal of the book? It is supposed to be "an attempt to challenge liberal constitutionalism as a philosophy and as a political way of life—to uncover its limitations and to explain certain of its failures—through a sympathetic examination of the political life of an alpine people over the last 1,500 years" (p. 7). Barber is aware that such a study can not "pretend to establish decisively the philosophical validity of alternative views of liberty and democracy. At best it can suggest the alternatives while disestablishing the claims to exclusivity of constitutional liberals" (p. 8). Barber wants to accomplish "more than the rehearsal of adversary arguments in the abstract" (p. 7). He says that we need "the weight of arguments embedded in their own historical traditions, carrying the authority of an actual political experience" (p. 7).

The philosophical thinking of Barber is close to the ideas of Rousseau, and, at one point Barber calls Rousseau "an invisible presence throughout our study" (p. 16). Barber has found the ideas of Rousseau realized not so much in contemporary Graubünden as in its history. In former times "the initiation, deliberation, and ratification of policy remained wholly with the citizenry . . . real power was not delegated to officials . . . the individual appeared to experience none of that atomization that attends freedom in representative systems, none of the alienation which so often emerges as the obverse side of individuality in liberal regimes (pp. 175–8). The citizen of Old Graubünden corresponded to the ideal type of the informed citizen: "He grew up in politics, listening to his father and neighbors distilling political wisdom from the chaos of European affairs. By maturity he was not only thoroughly familiar with the minutiae of various league and jurisdictional civil and criminal statutes but could pass on technical questions relating to Raetia's treaty obligations to Venice or the Swiss Confederation. No referendum question was too complicated, no jurisdictional quarrel too entangled for him to comprehend" (pp. 199–200).

Myself a Swiss citizen, I am surely tempted by the flattery of such an account of his ancestors. But I fear that affection for Graubünden has carried Barber much too far. To be sure, he can support his argument often with quotes from local historians. But the problem is that many of these historians too see the past in an excessively idealistic way. What they report is often merely the present ideology about the past. Sometimes Barber tries to support his argument with colorful anecdotes from the past. Thus he mentions the story of a Raetian muleteer who replied to a foreign prince: "And I too am a prince." The comment of Barber is that the citizen in Old Graubünden was self-governing, self-sufficient, and free like a prince. Such anecdotes, however, tell us much more about the present ideology of the past than about the past itself. It would have been helpful if Barber had tried to base his judgment a little more on historical research of his own. He writes in the introduction that he does not want "to compel the Swiss to conform to the theoretical infrastructure precipitated by liberal democratic thought" (p. 9). But has he not compelled the history of Graubünden to conform to the thinking of Rousseau? Barber tries to save his main argument at all costs. Thus, he claims that "the selling of offices was tolerated in part because the election of officers, in the eyes of the Raetians, did not carry the real burden of democracy" (p. 176). Would it not be more plausible to interpret the selling of offices as an indication that a financial investment in a political office was worthwhile in terms of political power?

In contemporary Graubünden Barber sees the ideal of direct democracy much less realized because modernity has destroyed the preconditions

—namely, intimacy, simplicity, autarky, equality, and public-spiritedness. Barber complains that the Swiss try to adapt their democracy to modernity. In his view, today "the radicals are those who plead for conservation and the restoration of community" (p. 240). He is aware, however, that simply going back in time is not possible, but he hopes that the dying forms of direct democracy "contain the promise of an alternative mode of political life, the importance of which can only increase as the viability of modernity diminishes" (pp. 240–1). In the very last sentence of the book Barber argues for a "radical remaking" of the world. I have doubts whether Graubünden ever came close to the normative model advocated by Barber. There were probably always many more elitist elements in the political life of Graubünden than Barber suspects. This is of course not to speak against the normative model of Barber, but perhaps against the present ideology of the history of Switzerland.

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Rules and Laws in Sociology. By Robert Brown. (Chicago: Aldine, 1973. Pp. x, 181. $7.95.)

I sometimes think that people who talk about causation in terms of "necessary and sufficient conditions," of "events" being "changes in state," of changes being the only things that can cause anything, can never talk to people of a statistical bent. This is a critique of the statistical sociology of prejudice by a person who learned his philosophy of science mainly from Hume and Mill; things obvious to Hubert M. Blalock (much discussed) or to me seem mysterious to him, and things that seem obvious to him seem obviously wrongheaded to me. Since I am not the sort of person the book is written for, I cannot evaluate it for its potential reader. The reader has to be a person to whom it makes sense to say that "All Australian prime ministers have been men" is an "accidental generalization" (p. 92). For a book on prejudice, that's not very illuminating. Let me instead try to analyze why statistical and classical approaches to causation seem to be talking about different things altogether.

The original issue of the authoritarian personality studies, discussed in the book, is roughly as follows. Hitler or General Amin of Uganda kill or exile minority ethnic groups for no good reason; each is obviously something of a nut; each got to power because his society was all screwed up; each got an amazing amount of support from the German workers or the poor Blacks. Is this support due to a mild infection of the general public with an analogous form of insanity, or an analogous screwing up of their social lives, or both? If so, what does the analogy consist of?

The results come in, that a scale of "authoritarianism" is correlated 0.29 with a scale of "ethnocentrism," 0.45 with a scale of "anomia," and "anomia" and "ethnocentrism" are correlated at 0.43 (p. 55, reporting Srole). Brown shows that the scales are measures of poorly defined concepts, that one can't tell whether the concepts are states or events or processes, that the concepts are not necessary or sufficient conditions for each other or for their measures. From this he concludes, as near as I can make out, that the correlation is all nonsense. "Explaining, in general, why some people become authoritarian will be no more useful, and no more specific, a solution than explaining why some people become bored" (pp. 68–69). As a person who explored at great length a correlation of comparable size about why some people become bored in school, I simply do not see what is ridiculous about it. What he thinks ridiculous is that he can think up strange counter cases, such as employers refusing to hire people more able than themselves (to shore up their authority) and so preferring to hire people they think inferior, (p. 109), or I suppose a bright ambitious child held by his school for three days in a gray windowless room.

I think what happens is this: I take the fact of a correlation of 0.45 as the thing to be explained. I refuse to conclude after tearing apart an old theory of that correlation that it must not be really there. Yes, the questions are vague, the concept neither necessary nor sufficient for measure, but to me 0.45 is out there in the world. If it doesn't fit in with Hume, too bad for Hume. The argument of the book strikes me then as showing the uselessness of philosophy of science, not the uselessness of sociology. For the questions it asks are not ones that lead to explaining the facts—no explanation of the 0.45 is ever offered, even by suggestion—but rather ones that lead us to conclude we are all muddled. The problem is to get out of the muddle, not to describe it exquisitely.

Hume taught us to reason about one case at a time, and to state necessary and sufficient conditions for what happens that once in universal form. R. A. Fisher taught us to think of conditions (necessary or sufficient, events or states) as having a distribution, being members of a population; of the distribution of necessary conditions being partly independent of the sufficient ones, so that on the average people with the necessary conditions (e.g. perhaps social estrangement and hostility) are more likely to have the necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g. ethnocentrism plus living in Uganda plus guns) for the event (e.g. driving the Asians and Israelis out).

The fact that I have only a very vague notion of why authoritarianism and anomia as measured should be correlated, or even what either of them is, worries me a lot. Why should events like genocide be apparently related to a bunch of foolish questions about children being seen but not heard? But the hard fact seems to be that they are, and that is one thing a book on prejudice ought to be about. This one is not.

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Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post-Revolutionary Writings. Edited by K. Fan. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972. Pp. xxiv, 536. $2.95, paper.)

Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War. Edited, and with an introduction and notes, by M. Rejai. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1970. Pp. xii, 452. $1.95, paper.)

Anyone who sets out to compile an anthology of Mao Tse-tung's writings faces two basic choices. The first is the familiar one of whether to let the author speak for himself, by presenting full texts or substantial extracts in chronological order, or to select bits and pieces, arranged to illustrate a particular interpretation. The second concerns the nature of the sources to be used. Should the original versions of Mao's earlier writings be preferred to subsequent revisions? Should materials circulated in recent years for internal use only, which were divulged during the Cultural Revolution, but have never been officially published, be included?

It has been suggested that because Mao Tse-tung is a living author, the problem of authenticity does not arise, the definitive text at any given moment being the revision which he has most recently chosen to issue. Every author has the right to change his mind, but this does not justify replacing what he actually said by what he decided twenty years later he should have said, and denouncing his rivals or opponents because they did not say it at the time. If, on the other hand, one is concerned not with historical truth, but with expounding and analyzing what constitutes authentic doctrine today, then obviously it is the post-1949 revisions which must be used. Mr. Rejai, whose interpretation of Mao Tse-tung's thought is based almost exclusively on the Chairman's writings prior to the conquest of power, was therefore justified in drawing the extracts from which he has constructed this intellectual edifice from the four-volume Peking edition of the *Selected Works*.

Professor Rejai's decision to include only officially published materials was made, and justified (p. xi) on methodological grounds. Professor Fan, who likewise uses only "authorized versions published . . . in Peking" appears to have been motivated rather by considerations of ideological orthodoxy—though, as indicated by his title, the context in which he made this choice soon changed dramatically. In the preface, dated November 1971, Mr. Fan recognized that Lin Piao was "no longer Mao's 'heir designate,' " but argued that he was "a major architect of Chinese policy during the Cultural Revolution, whose influence is lasting," adding that "together Mao's and Lin's works constitute a comprehensive statement of the official Chinese Communist thinking since the founding of the People's Republic" (pp. x, xii.) By the time these words were written, Lin Piao was already dead, and Mr. Fan must have known at least that Lin was under a very deep cloud. Why, under the circumstances, he chose to publish this anthology as it stands, in view of his obvious desire to align himself with "official Chinese Communist thinking," is hard to say. In any case, whether he was actuated by scholarly integrity, or by nostalgia for the heady days of the Cultural Revolution, the decision to leave Lin Piao in was misguided. Whatever his power and influence from 1959 until 1970, as a theoretician Lin was always a bean-curd tiger, and the two hundred pages of his speeches and writings included here add little indeed to our knowledge of the thinking underlying Chinese policy today.

Mr. Fan's editorial comments are so brief and self-effacing that his book can be judged only as a collection of materials. As such, it is valuable and timely, for it brings together in one convenient and relatively inexpensive volume a more complete selection of Mao's officially published post-1949 speeches and writings than can be found in any other single place. Mr. Fan himself is apparently not satisfied with this not inconsiderable achievement, and makes the extravagant claim that those items in his anthology written after October 1, 1949, "have not been collected in book form" (p. ix). In fact, well over half of them have appeared in one volume or another—sometimes in several—and eighty pages are taken from the one-volume *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* published in Peking. The remaining items, however, while they can nearly all be found in a decent library, are not always easy to lay one's hands on. The editing is careful and scrupulous (for example, in his abridgement of Mao's speech of June 23, 1950, Mr. Fan has not removed the statement that the socialization of agriculture belongs to the "distant future" [p. 94]). In sum, these 140-odd pages of less easily available materials are well worth the price of the book for students of China and for those interested in political ideas as well.

Mr. Fan has contributed documentation, but few ideas; Mr. Rejai, though he offers nothing in the way of new or inaccessible materials, has very definite ideas about how the old sources should be interpreted. His views on the nature of Mao Tse-tung's achievement are, in fact, summed up in the title: *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War*. Mao, he suggests, made his main contribution to the theory and practice of revolution in the course of two decades of armed struggle in the countryside; the four main original traits in his thought (pp. xix–xx) are derived from this experience, and the relevance of his thought in the world today lies primarily in the extension of his theory of "people's war" to a global scale. This conception is stated briefly in the introductory notes, but it is perhaps even more eloquently illustrated by Mr. Rejai's choice of documentation. Although he manifestly aims to define the contemporary significance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, he includes substantial extracts from only one major text written since 1949, the speech of February 1957 on contradictions among the people.

No one would deny that the heritage of Yenan, and of the Chingkangshan, is still alive in China today, and significantly influences Mao's perceptions of both internal and external problems. But are the post-1949 metamorphoses of "Mao Tse-tung's Thought" really immanent in his writings of the 1930s and 1940s? And is "war" really the key to the whole edifice?

Mr. Rejai's attempt to construct an overview of the Chairman's thinking begins and ends with the problem of imperialism. Chapter I deals with what imperialism did to China, and how China fought back; Chapter VI is devoted to global strategy against imperialism. Together, they include 48 pages of Mao's writings prior to October 1949, 24 pages by Lin Piao, and only 8 pages of recent statements. There is no doubt that Mao sees the Chinese and world revolutions in the context of the struggle against imperialism and "social-imperialism" (which is brought in by Lin Piao in his speech to the Ninth Party Congress). But do such materials as these provide an adequate framework for understanding China's internal policy, which is covered in Chapters II to V?

It is true that in Chapter II, entitled "Stages of Revolutionary Development," Mr. Rejai introduces some further general considerations about the pattern of the Chinese revolution as a whole, but his analysis is not particularly convincing. He argues, for example, that with the proclamation by Mao in 1949 of a "people's democratic dictatorship," there was "a change in . . . class relationships," the "four-class alliance of new democracy," though it continued to persist, being henceforth "expressed in a new formula—worker-peasant alliance. . ." (p. 86). In fact, Mao repeatedly made plain in the late 1930s that the worker-peasant alliance (hardly a "new" formula, since it was advocated by Lenin in 1905) should constitute the heart of the "dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes of China, headed by the proletariat" which he advocated during the "new-democratic" stage of the revolution. He made this point in many different texts, including some that appear in Mr. Rejai's own volume (pp. 99, 199, etc.). Even more puzzling is the statement that "Mao Tse-tung's theory of revolution is the theory of 'uninterrupted revolution,' " supported by a reference to a text of 1937 in which Mao said explicitly that he did *not* advocate the "Trotskyite theory" of permanent or uninterrupted revolution (p. 88; cf. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 290–91). Would it not have been better to cite some materials of 1958, by which time Mao had changed his mind, and come out in favor of this theory?

Far more serious and basic are the misgivings aroused by Mr. Rejai's failure to devote any serious attention to the stages in China's economic policy since 1949. In a twenty-page survey of the record of "the Communists in power" (pp. 18–37), economic development is one of the "three principal areas" discussed, but it rates only three pages, compared to seven for "national unification," and nearly ten for foreign policy. In Chapter II of the anthology (which is the only one in which these problems are covered at all), the sole item on patterns of organization in the countryside is the Central Committee's resolution of August 1958 on the communes. Neither Mao's speech of July 1955 on agricultural cooperativization (which is mentioned in passing in the introduction, p. 25), nor a single one of the Chairman's many other statements on industry and agriculture since 1950, is included among the texts selected.

Mr. Rejai, of course, regards "war" as more important in Mao's scheme of things than economic development. This prejudice is reflected by his decision to put Chapter IV, on the army, before Chapter V, on the Party, in his exposition of Mao Tse-tung's ideas regarding the institutions which dominate the Chinese political system. It is true that for twenty-two years, from 1927 until 1949, the Chinese Communist Party developed in a context of armed struggle, and owed its very existence to the main instrument of that struggle, the Red Army. But if this experience is the matrix out of which today's Party and army have grown, it does not determine completely either their nature today, or the relations between them. Nor, with reference to the PLA itself, can four fragments (two from 1928–29 and two from 1948) be taken as covering adequately the problem of "democracy" within the army (pp. 255–260; the quotation marks are Mr. Rejai's), before or during the ten-year reign of Lin Piao. The record of the past is indispensable to the understanding of the present; it is, in itself, no substitute for the analysis of present reality.

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A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. By Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. Pp. 231. $12.50.)

The quantitative analysis of social phenomena has entered a new scholarly era in recent years, and this advanced book by three sociologists is good evidence of the basic characteristics of that trend—attention to mathematical theories with tests utilizing empirical data. The book espouses a worthwhile goal of theoretical and mathematical explication plus tests for a mathematical theory of social change closely tied to the Coleman tradition. It consists of a set of ten basic equations which are either investigated or discovered by the authors and eventually reduced to three axioms and eight elementary laws of social change. By definition, the book is relatively narrow in scope, well defined, precise and limited to a specialized audience familiar with social change theory and higher mathematics, including calculus. Although the authors recognize the necessary level of reader sophistication, they attempt to appeal to a broader social science audience through clear prose—a goal which is only partially achieved. But for specialists, the book is important albeit elementary in its treatment of social processes. Its axioms are drawn from mathematical systems theory and behavioral sociology (largely reinforcement theory) with roots in experimental research—all a refreshing deviation from more usual functional fare. Its ingenious reliance on a wide range of social, economic, and political data at both the individual and system level is also an important departure from purely model-building treatises. Most of these data indicate a high level of statistical explanatory power for the equations developed throughout the book; an impressive record to challenge more timid, less applied modelers.

The book is organized around three basic change processes: (1) *adaptation* to social and physical environments for organizations and individuals alike—reflecting heavy reliance on theoretical and empirical research on organizational adaptation. This first substantive chapter contains a detailed discussion of learning curves and yields three basic equations for social adaptation. (2) Social *diffusion*—or the spread of adoption of various mechanical and social innovations through time—consumes four subsequent chapters. Data for model testing are drawn from a wide range of invention categories (transportation, education, marriage, leisure) and various adopting agencies including individuals, firms and governmental units. Particular attention is paid to "exponential epochs" of diffusion and various societal or political forces which interrupt change processes. (3) *Innovations* and their modifications over time are treated in three remaining chapters focusing on the distribution of patents for several mechanical inventions, the combination and recombination of innovations characterized as an exponential process, and several relationships between these elements which yield a socioeconomic theory of development. The final chapter presents the formal development of an integrated axiomatic theory of social change, accompanied by useful rules for scientific research and provocative suggestions for future inquiry.

Although the final chapter is desperately needed following a bombardment of equations and marshaling of data throughout each previous chapter, it does not save the book from a weakness resulting from the parsimony and formal precision of mathematics. While the book has a firmer theoretical base than the raw empiricism of early mathematical sociology, and while there are some verbal descriptions of equations, it is much like a large monograph, technical paper, or support document for a verbal theory—where the reader is *told* the theoretical context of the book without an elaboration or sufficient verbal theoretical explication and with meager development of the meaning or relevance of what the authors are doing. The latter will be clear to only a limited number of readers; others will find little help for understanding the *process* of diffusion or adaptation, and will have little appreciation for why social change occurs in certain isolated patterns which at times appear relatively simplistic and trivial. Yet political scientists can find much to emulate in the precision of this book and in the scientific certainty with which these quantitative sociologists approach the real world. In addition, they will find that the book fits nicely with recent quantitative developments in political science; with a traditional concern for social, economic and political development; and with a growing interest in innovation, diffusion and long-term change. Indeed, political science is ready for more perspectives on the policy sciences and for the investigation of alternative management policies governing rapid social change.

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Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII. Edited by James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1974. Pp. 84. $9.75.)

This is a valuable addition to the earlier series on mathematical applications in political science. Its most distinctive feature is the blending of substance and method. The substantive issues considered are primary elections, congressional voting, judicial behavior, and the analysis of aggregate data. The methods employed are decision theory, correlation, discriminant function analysis, and regression. Of the four essays in the volume, "Dimensionality and Change in Judicial Behavior" by S. Sydney Ulmer reflects the most effective blending of substance and method. Ulmer questions the earlier studies (e.g. Herman Pritchett, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court*, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954] and Glendon Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965]) which employed techniques such as Guttman-scale analysis and factor analysis and clearly implied in their conclusions that all the judges in a particular collegial court are positioned on the same or separate dimensions. The author suggests going beyond simplified dimensional assumptions in judicial behavior research. Ulmer uses discriminant function analysis for analyzing five Supreme Court justices' positions on political activism during the period 1937–68. Conceptualizing political activism as a dynamic dimension in this period, he shows with appropriate as well as adequate data that the 'probability of dimensional existence' was higher for two of these judges (Douglas and Black) than for the other three (Frankfurter, Clark and Reed).

The other three essays are on "Optimal Voting in a Two-Party Primary" by Lawrence S. Mayer, "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Dimensional Analysis: Illustrations from Congressional Voting" by Aage R. Clausen, and "The Uses of Statistics in Aggregate Data Analysis" by Charles Lewis Taylor. Mayer uses decision theory and establishes certain rules governing the optimal behavior of a voter in a two-party open primary. With the use of elementary statistics, Mayer presents clear and elegant proofs of certain theorems, establishing such rules. These rules also apply to a bloc of voters, and Mayer claims that his analysis could be used by a campaign manager to decide the optimal spending of the available funds.

In constructing optimal behavior for a voter, Mayer makes certain assumptions, some of them too simplistic even for deductive theory, to which Mayer's paper unquestionably makes a contribution. Thus, he assumes that the primary contains two parties with one of which the voter *identifies*; the voter cannot abstain; and a voter's choice affects the choice of no other voter. In fact, there is more of method than substance in this paper. Although Mayer establishes rules for a real political situation, there are no real political data in the paper.

Aage R. Clausen argues that "objectivity in research needs to be complemented by subjective evaluations of the phenomena under study" (p. 15). The stagement is self-evident. Clausen does admit that this is not a novel idea, but he maintains that "it is not explicated and implemented to the extent that it deserves" (p. 15). In order to establish his "thesis" Clausen considers the use of dimensional analysis, as exemplified by factor and Guttman-scale analysis, on congressional roll-call data. While demonstrating his preference for the "conceptual" approach over the objective approach, he emphasizes judgment prior to the analysis. As he writes, "If you don't know where you are going, how can you possibly know when you have arrived?" (p. 38). Clausen's contribution is in reiterating with sound logic and excellent data what most researchers believe in and practice.

Charles L. Taylor also emphasizes the essential theme of this volume: "Political sophistication must be at least as important as methodological sophistication in understanding politics" (p. 84). He questions "barefoot empiricism" in aggregate data analysis and suggests the integration of theory in the analysis of data. He argues that data analysis and theory construction are basically identical processes.

Taylor questions some of the assumptions made in order to be rigorous. He points out that the most basic assumption of random sampling in statistical inference is violated in aggregate data analysis. He discusses at some length the use of regression analysis, giving particular attention to residuals. His main arguments are well presented and do clarify some of the pitfalls in the use of aggregate data; however, he could have used political data instead of data on GNP and scientific authorship to strengthen these arguments.

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Le Nationalisme, facteur belligène. By Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1972. Pp. 387. No price indicated.)

All symposia are uneven, but some are more uneven than others. This book, which is made of the apparently unedited papers and transcripts (complete with "Excellence, Mesdames, Messieurs," with rhetorical flourishes, and with forensic jokes) of a conference held in Brussels, may well have a good claim to primacy in this respect. This is not because of the lack of a central idea, even less of a guiding theme. Most of the authors do refer to the question raised by the title: to what extent is nationalism responsible for wars? (Why anything having to do with war must be expressed in pseudo-Latin, like "belligène" and pseudo-Greek, like "polemology," two terms of which the book makes an utterly immoderate use, defies any explanation other than in terms of an almost touchingly naive desire for presenting old thoughts in new, apparently scientific disguise.) The general inspiration—to encourage the sociological study of war, to do it through a multidisciplinary effort and to build bridges between traditional approaches and the methodogically and politically more revolutionary or trendy movement of peace research—could not be sounder. Some of the papers make genuine contributions to the understanding of the problem. Yet, as a coherent effort, the book certainly is a failure, sometimes verging on the ridiculous.

This is not only due to the sizable proportion of papers which should just have been eliminated because they consist of circumstantial speeches or of barely intelligible outlines. The main reason is that the substantive papers themselves fall into three very different categories.

A first type, which is the most representative of the organizer's intentions, addresses the question of the meaning of nationalism and of its relations with war at a very general level, that of a broadly descriptive discourse. Often witty or erudite, but just as often complacent and rambling, these pieces address such questions as: "The Nation as a Belligenous myth" (Prof. J. Willequet) "Why is Nationalism a Belligenous Factor? (General Werner), "Nationalism and the Army (Prof. Lory), "The Religious Spirit and Nationalism (Prof. Abel). Their general theme is that while patriotism is good, nationalism is bad and relies on insecurity, aggression, and idolatry. They do not seem, except through an occasional insight, to add much to existing interpretations of nationalism as a new religion. An exception must be made, in this group, for General Werner's article: it is a serious piece of work, based on genuine erudition; it tries to stick to the analytical distinctions it posits at the beginning, and it insists on the impact of the psychological disruptions and insecurities caused by social, demographic, economic, and technological change as a crucial factor encouraging the resurgence of nationalism (whose possibility is always implicit in the political division of mankind into sovereign states) as a defensive and potentially agressive reaction at this particular time.

The second group, which is not presented explicitly as being composed of case studies, nevertheless concentrates heavily on the specific case of French nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century. A very detailed and competent literature report by Nadine Bernard on "Nationalism and War in France" (1871–1914) sums up recent French historical research on the question of Alsace Lorraine, on the influence of textbooks, on the attitude of the worker movement. The fascinating question of the sudden nationalist revival at the turn of the century is approached from many angles, although obviously not solved. Equally fascinating is an article by Prof. Henri Bernard, on the link, in the same period, between nationalist ideology and the prevailing French military doctrine of unconditional offensive. Prof. Raymond Poitevin sums up—in twelve pages—his important thesis about Franco-German economic and financial relations, showing they were more influenced by ideological and political factors than vice versa. All these chapters contain highly interesting material but are not related to the general problem by any analytical framework or any serious discussion aiming at drawing the general lessons, if any, to be learned from their studies.

Finally, three papers stand out as providing the combination of generality and precision which the volume lacks as a whole. Prof. M. Weyembergh, on "The Philosophical Bases of Nationalism" has deliberately chosen to avoid vague generalizations and to concentrate on a specific case, that of the influence of Fichte's thought on German nationalism. But he does so on the basis of a very rigorous and rewarding attempt at defining the nature of ideology, its relations to philosophy and at raising important questions about the political influence of ideas.

Prof. Goriely's paper, on "The Social and Psychological bases of Nationalism" also concentrates on a specific case, that of World War I. But in his quite brilliant discussion of its origins, as well as of the Versailles settlement, he manages to contribute illuminating insights to the question of relations between nationalism and imperialism and to the polemics between Marxist and non-Marxist interpretations.

Finally, Prof. Röling's paper, "Peace, a Problem of World Structure" is the most general of the group I have singled out and even of the book as a whole, since it is a general presentation of the author's views about peace and peace research. But its intellectual virtues are such that it does shed light on the problem of nationalism as well as on that of war. The central point, presented in the terms of the debate which was raging in Europe, a few years ago, between classical and revolutionary peace research, or between the advocates of negative and of positive peace, reminds one of K. Waltz's discussion of the three images in *Man, the State and War*. Essentially Röling shows the danger of confusing the search for justice and the search for peace, of implying that social inequality, however defined, is the cause of war and of neglecting the specific character and dangers of the interstate structure as such.

To the extent, then, that a message emerges from the best articles in the collection, its points to the importance of political, psychological, and cultural factors and to the obscurities of their links with social and economic changes, tensions and conflicts. Many areas (like the Third World) and aspects are practically left untouched. But, uneven and chaotic as it is, the book does serve a useful function: it shows (at least implicitly) the mutual relevance of discussions which are usually kept separate. It leads the way towards a reconsideration of peace research in the light of political philosophy and of current polemics on nationalism and the fate of the nation-state in the light of detailed historical studies.

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Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties. By Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1972. Pp. 262. $6.95.)

Things To Come is supposed to enlighten a concerned and educated public about the issues, problems, and opportunities of the seventies and eighties. It is also an introduction to the assumptions, methods, and language used by the Hudson Institute.

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs update and popularize ideas discussed earlier in Kahn's *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (1970) and Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener's *The Year 2000* (1967). Readers familiar with these works will recognize the "Long-term Multifold Trend of Western Culture" (somewhat modified) and the extensive use of tables, "chartpages," scenarios, historical analogies, and "surprise-free projections" illustrating the spread of military technology, possibilities of nuclear and conventional war, continued growth in the Japanese economy, and possible changes in the distribution of power in the international system.

New material appears in a detailed comparison between the contemporary world and "La Belle Epoque" (1900–1914) and in a thoughtful warning that uncontrolled technological advances in an "undersized and underorganized" environment may lead to a disastrous technological crisis around 1985. For the domestic American scene the authors develop neutral, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios, consider domestic consequences of a Vietnam debacle, explore potential confrontations between countervailing forces (the Reformation and Counterreformation act as analogies for the counterculture and possible populist or "ideological renewal" reactions), and comment schematically on the nature of postindustrial society.

The intended audience may find the presentation of these topics less appealing than do the authors. Wells, Huxley, and even Toffler show much greater sensitivity to the interests, dreams, and fears of contemporary Americans. Besides, readers will search in vain for meaningful examples portraying life in a future America, general themes uniting the disparate chapters, or any apparent overall organization by subject matter. There is no bibliography and few references to other published research, and the promised "introduction to the techniques and assumptions of futurology and policy research" (p. 4) is extremely disappointing. The authors simply do not furnish enough information on their methodology, sources, or reasoning in specific cases to allow the average reader to arrive at an independent judgment. One might argue that the reasoning underlying the forecasts may be more interesting than the forecasts themselves.

Readers will be reminded frequently that nothing becomes obsolete more rapidly than a work on the future. The expectations of better ballistic missile defenses and continued hostile relations with Peking are less striking in light of recent events in the Middle East (an area virtually ignored) than is a touching confidence in continued high rates of economic growth, agricultural overproduction, and the decreasing relevance of military force. The rise of a dictator or the assassination of a president may be impossible to predict, but given its resources one would expect that the Hudson Institute would not overlook basic features of the physical and social environment. Nevertheless, the authors do not consider seriously the *possibility* of major changes in weather patterns, the cumulative effects of population growth and the technology of synthetics, simultaneous high rates of inflation and unemployment, stagflation, the political use of natural resources by the Arab nations, or the dependence of Japanese industrialists and Green Revolution farmers on large amounts of inexpensive oil.

The extensive use of historical trends and analogies is based, I suspect, on the sound belief that only an analysis solidly grounded in the past is capable of distinguishing between important changes and superficial, local, or short-term phenomena. Nevertheless, in the absence of any explanatory model of historical development or any theoretical framework integrating social and cultural phenomena, the static historical analogies between contemporary society and La Belle Epoque or the Hellenistic world serve more as scholarly cosmetics than as sources of persuasive insights into future developments in Western society.

Equally disturbing are stereotype portraits of social groups and national character, ambiguous or simplistic statements in tables and scenarios, and serious flaws in theory and methodology. For example, the ethnocentric list of "The 12 Traditional Societal Levers" (p. 78) caricatures anthropology and psychology when the authors argue that twelve disparate and nebulous factors [e.g., 1) "Religion, tradition, and authority;" 4) "Defense of frontiers (territoriality);" 8) "The manly emphasis;" 9) "The puritan ethic;" 11) "Other sublimation and/or repression of sexual, aggressive, aesthetic, and/or other instincts;" and so forth] historically provided "meaning and purpose to life" for Western man. In the subsequent discussion of the erosion of these "levers" among upper and upper-middle class youth, it becomes apparent that "Western man" also includes Mexico, Colombia, and Japan. Another example is "The Long-term Multifold Trend of Western Culture" (p. 8) which is made up of different classes of phenomena in no way exhaustive or mutually exclusive. More important, the absence of cultural, historical, or geographic distinctions suggests an improbably uniform route of development for all Western societies, while leaving in limbo the fate of the non-Western majority of the world.

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs create a credibility gap, particularly for a younger generation, when they claim, "We have tried to take a 'value-free' perspective, indulging in attempts to achieve what Marxists sneeringly call 'bourgeois objectivity' " (p. 244). The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios in chapter six, the chart comparing "probably healthy" and "probably unhealthy" life styles (p. 79), the smug, unsympathetic description of the counterculture (p. 92), the speculations about a confrontation between the "responsible center" and the irresponsible "humanist left" (p. 82) leave little doubt about the authors' real sympathies.

In conclusion, the defects of *Things To Come* are likely to deter the general reader, unless he is searching for an all-too-revealing insight into the mentality of a think tank which is as influential among politicians and businessmen in France and Japan as it is in North America. It is obvious, however, that considerable research and thought have gone into the formulation and organization of the numerous tables and scenarios. Specialists in international affairs and future studies will find these to be useful sources of interesting ideas and stimulating insights. The whole may be less than the sum of the parts, but many of the parts deserve close attention.

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The Revolutions of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung." By Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. (New York: International Publishers, 1972. Pp. 302. $2.25, paper.)

More than ever before, we have now in English, in readily available and inexpensive editions, the writings of Marx and Engels. Some, like *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Grundrisse*, were unknown to Marxian scholars of twenty, or even ten years ago. International Publisher's recent volume, *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"* is a welcome addition to the growing list of easily accessible primary documents, for it brings together in compact form some of the most important of Marx and Engel's journalist writings of that important era of European revolution. The complete "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" contributions of Marx and Engels will appear in the forthcoming English edition of their collected works.

This growing list of readily available primary texts is important. When pieces like *The German Ideology* or *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* made their appearance, minor revolutions in the interpretation of Marx occurred. Those documents initiated the early-late Marx controversy. The more recent publication in English of *The Grundrisse* has further complicated the picture of Marx's intellectual development, and of what we are to make of it. The lesson, then, appears to be this. The Marxists and anti-Marxists of, for example, the period of the Second International had a very truncated, one-sided view of Marx. As more texts come to light or make their impact by being widely disseminated, our picture of Marx and Engels grows fuller and richer. No one restricted to English can, I think, arrive at any "final" understanding of Marx and Engels until the English-language edition of the collected works appears, for only then will we have a fully formed picture of just what they said. One impression that occurred to me after reading the present selection, for instance, is the implausibility of the claim that Marx contemplated a nonrevolutionary road to communism, a claim put forward by Shlomo Avineri in his *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). One cannot select suitable parts of Marx and Engel's writings; each part must be interpreted in the light of the whole corpus. When this is done, whatever slender "evidence" there may be in Marx for a nonrevolutionary road becomes swallowed up by the larger picture that emerges from, for instance, his writings of the 1848–49 period.

The volume itself is, happily in this day of inflation, inexpensively priced at $2.25. It comes with a useless, eleven-page foreword signed by one "S. Z. Leviova," which reads like a Soviet school textbook on European history. The subtlety of Marx and Engels' own analyses are caricatured by the banalities of the foreword. A less strident, more straightforward introduction setting out clearly the main developments of the 1848–1849 period would have been a useful addition for those readers who lack familiarity with nineteenth century European history.

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52 Peaceful Societies. By Matthew Melko. (Ontario, Canada: Canadian Peace Research Institute Press, 1973. Pp. 223. $7.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

This is a pioneering study, somewhat in the tradition of Lewis F. Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, of an extensive sample of societies which have had 100 years or more of peace, from 2560 B.C. to the present. The societies are all "historical" in the sense that information about them is derived mainly from written records. These episodes range widely over time and space; there is hardly a century in the last 2,000 years, at least, when there is not a century of peace going on somewhere in the world, and every continent is represented with the rather odd exception of South America, Costa Rica being the only Latin American representative.

The definition of peace is perhaps open to question. The author who teaches at S.U.N.Y. at Genesco, N.Y., in effect defines peace as existing for a territory when actual physical violence on a large organized scale is not proceeding within the area. Many of the countries which he cites are at war elsewhere in the period which he defines as peace, so that the essential criterion is whether actual combat is taking place within the area concerned. Consequently, some of his peaceful centuries involve a great deal of fighting on the part of the societies concerned, but as long as this is carried on elsewhere, the situation is defined as peace. The author seems a little uneasy himself about this definition, but it can be defended as a significant social state.

What the author calls "peace," therefore, might perhaps better be called "non-battlegrounds." If the author had defined these in terms of smaller areas, rather than national units, the number of periods of peace would have been very much larger. Thus, we might visualize a large matrix in which, say, every ten square miles of the earth's surface is laid out on one axis and every year for the last 5000 years on the other. We could color each square red if warlike operations were going on in it, white if it were not. Then the "peace" that we are really studying equals the white squares of this matrix. The matrix would almost certainly show, incidentally, that peace is by far and away the prevailing pattern of human activity. One would be a little surprised if more than 5 per cent of the squares of this matrix would be colored red. In order to identify war rather than peace, we would require a much more complex three-dimensional matrix, showing all national war-making units on two axes, with all possible pairs in the triangle between them and the time dimension on the third axis. A red cube would show where any two countries had been at war on a given date. This, however, would have to be the subject of another study.

Having identified the periods of peace on this definition, the author then proceeds to study their common characteristics. He finds they frequently originate with a charismatic leader, followed by an organizationally skilled consolidator. He classifies the societies into four types—insular, imperial, inter-state systems, and interstice states or buffer states. After the establishment of a well-ordered society, at least, mediocrity and efficiency, tepid ideologies, modest ambitions, and the tendency not to make alliances seem good recipes for a long peace. The form of the political and economic system, common languages or cultures, arms control and disarmament agreements, and population densities seem to have made very little difference. The consequences of a long peace seem to be benign; it does seem to produce prosperity—peaceful societies are often vital and active in the arts and are not dull.

On the other hand, the conditions which produced the long peace always eventually seem to erode. The author does not make use of the theory of threat systems, which obviously would seem to be helpful here, but it is clear that insofar as a long peace rests on a certain stability in perceptions of threat, this will erode as old threat centers decay and new ones arise. Peace ends perhaps because the mediocrity and modesty which produce it are not adaptable enough to deal with new situations. Mediocre people can end a peace very easily; it takes rather exceptional people to establish it.

The book is very clearly written and embellished with useful tables and maps. Students will find it fascinating. It would be extremely useful in the burgeoning peace studies programs, but it would be useful, also, in more conventional international relations courses. It would give the student a sense of the totality of the international system as it spreads out over time and space. It is an excellent exercise in what might be called the "entification" of history, that is, a perception of space-time entities within the total pattern of space-time and the classification of these entities into species. The "long peace" entity, which the author identifies, is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary species—many others could be delineated—but it is at least as clear and as interesting as most social species, and further studies of this kind are much to be recommended.

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Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government. Edited by Arthur J. Slavin. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 294. $11.95.)

Tudor men rather than Tudor institutions dominate this volume published in honor of Professor Walter C. Richardson. In the first of these ten essays Stanford E. Lehmberg surveys one of the most spectacular success stories in English history, the remarkable career of Lord Chancellor Thomas Audley (d.1544) and investigates how he acquired his vast wealth. (This inquiry is all the more valuable because there is still no study of the property accumulated by Thomas Cromwell.) Mortimer Levine on "The Fall of Edward, duke of Buckingham" is disappointing and misleading; although he was the most powerful English nobleman of his day, the last Stafford duke of Buckingham cannot be regarded as "a great magnate of the fifteenth-century type" (p. 34), nor did he enjoy an enormous annual landed income of over £6,000. In "Lord Chancellor Wriothesley and Reform of Augmentations: New Light on an Old Court," A. J. Slavin publishes for the first time (from a manuscript in the Hampshire County Record Office) an important memorandum probably written by Wriothesley late in 1546, shortly before his fall. J. R. Lander's skeptical and well-documented essay on "The Hundred Years War and Edward IV's 1475 Campaign in France" will command attention, but it does seem incongruous in a volume devoted to Tudor studies.

Three of the more substantial contributions deal with aspects of the judicial activities of royal courts. By analyzing the plea roll for 1506–1507, DeLloyd J. Guth shows that although royal justice was expanding in the early Tudor period, the common-law jurisdiction of the Exchequer of Pleas had become relatively insignificant. In the late sixteenth century the Exchequer of Chester had lost its fiscal jurisdiction, but as a court of law it had gained a new place in the Tudor governmental system; W. H. Jones's "The Exchequer of Chester in the last years of Elizabeth I" (the longest chapter in this volume) examines the difficulties that this court was encountering before 1600 and considers its eventual failure in the seventeenth century to meet the judicial needs of the county palatine. In "The Enforcement of Royal Proclamations under the Provisions of the Statute of Proclamations, 1539–1547," R. W. Heinze concludes that after the Statute of Proclamations of 1539 royal proclamations were enforced by the Court of Star Chamber (and not by the new court created by that statute). Connoisseurs of administrative history will find this book indispensable, and ecclesiastical and legal history have not been neglected. In "The Essex Puritan Movement and the Bawdy Courts, 1577–94," Jay P. Anglin's main theme is the limited success that accompanied the efforts of Archbishop Whitgift and Bishop John Aylmer (d.1594) of London to secure clerical conformity in Essex. A major expansion in the Inns of Court at which lawyers were educated took place during Elizabeth I's reign; in "The Matriculation Revolution and Education at the Inns of Court in Renaissance England," Louis A. Knafla studies the causes and consequences of one of the most important developments that occurred in higher education in Tudor England.

The last writer, G. R. Elton on "The Rule of Law in sixteenth-century England" is likely to prove the most controversial (and widely read) of these contributors. Dr. Elton regards "the essential character of the Tudor state" as "a slightly old-fashioned problem" (p. 265). While refuting the views of W. H. Dunham, Jr., and Joel Hurstfield, and maintaining convincingly that even in Henry VIII's reign Tudor government never became a despotism, Elton observes that "Tudor rulers, like all rulers, occasionally did things that were not lawful." He sees the executive power of the crown in sixteenth-century England as subject to two great limitations; these were royal "dependence on a network of self-reliant men throughout the realm" (p. 294) and the rule of law. This interesting volume is a fitting tribute to one of the most distinguished of Tudor historians; its usefulness would have been enhanced by the inclusion of an index.

T. B. PUGH

University of Southampton, England

The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century. By Beryl Smalley. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973. Pp. 258. $13.50.)

Professor Beryl Smalley writes with the noble simplicity and charm of a medieval Master. The theme of her book, as the title suggests, is not Becket himself, whose story has been told many times, but the role played by contemporary theologians in his struggle with Henry II over the liberties of the Church in England. On the issue at hand Smalley professes to remain neutral. Her purpose is not to pass judgment on the various theologians involved in the controversy but to determine (a) what their political views were and (b) whether they were prepared to act on them "when the crunch came" (p. 17).

Recent historical research has shown that the twelfth-century schoolmen (Smalley's "intellectuals") were far from being as free from political pressures as was once commonly thought. They depended on the Church for their livelihood and protection and would normally have been expected to side with her in the event of a conflict with the secular authority. The Becket controversy, which "marked high tide in the claims of *sacerdotium* against *regnum*" (p. 239), provided a unique test of the sincerity of their intellectual convictions. It gave rise, among other things, to a new kind of political theology promoted mainly by the Paris schools, whose Masters were to have an immediate and decisive influence on the formation of clerical opinion.

The book reveals beyond the shadow of a doubt that, contrary to what has often been asserted, these theologians were not bribed and willing agents of the papacy; nor were they detached scholars indifferent to the burning issues of the day. Most of them were politically committed clerics whose ardor had to be restrained rather than stimulated by the Pope (see p. 157). Their views differed widely. The Paris Masters and their followers rallied behind Becket and became his most effective propagandists. Others, like the Henrician Gilbert Foliot, were against Becket from the start and never wavered in their opposition to him. What is remarkable is that virtually all of them seem to have been guided by principle rather than by self-interest, as is borne out by their readiness to suffer poverty, loss of ecclesiastical or political favor, and, in Becket's case, martyrdom for the sake of their cause.

Smalley's "hero," if the term is not inappropriate, would appear to be neither the uncompromising Becket nor his opponent, Henry, but Pope Alexander III, who emerges as the true "theorist" of expediency (p. 159). Like Becket, Alexander was fully dedicated to the defense of the Church, but he also proved to be a man of keen political sense. If the author is correct, it was he who first devised the theory of *raison d'Eglise*, by which he managed to save his own face all of the time and that of his theologians most of the time (p. 239).

Equally instructive from the standpoint of the history of Church-State relations are the side effects of the controversy. Not long after Becket's death, his own admirers began to develop "second thoughts" about the whole matter (pp. 216–34). Even Herbert of Basham, who had been his closest friend and advisor, was forced to concede that the bitter conflict had brought harm to both the religious and the secular powers. The prevailing mood at the end of the century is best illustrated by the example of Albert of Louvain, whose assassination at the hands of the Emperor, Henry VI, in circumstances not unlike those of Becket, created barely a ripple in ecclesiastical circles. Albert's murder came "too late to be noticed" (p. 215). Becket's successors had learned to approach their task with a more practical, down-to-earth outlook. New problems and new modes of thought had already started to solicit the attention of the schoolmen, who now took a more positive view of the secular authority and recognized its indispensable function in promoting the good of society.

Smalley is obviously more at home with the complexities of history than with the abstractions of political theory. She is at her best when she describes the careers and political activities of the twelfth-century Masters, the academic reaction to Becket's assassination, and the cult which grew up around the martyr in the years that followed his demise. Her remarks on the subject of political allegory (pp. 30–36) add much to our knowledge of that important but often neglected genre and serve as a useful complement to H. de Lubac's classic study of medieval exegesis. One regrets that, in the case of certain, more subtle thinkers, such as John of Salisbury, greater care has not been taken to penetrate beneath the surface of the argument to the level at which the inconsistencies noted by the author (e.g., p. 100) might find their deeper unity.

ERNEST L. FORTIN

Boston College

The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism. By Sterling Stuckey. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1972. Pp. 265. $8.95.)

The Black Muslims in America. By C. Eric Lincoln. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1973, originally published, 1961. Pp. 302. $2.95.)

The nature, scope, and manifestations of black nationalism in this country have recently gained significant attention from social scientists. Recent movements such as the Black Power Movement, the Republic of New Africa Movement, the Black Panther Party and the rise in black elected officials have aided in the emergence of new studies and explorations such as these two works.

Professor Stuckey's work journeys into the past in search of documents and spokesmen for black nationalism and he succeeds in finding some. The documents in his book, he notes in the introduction, "indicate that black nationalist ideology, contrary to the view advanced in certain quarters, developed at least two decades before Martin Delany became nationally known for his advocacy of black hegemony" (p. 2). Using seven documents ranging from Robert Alexander Young's *Ethiopian Manifesto* issued in 1829, to Martin Delany's *The Political Destiny of the Colored Race* issued in 1854, Stuckey shows that black nationalism did exist and indeed flowered during the nineteenth century. In his introduction, he indicates how each man in this period used the resources then available to him to propogate his ideas on the destiny of the black race.

In the first document by Robert Young, the inferior place in society relegated to those of African decent is clearly set forth. David Walker's document is an address in nationalist language urging the slaves to rebel. In the third document, Reverend Lewis Woodson lays bare a plan for the moral elevation of black people based on the creative dimensions of Afro-American culture. The fourth and fifth documents argue for and advance numerous schemes for building a black nation relying primarily upon self-help. And the final document by Martin Delany shows the search for a land for black people. An excellent introduction by the editor, Stuckey, ties all of these documents together.

Stuckey concludes by stating that during this era, "there were no monolithic conceptions of black nationalism projected by (any) nationalist figures." The idea of black nationalism then as now lacked unity, and specificity. These insights and some of the documents which cannot be easily obtained elsewhere make the volume extremely valuable.

On the other hand, Professor C. Eric Lincoln's revised work on the Black Muslim movement captures an organizational manifestation of black nationalism in contemporary society. The book is still the *best* study of how a segment of the black community has operationalized aspects of black nationalism to save and improve their self-concepts and adjust to a white racist society. Lincoln writes: "The Muslims have abandoned the fundamental principles of the American creed and have substituted in its place a new system of values perceived as more consistent with the realities of their circumstances" (p. xxix). This new system of values for the Muslims embraced the fact that not only should they

> resist assimilation and avoid interracial participation in the life of the community, but the Muslim creed assigns all non-blacks to the sub-human status of "devils" (and promises to treat them as such); the sustaining philosophy is one of black supremacy nurtured by a careful inculcation of suspicions of the white man and his characteristic institutions. (p. xxix).

The revisions which have been made in chapters 1 and 5–9, set the Muslim movement in the context of the Civil Rights movement of the sixties as well as linking it to some of the new black organizations that came into existence then. In addition, the book also sheds some light on those blacks of the "Moslem" faith that oppose the Black Muslim sect in this country.

Both books provide visions into one aspect of black political thought, its conflicts and ambiguities as well as its practical applications. And both works provide an array of insights into the forces seeking to combat this sociopolitical ideology. For the political scientist, the historical work by Stuckey gives depth and a longitudinal thrust, while the sociological work by Lincoln depicts the institutional realities. These unique approaches provide the background for the possible forthcoming political expression of this present socioreligious phenomenon.

HANES WALTON, JR.

Savannah State College

The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History. By Bernard Asbell. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973. Pp. 461. $10.00.)

Bernard Asbell, a free-lance author, has added to the voluminous literature on Franklin D. Roosevelt by ghost-writing the President's memoirs nearly thirty years after his death. This is his second book on Roosevelt. In an earlier study, *When Roosevelt Died* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), he described public reaction to the death of the thirty-second president. The idea for the present work came up when the author and two editor friends were discussing presidents and lamenting that FDR had not lived to write his memoirs. Asbell accepted the challenge of filling the historical gap, believing that through this unusual technique he could reveal more fully the mind and character of a complex personality.

Actually the author takes two approaches to his subject. One is through a first-person narrative, extending in time from preinauguration days through the end of the second term. In these chapters he has FDR re-creating the crisis atmosphere, expounding his political philosophy, and explaining the strategy for enacting specific programs for coping with the economic and social ills of the nation. There are also appraisals of political friends and foes, as well as commentary on the deficiencies of Congress and the Supreme Court. A second approach is through biographical vignettes which focus on selected aspects of FDR's life. These are included at the end of each memoir chapter as an aid to understanding the linkage between Roosevelt's public acts and private life. Such is the format of the book.

Reading the memoirs is reminiscent of listening to the fireside chats. The tone is conversational and the style simplistic. The President is speaking again to the people about agricultural crops, conservation, emergency relief, the Blue Eagle, wages and hours, and other New Deal landmarks. It is a familiar story told in an uncritical way and offering no new insights or revelations to scholars in the field. The memoirs will be of interest primarily to the general reader and secondary school student looking for a novel and readable introduction to the New Deal period. Whether Roosevelt himself, in retrospect and with perspective, would have written such a superficial account of the first eight years it is impossible to know. In any case the ghosted posthumous memoir serves as an inadequate substitute for an original.

The biographical essays are well done. Asbell made use of the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park, conducted interviews, and assimilated a great deal of secondary literature. The analyses and interpretations of FDR's relationship with his mother, of the Lucy Mercer affair, and especially of the role of Missy LeHand in his life, are illuminating and perceptive. These chapters are a necessary and valuable complement to the memoirs. Through them the author succeeds to some extent in penetrating to the inner man. The book as a whole, however, does not live up to the claim on the cover of being a creative breakthrough in the art of biography.

PAUL T. HEFFRON

Library of Congress

The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. By Ralph J. Bunche. Edited with an Introduction by Dewey W. Grantham. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 682. $17.50.)

This publication contains the basic findings presented in a massive report prepared in 1940 by Ralph Johnson Bunche for the Carnegie Corporation's study of the Negro in the United States. Entitled "The Political Status of the Negro," this report strongly conditioned Gunnar Myrdal's treatment of the black political experience in writing *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, the most comprehensive study of race relations in America ever undertaken. Dr. Bunche, then a young professor of political science at Howard University, was a principal member of Myrdal's staff of scholars and helped to develop the research design for the study.

The report, one of four memoranda Bunche prepared, was based upon extensive field notes on several hundred interviews conducted by Bunche, Myrdal, and Bunche's assistants. However, the report also reflected Bunche's experience as a black American, and his long interest in the black political experience.

Developed as a working paper for Myrdal's use, Bunche's memorandum, he emphasized, was "not a finished product" (p. vii), because meeting stringent deadlines had inevitably resulted in "a terribly hurried, poorly integrated, and roughly written job" (p. viii). Thus the editor, Professor Dewey W. Grantham, somewhat overstates the manuscript's weaknesses in explaining the editing he did—which was relatively minor. He found it nevertheless, to be "impressive" and could "only admire the ambitious scope of the study, the care with which it dealt with many aspects of the subject and the seriousness of purpose and scholarly commitment that are reflected in its pages" (p. xxxi).

Consisting of 1,660 typed pages in its original form, this comprehensive report is divided into 19 chapters. The first parts examine the American political tradition and the historical background for the study of the political condition of black Americans in modern times. Other chapters deal with politics in the contemporary South, restrictions on registration and voting, the white primary, the poll tax, the Negro at the polls in the inner and outer South, Negro participation in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's (AAA) cotton referenda, Negroes in selected southern cities, the Negro as an issue in southern politics, benefits derived from black political activity, Republican politics in southern states, liberalism in the South, black political participation in the North, and the Negro and New Deal agencies. An extensive bibliography prepared by the editor is included.

In his careful examination of the entire southern political process, Bunche focused upon three salient features: (1) the extreme decentralization, looseness, and incredibly corrupt political practices; (2) the tremendous extent of disfranchisement of both blacks and whites; and (3) the almost complete lack of effective reform movements at the local level. Though there were variations between and within states, all across Dixie overwhelming evidence was found of a pattern of inefficient, unfair, and fraudulent electoral administration, often in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. Ignorance, dishonesty, and deepseated prejudice were found to be rampant among southern election officials. Voluminous testimony indicated that in support of corrupt county and municipal political machines, "Votes are controlled, and checked by registration slips, the 'chain letter' system, vote buying, poll tax payment, double voting, vote stealing, 'counting out' unfortunate candidates, employment of 'agents' to sign up voters, and many variations of these methods" (p. xviii).

Despite black southerners' enormous political and economic burdens and feelings of hopelessness, Bunche perceived the Southland to be in a period of transiton. For although the black masses remained disfranchised, he detected significant beginnings of change. With growing numbers of Negroes showing increasing determination to enter politics, "there has been a gradual easing of barriers. . ." and black registration and voting were slowly expanding. Despite the many obstacles placed in their way, Bunche reported, blacks in some parts of the South, like those in the North, were learning that the ballot is negotiable and can be used to secure better public services, jobs, fairer treatment, etc.

This volume reveals the nature of Bunche's view of the race problem and his perceptions of the human condition. Nowhere can there be found a more incisive and forthright indictment of the failure of American society toward black citizens, whose conditions "make a mockery of the Constitution." He recognized that in 1940 "the United States has all the necessary raw materials for a native American fascism," and that "the Negro is no longer indispensable in this country. . ." (p.

113). But, though deeply sensitive to the disabilities of blacks, Bunche never succumbs to racial chauvinism. He is also concerned about poor, exploited whites and other minority groups. He believes "that there is a virtual identity of fundamental interest between Negro and white citizens" (p. 104). And he insists that

> . . . it is useless to think in terms of full Negro citizenship so long as white and black citizens must engage in daily violent struggle for the wherewithal of life. This is the process that feeds fuel to the fires of race prejudice and perpetuates those mores which stand guard against Negro entrance to the polls. The economy must afford a far larger measure of security for all before the Negro can hope for much greater political advancement (p. 117).

Assessing its significance, the editor notes that numerous scholars have used Bunche's manuscript and have been influenced by his interpretation of southern politics. It should be added that a generation of students, impressed by Bunche's scholarly insights, have addressed many of the questions he posed for study. Accordingly his impact upon the literature of black politics and the American system has been substantial and lasting.

Perhaps Professor Grantham's main error was his view that Bunche may have "exaggerated the significance of the black man's participation in the cotton referenda" (p. xxv). I myself was able to confirm Bunche's evaluation of the importance of this voting experience in an intensive study of "Negro-White Participation in the AAA Cotton and Tobacco Referenda . . ." (Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947).

This remarkable and very useful document is of great historical significance as an instrument by which to measure meaningful change in the political status of black Americans. The second Reconstruction cannot be assessed without knowledge of the conditions illuminated so effectively in Dr. Bunche's memorandum.

ROBERT E. MARTIN

Howard University

Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform. By John D. Buenker. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. Pp. 299. $8.95.)

Professor Buenker tells us that:

> U.S. history, until very recently, has been almost exclusively the story of the native, Protestant middle class. Only . . . with the rise of significant numbers of non-British-American historians, have the sagas of blacks, Indians, Chicanos, and others been investigated to any degree. Even then, the greatest problem has been integrating their experiences into the entire fabric of American history, because they square so little with prevailing interpretations. (p. 212)

The "prevailing interpretation" which Professor Buenker challenges is that of the limited or negative role of the urban new-stock masses in the making of the reforms of the Progressive Era. Instead, Buenker argues that the urban new-stock working class elected Democrats who were a crucial component of most of the reform coalitions.

The primary data are newspaper reports and official legislative records of debates and votes in the state legislatures of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Illinois. Buenker uses these data to demonstrate that, on the key reform issues, the bulk of the urban ethnic Democrats consistently supported reforms.

Chapters are devoted to early welfare legislation, business regulation and taxation, reforms in the political system, and the prohibition movement. Urban legislators were strong supporters of early welfare legislation including workmens' compensation, industrial health codes, limitations on the number of working hours, and restrictions on the employment of women and children. These same legislators supported efforts to regulate big business (especially public utilities) and to ratify the income tax amendment.

Contrary to the "prevailing interpretation," the roll-call record of the urban legislators is also positive on most "good government" reforms. The urbanites favored the direct election of senators, home rule, reapportionment, initiative and referendum (means of bypassing rural controlled legislatures), and direct primaries. They opposed civil service, the city manager and woman suffrage although most adjusted to the inevitability of woman suffrage and supported the amendment in the end.

Urban lawmakers broke with middle-class progressives over the issue of prohibition. Buenker argues that the ritualistic religious traditions to which most of the urbanites adhered contrasted to the middle-class pietistic traditions which stressed the responsibility of its adherents to improve the individual morality of everyone. Out of these pietistic traditions came the crusade for prohibition. Although the new-stock machine politicians and the middle-class reformers could and did cooperate on many issues (most reform could not have taken place without such coalitions which often included labor), they were at loggerheads over prohibition.

Does Buenker make a convincing case for the reform contributions of the urban new-stock Americans? Yes, but there are still some doubts.

First, the terms urban, new-stock, machine, and Democratic are used almost interchangeably. But, many legislators from urban areas were neither new-stock nor Democratic nor supported by a machine. Buenker show convincingly that urban legislators provided crucial support on many progressive votes, but rarely differentiates among types of urban legislators.

Second, there are no criteria supplied for the selection of the seven states. Would the conclusions have been the same in, for instance, Pennsylvania with its Republican machine of Matthew Quay, Boise Pentrose, and the Vare brothers?

Third, Buenker wishes to applaud the urban, new-stock masses for their progressivism, but his data entirely deal with elite behavior. Since at least on the national level, the linkage between constituency attitudes and representatives' behavior is weak (Miller and Stokes, 1963), the electing of progressive legislators is not by itself convincing evidence of the progressive attitudes of the urban masses. Referenda data, which might provide a more direct measure of the views of the urbanites, are mentioned sparingly and unsystematically.

Fourth, the book is both an extensive overview and a series of intensive case studies. As such, it suffers from some of the limitations of both kinds of study. It covers the reform battles in seven states, yet these data are hardly sufficient to permit generalization to the entire country. On the other hand, dealing with seven states over a twenty-year period on a myriad of issues in under three hundred pages produces oversimplifications and leaps beyond the limitations of the data (e.g., [p. 107] "popular agitation forced the Republican party to propose a corporation tax in 1910. . . .").

Nevertheless, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* is an important work on a neglected topic. Buenker demonstrates that archival sources can be used to produce sound research into the origins of public policy at the state level. He also shows that machine politicians were a leading component of the coalitions which enacted progressive legislation. While not beatifying "Bathhouse John" Coughlin, George Washington Plunkitt, Martin Lomasney and their compatriots, Buenker does emphasize the tangible policy accomplishments of the urban machine politicians. This book, replete with clearly testable propositions, is an important step in the development of a balanced and accurate understanding of the role of political machines in the early years of the twentieth century.

ROBERT E. O'CONNOR
The Pennsylvania State University

Uncommon Sense. By James MacGregor Burns. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. xi, 196. $6.95.)

Like many other citizens, James MacGregor Burns is unhappy with the thrust and fragmentation of American governmental policy. In this short book he turns his notable analytical powers and stirring literary style toward examining causes of difficulties and proposing changes that may serve to remedy them. In the spirit of the bicentennial period he calls for a reapplication of that uncommon sense necessary to reorganize a polity.

"It is the failure of government," Burns writes (p. 7), "to anticipate and manage . . . social change . . . that most directly lies at the source of our difficulties." Historic governmental weakness and the strength of competing social institutions, as well as frequent confusion of means or processes with basic social ends, have contributed to that failure. Those social goals, he submits, must have a new and effective priority. They are essentially two in number: (1) individual liberty, both positive and negative, and (2) equality not only of opportunity but also, to a far greater extent, of condition. Subsumed within them (pp. 11–12) are other problems of high priority: the economy, poverty, crime and violence, education, the environment, drug addiction, military and industrial concentration. Protecting the environment is one of Burns's highest priorities (p. 14) because he is convinced that such action will enhance both liberty and equality.

There is far more in this book than institutional analysis and prescription. Illustrative accounts of America's modern travails, domestic and foreign, add framework and perspective. In orientation they are sensitively but in the main moderately liberal. Burns is opposed to violence, pointing out (p. 61) that revolutionary thinkers in America have been "highly deficient" in analyzing "the extent to which they can bring the morality in their own goals to bear on the means they propose to adopt." Uncompromised values (p. 117), not polarization, are his objective. Interspersed appraisals of major presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Nixon are signally candid and evenhanded.

Burns's prescriptions are chiefly institutional or political. Economic analysis is not a major focus of his book. In foreign policy he strikes notes of caution, commenting that circumstances are often beyond American control and observing that Communist nations are likely to act in concert and to be slow in internal liberalization. He remains an advocate of a strong presidency, warning that (p. 53), particularly in foreign affairs, "no legislature can provide the steadiness, the restraint on the military and the activists, the timing, the concerted action, the consistency of policy that can at least be hoped for from the executive."

In domestic administration Burns would (p. 121) "establish the effective authority of the national government" over civil rights, abolition of poverty, and protection of the environment. Several hundred regional agencies should be established (p. 132) to bypass local governmental fragmentation and, if necessary, federal departmental levels.

He favors (p. 123) presidential power, subject to broad limits set by Congress, over spending and application of the tax laws. But he believes that Congress should be "nationalized" under far more party backing and discipline. A national party "fit to govern" is imperative. A coalition (p. 150) —perhaps unstable, if one may interpolate— might have as its core the urban poor, the blacks, the young, organized labor, and sizable sections of the white-collar middle class. But a national reform-minded party "fit to govern," whether it be the Democratic or a new party (pp. 153–154), must be goal-minded and inclusive while at the same time unattractive to conservatives.

Written before the impact of excesses broadly associated with the Watergate rubric, this idealistic but generally sensible book is all the more attractive now. Like Rexford G. Tugwell's longer and more historically oriented *The Emerging Constitution* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1974), Professor Burns's book is fascinatingly suggestive rather than a probable blueprint for specific change. While it takes into account the weight of precedent in familiar institutions, it gives little notice to the changing moods of public opinion under varying and often unexpected economic pressures. One cannot be unmindful that the nation's centennial occurred in times of deepening crisis, even despair, and that if history has any lesson it is that the future will be different than we may suppose it now.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
Late of University of Maryland, College Park

Consequences of Failure. By William R. Corson. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974, Pp. 215. $7.95.)

This book was completed in early 1973 and was published in September 1974, apparently without revisions. The result is a book in large part overtaken, even overwhelmed, by events. Ostensibly it is concerned with the meaning of our "failure" in Vietnam. (I use inverted commas because Dr. Corson gives the word a special meaning in contrast with the word "defeat.") In actual fact, it is a sermon for Americans on a variety of subjects— "creeping fascism" (a variation on Bertram Gross' "friendly facism"), "ecological genocide," and why this nation has "gone past the point of no return" (p. 151). Chronologically, the author could not foresee Watergate and its consequences; as a result his book is rather like a book about Noah which ends the first day he and his entourage entered the ark. It may also account for a peculiar sympathy for President Nixon who "reduced" wire-tapping, yet was unable to persuade the American people, because of their "general paranoia," that he had done so (p. 109).

To put it bluntly, Dr. Corson's book contains some high-sounding nonsense, all of which is too bad because when he writes about what he knows, he writes convincingly. The blurb tells us only that the author is a retired Marine of undetermined rank, who fought in World War II and Korea, that he has "lived, worked and traveled in Japan, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia throughout the Cold War years (and speaks the languages of these nations)." Whom he worked for or what he did in these countries the blurb does not say. He is presently described by his publishers "as a business and financial consultant."

The most hair-raising chapter focuses on the American military's "critical condition [which] is primarily due to America's failure in Vietnam" (p. 103). Our military has "become psychologically enfeebled and physically weakened to the point where its capacity to deter or repel real aggression is inadequate" (p. 74). In addition, the author says that the armed forces may soon be unable "to function in the real world" because of the high rate of desertions. There may be "one dubiously 'combat ready' division in the Army but it is doubtful that there are two" (p. 86). He adds that "mutinous behavior" has been institutionalized, while "internecine conflict in the military is a tragedy of epic proportions" (p. 89). If true, this is a rather serious finding in the era of "semi-alerts." The effect of Vietnam on the military is an aspect of the war which merits discussion particularly because there is evidence that military leaders opposed Asian adventurism in the early 1960s. (See Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy*, p. 723; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, pp. 302 and 306 and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 128–9.)

After so fearsome an exposé of the internal state of the American military establishment, it is strange to read the author's prescription that the military should be given a "domestic action" role in order to help solve current social problems and to "help cure social ills while maintaining combat readiness" (p. 164). One might argue that praetorianism may be a short step away from the "creeping fascism" which concerns the author (p. 143).

One of the obstacles to evaluating the book is the paucity of sources for some of the more startling statements. For example, the author says that not only has the country's military leadership failed to solve the GI drug problem but, worse, the military leadership has also allowed " 'no-fire zones' [to be] designated to protect areas where opium poppies are known to be cultivated" (p. 82). From the context, it would appear that the author is talking about Vietnam. Now Alfred W. McCoy in *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) writes: "Since opium is not grown inside Vietnam, all of her drugs have to be imported" (p. 152). The imported narcotics come from what is called the Golden Triangle, 150,000 square miles of northeast Burma, north Thailand and north Laos. There are some opium-growing areas in North Vietnam, concentrated in the northern provinces bordering China. If Corson is not referring to "no-fire zones" in South Vietnam, where opium is not grown, is he implying that North Vietnam poppy-growing zones were declared off-limits to B-52s? Or is he suggesting that the Air Force should have bombed Thailand, Burma and Laos, the Golden Triangle, where poppies are cultivated, or what? It is unclear who is responsible for designating these "no-fire zones" and where, if not in Vietnam, they are located. Is the U.S. military in business with narcotics syndicates?

Another example of his difficulty with source material is his estimate that the Vietnam war cost $250 billion (p. 142). An Associated Press dispatch (International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1973) gave a figure of $137 billion, quite a difference. Corson criticizes the U.S. for attempting to preserve "the fiction of South Vietnam as a nation" (p. 18). Yet the Hanoi-Washington agreement signed on 27 January 1973 recognizes South Vietnamese nationhood in Article 9, clauses "a" and "b." Corson looks upon the Vietnam war as utter failure, defined as "nonperformance of something required or expected" (p. 15), yet Edwin O. Reischauer, a critic of the war, has written that "losing the war, then, has proven, in strict balance-of-power terms, much more beneficial than winning it" (*Saturday Review*, December 1972). Having been in Vietnam as a correspondent during and after the Diem regime, I would disagree with Corson's judgment that Diem was a "totalitarian" (p. 19) dictator. The entire concept of "totalitarianism" is as vague as the concept of "fascism."

The appendix contains the text of "National Security Study Memorandum Number 1, February 1969," prepared by several government agencies at the request of Henry Kissinger in his role as special assistant to the President on national security affairs. Although the document was leaked a couple of years ago and finally ended in the Congressional Record (10–11 May 1972), it still makes fascinating reading.

This volume is one of the few written by a military professional to have appeared so far about the Vietnam War. With all of its deficiencies and a disturbing lack of verifiable sources, parts of *Consequences of Failure* are important reading for the reaction of a Marine writing as a civilian who has benefitted by serious research studies at Miami, Chicago, and Wisconsin Universities. He is writing about a war which, as far as the U.S. is concerned, has been forgotten and entombed in less than two years.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN
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Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era. By William M. Dick. (New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 211. $10.95.)

The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon. By Carl Reeve. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 193. $6.50.)

Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920. By Sally M. Miller, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1973. Pp. 275. $11.50.)

Two considerations, apart from general curiosity, may move a political scientist to study three books dealing with American socialism between the 1880s and the First World War. First, there is the hope that historians can help us find better ways of dealing with the interplay between expressly formulated doctrines and other aspects of political life. Second, there is the fact that several of the influential interpretations which have portrayed American political culture as comparatively resistant to political actors espousing "forensic ideologies" have been expounded in connection with the failure of American socialism. Two of the three books under review advance theses meant to counter leading arguments of the latter sort, while the third works out of a tradition which has always rejected all such claims.

William M Dick challenges the view that the American political environment compelled labor to entrust its interests to "business" or "pressure group" unionism and rendered socialism an alien, transient force, whose brief influence depended on temporary and localized conditions. Against such "environmental determinism," which he ascribes to social scientists, Dick puts forward a view he considers more congenial to the historian and more adequate to the historical facts: that it was because of judgments and decisions made by leaders that unionism and socialism in the U.S. failed to build up the mutually beneficial sustained interdependence exemplified in the story of the English Labour Party. As its subtitle indicates, Dick's book is an essay on Samuel Gompers and "Gomperism."

American reformist socialism, Dick argues, did not founder on the psychological resistance of American workers captivated by the Lockean individualist American dream; it failed because Gompers failed to see the basic compatibility between such a movement and his own social idealism, because the contours of the emerging movement were distorted by voluble dogmatists, and because the diverse actors interplaying in the light of their diverse perceptions created new situations which destroyed the original possibilities.

In a book that is more carefully documented than Dick's, Sally M. Miller addresses a question complementary to his: Why didn't reformist socialism mount and sustain a more effective alternative to Gomperism and to the major parties, given its base in the working class, its capacity for adapting to American conditions, its vitality during the decade before the First World War? She opposes Daniel Bell's thesis that American socialism failed because its proponents, putting forward a doctrine alien to the real political world within which they operated, had to adopt that ethic of ultimate ends which Max Weber had contrasted to an ethic of responsibility and had shown to be antithetical to an effective political vocation. Miller counters that Weber had also projected an ideal politician who synthesizes the two patterns, and she maintains that Victor Berger closely approximated this ideal in many respects and for a considerable time. As a major figure in the effective leadership of the Socialist Party of America, Berger had a principled and coherent vision of a collectivist social order democratically controlled in the interest of egalitarian welfare, Miller contends. She maintains that he skillfully undertook the political work of winning trust through persuasion, pursuing immediate goals, accepting responsibility for government, while he steadily furthered movement toward his broader objectives. His failure came, she argues, when he failed to remain true to himself in the crisis of the First World War; and this, in her view, was a matter of personal responsibility, not impersonal social forces. If the dominant right wing of the Socialist Party, led by Berger, had accepted the reality of American participation in the war and had concentrated on promoting reforms in domestic war-policy, the Socialist Party might have achieved a good deal and could have played a major role after the war. As it was, Miller claims, the organization was discredited and splintered. Democratic socialism missed its opportunity in the USA.

Carl Reeve locates his account of Daniel De Leon's career within quite a different political and temporal context. For Reeve, the story of American socialism is not the story of a lost opportunity but the story of continuing revolutionary tradition, and De Leon's "life and times" are to be pondered as an instructive chapter in this larger whole. Within that tradition, as Reeve expounds it, there already exist a number of authoritative judgments on De Leon's work. Engels chided the Socialist Labor Party for its sectarian impatience with the Henry George movement and its poorly defined quarrels with organized labor; Lenin praised De Leon's conception of a disciplined, centralized party; William Z. Foster, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Ella Reeve Bloor attacked De Leon's dual unionism but praised his adamant hostility to "opportunist" socialists and labor leaders, and, above all, his educational work in translating and popularizing the great classics of revolutionary socialism. Reeve builds his brief narrative upon these judgments.

Reeve's work exemplifies Marxist traditionalism, not scholarship informed by Marxist theory or modeled on the founders of the school. The influence of revisionism among organized workers gets no explanation beyond cursory references to the opportunist character of the leadership, and the vicissitudes of revolutionism get no social explanation at all, beyond the strengths and weaknesses of some leaders. When the author interrupts his biographical narrative for an account of the changing historical context, he offers a few stereotyped assertions about the dominant tendencies of the moment, taken for the most part from a single introductory survey of American history. Reeve's book contains very little new information, and no critical commentary on contemporary research or alternate interpretations, and it depends too much on a few books in its own tradition. Reeve gives us hortatory reflections on a flawed exemplary figure and precursor, rather than critical inquiry.

Dick's work is an interpretive essay of another sort. He presupposes a reader familiar with scholarship on the subject, but he assembles fresh evidence to support his major novel contentions. The argument is suggestive, but the evidence is far from making it definitive. To credit (or charge) a political figure like Gompers with working out a posture expressible by an organized body of ideas requires some systematic concern with the difficulties encountered when interpreting selected utterances made in diverse contexts and designed for various rhetorical purposes. Dick proceeds very casually in these matters, although the claim that Gompers's "plain and simple" unionism has more in common with European syndicalism than with the business unionism that followed is central to his thesis. In assessing the importance of industrial unionism as the issue creating a fatal chasm between Gompersism and socialism, Dick's reasoning depends a good deal on his assumption that revolutionary socialism was an excrescence upon American socialism—the hobby of some ambitious intellectuals or a metaphorical language for unpolitical populist radicals. On this view, revolutionary socialists get their chance to distort the Socialist Party and finally to embitter the AF of L only because the responsible leaders of both organizations failed to organize the new industrial work force. Dick's conception of the Left in American socialism would require much more support than he gives it, if it is to bear the weight he puts upon it.

Miller shares Dick's view that the Left was an irrelevant force capable only of disruption; and, as she sees it, the "promise" of socialism in America depended on the prosperity of the Right, exemplified and led by Berger. The crux of her case is the contention that Berger committed a decisive and avoidable error when he accepted the party's stand against American participation in World War I. But on the evidence she has collected Berger's action could just as well be taken as a sign of the moral centrality of the Left within the American socialist identity. Moreover, we are still faced with the question of whether the reformist activities which Dick and Miller think might have been carried on by a revisionist socialist party in America had not already been taken up by other organizations in most American constituencies. Miller contrasts Berger's collectivism with the individualism of midwestern reformers like LaFollette, but fails to consider the main stream of urban Progressivism in trying to ascertain whether Berger's "constructive socialism" could have maintained a distinct political identity without the mythology and elan of the Left.

Dick and Miller have contributed to the ongoing reconsideration of ideological politics in America, helping above all to counter the easy acceptance of certain plausible generalizations. The nature of the questions they leave unresolved, as well as the uncertainties created by their strong hostility to the Left, make it all the more regrettable that Reeve's book on De Leon cannot be recommended as an effective corrective. The books have little to offer from the standpoint of method or theory, since both authors are quite unreflective about the structures of political thought and language and pay no special attention to problems of interpretation. But their stress on the purposive actions of political actors usefully challenges the social scientists' preoccupation with impersonal processes and structural determinants.

David Kettler
Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario

Interracial Public Housing in Border City. By W. Scott Ford. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pp. 98. $10.00.)

Public policy in this country in the mid-twentieth century has strongly supported the coming together of blacks and whites. The courts, and to a lesser extent, the legislatures and the executive branches, have attempted to bring about desegregation of a variety of public and private facilities. In schools and municipal swimming pools, in motels and public housing projects, desegregation has become the law, and in some places, the practical reality. In short, government has attempted to change the behavior of blacks and whites by forcing, or at least permitting, them to interract in a variety of contexts. It is hoped that these policies can also lead to a reduction in racial prejudice by both races.

For several decades, social scientists have studied the relationship between interracial contact and tolerance among the races. This research has helped to inform public policy makers' efforts to achieve equality. *Interracial Public Housing in Border City* is a useful addition to the literature of race relations. The book is a well reasoned, clearly written study of interracial neighboring in public housing in a border state city. It is a test of the "contact hypothesis," which suggests that when blacks and whites associate with each other regularly, and as social equals, racial tolerance increases. The study was designed to fill in several gaps in earlier studies of race and residence. First, it focused on a city in a border state, unlike earlier studies of northern urban and deep South communities. Second, much of the previous research analyzed the reactions to interracial contacts of whites only. Professor Ford chose to give equal emphasis to black responses to interracial neighboring. Finally, the author caught the process at an unusual point in time, shortly after federally mandated desegregation of the public housing project. The black and white people who were interviewed were asked to respond to an ongoing desegregation process which provided them with the opportunity for relationships with members of the other race. (As the author acknowledges, this study is subject to all the limitations of a case study. The focus of one border state city, at a point in time, in a particular [and unusual] kind of public housing project implies that the findings may not be generalizable far beyond that situation, either in time or place.)

In giving equal emphasis to black reactions to contacts with whites, the author raises some thorny questions. Perhaps the most difficult and important is the definition of "equal status contacts." Professor Ford does an excellent job of teasing out the ambiguities embedded in this concept. As Ford suggests, it is difficult to determine which contacts are equalitarian, particularly if the search is for contacts that are similarly or identically interpreted by blacks and whites. In addition, "more important than any 'objective' appraisal of an interracial contact situation is the respective participants' 'definition of the situation' " (p. 5). Given this country's history of racial subordination, it may be that few interracial contacts would be viewed as equal ones by blacks and whites alike. The author attempted to identify interracial neighboring in a desegregated public housing project as such a situation. The contact hypothesis, however, was not strongly supported as applied to blacks. Blacks did not become significantly more tolerant of whites after contact in the project. In interpreting these divergent findings for blacks and whites, the author raises the crucial questions of black perception of these "equal-status contacts." Perhaps the black respondents did not consider even this situation as equalitarian. My own experience as an inadvertent participant-observer at a northern public housing project tends to confirm this interpretation. As a teacher at the school adjacent to this predominantly black project, I began to sense that many of the black tenants seemed to regard themselves as being of lower status than the white tenants, partly because whites were perceived as "outwardly mobile." As in the border city desegregated project, blacks had generally lived in public housing longer than whites.

Perhaps many blacks would perceive interracial contacts as equalitarian only if they were in an "objectively superior" position. As the author suggests, more research is needed on the application of the contact hypothesis to blacks. An important place to start would be to attempt to identify kinds of interracial contacts which are interpreted by blacks as equalitarian. If reduction of prejudice is a goal of policy makers, this goal must apply to blacks as well as whites. And if promoting contact is to be a means toward that end, it is critical to know which types of contact are likely to serve that purpose. One context where this research might be done would be housing where there is racial *and* economic mix.

In summary, Professor Ford has performed a service in moving along our understanding of the "contact hypothesis." In particular, the emphasis on responses of blacks to interracial neighboring is a worthwhile addition to previous research in this area. As is the case with much useful research, Ford's study raises as many new questions as it answers.

Finally, a personal note. It is an encouraging sign of the "desegregation" of academia that a lawyer may review a book by a sociologist for a political science journal.

LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ
Northwestern University

Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools. By F. Chris Garcia. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 280. $16.50.)

This is a difficult book to review because, on the one hand, it represents an important addition to the political socialization literature; on the other, the book appears limited by a familiar problem in the *interpretation* of the findings that raises serious questions about the validity of many of its conclusions. Let me first attempt to describe briefly the design of the study and selectively summarize its major conclusions before going into its limitations.

The study by Professor Garcia, is based on a questionnaire survey of Anglo ($n = 544$) and Mexican-American ($n = 683$) children in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 who were distributed among eight public schools in east Los Angeles County and the Central Valley of California. The response represents, in the author's words, an "availability sample," which is to say, it is nonrandom and probably unrepresentative. But since there are few other comparable studies available at this time, the results can be legitimately considered exploratory and suggestive in their implications.

With this qualification in mind, the results indicate, that Mexican-American children tend to be very much like their Anglo counterparts in most of their political attitudes. Ninth-grade Chicanos tend to be somewhat more cynical than comparable Anglos, but overall there does not seem to be the strong dimension of alienation or cynicism among Chicano children that one might expect given the widely publicized activities of Cesar Chavez and the Huelga movement in this part of California. Chicano children tend to have even *more* positive feelings toward the American political community and the values of American democracy than do Anglo school children; Chicano children tend to be slightly *more* trusting of government (Table 5.3)—the author's contrary comments in the conclusions notwithstanding (p. 133)—but feel less "efficacious" and possess a weaker "sense of citizen duty" than Anglos. When social-class differences are observed, the usual case is that rural, lower-class Chicano children tend to vacillate more between negative and positive attitudes than their middle-class, urban counterparts.

It is possible that the relative absence of strong feelings of expressed hostility observed among Mexican-American children in this study may be due to the absence of a well-defined sense of *relative* deprivation in the family—regardless of the deplorable *objective* conditions under which many of them live. Anyone who has traveled through the vast reaches of rural northern Sonora and Baja and witnessed the arid, unforgiving terrain, the scrawny cattle and barking rib-bare dogs, the barren shelves of the *tienditas* in the villages, and the homes made of cardboard and tin dangling from gnarled mesquite frames, can appreciate the notion that the squalor north of the border in barrios and migrant labor camps may, in comparison, represent some improvement. For some reason, the migration continues north—not south.

Since the study suffers from the same atheoretical perspective of most socialization studies, there is little convincing explanation to accompany the findings. This observation is not intended as a specific criticism of this book. Rather it is simply a fact concerning the state of theoretical development in a subfield which has, for the past fifteen or so years, devoted more than enough time and print to describing public opinion surveys of school children in the context of the Easton "systems model."

The more specific theoretical problem in the study—and again let me emphasize that this problem is not unique to this study—has to do with the inherent difficulties in attempting to reconcile developmental theorizing with cross-sectional research designs. The author is studying *different* children at roughly the *same* point in time (at least within a six- to twelve-month period). What is required in any study of developmental processes is, of course, an examination of the *same* children at *different* points in time.

In the final analysis, the value of this book will depend to a large degree on a reader's willingness to accept the "quasi-longitudinal" assumption upon which it is based. In my opinion, however, there are serious theoretical pitfalls in suggesting that third graders (in 1970) will as ninth graders, six years later in 1976, express virtually the same political attitudes/orientations as ninth grade students did in 1970. The assumption ignores the probable impact of events such as the continually changing character of the Chicano movement itself—not to mention Watergate, a president's disgrace and resignation, and other developments that represent potentially important discontinuities in the socialization process.

My refusal to accept this assumption and the developmental interpretations of the findings that flow from it should not, as I mentioned at the beginning of this review, detract from the book's overall value in providing an important descriptive reference point in this neglected area of ethnic political research.

JAMES W. CLARKE

University of Arizona

Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City. Edited by Edward L. Henry. (Collegeville, Minn.: Center for the Study of Local Government, St. John's University, 1971. Pp. 395. $8.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Visions of the good society are legion, and among the more durable is the vision of social life organized on a limited scale, in small humane as well as human settlements. Much of this vision, to be sure, consists of wistful images of lost innocence in a Golden Age that never was or utopias that never can be. Nevertheless the ideal has had an enduring influence, helping to shape each generation's quest for a more perfect human environment.

Micropolis in Transition is one perspective on this quest—the perspective from St. Cloud, Minnesota, population 39,691 (1970), a small city situated some seventy miles northwest of Minneapolis, the state's largest metropolitan area, a city with its own rural hinterland dependent on it for public and private goods and services. For much of the 1960s, the city was headed by Mayor Edward L. Henry, a former Professor of Government who had, as it were, left the academy for the agora and has since returned as Director of the Center for the Study of Local Government at St. John's University in Collegeville, Minnesota. With his colleagues and students from the University along with others from neighboring colleges and the community, Henry has edited a collection of essays, reflections and case studies concerned principally with political life during his years in office (1964–1970). The vantage point thus is not so much of the researcher who in Norton Long's quasi-irreverant phrase "hides under the mayor's bed" as it is the mayor's bed itself.

For an administration to chronicle its own experiences is of course a perilous undertaking. All too often, it seems, such chronicles are little more than self-serving testimonials that reveal only that political leaders can indeed be vain. To his credit, the editor is fully aware of this difficulty and on the whole has managed a balanced and remarkably detached account of his years in office.

If not a testimonial to Mayor Henry, neither is it a romanticized account of small city life. True, the writings reflect a decided preference for this life style, and the editor suggests at the outset that cities of this size offer an attractive alternative to those weary and wary of other forms, be they urban, suburban, or rural. But the book's purpose is not the promotion of St. Cloud or comparable cities. Rather it is an examination of the city's efforts to anticipate and provide for a future that had discovered "micropolis," efforts the administration believed would help the community avoid the crush of urban growth.

For the Henry administration this meant policy initiatives designed to modernize the municipality's physical plant (its storm sewers and airport, for example), and to adjust its corporate boundaries (annexation) and its governmental structure (strong chief executive) to expected future demands. These issues are examined in individually written case studies and are supplemented by chapters on the city's historical development, its "power structure," its council, and its residents, the last of which includes the findings of a survey undertaken in connection with the research.

In a general way much of the material in this book is familiar. The struggles, conflicts, strategies, politics, and personalities encountered here are of a type encountered elsewhere. Even so the studies are well worth reading for they are instructive as well as informative. Throughout there is an awareness of the broader issues—not the least of them the inner complexities of any democratic system and the dilemmas of a progressive, popularly elected official confronted by a sometimes reluctant and unaware electorate—and an effort to illuminate general propositions with the case material. In this respect the book differs, happily, from the formless case study that consists in large part of nothing more than facts in search of a theme.

While the material is generally well presented and thoughtfully analyzed, the book is characterized in part by a perhaps excessively sanguine outlook on the potentials of "micropolis," and in particular on its capacities to avoid the "ills of Big City, USA" (p. 4). If "micropolis" does emerge as an alternative—as a "key to demographic relocation" and a "nucleus for population resettlement" (p. 8)—policies such as those instituted in St. Cloud may well facilitate the transition. But whether they would be entirely adequate depends largely on the magnitude and character of the change. One wonders, for example, how effectively "micropolis" would respond if resettlement were to include substantial numbers of the urban poor or those afflicted by the social-personal pathologies and disabilities so much a part of the urban crisis. As far as I can tell, this particular "micropolis" has not dealt with these issues. While it has planned and evidently planned well, St. Cloud has yet to face, if indeed it ever does, a challenge some believe is largely beyond the wit and ingenuity of civic leaders, whether in large cities or in small.

RUSSELL D. MURPHY

Wesleyan University

The Politics of Health Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. Edited by Herbert Harvey Hyman. (New York: Praeger, 1973. Pp. xiv, 208. $16.50.)

The editor and chief author of this book is professor of social planning with major emphasis on health planning at Hunter College's Department of Urban Affairs, and eight of the nine other authors are holders of Masters degrees from that department. The book is a comparative analysis of nine health programs initiated in the 1960s, from their inception to 1971, with a view to discovering how they were "transformed from someone's idea at a higher level of government to actual working programs that served people at the local level of government" (p. 4). The editor also sought to identify the role and functions of the professionally trained health planner in the programs but wryly reports that they have had no role except in the implementation stage of comprehensive health planning.

The changes that took place in the objectives sought by the initiators of these new programs are analyzed by Professor Hyman in a final chapter utilizing a model based on a modification of Richard Warren's Five-Step Action System. The model adopted uses four steps: T1, Inception of the Action system; T2, Expansion of the Action System or Development of Opposition; T3, Legitimation of the Objectives; and T4, Implementation and Operation of the Action System. By T4, all but two of the nine programs had significantly changed their objectives, with most of the changes occurring in T4.

Dr. Hyman suggests that the studies support the theory that organizations have a life of their own in which continuation of the program becomes more important than achievement of the program's initially conceived goals. The changes resulted in programs that were more in accord "with the financial capacity, the usual organizational structure and procedures, and the traditional programmatic style of the established health forces" (p. 195). As a result, "there are new, but not significantly different, health programs operating; there are new, but not really innovative, organizational arrangements to accommodate them; and there are some new, but not sufficient, sources of financial inputs to mount them" (p. 195).

Most of the individual authors did not closely follow the data collection outline suggested by the editor. Many of them became involved in describing the content and functioning of their program. Hence, while some of them provide an informative and useful account of the work of the various agencies involved with specific programs (notably Planned Parenthood and Ambulatory Health Centers), the editor must have been hard pressed to derive a coherent sociological analysis from such disparate material. The chapters also vary greatly in quality and in the extensiveness of the research on which they are based.

EVELINE M. BURNS

Columbia University

Politics and The Housing Crisis Since 1930. By Nathaniel S. Keith. (New York: Universe Books, 1973. Pp. 232. $8.50.)

This book is a welcome addition to the comparatively few volumes which lend to a comprehensive understanding of housing in the U.S. Although it is not the product of social research, it does provide a valuable narrative of the political successes and failures in establishing a national program designed to build and maintain adequate housing for twentieth century America.

The book is divided into thirteen chapters most of which correspond to the term of office of the incumbent presidents—for example, Chapter 10 is entitled, "The Great Society and The Urban Crisis, 1963–66." Mr. Keith illustrates throughout these chapters some of the most important political, social, and economic forces which have helped and hindered the creation of an effective national housing program. In the last chapter, he presents his prognosis for the future.

Nathaniel Keith writes with the insight and experience that could only be gained from the inside looking on. His knowledge of the individuals and institutions on Capitol Hill are impressive. He served in the Federal Housing Agency, and, for the past decade and a half, has been the president of and the lobbyist for the National Housing Conference. The author, therefore, is hardly unbiased, but his criticism are nonpartisan and frequently shed light upon the process of Congressional politics.

The most important contribution the book makes is that it provides a good illustration (lesson?) of how federal legislation has operated heretofore in order to solve or ignore vitally important national issues. The reader cannot help be impressed and/or frustrated by the amounts of time and effort necessary to keep an idea alive, far less to have bills passed and programs enacted. Of particular interest are examples which demonstrate, on the one hand, that powerful groups in concert *can* affect the political process in Washington (all the more so if there is a perceived crisis) and, on the other hand, that *intragroup* conflict can frequently be more damaging than opposition from without. The AFL support of the proposed public housing program in 1935 is an example of the former, whereas the difficulties within the Roosevelt administration and their effect upon the U.S. Housing Bill illustrate the latter.

There are two aspects of Keith's book which trouble me. The first is the implicit assumption that I find throughout which suggests that increased legislation for public housing would substantially improve our nation's housing problem. In fairness, the author does briefly discuss the necessities of providing housing subsidies to the not-so-poor and also alludes to those problems beyond Capitol Hill in local communities in which public housing is to be built. He repeatedly returns to public housing, however, giving the impression that it (still) represents the "liberal" answer. Whereas I assume public housing fits within the community development program which Keith mentions frequently, nowhere is it made clear what this development is to be like.

A second problem is that I simply cannot share the author's optimistic prognosis for the immediate future (to 1990). Keith concludes by stating "Can the nation afford to reach a full housing economy? The answer is yes, if the political force of the American public and its response in Congress and in the Executive Branch of the Government insist on policies assuring a reasonable priority" (p. 232). Given the author's documentation of housing politics over the past decades, this must be largely a statement of faith rather than a projection based upon any observed trend. He does argue several points which he feels support his view, but I believe these are unconvincing. I sincerely hope to be proven incorrect.

Politics and The Housing Crisis Since 1930 can be especially profitable to those social scientists and planners who do not follow national politics closely. It provides a lesson in political reality.

W. Scott Ford

The Florida State University

Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests. Edited by Harald B. Malmgren. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 148. $10.00.)

This book fills a neglected gap in the enormous number of recent publications regarding the role of the United States in East Asia, by stressing the sweeping and fundamental economic changes that occurred in this region in the 1960s. Based on papers presented at a series of seminars sponsored by the Overseas Development Council, it sketches in broad and clear strokes the new and vastly expanded patterns of trade, aid, and investment that have pushed Japan and the United States into the forefront as the dominant regional powers. This slim volume is distinctive not so much for original contributions as for a concise and readable survey of American economic involvement in Asia, which should prove attractive to the academic specialist and international businessman alike.

Of particular interest are the two contributions of the editor, Harald Malmgren, both because of their substance and because the author carried his views into a high position on the White House staff (Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) in the Nixon administration. Malmgren rightly takes a political economist's approach to international affairs and stresses that any future "power balance" in the region will necessarily involve a scrupulous consideration of economic as well as security interests. Despite this refreshingly appropriate perspective, he does tend to be too general in defining what American interests are and too optimistic about their tractability. Whether, in fact, a higher level of economic well-being will lead to an increased capacity for Southeast Asian nations "to withstand external as well as internal security threats" in the next decade or two, is, to put it mildly, a questionable assertion in view of the persisting political quagmire in this area. Just how economic and geopolitical interests are linked and what are the appropriate priorities for American policy are not really clarified. Despite this rather high level of generality and a tone of optimism that seems especially strange in the world of scarcity and uncertainty that has now emerged, the thrust of the argument takes the right direction. By emphasizing United States economic involvement in the region and probing for a political posture appropriate to these links, it stands in refreshing contrast to the vapid debate on the U.S. military role in the region held over from the Vietnam War and to the increasing stentorian and undifferentiating demands to get out of Asia on which the policy dialogue centers. What is sketched is the economic dimension of the so-called Nixon Doctrine, and it is a constructive place to begin assessing America's present and future place in Asia.

Another useful corrective to the debate on America's Asian policy is the importance accorded Japan in the international relations of the Pacific. The careful description of the last two decades of Japan's aid policy (by J. Alexander Caldwell), a more analytic article comparing the Japanese and American roles in Asian economic development, and a general stress on the dominant, if not predominant, place that Japan has in the regional economy, are matters that have rarely been accorded more than journalistic attention in this country. Alas, the arguments as presented here have been somewhat dulled by recent events. The serious impact on Japan's growth and balance of payments of global resource scarcity and inflation make the euphoric appraisal of the future of the Japanese economy a bit unreal. Moreover, the failure to consider fully the place of China in the economy of the Pacific basin, at a time when Peking is moving toward full participation in international affairs, provides a curiously inverse coloration to the discussion of American policy in which Tokyo, not Peking, is the focal point.

Articles dealing with the prospects for economic cooperation in the region, especially regarding the place of the multinational corporation, touch on the critical issues regarding the future of the Pacific basin (defined in this book as East and Southeast Asia). How will the U.S. be able to affect these patterns of development; through the multilateral international organizations or the multinational corporation, through regional or global arrangements? It is at this juncture that argument turns to conjecture and policy proposals take on a quixotic quality. There can be no prospects for economic growth in East Asia unless a suitable and stable geopolitical structure is built. The political horse must precede the economic cart in the region. While *Pacific Basin Development* does not really confront regional international relations from this viewpoint, it does provide a prism through which important features of the Asian landscape can be seen more clearly. It deserves a hearing.

Donald C. Hellmann

University of Washington

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare. By Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Pp. 326. $10.00.)

For Rufus E. Miles, Jr. the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is "the foremost institutional expression of five social revolutions that have, within a single generation, completely altered the relationship between U.S. citizens and their national government" (p. 1). He identifies these as the New Deal, the education revolution, the civil rights revolution, and the health revolution. His book, the latest addition to the Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, provides a valuable guide through the maze of programs administered by HEW, but it does not contribute materially to our understanding of the institution and its unique culture and subcultures.

Miles, a retired public official and professor, acknowledges the impossibility of packing into three hundred pages an adequate characterization of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Rather than probe the HEW psyche, he has chosen to concentrate on what HEW does. His lucid summaries and critical evaluations of such complex and varied programs as social security, public assistance, aid to education, health research, and health services constitute something of a *tour de force*. For the student and scholar they provide a useful introduction to the field of Federal social legislation.

Except for some excellent brief analyses of the contrasting styles of HEW's ten Secretaries, Miles tells us very little about the people who give HEW its special character. The key to understanding HEW is to understand the role of professions and associated professional organizations within the Department. HEW is the most "professional" of the executive departments. Miles recognizes that the struggle between professionals and generalists underlies many of HEW's current management problems, but he does not attempt to analyze in any depth the significant influence of professionals on the organization and administration of HEW. The story of the decline and fall of the Public Health Service certainly merits fuller treatment than it is given in the book.

Rufus Miles, Jr. is that rare combination, a scholar-practitioner. In discussing such problems as delegations to generalist regional directors, the potential and limitations of the Secretarial role, management of Federal grants, super-departments such as the proposed Department of Human Resources, and the future of HEW, he provides fresh insights gained from his experience as a top career official in HEW and the Bureau of the Budget. His observations will be of interest to all those concerned with Federal administration. One only regrets that these themes are not more fully developed in the book, perhaps owing to the constraints imposed by the Praeger series format.

HAROLD SEIDMAN

University of Connecticut

Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s. By Irene L. Murphy. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. xi, 129. $11.00.)

This book may well achieve recognition as a seminal work in American policy studies. Beginning with an overview of existing policies on the status of women, the author proceeds to evaluate those policies and to propose an agenda for the coming decade. Many people working in policy studies have favored a process approach, in which their focus has been a specific policy or set of policies; they normally trace the evolution of a policy from issue formation through impact. Although Dr. Murphy engages in analysis of the origin, formulation, implementation and impact of specific pieces of legislation, the fundamental purpose of the book is less an analysis of the policy process than a concern for policy outputs and their efficacy and for political advocacy. Relatively few, if any, political scientists have wandered into the area of policy evaluation and policy goals and strategy to the degree that Ms. Murphy has done. With policy-making experience at both the national and local levels, Dr. Murphy, a member of the Kennedy administration and now an elected local official in Maryland, dares enter into the arena of policy recommendation which most political scientists avoid. Political scientists, in fact, have often asked whether policy advocacy is an appropriate arena for the discipline to enter.

A very concise work, this book contains a pithy, detailed synopsis of legislative and administrative policies affecting particularly the occupational and economic status of women. The author's time frame is the last decade, with special emphasis on the policies of the Nixon administration. The analysis of the policies includes an explanation of policy intent and objectives as well as an evaluation of their accomplishments and impact.

The major sections of the book deal with the prevalence of rhetoric over policy, the activities of the first Nixon administration, the work of Congress (especially the 92nd Congress), the women's rights lobby, an agenda for the 1970s, and strategies for women's groups.

Murphy convincingly presents the point of view that the policies which exist as of the early 1970s are merely a beginning in coping with the issues of achieving equality for men and women on the job and in the society generally. Her analysis of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor as an agency more concerned with enforcement of laws on women's employment rather than with reform is particularly insightful. The juxtaposition of goal differences between the feminist movement and the Women's Bureau is especially useful for one trying to understand why the Women's Bureau has not pushed vigorously for women's rights. Murphy's disappointment with the Nixon administration and its failure to implement some of the policy recommendations of its own task force is a criticism often repeated in the book but well substantiated. Her agenda and strategy for the 1970s are ambitious and thorough, yet possible if the varied women's rights groups are able to focus considerable, united energy on issues affecting the general economic and social status, and particularly the occupational status of women. Many women tend to think that the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, will be a panacea, when, in fact, it will be only a catalyst for change.

The strengths of this book are many, including its brief exposition, summary, and evaluation of existing policies, as well as its presentation of the author's extensive and well-reasoned policy strategies for the women's movement to adopt. All of these are justification for recommending this book. Dr. Murphy has drawn on documents and reports as well as used survey research and interviews to gather data. The volume also contains a good bibliography of books, articles, and documents on the status of women.

Its weaknesses are relatively few, but should be noted. The book might be read with satisfaction by the individual totally unaware of existing policy on women, but the author assumes that the reader will have considerable background knowledge of the policies, of the policy process, and of specific governmental agencies. Since one of Dr. Murphy's goals is to involve more women, especially less-educated and lower-income women, in the process of advocating women's rights, it may be unfortunate that the book assumes a background in government that most lay persons are not likely to have.

Technical yet clearly written, the book can be a useful resource for the social scientist and also for women's rights groups which are in the process of defining their policy goals. Its freshness and boldness in the area of policy advocacy make this a strong contribution to the field of policy studies within political science.

NORMA NOONAN

Augsburg College

Bound with them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement. By Jane H. and William H. Pease. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 334. $12.50.)

Protesting that previous historians have been insufficiently sensitive to the complexities of the abolitionist movement, Jane H. and William H. Pease, professors of history at the University of Maine, present us with brief biographical sketches of ten antislavery leaders "deliberately chosen for their diversity" (p. 4). The ten are all middle-level figures—missing are the most famous abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, Lewis Tappan, and Frederick Douglass—who, although well known in their own day, are hardly household words today. They include, in order of presentation, Maria Weston Chapman, Cassius Marcellus Clay, Benjamin Lundy, Hiram Wilson, Samuel Eli Cornish, Henry Highland Garnet, Stephen Symonds Foster, Elizur Wright, Joshua Reed Giddings, and Samuel Joseph May. The central—indeed the only real—theme of these essays is that of diversity. "To view abolitionism broadly, . . . " the authors write, "is to comprehend a wide spectrum of differing motives, goals, and methods undistorted by hypothetical categorical uniformity" (p. 4).

Although the Peases convincingly demonstrate the existence of such diversity among opponents of slavery, they also create a good deal of confusion by failing to differentiate between the terms "abolitionist" and "antislavery." Most historians have used the word "abolitionist" to describe a relatively small number of moral reformers who from about 1830 on demanded the immediate overthrow of slavery, and have distinguished these abolitionists from other antislavery men. The Peases, however, avoid this distinction, including in their volume men such as Joshua Giddings, the antislavery Whig congressman from Ohio, and Cassius Clay, the "Kentucky squire" who opposed slavery because he considered it harmful to the white South, not because he sympathized with the slaves. As a result, the authors are really talking about the diversity of the antislavery movement, not of the abolitionist movement. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an approach, but it does diminish the significance of their argument in two respects. First, their thesis loses whatever originality they might have claimed for it, since historians have long recognized that different people opposed slavery for different reasons, in different ways. Second, their attack on other historians for improperly categorizing abolitionists loses its force, since they themselves are talking about a much broader movement.

Also disappointing is the Peases' unwillingness to attempt any explanation of their subjects' motivations. Indeed, they appear to reject the very possibility of such explanation. "Neither ancestry, education, nor social position necessarily marked Maria [Chapman] for reform in general or antislavery in particular" (p. 31) they state at one point; a little later they declare that "there was little in [Benjamin] Lundy's background that foreshadowed his role as a major antislavery colonizationist" (p. 91). One wonders in vain why these ten men and women joined the antislavery ranks. The closest the Peases come to an answer is their statement that abolitionists opposed slavery because until it was abolished "every abolitionist felt himself in some way bound, restricted, unfree, as the slave was bound, restricted, unfree" (p. 315)—in other words, they became abolitionists because they disliked slavery.

This is, then, a book with conceptual limitations. Nevertheless, it is a useful book, one that provides good, well-researched biographical sketches of several relatively unknown antislavery leaders, many of whom were not important enough to merit full-length biographies of their own. For anyone interested in learning about one or more of these people, *Bound with them in Chains* is a good place to start.

PETER KOLCHIN

University of Wisconsin—Madison

The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia. By Kirk R. Petshek. (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1973. Pp. 336. $10.00.)

The late Kirk R. Petshek, an economist, has written a history of the Philadelphia municipal reform movement of the 1950s and early 1960s. Dr. Petshek offers detailed descriptions of the major industrial development, housing, urban renewal, and transportation programs begun during this period in Philadelphia. He supplements this with rich insights into the roles played by a number of individuals and organizations within the government and outside of it.

Professor Petshek sees the 1950s and early 1960s as a period of renaissance in Philadelphia. Led by two reform Democratic mayors, Joseph S. Clark and Richardson Dilworth, during the conservative Eisenhower era, the city embarked on a number of innovative developmental programs that predated by a decade the heightened national awareness of urban decay. The active white middle-class civic groups and the professional public administrators formed a productive coalition that permanently changed Philadelphia but left some important problems unresolved. For example, very few gains were made by local blacks, and some of the urban renewal and housing programs seriously disrupted local black community life.

Why didn't the reform movement last more than a decade and a half? Professor Petshek points out the many obstacles to a permanent reform organization or third political party in the City of Brotherly Love. Strict enforcement of the rule that all elected officials and civil servants had to live within the city limits worked against the reformers because many of their potential supporters lived outside Philadelphia. Those reformers who resided in the city clustered in two or three areas. The citywide support for a permanent reform political organization could not be mustered. The author wisely notes that reformers often do not cherish the notion of a highly structured political organization.

Those seeking fresh insights into the question of the pluralist or elitist nature of Philadelphia reform-era policies will be disappointed, as will those seeking significant generalizations on ethnic politics in the city or the role of the parties during the reform era. Professor Petshek has collected important data on these questions, but he does not offer any extended analyses useful to the political scientist.

Professor Petshek draws heavily on data he collected during his tenure as Philadelphia's Urban Development and Economic Coordinator under Mayors Clark and Dilworth. Additional data are drawn from an extensive series of interviews with local policy makers conducted several years ago. An excellent appendix lists the names and positions of over 100 interviewees, 27 local reports, and a chronology of significant events. Political scientists seeking to reconstruct this critical period in American urban political history will find this volume highly useful, but the definitive analysis of the Philadelphia reform movement has yet to be written.

MIRIAM ERSHKOWITZ

Temple University

Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. By John Snetsinger. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. Pp. 208. $6.95.)

Both the advantages and disadvantages of this monograph lie in its simplicity and directness of focus. It addresses the issue of the title directly. But the reader ought to be prepared to do much additional reading, however narrow his interest.

There is a dearth of material written by political scientists and historians on the policy impact of ethnic voting. For this reason alone this book is a welcome addition. Of major interest are the many diaries and personal letters of persons in the Truman administration, plus a considerable literature written by Zionist commentators about America and Palestine. Professor Snetsinger is familiar with much of this literature, as the myriads of footnotes attest, but the information would have been more useful if incorporated within the text. The monograph is 140 pages, followed by 52 pages of footnotes. It would have been preferable to spend more than five pages on Zionism, the American Jewish community and involvement with Palestine before 1945. Some important and highly relevant material does not appear. This includes Arthur Morse's *While Six Million Died* (New York: Ace Books, 1968), a careful recounting of Jewish political activity during the war, and of the Roosevelt administration and State Department indifference to the refugees and Palestine; useful background information on the predicament of the British is provided by Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); the cultural bias and religious idea of Israel as a Jewish entity is found in Hertzel Fishman, *American Protestantism and a Jewish State* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973).

The theme is Truman's vacillation between two sets of polarized forces, and his inability to satisfy either side. These factors include the oil interests—about which almost nothing is written—the State Department, the military (especially Forrestal), and the pattern of friendly relations with Great Britain and increasingly hostile relations with the Soviet Union. The State Department, recognizing the strategic importance of the Arabs, urged a policy that would not antagonize them. Arab intransigence and threats to move toward the Soviet camp reinforced State Department opposition to a Jewish state. On the other side were the pressures of the American Jewish community, exerted on a president whose political situation was precarious. Another factor, which the author minimizes, was Truman's genuine concern with the Jewish refugees for whom Palestine was the only home. In *The Man From Missouri* (New York: Putnam, 1962, pp. 304–8), Alfred Steinberg has neatly outlined the forces and interactions. What Snetsinger contributes is extensive first-hand documentation. He sees Truman as taking a pro-Israel position when forced by domestic pressure, especially before election time when he was deluged by importunate requests of Democrats, particularly from New York. When this pressure abated, Truman was more ready to listen to the advice of Forrestal, Marshall, and the State Department. But ultimate recognition and support was more complicated than a political response to the votes and financial support of Eastern, big-city Jews.

Although he tends to neglect the role of certain Senators, especially Robert Wagner, Sr., Snetsinger reveals the importance of two close presidential advisers, David Niles and Clark Clifford. A very important source for Niles's role is uncovered in David Sachar's undergraduate thesis (Harvard University, 1959), "David K. Niles and United States Policy Toward Palestine." In most instances, observations adhere closely to the evidence. Not the least of Snetsinger's virtues is his honest, relatively nonpartisan approach, in an area where this is rare.

Most of the shortcomings result from the narrow focus. There is little insight into the British position—the desire to maintain the Empire although faced with an uncontrollable situation in Palestine. There is no reference to the split within the Zionist movement between the aggressive faction led by Abba Hillel Silver and those more wedded to Democratic politics, particularly Stephen Wise. The most dramatic claim is that Truman was directly responsible for Ambassador Austin's speech, reversing policy from support of partition to support of a U.N. Trusteeship. There is no attempt to disprove those observers who saw this incident as a surprise to the president. In general, the proof that Truman followed a policy for partisan political reasons remains primarily circumstantial. One ought not to expect a political figure like Truman to have neglected political ramifications, but this is not to claim that they were the decisive factors. Since Truman's constituency was much larger, he did not always agree exactly with the Zionist leadership, though he remained sympathetic to and acted in behalf of their cause.

One consequence of this book will be more material for the rate-the-presidents game. Truman does not fare well. He is, I think, too harshly portrayed as vacillating and uncertain. The world was in a state of extreme flux, new alignments being created, notions of warfare and resource requirements undergoing radical change. The Arab states were rigid. Truman had only recently inherited the mantle of world leadership. There had to be adjustments to external and internal developments. And Truman had his own commitments—to the refugees, the Allies, the U.N., to preventing another world war. Serious observers have said that the state of Israel would not have come into existence had Roosevelt lived. That is partly a reflection of political changes, partly of Truman's strong sympathy for the war refugees. As an afterthought, one cannot help wondering whether some of the millions of Europeans slaughtered for racial and religious reasons might not have lived had Truman ascended to the presidency earlier.

ALAN FISHER

Small College, California State College, Dominquez Hills

The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs. By Dennis P. Sobin. (New York: Kennikat Press, 1973. Pp. 194. $8.50.)

This book, research for which was conducted as part of a U.S. Department of Labor study in Cleveland, Newark, and Baltimore, is an attempt to assess the potential for violence among the working poor—in this case, 108 black workers, the majority of them unskilled laborers in public institutions and industry. The study itself grew out of the famous National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders finding that it is the underemployed black in a low-level, "dead-end" job who is most alienated from the system, and therefore, the most likely to explode in anger and frustration. Professor Sobin's book is meant to show the actual impact of these menial jobs (dishwasher, assembly-line worker, packer) on the ghetto resident, by studying his attitude towards government and community, and his limited political participation. It concludes with a prescription for government and business should they attempt to find solutions.

All this is commendable, but Professor Sobin seems to make too much of very limited data. The sample of 108 workers is subdivided in various ways—first into residents of the three cities (a distinction strongly made in Chapter 2 and then discarded), next, into employees of the public and private sectors, then into paraprofessionals and unskilled workers. It should be noted that the 32 paraprofessionals sampled (the vast majority of whom are women) are used as a control group in the analysis, and that the data consistently show a greater degree of alienation among the unskilled laborers.

The crucial problem with the sample is the sex distribution. Of the 32 paraprofessionals, 26 are women, while 40 of the 76 unskilled laborers were also female. Sobin bases conclusions about what has been thought of as the black *male's* potential for violence on only 36 unskilled male respondents, drawn from three cities, and two sectors of employment.

The small number of respondents is understandable, given the exigencies of his research method and the necessity of piggy-backing onto an already conceived government study. The empirical findings as a whole, however, serve to reinforce social scientists' perceptions of the nature of unskilled employment and its impact on the workers. Even within the racially homogeneous group here, differences between the paraprofessionals (who are required to be high school graduates, starting at $110 a week) and the unskilled workers are apparent. The unskilled workers are less trusting of government, belong to fewer organizations, are less likely to vote than the paraprofessionals. The unskilled laborers almost uniformly disliked their jobs—for the simple reasons that they were unsatisfying, routine, and therefore boring. Their negative attitudes carried over to their neighborhood—the ghetto, and surprisingly, toward their view of violent protest. More than half the unskilled workers felt that the effects of riots were negative (in contrast to a plurality of paraprofessionals who believed that rioting had beneficial effects).

The summation of Sobin's research is in the formulae he suggests for business and government—formulae to change the status of "unskilled" workers, many of whom are clearly capable of moving into supervisory and skilled positions. He recommends a governmental program that includes continual use of government contracts to fight job discrimination; worker upgrading programs; and increased and better planning at the local level. Industrial changes include the creation of purposeful entry-level work, upgrading of current jobs, and elimination of discriminatory practices, as well as increased sensitivity among white supervisors.

On the whole, the book exposes some problems of the black unskilled laborer but does not address itself to what may be the critical problem. The impact of low-level, menial employment on individuals transcends racial divisions, and Sobin does not deal with the relative importance of race vs. employment. The raw data, however, are extremely valuable for those who study political attitudes. One important finding, not discussed at length in the book, involves the impact of workers' attempts to change their situation on their level of frustration. Those individuals who have tried and failed express the greatest degree of alienation from the system, as opposed to those who have accepted their fate. This not only reinforces some current research on efficacy and political behavior, it merits further work along the same lines.

KATHLEEN A. FRANKOVIC

The University of Vermont

Perspectives on Urban America. Edited by Melvin T. Urofsky. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973. Pp. 307. $2.95.)

This is an uneven, internally contradictory, dated, and generally atheoretical set of essays. At the same time, a few authors provide new insights on contemporary urban problems, while those whose work seems dated or simplistic at the very least offer food for thought. I was given the option —as are all *APSR* reviewers—of recommending that a book "of very poor quality or not significantly relevant to the interests of political scientists" not be reviewed. This option hovered over my shoulder almost unto the end of my reading. My decision to review the book, for better *and* worse, came simultaneously with the decision to assign it, for purposes of stimulation, to my sophomore class in urban politics.

The theme of the collection is that, contrary to "current American truisms," urban problems are not exclusively urban in nature *or in solution*. This is, of course, a theme discussed on the theoretical level by many urbanists (Is the urban political system unique or simply a microcosm of the national system? Can we consider the urban system as somehow "bounded" or isolated, for analytical purposes?)—but very seldom is the point handled explicitly at the programmatic level. A subtheme, stressed in the editor's preface, is that the problems, while gargantuan, are not insurmountable—indeed there are "many hopeful and innovative efforts to deal with them." "The cities [are] still alive and vibrant, with at least a chance to solve these dilemmas" (p. x). The individual authors—mostly teacher-activists, educational administrators, and staff members of such agencies as the Urban Institute and the League of Women Voters—handle such topics as urban poverty, racism, the environment, education and—more important for present purposes—discuss the role of planning, citizen participation, and federal impact on urban politics.

The two articles which deal explicitly with the relation between social theory and social reform are among the most interesting, from both heuristic and research perspectives. Paul Meadows argues, in "The Idea of Community in the City," that both macrosociologists (Weber, Tonnies) and microsociologists (the Chicago school) have overlooked the vitality and diversity of the urban community, stressing instead a romantic and consensual past. The consensual view is a poor and misleading model, he believes, for urban reform: it is unrealistic and it points toward the wrong set of goals. In an analogous fashion, Ross A. Evans (in "Psychological Problems of the Urban Poor") considers three different models of poverty: Moynihan's "Subcultural Deviance Model," Hamilton's "Subcultural Colonization Model," and Valentine's "Subculture Difference Model." He prefers the latter (more pluralistic) explanation, although he specifies a great many unanswered questions—e.g., precisely which subcultural patterns must be altered? Who shall decide?

In contrast, the three authors who deal with urban planning (Shirley Passow), citizen participation (Melvin Mogulof), and the federal impact (Anona Teska) are simply taxonomic in their approach—each covering much the same ground (housing and urban renewal, Model Cities, the dismantling of OEO, and the prospects of revenue sharing), often reaching different conclusions. It is here that the book seems most dated: the authors conclude that federal policies toward the poor show great hope, if only firm leadership is forthcoming (Mogulof) and the executive-congressional struggle is resolved (Teska). Teska is dubious about the merits of revenue sharing without a resolution of this conflict; Passow, in contrast, sees revenue sharing as "the medicine the sick cities need" (p. 238). None of these authors proved prescient (in 1973) about the crisis (in 1974) over the future of programs involving citizen participation, and the apparent unwillingness of many cities to continue—via their new "shared" revenues—the programs begun by the OEO.

Several authors reject the optimism of the editor's preface and of the chapters just cited. Charles Wilson ("The White Problem of the Cities") and Daniel Levine ("The Crisis in Urban Education") reach angry and pessimistic conclusions. Both insist that educational (and other) problems can only be solved within the context of a realistic appraisal of urban social relations. For Levine, this implies facing up to the existence of rigid social stratification; for Evans, it means understanding the consequences of white racism. Levine's piece in particular seems marred by an overdrawn contrast between the problems and prospects of middle-class suburban youth and their inner city counterparts. For the former, the future is uniformly rosy; for the latter, it is unmitigatedly bleak. True to a degree, but even in 1972 (when the article was probably written), the deteriorating job market for new entries—regardless of class or race—was already evident. No hints of the relation between the health of the national economy and the viability of the educational programs advocated by Levine appear in his chapter. This is surprising in a book which hopes to show that urban problems cannot be understood apart from national phenomena.

It is impossible to do full justice, in limited space, to the variety of strengths and weaknesses of the twelve authors. Suffice it to say that their sometimes angry and often simplistic essays are seldom boring, and may well serve as a starting point for many fruitful classroom discussions. They might even yield testable hypotheses for urban research. One might wish for more documentation, for a more theoretical stance, and for some attention to some of the tough questions plaguing urban scholars (what is uniquely urban about what we do? around what central concepts can we organize our work? what are the points in common and the differences between small "urban places" and large metropolitan centers?) Perhaps sprightly or angry insights and scholarly caution make uncomfortable bedfellows.

Betty H. Zisk

Boston University

Statism in Plymouth Colony. By Harry M. Ward. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. 193. $9.95.)

"Statism," writes Harry Ward, is the "placing of external controls in the state at the expense of the rights of the individual," as well as "the exercise of power by the state for the sake of power." (Preface). The inhabitants of Plymouth Colony avoided the temptations of "statism" and created, instead a free society in which "individual liberty had a breadth that was novel for the time" (p. 168). In the process Plymouth contributed much to the development of America's tradition of democratic liberalism by making an early affirmation of the dignity and worth of the individual.

Plymouth's history, as Professor Ward perceives it, reflected constant tension between libertarian and statist tendencies. Most of that tension resulted from conflicting ideals imported from England. For example, although the Pilgrims believed in political democracy, they placed equivalent stress on the social utility of political consensus and domestic tranquility. Thus, they made few attempts to guarantee minority rights and were content to let an oligarchy of magistrates interpret the will of the majority. In religion, the Pilgrims exalted the worth of the individual but they sought uniformity of belief and practice as well. Consequently, they gave the state the power to silence dissenters. In economic affairs the Pilgrims were both capitalists and mercantilists. They believed "that all members of society should have equal opportunity in economic self-improvement" (p. 36), yet they allowed the state to regulate economic activity in accordance with what the magistrates perceived to be the welfare of the whole.

Gradually these contradictions between personal freedom and state power began to disappear. After 1640 the influence of both church and state declined as the cohesiveness fostered by the Pilgrims' initial zeal for a holy commonwealth failed to take hold among members of the second generation. Political authority passed "to a fragmentation of town democracies," (p. 158) economic regulation gave way to *laissez-faire*, and moral conformity evolved into liberty of conscience. By the time of Plymouth's absorption into neighboring Massachusetts, the libertarian tendencies inherent in the ideals of the Pilgrim founders had triumphed.

Though *Statism in Plymouth Colony* represents an admirable attempt to deal with an issue of fundamental historical importance, the book's thesis is marred by some significant flaws. Not the least of these is the author's failure to provide adequate documentation for several important conclusions. In Chapter One, for example, Ward argues that early Plymouth was a collective capitalistic enterprise which fostered political democracy. The reader finds little evidence of that linkage. Chapter Three suggests that the Pilgrims believed in equality of economic opportunity. But, again, documentation is slim. Chapter Four reveals that the authority of the church declined after 1650 but the reader is not told how or why. Chapter Six contends that the collapse of church authority forced the state to assume responsibility for personal morality and led to an increase in state supervision of private conduct. Unfortunately, the reader is not shown the process whereby the church gave way to the state in this area, nor is he given statistical data to support the charge of greater state interference. But the most damaging omissions are found in Chapters Seven and Nine where the author theorizes that the state's political power decreased drastically in the last years of Plymouth's existence. Much of the book's efficacy hinges on the validity of this argument but Ward gives us very little evidence demonstrating such a decline.

Equally disturbing is the confusing and contradictory nature of some arguments in *Statism in Plymouth Colony*. For example, Ward characterizes Plymouth's founders as Separatists and Pilgrims. He believes that they were less statist than their New England neighbors because they were not Puritans and therefore had few ideological axes to grind. Not only is the assertion of Plymouth's libertarian stance not supported, but terms like "Puritan" and "Separatist" are left undefined. Later, the confusion grows worse when the author refers to Puritan ideals and practices in Plymouth and credits the decline of statist policies to the collapse of the founders' dreams of a holy commonwealth.

The reader will encounter similar problems in Ward's chapter on militarism in Plymouth. The author assumes that statism fosters a military spirit and that militarism exists whenever the state "regards military efficiency as a paramount end and when it subordinates other interests to those of the military" (p. 129). Following Ward's general thesis of statism's decline in Plymouth, one could expect militarism to be an insignificant factor in the colony's history. The author is not so sure. He sees "a subjective fusion of civilian and military authority" (p. 141), and concludes that "the idea of a democratic soldiery, ready to respond at a minute's notice, enhanced the military arm of the state probably to a greater degree than if a small regular army had been maintained entirely separate from civilian life" (p. 141). Such arguments force the reader to conclude that *Statism in Plymouth Colony* adds little to our understanding of the struggle between freedom and authority in America's past.

PAUL R. LUCAS

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1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics. Edited by Robert Paul Wolff. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Pp. 201. $6.95.)

Within a decade we shall reach 1984, the portentous date of George Orwell's prophetic novel. By extrapolating trends visible in the politics of the 1940s to a specific but not too distant time, Orwell gave us a target we should all very much like to miss. As 1984 draws closer we can expect a mounting number of assessments of just how far we have come down Orwell's path to totalitarian repression. Orwell, of course, would be the last to be surprised if the arguments over his prophecies did not also become weapons in the ideological struggle to control men's views of reality.

In the volume under consideration, Robert Paul Wolff, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts has brought together an opening salvo from the viewpoint of the Left of the 1960s. Six academic adherents of the "movement" were asked to examine the future up to 1984 in a specific area of American politics. Their credentials as figures of the left are prominently displayed in the book. Michael Lerner was indicted for organizing an antiwar demonstration in Seattle; Gene Mason was sentenced to a year in a Kentucky penitentiary for purchasing a stolen typewriter in the midst of a campaign he was waging against an incumbent congressman; Ira Katznelson was editor of *Politics and Society*, a counterculture journal; Frances Fox Piven helped organize the National Welfare Rights Organization; and Todd Gitlin was prominent in the Students for a Democratic Society. Robert Nakamura is the only contributor who is not assigned a special role in the 1960s movement.

The premise from which most of these authors work is that American society is already repressive; its democratic institutions are a sham working in the interests of a few; its economy rests on imperialistic exploitation. This is not the sort of position from which we might expect to get a measured assessment of our descent into Orwell's abyss. For if the 1960s rhetoric is to be taken seriously, then 1984 has been upon us for a long time.

Thus the projections of these essays are less efforts to see how various institutions may become more oppressive than they are speculations about how we might break out of an existing state of injustice.

In the one essay which directs itself to the Orwellian theme of repression and thought control, Gene Mason lays out the catalog of devices such as wiretapping, "no-knock" laws, and computer files which have made supervision of private behavior ever more efficient. But such widely regarded dangers are not sufficient for Mason, for he must find repression everywhere, even if he must redefine the term to cover any ". . . control through the ordering of human activity" (p. 63). In his hands the term loses all of its customary meaning and we are lost in Orwell's Newspeak, the first principle of which was to reduce the choice of words to a minimum so as to diminish the range of thought. It is the same tactic which not so long ago took such terms as brutality or genocide and sought to control our perceptions by expanding their meaning far beyond our common understanding.

Todd Gitlin's piece, "The Future of an Effusion: How Young Activists Will Get to 1984," sets forth alternative paths for the now defunct movement. He rejects the possibility that radicals will simply melt into the mainstream. His "minimum future" would find radicals playing discrete roles in various parts of the society, never adding up to anything like a movement, but acting as gadflies to liberal reform. His "maximum future" would see the coming together of working- and middle-class activists in a common radical cause. It is never clear, however, just how this is to be brought about.

Two essays deal with national institutions. Robert Nakamura provides what is in this context a relatively conservative analysis of presidential-congressional relations. The Vietnam experience he perceives as having weakened the hand of the president and strengthened that of the Senate in foreign affairs. On the other hand he argues that the House of Representatives is so institutionalized in its ways that even the reform of such rules as seniority would not revive it. Michael Lerner's analysis of the two-party system looks forward to the possibility of the development of a "People's party" to compete with the dominant "Property" party, i.e., the Republicans and Democrats. With the decline in America's imperialist fortunes, the ruling elite will seek to transfer the costs to the working class, thus planting the seeds for a radical party.

Two essays deal with the cities, both thoroughly pessimistic about the possibilities of any radical changes there. Ira Katznelson sees the various efforts of the '60s to meet the urban problems as counterrevolutionary. If they succeed they will ". . . impose on our cities a soft version of 1984, in the beneficent guise of liberal, participatory reform" (p. 140). In a similar vein Frances Fox Piven demonstrates how the many programs developed in response to the demands of urban blacks, have worked to benefit organized producers, teachers, city employees, and welfare workers. What is worse, Piven charges, the system itself, by pitting the disadvantaged against each other, submerges the basic issue of inequities in the distribution of wealth.

The real enemy which keeps popping up in these essays is "repressive reform," or the ability of liberals to ameliorate the miseries of the masses. Whatever optimism we see here comes from the expectation that the American system will face disasters with which it will be unable to cope, thus producing the grounds for an effective radical movement.

Another theme in these essays is the search for the errors of the 1960s Left. They were all written in the early 1970s, in the hangover period of the movement, when it was first apparent that one could indeed throw a demonstration and not have anyone show up. They show concern for the arrogance of the Left, for its anti-intellectualism, and for its inwardness. The authors realize that they must expand their appeal beyond the middle-class white college youths who dominated their movement. But nowhere in these writings is there evident the continued will to organize or the readiness for long personal sacrifice which has characterized the leaders of historically successful revolutionary movements.

What strikes one, however, is that the world of 1984 to these authors is not likely to be much different from what it is today. Perhaps it is their academic training which has given these radicals such a healthy respect for the capacity of American institutions to absorb demands without changing its basic character. Or it may be that the time set for their projections is too close upon us. Those who predict doom tomorrow are only fit subjects for *New Yorker* cartoons. Respectable prophets require more time. After all, 1984 was 35 years away when Orwell's book first appeared, a time soon enough to touch his readers, yet not so soon as to violate their sense of reality. Today's futurologists talk of the year 2000 and beyond. The shorter the projection, it would seem, the more one is restrained by the cautionary thinking of the social sciences. These essays are addressed to the convinced. Skeptics will find little evidence to support the major themes.

JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER
Michigan State University

Executive Ombudsmen in the United States. Edited by Alan J. Wyner. (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1973. Pp. 315. $5.50.)

This collection of essays on executive-appointed centralized complaint handlers is one of the very useful results of the Ombudsman Activities Project of the University of California, Santa Barbara, which owed its existence to OEO interest and Santa Barbara expertise in ombudsmen. The research of most of the contributors was subsidized by the project, as was the book itself, which probably is the most important publication on complaint handling in the United States since Walter Gellhorn's *When Americans Complain* (1966). Eight state or urban organizations are described and assessed, as well as the complaint handling experiences of three lieutenant governors. Unfortunately, as is often the case with books of this sort, the writers are inclined to go their own ways with little or no effort to produce comparable data that would allow further and sounder conclusions to be drawn. For example, there is no information about the cost of the organizations in Honolulu, Nassau (N.Y.), and Puerto Rico.

What is an executive ombudsman? According to the editor, Alan Wyner, he is "a centralized complaint-handling officer who has been appointed to office and who serves at the pleasure of an elected or appointed chief executive" (p. 10). Wyner observes that the executive ombudsman differs from other institutions that handle complaints against governmental administration by being centralized, and the executive ombudsman differs from classical ombudsmen by being appointed and removed by a chief executive. If mode of selection and dependence on a chief executive were the only characteristics distinguishing the organizations discussed in this book from classical ombudsmen, it would be sensible to use the term "ombudsman" for both species. Indeed, until it was transformed by legislation in 1972 into a classical ombudsman, the Iowa Citizens' Aide Office does appear correctly to be designated an executive ombudsman. It operated very much like the classical species and handled the same kind of complaints. This, however, cannot be said of the other so-called executive ombudsmen described in the book, who, I believe, are not ombudsmen at all in the technical sense of the word.

The classical ombudsmen of Scandinavia, New Zealand, and the United States, although some of their incidental activities are the same as the main activities of executive ombudsmen, are primarily concerned with investigating complaints against alleged abuses of administrative authority. Wyner notes that most executive ombudsmen are able to take on much larger caseloads than classical ombudsmen. The reason for this difference, as Wyner and his colleague John E. Moore point out, is that most of what executive ombudsmen call "complaints" are not the "complaints" investigated by classical ombudsmen. In Moore's view, an important distinction must be drawn between complaints against adminstrative action and requests for administrative services, although Moore realizes the difficulty of placing some communications from the public solely in one or the other category. Most of the activities of the American executive ombudsmen described in the volume consist in helping people to secure government services, which involves no more than referring individuals to appropriate administrative agencies or phoning agencies to expedite the delivery of services. While classical ombudsmen occasionally provide such assistance, this is not the kind of activity which consumes most of their time, nor is it the reason they have been called "ombudsmen." A request to an executive ombudsman to have a dead cat removed from a backyard is very different from a complaint to a classical ombudsman that an administrative agency had abused its authority in deciding to deny the complainant some social service. The methods by which the executive ombudsman handles the first type of "complaint" and the classical ombudsman the second are totally different. There is an investigation in the second case, while there is none in the first. Moore's assertion that investigating complaints against alleged maladministration and telling people where to receive services are different points in a single continuum blurs the important distinction he has made between the two quite distinct types of activities.

If Moore rejects a dichotomy where it would have been appropriate, his colleague Stanley V. Anderson makes the opposite error in his essay which concludes the book by creating a dichotomy between "passive" classical and "active" executive ombudsmen. By distinguishing sharply between the classical ombudsmen, "who wait passively in some secluded office for complaints to come in," and the executive ombudsmen, who "have the opportunity to go out into the community in order to solicit complaints" (p. 308), he obscures the significant fact that American ombudsmen of both types have made themselves more accessible to complainants than have the ombudsmen of other continents. It is true, as the book shows, that executive ombudsmen in America have gone further in this direction than the classical ombudsmen. The former are able through outreach programs to encourage as many people as possible to bring their troubles to them, for they are not bothered by jurisdictional problems and spend only a few minutes on most cases. Classical ombudsmen have precise jurisdictional limits, generally accept as cases only those complaints which have already been pursued through regular administrative channels, and require considerably more time to investigate a complaint than that needed for executive ombudsmen to refer one. The inability to handle large case loads and the fear of encouraging people to come forward with cases they cannot accept seem to inhibit classical ombudsmen from reaching out for clients in the manner of executive ombudsmen.

Several authors in the volume, including Anderson, recognize how very different classical and executive ombudsmen are when they argue that the two institutions perform complementary functions and that the services of both institutions are needed in contemporary society. John Moore reveals how the Honolulu Office of Information and Complaint and the Hawaiian Ombudsman do in fact complement rather than duplicate each other's work, while P. N. Burgess, C. R. Hofstetter, and L. D. Higgs show from Puerto Rican experience how the two functions can be performed by two very different parts of a single complex organization.

Only one of the authors appears to recognize that executive ombudsmen can be a mixed blessing. As Dean Mann points out, "Getting a family into public housing or finding a job through extraordinary efforts may, in fact, short-circuit a process established to ensure all applicants a fair chance of better housing or employment" (p. 277). Future research on centralized organizations for assisting persons to receive public services should pursue this problem of dysfunctional consequences.

William B. Gwyn

Tulane University

Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. By Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973. Pp. 257. $10.00.)

Professors Adelman and Morris have written a sequel to their immensely interesting *Society, Politics, and Economic Development.* In that book they used factor analysis to quantify the elusive forces of modernization. Using forty-one social, political, and economic indicators scaled on data covering the 1950s and early 1960s and drawn from seventy-four non-communist countries, they categorized these countries as exemplifying one of three levels of socio-economic development and observed the statistical associations of the variables at each level. They concluded that "the process of economic development in underdeveloped countries consists basically of the separation of the economic sphere, first, from the complex of social organization and the norms that govern it, and, subsequently and to a lesser extent, from the political environment by which it is constrained" (p. 267). Since they are strongly oriented toward policy, they advised that the preponderance of foreign assistance should go to the "high" level countries which were best equipped to apply economic criteria in using it and where their data "show a significant positive association between long-run economic performance and the establishment of representative political institutions" (p. 276).

In *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* Adelman and Morris narrow their inquiry to the effect of economic development on political participation and the distribution of income. They draw on data from the same seventy-four countries (chapters 1 and 2, accounting for half of the present volume, are an edited version of chapter 2 of the previous volume) with the indicators expanded from forty-one to forty-eight. In their treatment of political participation they apply discriminant analysis, in income distribution a stepwise analysis-of-variance technique. To their dismay they find that "economic modernization has had little direct effect on the sharing of political power" (p. 186). Moreover, their "findings strongly suggest that there is no automatic, or even likely, trickling down of the benefits of economic growth to the poorest segments of the population in low-income countries. On the contrary, the absolute position of the poor tends to deteriorate as a consequence of economic growth" (p. 198).

Whether or not the analysis can bear the weight of these conclusions is reason enough for political scientists to be interested in the book. The authors are trying assiduously to quantify a world that many of us write about qualitatively, intuitively, or anecdotally. As they well understand, multivariate analysis, no matter how sophisticated, can be no better than the data going into it, and working with sources—often inadequate—from seventy-four countries across forty-eight indicators is a hazardous venture. How, for example, does one scale administrative efficiency in countries as diverse as Gabon, Nepal, Ceylon, Mexico, and Kenya? In classifying these and other countries in this performance dimension, Adelman and Morris have interviewed regional and country experts. They also have consulted recent country studies and, in this instance, checked their classification with Banks and Textor's character of bureaucracy in their *A Cross-Polity Survey.* Can there be consistency in the judgments rendered when so many judges are involved? One is inclined to regard their struggles with this and other problems as they attempt to bring quantitative order out of qualitative vagueness rather like Samuel Johnson's view of a dog walking on its hind legs: it is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all.

For those who are not put off by methodological difficulties, the substantive conclusions of the book are intriguing. Adelman and Morris have given a new lease on life to Marx's immiserization thesis as well as to the role of politics in modernization. Their data show that economic growth is not a benign force that affects other subsystems in society positively. If we are to have our cake and eat it too, that is, to have growth *and* equity, the state must play an active role. "... the most important instruments for increasing political participation ... are those that involve fundamental changes in socio-economic and political structure as well as a basic reorientation of development strategies" (p. 198). Moreover, "If a country is to avoid stagnation at a low level of development, it must not only eliminate expatriate or neocolonial elites but replace them with indigenous entrepreneurs and administrators who are quite widely spread throughout the country" (p. 194).

One senses that Adelman and Morris are chastened by their conclusions. The policy recommendations in *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* are made with less assurance than those in *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*. Indeed they have a certain rhetorical and hortatory quality. Committed to equity as a proper goal for developing societies, and persuaded by their own research of the need for institional reform, they have, in effect, passed the modernization baton to political and other social scientists with the injunction that they must have a "thorough knowledge ... of the complex interrelationships among the society, the bureaucracy, and the economy" (p. 200). Readers of this journal are not likely to quarrel with this view which, after all, is very largely what the literature of political modernization is about. Yet they, too, should feel chastened because it is far from clear that that literature contains solutions to the policy problems Adelman and Morris pose.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.
Northwestern University

Agrarian Reform in Latin America. By Robert J. Alexander. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1974. Pp. 118. $5.95.)

Part of a series on key Latin American issues edited by Samuel Baily and Ronald Hyman, this book by Robert Alexander promises more than it delivers. In the preface we are assured that the books in the series will focus on crucial and controversial cross-cultural hemispheric issues handled within the context of a Latin American perspective, countervailing the usual North American cultural bias likely to be shared by many student readers. It is not a satisfying study. It is technically flawed, blandly written, and absolutely noncontroversial.

The problem begins with how the author conceives of a basic issue such as agrarian reform. He mentions all the proper shibboleths about its importance to economic, social and political factors but then proceeds to disembowel the issue of its profound structural impact on the whole societal and human condition. The fault lies partially with a reflexive need to cover again the whole historical land pattern, to treat Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba serially in each chapter, and to outline simplistically who gets the land, how the landlords are paid and what is needed after the land is redistributed.

Although the author has had much experience in Latin America, he recounts only one personal anecdote, which took place in Bolivia in 1954 after the MNR revolution. The book has only ten footnotes, several marginal in their value; only two of them postdate 1965, and there are none from the '70s. There is not a single reference to the many excellent accounts of agrarian reform from such sources as Hirschman on Colombia, Kaufman on Chile, and the many articles and papers produced by the affiliates of the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center.

Thus from a man who has written so feelingly of many varied themes in Latin America, this performance is a keen disappointment. It is a linear, legalistic, pedestrian, antiseptic account of the methods, means, and varieties of this and that agrarian program. No apparent interest or passion for the subject seems to bubble through. Redundancies abound, well-known Spanish terms are misspelled, and even the English grammar is unedited.

Although the descriptions are accurate, there is little attempt to explain the agrarian reform policies of these four countries within the total societal context of value conflicts, economic and social structures, international influences and interventions, elite interaction, and the policy-making process itself. Alexander rarely describes the human and material dimensions of a single agrarian policy. Never do we read about the already documented accounts of corruption, cooptation, exploitation, interest-group interlinkages, patronage, rural violence, elite strategies, peasant movements. Reading this apolitical treatment of a thoroughly political process is something like reading a Chase Manhatten Bank brochure of how they changed the tile inlays on the sidewalks in front of their Rio de Janeiro branch.

It appears that Alexander's own predisposition makes him partial to the Venezuelan land reforms, overtly hostile to the Cuban experiments in rural programs, and disinterested in the late Allende government's agrarian reforms in Chile. His predilections concerning cooperative or collective farming are most manifest in the Mexican case; he argues that the Mexican *ejidos* are not productive either because of the uncertainty of individual land tenure or because the peasants are too sure of tenure and thus invest their energies elsewhere. The author has it both ways, and neither is probably correct. Alexander goes on:

> The author has seen the effects in practice. In one *ejido* he visited, given over to growing corn, there was a sharp contrast between one *ejidatario's* long ribbon of corn land and his neighbor's. In one, the corn was seven feet tall, the irrigation ditches were in very good condition, there were no weeds among the corn. In the other, the corn was no more than five feet high, the irrigation ditches were in a bad way, and the weeds were threatening to choke out the corn. However, because the unproductive farmer was not allowed to sell or otherwise dispose of his property, the other farmer could not buy him out. As a result, the overall productivity of the *ejido* was probably lower than it would have been if each member had had full title to his land. (pp. 54–55)

This is certainly one way to have viewed that scene.

PETER RANIS

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The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. Edited by Edward Allworth. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 236. $16.50.)

Central Asia receives comparatively little attention from scholars in Soviet Studies, compared with that given to Russia itself or some of the non-Russian European nationalities, and much of the study of Soviet Central Asia is not so much of the Central Asians themselves, but of the policies of the Soviet party and government toward them. This is better than no study at all, but it necessarily involves some degree of objectification of the Central Asian nationalities, which is unfortunate, because Soviet Central Asia is a fruitful area for study in itself.

This book (which is basically a set of conference papers and comments on them) concerns itself with only one issue, that of nationality, but deals with a number of aspects of it. Although there were some equivocal signs of a nascent nationalism in the Bukharan Republic at the outset of Soviet rule, the devils which the Communist party was most concerned to exorcise were those of Panturanianism and Panislamism, because nationality in the European sense did not exist. Soviet policy chose to implant the concept by administrative act, setting up five "Republics," each based on predominance of a single ethnolinguistic group. Over fifty years the concept has become so well rooted that it threatens the ideological objective of "convergence" into a single Soviet nationality, and creates possible problems for the future through a combination of national self-assertiveness with a birthrate much higher than that in the European USSR.

In literature, as Robert J. Barrett's very lucid paper argues, a rather difficult and delicate policy is being pursued which attempts to halt divergence and promote convergence of Central Asian nationalities with Russians rather than with each other—a policy which clashes with the growing preoccupation of many Central Asians with their own past, and appears to be fighting a losing battle with it, despite reiterated calls by party figures and the literary establishment for added emphasis on officially approved themes.

Several papers are devoted to an attempt to decide whether the short-lived Bukharan State exhibited a nascent Central Asian nationalism sufficiently strongly to constitute a threat to Soviet hegemony and motivate the subsequent administrative division of it. Timur Kocaoglu concludes that it did, but to make his case comes close to creating a distinctive type of Asian state-formation, multilinguistic, multiethnic and distinguished from an allegedly "European" type based on ethnolinguistic unity (a false antithesis when applied to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Canada, or to the Soviet Union itself). He also has to utilize the doubtful argument that the title "Bukhara Khälq Shoralar Jumhuriyäti" signified an attempt to indicate "separateness and independence" rather than a straight translation of a Russian equivalent (Bukharan People's Soviet Republic). Use of the coinage "Conciliar" (which properly refers only to *ecclesiastical* councils) is a mere device to avoid the unpalatable term "Soviet" of which "Shoralar" is clearly a translation, used in 1921 because it was common to the two main languages of the area and few Bukharans would then have known what "Soviet" meant.

Seymour Becker, William N. Hanaway, Jr., and Ian Matley do not claim a "Bukharan nationality" existed. Becker, however, argues that a threat of "Turkestan nationalism" was nascent among the intelligentsia, including Communist party members. But his argument does not distinguish clearly between it and Panturanianism, and leaves unargued the question why a "divide-and-rule" policy was imposed only *after* the Basmachi threat in Bukhara had been brought under control and the Panturanianist danger had diminished, i.e., when the greatest need for it had passed. Hanaway's conclusion that an "urban solidarity" not amounting to "national awareness" existed, depends to some extent on accepting that the word "millat" carries the same overtones as the word "people" which is used to translate it. Its Ottoman equivalent ("millet") did not, so it is possible that even his moderate conclusion is slightly overstated for the Turkic elements in Bukhara. Ian Matley's sober and judicious examination of the wide range of factors inhibiting the growth of a "national identity" (ethnic heterogeneity, poor communications, tribalism, nomadism, and so on) carries the most conviction in this section.

The papers by Edward Allworth on "Regeneration," Ralph Scott Clem on "Demographic and

Socio-Economic Forces," Ethel and Stephen Dunn on "Intermarriage and Cultural Convergence," Ronald Wixman on "Recent Assimilation Trends," M. Mobin Shorish on "Who Shall be Educated?", and John Hanselman on "Leadership and Nationality," are all cogent and well researched, but indicate what needs to be done to avoid Central Asian "particularism," namely to examine other areas of the Soviet Union in order to distinguish between phenomena which are general and those which are particular to Central Asia. This is especially necessary in respect of attitudes of youth to the concepts of "Soviet nationality" and "convergence," or the degree to which "Europeans" dominate the higher levels of party, government, bureaucracy or industrial management (e.g., by comparison with Armenia, Georgia or the Baltic States), or in considering relative levels of industrialization (where Soviet statistical publications have indicated over a number of years that in all the Central Asian Republics industrial productivity is well below the Union average both absolutely and in rate of growth, a factor which would tend to inhibit establishment of new industries there and hence perpetuate its dependence on primary production).

The relevance of Soviet Central Asia to Soviet foreign policy also needs to be examined, because of its role in Soviet relations with the Asian and African states, both as a "showcase" for visiting statesmen and as a source of influence through use of Central Asians in Soviet diplomatic, technical and cultural missions abroad. Obviously these issues could not all be covered at one conference, but the present volume is promising enough to give grounds for the hope that there will be others in which the frame of reference will be broadened.

G. JUKES

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Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich. By Paul Alpert. (London: Collier-Macmillan LTD and New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. 269. $10.00.)

Behind the catchy title Paul Alpert has presented a broad survey of the economic development problems of poor nations with some added suggestions about what the rich lands should do to help. For 25 years the French author has worked with the United Nations. His writing also resembles the country studies of UNDP or the World Bank in its competent but not very stimulating assembly of facts.

Alpert's basic idea is that while the East-West tension is diminishing "a conflict of far greater scope is emerging as the major threat to peace, continued progress, and the very survival of our civilization" (p. ix) the one between rich and poor nations with its racial overtones.

This could be a fruitful hypothesis, even if it is hardly novel. It could give the foundation for a challenging study helping us to understand, for example, the tensions revealed in the UN Special General Assembly of spring 1974. My main criticism of the book is that instead of realizing this potential, Alpert has written a survey of development problems of a sort that by now is common.

The book starts off with a few facts about three "precedents for economic development"—Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. It continues with a discussion of three groups of domestic issues of development in the poor nations, human problems, policy problems, and some regional problems.

We are told, for instance, that the most important aspects of development relate to changes in human values, that human resources must be maximally utilized, that education is of paramount importance, that family planning is an "obvious solution," and that "major efforts must also be made to provide productive employment for the urban unemployed."

Among other similar generalities the author, on page 36, states that one of the most serious effects of sudden overpopulation in poor nations is the sharp increase in unemployment. It is regrettable that he does not relate the unemployment problem, as well as several other issues, also to social institutions and to social systems. This is the more surprising, because in the preceding paragraph he takes up Chinese family planning efforts. China can be considered overpopulated in comparison with Brazil, with seven times as many individuals per square mile, but it is Brazil and not China that is plagued by unemployment. In the treatment of "policy problems" we are offered similar insights about the proper balance between private and public enterprise, laissez-faire and planning, agriculture and industry, with some consideration of trade, foreign investments, and external aid added. The copious academic writing of the last two decades on neocolonialism, unequal exchange, or the role of the multinational companies in poor nations is not referred to, and it seems questionable if the author has taken the trouble to go to those many books.

Four pages on Latin America's special regional problems, two on Africa's, and two on Asia's complete this section. Part Three of the book repeats some of the many pious wishes about what the rich nations should do on trade, foreign investments, and aid, in order to speed up the development process in the poor nations. But Alpert does not advance this dicussion beyond what has for long been common in many U.N. documents.

Part Four takes up the concrete development experience of Algeria, the Ivory Cost, Tanzania, Cuba, Mexico, (which is considered the outstanding success), China, Iran and South Korea. A number of detailed features are here quite interesting, e.g., the description of the gradual but methodical elimination of the French influence in the Algerian oil and gas production, or the story of the growth of the South Korean export economy which, if it were generalized to the more populous Asian nations, could really create employment problems in the rich nations.

In a concluding chapter Alpert discusses the necessity and the feasability of a "world strategy for economic development," mainly keeping to that of the UN Second Development Decade. The author is sadly aware that this strategy consists more in "lofty proclamations" than in real actions. He ends up with a warning, similar to that of Robert Heilbroner in *An Inquiry into The Human Prospect* (New York: Norton & Co., 1974, pp. 42–46) about the risks of nuclear blackmail from the poor nations, if the rich ones do not change their present behavior.

With the energy crisis adding about as much as all Western aid to the import bill of the nonoil-producing nations in the Third World, with the nine European Community nations hardly able to agree on a three-year aid program of a size smaller than the profits of the British Petroleum for the first quarter 1974 to this "Fourth World," and with India's atom bomb, this prospect of nuclear blackmail may have advanced a bit since the book was published.

In summary this is a very well-meaning, but neither a deep, novel, or challenging book about one of the most serious problems of the present world situation.

GUNNAR ADLER-KARLSSON
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Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. By Elaine Baldwin. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 240. $11.75.)

The work before us is another in the brilliant series of monographs written under the supervision of Professor Max Gluckman in the Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Manchester. With this study of one of the oldest co-operative smallholders villages in the Sharon plain, Dr. Baldwin joins D. Weintraub, M. Shokeid, E. Marx, and S. Deshen among others who have demonstrated the relevance of the techniques and methods of social anthropology to an understanding of Israeli society and its political system. The study is important not only as a description of the processes of change within a particular village called "Kfar Hefer" but as an examination of the routinization of ideology.

The first *moshav*, or co-operative smallholders village, Nahalal, was established by a breakaway group from the first kibbutz, Degania. In place of collective living and collective cultivation of commonly held lands, the moshav was structured on the basis of single-family units cultivating equal family-held plots while practicing co-operation at the marketing and purchasing levels. The village is administered by a general meeting of all the member settlers which in turn selects a Council and a village Executive made up of social and economic committees; the day-to-day management of a village is carried out by two officials, an internal secretary who deals with organizational, planning, agricultural, and social matters within the village, and an external secretary who is responsible for the village's financial affairs and dealings with governmental and public agencies and moshav organizations. In the course of time, power and authority in the villages have tended to become concentrated in the narrower bodies and among the full-time "professionals." This has occurred concomitantly with the emergence of economic considerations as a dominant factor in the villages' decision-making processes.

The original ideology of the moshav movement stressed egalitarianism, self-work as opposed to the employment of hired labor, mutual aid, and co-operation. The rise of the state of Israel and the growth of central planning through bureaucratic structures have substituted rational economic goals and methods for the ideological and communal goals of the original settlement movement. Changes have also occurred within the villages. Some farmers have been more successful than others. Others have no male children or sons-in-law who can assure the continuity of the family farm. The result has been growing social and economic differentiation within the villages between the more and less successful, the less successful being compelled to give up or sell their "quotas" of water, poultry production, etc. to the more efficient. Together these developments have created social tensions. Efficiency has become a slogan of the successful, with ideology increasingly the refuge of the weak and the less successful. All these have put the old moshav values to a severe test, the outcome of which is not yet clear.

Increasingly important decisions are made by external, governmental, and public agencies with the informal social controls of scandal and gossip being relegated to personal relationships. The old unity of the villagers has been shattered. Whether the moshav can survive in anything like its original form is questionable. Dr. Baldwin makes no predictions. She says simply, "A re-definition of economic relationships invariably carries with it a re-definition of other ways of life" (p. 225). We feel the measure of her sympathetic understanding of the people of "Kfar Hefer" as we agonize with the villagers over the fate which overtakes all of us who are involved in the process of modernization.

KHAYYAM Z. PALTIEL

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Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939. By E. A. Brett. (New York: NOK Publishers Ltd., 1973. Pp. 330. $16.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

During the past six or seven years the established theories of political and economic development of the 1950s and '60s have increasingly been abandoned in the face of their manifest inability to deal with the political and economic failures of the so-called "developing" nations. This transition has reflected a rejection of the ahistorical character, preoccupation with indigenous variables, and sanguine optimism of much previous research for a more historically rooted, global perspective that is essentially critical of and pessimistic about the impact of linkages between developed capitalist states and the Third World. E. A. Brett's book is a product of this process. It began as a doctoral thesis written in the empiricist and largely uncritical ethos of the Institute for Commonwealth Studies of the University of London and was subsequently extensively revised to reflect the author's concern with "the broader questions of colonialism and underdevelopment which have now forced themselves into the centre of all serious work in this general field" (p. ix).

The substance of the study is Brett's analysis of how the state and capitalist interests in Britain and East Africa interacted to produce dependent primary-product export economies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Using some Cabinet papers as well as a rich variety of other public and private documentary sources, he shows that during the interwar decades British interest in colonial development began during the post-World War One economic slump as an effort rooted in British economic weakness, particularly the lack of competitiveness of British industry; the need for cheap raw materials and soft, controllable markets; and the fear of the political instability which might result from excess capacity and unemployment. During the depression of the 1930s interest increasingly focused on the protection of colonial export markets in East Africa from Japanese competition. The constraints on the development of the East African economies showed up in the lack of metropolitan interest in colonial industrialization out of the fear among capital and labor of local competition in the colonial markets and the reluctance among humanitarian interests to see Africans subjected to the rigors of industrial labor.

Brett also examines in fascinating detail the development of the specific form of a dependent colonial economy in each of the three territories. He notes the crucial choice which had to be made between the alternative strategies of basing the primary product export sector on African peasant, corporate plantation, or individual settler production. In Kenya the settler community emerged as the predominant force, despite real and continuing economic weakness, only at the cost of a substantial transfer of resources from the African population to the inefficient settler producers. In Tanganyika and Uganda, African peasant production predominated in the face of more limited plantation and settler activity, although Brett shows how in Uganda metropolitan corporate interests dominated marketing and processing and collaborated with the local administration in the entrenchment of oligarchic controls at the expense of the African producer. Focusing on land, transportation, marketing, and financial policies, Brett depicts how colonial economic institutions granted differential access to the market place and to the appropriation of the surpluses generated by increased production.

Several problems remain, however. The most serious is Brett's failure to distinguish between colonialism and imperialism, which are treated as synonymous throughout the work. But imperialism is better understood as a general abstract relationship between metropole and dependency which can assume a variety of specific forms. Colonialism itself is that pattern of relationships established where indigenous political and social forms are incapable of sustaining the relationship desired by the metropole, and the latter directly establishes the infrastructure of political and economic control with its own agents. The internal "colonial" relationships of domination over the subject population are personal and intense, and ultimately far less flexible than the external, largely impersonal intersystemic linkages with the metropole. Brett thus dismisses the conflicts between metropolitan and local administrative and settler interests as issues of detail that did not affect the basic structure, when in fact these were linked to fundamental differences which widened greatly after World War Two and gave impetus to the decolonization process in which the metropole divested itself of local colonial agents who were becoming increasingly costly to maintain.

For the above reason, as well as for the general and surprising neglect of internal documentation from the Colonial Office and the individual colonial governments, the treatment of colonial administration is generally weak. Thus, for example, the colonial governments, particularly the field administrations which were the backbone of control, did not find their "ideological roots in the Weberian tradition of scientific administration" (p. 304), but were instead more archaic in their ethos. Furthermore, Brett accepts at face value the notion of "indirect rule" as characterizing the modus operandi of colonial administration, while in reality it was nonexistent in Kenya, little more than a facade in Tanganyika, and operated in approximation of the theory only in the African kingdoms of Uganda.

These problems are reinforced by the constriction of focus to the interwar decades. Brett can therefore only hint at the important watershed in East African development represented by the Second World War and the ensuing 15 years of rapid growth and rising African nationalist opposition. Thus, in the last chapter, when he leaps to a consideration of the contemporary impact of the colonial political economy, the effort is not wholly convincing.

Brett's work is nevertheless a solid and important case study which presents a theoretically and historically sophisticated approach to the political economy of African development. It deserves wide reading and serious attention.

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From Tribe to Nation in Africa. Edited by Ronald Cohen and John Middleton. (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 276. $8.75, cloth; $4.75, paper.)

The editors of *From Tribe to Nation* begin with the premise that anthropologists have traditionally disregarded the importance of the nation-state in Africa in favor of comparative analysis of cultural subunits, while political scientists, ethnocentrically oblivious to the importance and richness of African societies' multiple subcultures, have focused almost exclusively at the level of the new national units. Questionable as this argumentative premise may be, it in no way interferes with the quality of ten substantive essays which examine processes of absorption and assimilation within a number of subnational cultural groupings in Africa. The principal common denominator of these essays is the proposition that the process of cultural absorption, which seems so vitally important if African nations are to develop a viable basis for political stability, has been a fundamental part of the social experience of African communities since long before the colonial division of Africa; and that state structures exercising administrative and political powers over culturally heterogenous populations have existed in Africa for many centuries.

If any social scientists concerned with Africa have ever operated on the relatively simple assumption that cultural assimilation unidirectionally involved the upward transfer of personal loyalties from the tribal grouping at one level to the nation-state at another, *From Tribe to Nation* should certainly put an end to this sort of thinking. It shows that cultural incorporation is an almost infinitely complex process which involves the continuous adjustment of personal orientations and allegiances at various levels of society.

Among the many oversimplified assumptions which would need to give way in the face of the essays in this volume, perhaps the most widespread concerns the supposed cultural homogeneity of historic subnational units. African societies, which vary widely in scale and political organization, have frequently played host to highly variegated groups of stranger minorities. The absorption of these minorities into the political, economic, and cultural life of regionally dominant ethnic communities is, in certain respects, as important a part of the overall social integration of modern Africa as is the integration of subnational units into the politicoeconomic framework of the new nation-state.

One useful way to compare the various patterns of cultural assimilation considered in this volume is to consider the various institutional vehicles through which integration is initially accomplished. In almost every case of cultural integration, this process proceeds on the basis of one particular starting point of contact between dissimilar groups and then gradually unfolds to include other dimensions of social life and behavior. Thus, among communities which possess strongly articulated systems of chieftaincy, this institution seems to play a crucial role as the initial structural bridge between diverse cultural elements. In his discussion of the Alur people, for example, Aidan Southall comments that "Alur incorporation of non-Alur has depended mainly upon the constant proliferation of Alur chiefship and the gradual envelopment of new subjects in its realm" (p. 76). Once non-Alur groups accepted Alur chiefs there was a pronounced tendency for them to bring other aspects of their culture into alignment with that of the predominant group.

The Nyamwezi of western Tanzania provide a second illustration of the importance of chieftainship with the important distinction that whereas the Alur system has depended entirely upon chiefs of Alur descent, the pattern of chieftaincy among the Nyamwezi poses no institutional barrier to non-Nyamwezi ascending to the position of chief. The important point is that every non-Nyamwezi in the Nyamwezi area has been considered to possess full rights of citizenship in a subchiefdom and full entitlement to the ritual services of chiefs. R. G. Abrahams notes that since these rights were often fairly similar from one cultural subcommunity to the next, chieftaincy provided an extremely effective unifying and integrative framework. In West Africa, Elliott Skinner notes the supreme importance of chieftaincy as the vehicle whereby the Mossi people were able first to dominate, then to assimilate, non-Mossi groups. One of the unique aspects of the Mossis' system was their ability to generate and implant a series of historical and ritual myths which gave their chiefs a strong degree of legitimacy among subordinated elements. Chieftaincy has also been the cutting edge and *sine qua non* of cultural assimilation between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda.

Where chieftaincy is not strongly developed, as among the peoples of northern Ghana which lack the institution of chieftainship, other institutions provide the basis for initial contact and assimilation. Jack Goody documents the extreme importance of intermarriage as the basis for cultural unification among a wide assortment of northern Ghanaian peoples. He notes that "for most purposes, the situation in northern Ghana can be summarized in the proposition that the rate of incorporation (I) varies directly with the rate of out-marriage (OM)" (p. 137). As in the case of societies where chieftaincy functions as the initial vehicle of cultural contact, other dimensions and aspects of culture begin to align themselves once the first institutional relationship has been established.

It is tempting to hope that Africa's long tradition of cultural incorporation and interethnic assimilation will abet the process of building unified nation-states in the contemporary era. This hope is given strong implicit expression both in the editors' Introduction and in the essays that follow. For the moment, however, the most that can be said is that cultural integration at the level of the nation-state has ample precedent historically and that identical processes have been occurring at the subnational level since the beginnings of African history.

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Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution. By D. W. Fokkema. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 185. $7.50.)

D. W. Fokkema was a Dutch diplomat posted in Peking during the period between April 1966 and February 1968. His book is an account of the course of the Cultural Revolution through the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. Now a professor of East Asian Literature at the University of Utrecht, Dr. Fokkema gives us a study that is at once journalistic and a piece of analytic scholarship.

Fokkema the journalist gives a vivid firsthand account of the events of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and a good deal more: he explores its temper. The events composing a social and political phenomenon as complex as the Chinese upheaval have been given to us before in a number of accounts—accounts which often prematurely imposed meanings and explanations. Fokkema's approach is significantly different in this respect. The narrative is there (often in a confusion of names and dates), but beneath this is a sensibility which explores a conflict of attitudes, attitudes rooted deeply in historic Chinese culture and the revolutionary process which China has experienced for two generations. Fokkema has rightly suggested that the Cultural Revolution was a political conflict, a confrontation of opposing personalities and factions in the conventional sense; and it was also a conflict of policies and national priorities. But in addition, he suggests that such a profound disorientation of a society was more than political because it was a conflict of values and tempers reaching deeply into the consciousness and processes of a society which was experiencing profound change. "During the Cultural Revolution the impossible and unbelievable happened," Fokkema asserts (p. 161). Only because the animus was "ideological" was this possible.

In Fokkema's view the Cultural Revolution represented Mao Tse-tung's vigorous reassertion of an ideology of uninterrupted revolution and voluntarism. It represented Mao's fear that China was entering a postrevolutionary age of bureaucratic organization, technocratic thinking, and materialism. Against this trend he urged selfless dedication to revolutionary consciousness, spontaneous human effort, and a reaffirmation of *will* in the building of a socialist society. The libretto of the Cultural Revolution thus involved factional strife, the rise and fall from grace of individuals and groups, and mass campaigns and organizations of various sorts; but the more important underlying music was impelled by nothing less than an attempt to create and recreate a new consciousness. The end of the Cultural Revolution was thus revolution itself. If the revolution often seemed to be chaotic, out of control, and politically erratic it was precisely the enthronement of the revolutionary process which made this possible and necessary if Mao was to achieve his wider goal.

Dr. Fokkema's training in language serves him well, and his use of content analysis to study the various poster campaigns and attendant polemics represents a particular strength of his book. He has understood that a problem in reading the language of revolution is to take it either too seriously or not seriously enough. That "the medium is the message" can be asserted for much of the discourse of the Cultural Revolution, and Fokkema even gives us a study of the calligraphy of Lin Piao as a kind of window into one of the minds which animated the Chinese struggle.

I think Fokkema is wrong in asserting that

Mao's revolution in consciousness was essentially "anti-intellectual" (p. 3). It is true that intellectuals often carried the brunt of the Cultural Revolution, but I would suggest that in fact Mao's campaign was supremely intellectual: if it was directed against intellectuals it was only to substitute one dispensation (analytic, organizational, "bureaucratic" thinking) with another (humanistic, willful, intuitive). No one could be more intellectual than Mao in believing that society should be ruled by values and ideas rather than by materialistic or organizational considerations. It was in fact Mao's fear that China was in a fundamental sense becoming less intellectual in its foundations that prompted his campaign against the intellectuals whom he held responsible for this state of affairs. If Fokkema really wants to assert that "Mao Tse-tung wanted to use the Cultural Revolution in order to settle an ideological dispute" (p. 168), he can hardly call it a campaign against "intellectualism," except within a very narrow meaning of the latter term.

In Fokkema's view the net results of Mao's revolution were negative. It produced deep division, not unity. It did not settle the basic ideological question which it proposed; it only degraded a number of personalities associated (rightly or wrongly) with "revisionist" and "opportunistic" ideas and policies. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution rather emerges as but another of those intense "self-investigations" in which China has engaged since she has had to come to terms with the modern world during the last century. Students of contemporary Chinese history and politics will find Fokkema's well-documented study of great value in their own investigations.

G. Eric Hansen

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Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore. By Theodore and Frances M. Geiger. (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1973. Pp. 239. $3.50.)

The investor considering Singapore or Hong Kong will find this book an invaluable introductory guide. With statistical data and clear discourse, the authors tell what to expect by way of taxes, fiscal limitations, characteristics of the labor pool, governmental involvement in business activities, union pressures, protectionist threats, growth rates, and political stability. There is a well-integrated chapter on "Chinese Sociocultural Background."

Associated with this analysis of what has been successful industrial growth are optimistic assertions as to the present and future viability of the two city-states. The authors see dangers ahead, but express confidence that these dynamic people and governments will continue to overcome future challenges. The declining proportion of Singapore's family budget spent on food (one example among many of the casual, optimism-oriented mode of analysis) "indicates that levels of living have been rising" (p. 203), rather than the unstated alternative possibility of a diminution in food consumption because of higher housing and transportation costs. Trade union membership is declining; this is probably a sign of contentment (p. 207), rather than disaffection over their low effectiveness. The activities of multinational corporations are being kept in line with "national interest" (p. 30), even though the governments place highest priority on promoting investment and show few signs of interfering with the profits of successful firms. The problem of increasing protectionism in Japan, Western Europe, and the USA—perhaps not accidentally the key customers of both city-states—"will probably" be solved by flexible "macro-adjustment processes" and "imaginative leadership." Those few—mostly academics—who would prefer greater government spending on social welfare (in Hong Kong) and more democratic inputs (in Singapore) could "reverse" the delicately balanced budgets and investment incentives which have induced economic progress and which offer security in the event of recession.

The authors went to the two countries, talked with government and business leaders, and intelligently synthesized their conventional wisdom. Those social scientists who feel it is their role to examine whether such wisdom is descriptive of reality will be disappointed. This is not investigative reporting. Statistics and thoughts are largely presented in the form in which they emanate from official sources. No comparisons are made with other countries. Political development literature is ignored. The authors feel encouraged by the fact that the man on the street seemed supportive of this conventional wisdom (e.g., p. 216) even though they are aware that dissent is sublimated and discouraged. They place an aura of natural harmony upon the actions of the two governments—and on Communist China as well. All three (with differing emphases) are carrying forward Confucian principles of subordination and authority in a modern setting (e.g., cf. pp. 134, 223), whatever that means. It is noted in passing that leaders in other developing nations, too, should be able to create similar successful pragmatic and flexible development strategies (p. 23).

Optimism is essential for a healthy business climate. It is easiest to maintain when there is little dissenting opinion, or examination of hypotheses. This happens to also suit the interests of incumbent regimes. If what is right for today's business and incumbent regimes (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore's investment climates) is right for all nations at all times, and welfare spending is synonymous with improved living standards, the Geigers' book should set everyone's mind at ease.

ROBERT E. GAMER

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Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya. By George M. Haddad. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1973. Pp. 444. $12.50.)

The defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of June 1967 brought with it a torrent of critical literature that came to be known in the Arab World as the "Self-Criticism Literature." Professor Haddad's book is one instance of this literature. The volume under review is the third and last volume of a series on military rule in the Middle East. It deals with military rule in Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya.

While the author states in his preface that the purpose of writing this volume was to "contribute to the understanding of the contemporary Arab" and "to explain the consequences of the intrusion of the military into radical politics" and the result of such an intrusion, the reader cannot fail to notice that the real purpose is what the author claims to be his conclusions, namely "to refute the assumption that the military was the only force for reform and stability in the Arab World and that their socialist revolutionary regimes gave the Arabs more dignity, unity and strength."

The book advocates the thesis that military regimes and the radical socialist transformation they brought with them, especially after 1955, if compared to the liberal democratic regimes they replaced, are characterized by "more instability, more inefficiency, more demogogy, more lust and struggle for power, more humiliation and defeat, and less freedom, less equality and less prosperity" (p. 414). To support his thesis, the author includes newspaper reports, journalist editorials, statements of political refugees, psychological warfare literature produced by foreign embassies and intelligence units, political opponents' diatribes, gossip and rumors. Unfortunately, the abuses, the injustices and the cruelties of the oligarchies that preceded the military are forgotten; instead, a golden age of liberal democracy is resurrected. King Idriss Sanussi of Libya, for example, becomes a progressive whose only concern was the advancement of Arab causes and the prosperity and dignity of the Libyan people, while the military revolutionaries become an obstacle whose "inexperience" and "suspicion and resentment of foreigners and former local officials consequently slowed down the economy" (p. 339).

The author fails to explain the socioeconomic and ideological variables that led to military intervention in the Middle East; what factors shape the military-civilian relationship; and how military regimes managed to survive, and in the case of Nasser, to enjoy wide range popular support, in and outside Egypt. The relationship of increased military professionalism, the nature of the economy, the socioeconomic background of political and military elite, or the contribution of urbanism, tribalism, or peasant societies to military interventions are questions that are not discussed. Nor does the author address himself to the impact of external inputs by the superpowers in terms of arms, technologies, training, and ideologies on the role that the military plays in small societies.

The main villain in the whole book remains Nasser, whose success as a ruler is attributed to his ability as a conspirator, propagandist, and willingness to use force, intrigue, subversion and violence in the pursuit of his goals (p. 146). Nasser's real aim, the reader is told, was to attain power and to keep it. According to Haddad, Nasser failed in Egypt, in the Arab World, in the international context, and in Africa, bringing misery to his people and to others while failing

> to provide a stable government . . . to guarantee the people's civil rights and freedoms . . . to reform the administration and improve the work of the bureaucracy, to build a strong army, to run the new economic system efficiently, to raise the standard of living among the poverty stricken ignorant masses and to create a new moral and mental outlook that reflects itself in more efficient work . . . (p. 149).

The author concludes his book with a violent attack on the military and the radical socialist regimes and the class warfare that they produced, calling upon the people of the area to revolt and restore the kind of liberal democracy that respects human dignity and freedom (pp. 417–19).

For those political scientists who are interested in theory building or proposition testing, the present volume has very little to offer; in fairness to the author, it was not intended to do those things. For those who are interested in knowing why the military came to power and what are the political dynamics and achievements of military regimes, the present volume offers a myopic vision, perhaps intentionally so, as a reaction to what the author conceives as the docility of the Arab intellectuals to speak out against the negative effect of those so-called "revolutionary regimes" (p. 411). The action is dominated by a few personalities whose only rationale is that of power attainment.

Perhaps the volume's main asset is that it reintroduces to political science the concept of power as a focus of analysis after it has been submerged under the system theories approach. The book will certainly appeal to those who were victimized by the various military regimes in the Arab countries and in other parts of the world, without satisfying those who yearn for change and for the establishment of a new political, social, and economic order. It certainly failed to anticipate the performance of Arab armies in the 1973 war and the impact of such performance on their role in modern Arab societies. In the same vein, his predictions about the direction of Egypt under Sadat, (p. 157–164), of Libya under Qadhafi, and Sudan under Numeiri have not been substantiated by later developments.

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Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers. By Carroll Hawkins. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. 141. $11.50.)

Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the trade union movement in Latin America has had contacts with the international labor movement. Unions of the area have been affiliated with one or another of the worldwide labor confederations. At the same time, a series of groups has brought together national labor organizations from various Latin American countries, as well, sometimes as those of North America.

The broadest-based hemispheric group, in political terms, was the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), organized in 1938. Although founded as a united front of labor organizations with very differing political orientations, during World War Two it came completely under Communist control.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the CTAL had lost most of its influence, and its place as the principal hemispheric labor group had been taken by the Organización Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (ORIT), regional grouping of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It largely dominated organized labor in the Americas during the 1950s, although in the middle 1950s a rival to the ORIT was established, the Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos (CLASC), regional affiliate of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

Today, ORIT and CLASC (rechristened Confederación Latino Americana de Trabajadores—CLAT), are the two functioning hemisphere-wide trade union groupings. Professor Hawkins studies them through the medium of the men who were until recently their secretaries-general. One is Arturo Jauregui, Secretary General of ORIT throughout the 1960s. The other is Emilio Maspero, an Argentine, the most vocal spokesman of CLASC during most of the 1960s. Hawkins has interviewed both men extensively. He has also obtained information about them and their organizations from many sources in Latin America, the United States and Europe.

Maspero and Jauregui are vividly contrasting figures, and their contrast, as Hawkins rightly points out, reflects to a considerable degree the kinds of organizations which they have headed. Although both profess to seek basic changes in the economic, social and political life of Latin America, their approaches to achieving these changes are strikingly different.

Jauregui for a long time headed an organization, ORIT, which included not only the largest United States and Canadian labor movements, but also the principal labor groups in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, and various West Indian countries, as well as unions in Argentina and other countries. It therefore has had within its ranks organizations with a very wide range of ideological and political orientations. This, and the added fact that it was Inter-American and not just Latin American, meant that Jauregui needed to draw heavily on his talents as a diplomat and political tactician. He could not afford to rush recklessly into print.

The CLASC and CLAT, on the other hand, has been a group of small organizations, relatively homogeneous in philosophy and ideology. Only in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic has it had the largest national labor group. The cost of high-flung oratory has therefore, been relatively small for Maspero.

Professor Hawkins makes all of this clear. He discusses the attitudes of the two men toward the United States, the U.S. labor movement, the influence and activities of the Communists, the kind of basic transformation which Latin America should undergo. Through direct quotations from the two men, and an analysis of these, he clearly brings out the differences between Jauregui and Maspero.

Useful as this volume is to an understanding of Latin American labor and general politics, I have several bones to pick with Professor Hawkins. The first is that the book lacks an overall assessment of the national organizations in ORIT and CLASC. Such a discussion might have made more obvious one of the roots of the bombast of Maspero and the relative caution of Jauregui: a relatively small and weak organization has to speak in somewhat shrill tones to get attention and to establish its own importance in relation to a much larger and more solid group. It also might have made clearer that Jauregui had much to lose by speaking rashly, while Maspero had little to lose by doing so.

My second quarrel with Professor Hawkins is that, on balance, he finds Maspero's approach more appealing than Jauregui's. The obvious question arises: If the revolutionary rhetoric of Maspero is more in line with the needs of the Latin American workers than is the more pragmatic approach of Jauregui, why have workers' organizations for the most part stayed with ORIT instead of joining CLASC?

A third point is that Hawkins fails to recognize that the ORIT type of trade unionism, which concentrates largely on collective bargaining although not slighting political issues, has brought substantial gains to the members of the organized labor movement—so much so that some left-wing critics now talk about organized labor in Latin America as a "labor aristocracy."

Finally, a fundamental question is raised by Professor Hawkins's discussion: Can a trade union movement in fact be revolutionary, in the sense of having as its basic goal the fundamental transformation of society, rather than improvement of working conditions and general well being of its members? Three-quarters of a century ago, Lenin, in *What Is To Be Done?* answered this question in the negative, asserting that revolution had to be the primary objective of a political party, and that a trade union movement could never be expected to carry out revolution. I happen to agree with Lenin, not with Maspero and Hawkins.

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Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies. Edited by Martin O. Heisler. (New York: David McKay Company, 1974. Pp. 415. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

A compendium of papers on European politics presents a reviewer with two major assessment criteria. One can compare the work with others of its type, of which there are many. Or one can measure the volume against its internal claims. Because in this case the outcomes differ so markedly, I shall use both perspectives.

On the one hand, it is in comparison with similar works on European politics that the merits of the book are most apparent. In the first place, the articles are original (the almost total exception of Lindberg's contribution—which is basically a section from his book *Europe's Would-Be Polity*—shows how valuable this criterion is. Interested readers should be familiar with his argument already). Second, many of the "postindustrial democracies" studied (Austria, Belgium) are relatively underexplored in the literature. Third, many of the papers are of sufficient length to allow for a sustained argument that goes beyond the mere presentation of data.

Finally, we should note the particular quality of some of the contributions. Stiefbold ("Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria"), in an insightful essay, develops and refines the typology suggested by Lijphart by showing the links between elite and mass opinion as a source of strain for Austria's experiment with the Grand Coalition. Heisler ("Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity") reviews the recent upsurge of linguistic discord in Belgium with its associated stress on, and subsequent transformation of, the political party system. And Peters ("The Development of Social Policy in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom: 1860–1965"), using a rather elegant mix of historical commentary and quantitative measures of public services, offers a number of insights into the pronounced differences of historical development among the countries studied and the implications of the now general switch to more administrative modes of service delivery.

These, then, are the strengths of the volume—original, usually lengthy essays, some of which are first rate, on matters or countries often neglected by political analysts. From the perspective of the self-expressed goals of the book itself, however, the record is more mixed. Briefly, in addition to collecting original and discretely useful articles, the editor aims to construct what he calls a model of the "European polity" and to relate the contributions to it. Neither task is happily resolved.

Turning first to the theoretical claims, it must be stated that "European Polity Model" as outlined in Part I is far from persuasive. Among the major confusions are that it is *not* a model in the generally recognized sense but rather a "pretheoretical statement" (p. 22). Nor does the comment that "we attempt neither to sketch the outlines of the whole matrix within which the European polity is located nor to make empirically grounded assertions about the relationship of the system type under discussion to other types of political systems" (p. 34) help the reader to formulate the essential *distinctions* among system types. It seems rather that the "European Polity" is the end state toward which all advanced industrial states are vaguely headed. Perhaps because of this lack of distinctiveness, the generalizations attributed to the model (pp. 38–78) seem curiously old-fashioned, often a mere repetition of the end-of-ideology argument. Nowhere, for example, is there significant mention of the general disenchantment with politics as usual in many European states, the emerging debate on participation in *corporate enterprises*, the unstabilizing effects of inflation. This is not to say that the model should involve a current events commentary, but it should provide a framework within which these developments can be understood.

Next, not only does the "European Polity Model" fail to perform the tasks generally associated with a "model," it also encompasses very little of the European continent. To detail the restrictions, there is first the usual (but still unfortunate) exclusion of all but the European "democracies." In addition, it soon becomes clear that the major emphasis is on the smaller democracies. Finally, even this set is found too inclusive; real attention is limited to the smaller, *segmented* democracies. It is suggested that these somehow are beating the path for other states to travel.

Given these restrictions it is obvious that many of the contributions (e.g., Peters and, indeed, all of Part III) bear only a tangential relationship to the themes outlined in the first part of the book. When it is recalled, however, that the theoretical perspective is, in my opinion, less than compelling, the implications of this discontinuity are rather ambiguous. In short, we can conclude that while the volume contains some excellent articles, in the final analysis it shares with other readers on European politics the characteristic of the whole being less than the sum of its parts.

NORMAN FURNISS

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West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement. By William Henderson. (New Jersey: Seton Hall University Press, 1973. Pp. 281. $7.50.)

The appearance of yet another book on the West New Guinea dispute which was settled in August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands faces the problem of justifying its publication at this time. Irian Jaya, as West New Guinea is now called under Indonesian sovereignty and administration, is not without current interest in the Melenesian region, partly because Papua New Guinea, which occupies the eastern half of the island, is scheduled for independence sometime in 1975. This forthcoming event has stimulated some interest in the border separating Irian Jaya from Papua New Guinea. The West New Guinea settlement, however, has not brought the Indonesian infiltration and attempts at subversion of the eastern half of the island that some have predicted. Papua New Guinea, in fact, lives harmoniously with Irian Jaya, although a Free Papua Movement based along the border carries out periodic skirmishes against Indonesian troops. Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia over the West Irian border have been normalized, and the Indonesians have allowed the clans and tribes which straddle the border to move about without official hindrance. Further, the movement of refugees from West Irian to Papua New Guinea has been routinized under an arrangement whereby refugees are given "permissive residence" status in Papua New Guinea so long as they do not participate in politics affecting Indonesia.

Professor Henderson, then, re-examines the West New Guinea dispute without the benefit of current international, or even much Papua New Guinean interest in it. One must therefore look for other kinds of justification for this work. From the point of view of substantive content, the materials are basically a rehash of old familiar data with a clearly visible anti-Indonesian bias expressed in many parts of the book. The anti-Indonesian sentiment is particularly emphatic in the chapter that deals with the "act of free choice." Here, the author's previous balance in using a variety of sources breaks down almost completely. It is probably in this very area, dealing with the follow-up of the settlement, that Professor Henderson could have made a contribution on the substantive aspects of the dispute. Unfortunately, the book is weakest exactly in this area because of the author's reliance on very partial secondary sources.

On what grounds, then, can this new book on the West Irian dispute be recommended? Henderson has attempted in the latter part of the book to examine the dispute from the point of view of the effectiveness of third-party intervention in international crises. Using theoretical materials drawn from Oran Young's *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), he has attempted to show that the effectiveness of a mediator's role needs not in all circumstances depend upon such factors as neutrality and independence. Specifically, Henderson contends that despite the United States' close friendship with the Netherlands, the United States was accepted by the Indonesians to settle the dispute. The point, however, does not negate Young's contention that effective third-party mediators must be impartial; clearly, the Indonesians did not reject the mediatory role of the United States because the latter was interested in a pro-Indonesian solution. What the settlement of the dispute does show is not the limitations of Young's prerequisites for effective third-party mediation, but rather the capacity of a major power to coerce a militarily and economically dependent ally to accept a solution which it would ordinarily reject. The Netherlands, which tenaciously held on to West Irian for over a decade, in the face of the larger interests of the United States to keep Indonesia out of the Communist bloc, quickly succumbed to pressures to accept a pro-Indonesian settlement.

Specialists in Indonesian politics, then, will find that the book does not offer them much substantively. From the standpoint of theory, especially with regard to the role of third parties as intermediaries in settling disputes, again its value is limited. The book could readily be recommended, however, to those who know very little about West Irian. For them, Professor Henderson has done a capable and commendable job in bringing some order out of a vast amount of materials written on the West Irian dispute.

Ralph R. Premdas

University of Papua New Guinea

To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's. By Judith M. Hughes. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 300. $9.00.)

The First World War exhausted France, depriving the country of both the physical means and the moral drive to fight another total war. Successive French governments had to satisfy public opinion by reducing the burden of defense to a bare minimum, while limiting and ultimately confronting a much stronger Germany. This situation accounted for much of France's inability and unwillingness to risk war in the 1930s, and for the late date at which the nation began to rearm.

Judith Hughes has attempted to trace the motivations of French decision makers grappling with national security during the crucial postwar decade. Both government restrictions on the use of documents (restrictions which have been loosened since this research was done) and the breadth of her topic prevented the author from contributing major new facts and concepts to the topic. What Hughes has produced, based on memoirs and published sources, is an able summary of the more sympathetic interpretations of government actions.

According to the author, French political and military leaders shared a common viewpoint on the essentials of their situation. Given France's position relative to Germany, the problem was to assure the support of allies and to provide the troops needed to defend the nation until those allies and the limited French war potential could be fully mobilized. Since Germany had never lost the capability of rearming itself, enforcement of the Versailles treaty was obviously a luxury which France had to give up when such enforcement risked alienating Britain and increasing French defense costs. Yet once France agreed to evacuate the Ruhr and ultimately the Rhineland, it lost its political levers and its strategic outworks against Germany.

Even before this, Dr. Hughes tells us, progressive reductions in the size of the army and the length of conscripted service forced the French commanders to plan for an initial defensive in case of war. These reductions were due in part to public opinion and in part to the demands of finances and colonies. The generals acquiesced because they were promised that the resulting economies would be used to improve the numbers and pay of career soldiers. The Rhineland evacuation, however, obviously militated against such a weak defense system. The best solution appeared to be a set of fortifications designed to delay a German "sneak attack" and to provide a secure flank for mobile operations in Belgium. Thus the author portrays the center and right-wing French politicians as trapped into a weak and defensive policy by the basic situation and by their own unconscious desire to avoid another holocaust.

As a brief political summary of a moderate viewpoint, *To the Maginot Line* is more than adequate. The problem with this work lies in its lack of depth on any one of the men and decisions involved. The author presents events as predetermined, neglecting the background to the individual actions for the sake of brevity. The book is also sparse in its political analysis of Pétain, Painlevé, and the other controversial leaders of this period. Such omissions limit the utility of an otherwise valuable essay.

Jonathan M. House

The University of Michigan

Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England. By Joel Hurstfield. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. 368. $11.00.)

Although he has produced four longer works, Joel Hurstfield, Astor Professor of English History at University College, London, excels as an essayist. This book brings together eleven articles, all published previously but mostly hidden away in other people's books. While concentrating on sixteenth-century England, the essays cover more than the title indicates, but they do not constitute a monograph on either freedom, corruption, or government.

There is no unifying theme for the essays, but the author believes most concern the "frontier between what the individual has liberty to do and what the state has authority to restrain" (p. 18). In half the studies, however, the reader is more teased than informed by the treatment of that theme. The two on religion demonstate the astute statesmanship of William and Robert Cecil. The one on Wiltshire is an introduction to local government, especially the work of the JPs. An analysis of office holding places that subject in the context of inflation, royal taxation, and social ambitions among the upper ranks. The article on the English Renaissance is an excellent short synthesis. So far the author is keenly sensitive to the Tudor setting and in command of manageable questions.

The other essays lack the same sharpness and cogency. What is corruption? His definition ("If we assume that the object of the state is the welfare of all its members, we may define corruption as the subversion of that object for other ends") ([p. 141]) is too broad, and his examples neither encompass the possibilities nor adequately examine any of them. Clientage, for instance, is condemned less by evidence than such generalizations as "the system [the Cecils' clientage] carries the taint of corruption for it sacrificed the public to the private interest, the need for a first-class body of public servants to the interests of a leader of faction" (pp. 152–53). Yet considering the paltry number of professional officials, perhaps a faction loyal to the state was the only means of achieving a coherent and effective government, and of avoiding the more dangerous corruption of a George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. The manifest harm done to individuals by selling wardships is mentioned, but this is termed an abuse, not corruption. Careful weighing of the particulars in each case, Hurstfield argues, is necessary to establish corruption in taking fees, gifts, and other perquisites of office. But since the author fails to do this one wonders whether the prosperous careers of the Cecils resulted from peculation or more accepted practices, or both.

Concerning freedom Hurstfield raises some fundamental questions but leaves them largely unanswered. Nevertheless, all the essays are stimulating and written with surpassing craftmanship. He shows that liberty had more to do with national independence than individual freedom, and that contemporaries, to judge by Shakespeare's plays, equated liberty with license, violence, and mob rule. Henry VIII exercised a despotism of intent, though his accomplishments never equaled his desires. Robert Cecil is acquitted of age-old charges that he instigated or encouraged the Gunpowder Plot of 1605.

Several conclusions are implicit in the studies. Neither rulers nor ruled often understood what the twentieth century calls liberty or freedom. Effective administration was impossible without what we would call corruption. Government had little to do with popular consent. These are valuable reminders, but they offer no fresh appraisals of Tudor government. This is disappointing since the author's experience, skill, and interest in social history give him exceptional qualifications for a more direct examination of the constrained cooperation between a vulnerable, albeit authoritative, dynasty and the realm's powerful, ambitious, yet quarrelsome and undisciplined social elite. Instead the author presents a masterful but traditional review of politics as seen from Westminster: leading ministers, royal officials, privy council, a nod toward parliament and a wink at the counties.

FRANK F. FOSTER

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From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vol. I & Vol. II. By Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1973. Vol. I: Pp. 378. $14.50. Vol. II: Pp. 536. $17.50.)

The volumes under review are the first two of a three-volume collection of documents on African politics in South Africa. The final volume will cover the period 1953–1964.

Without question this publication is of major importance in the study of South African politics. Scholars will draw upon the documents in many ways—as a source of reference, as material for general political studies of South Africa, as a framework upon which to build more specialized research, or simply to provide an overall picture of African political activity over the last century.

The documents are arranged in chronological periods, subdivided into subject areas. For example, Part Two of Volume II, which covers the period 1937–1949, has documents grouped under four heads: "The Revival of the African National Congress 1937–1945"; "The Failure of the Natives' Representative Council 1946–1947"; "The Rise of the A.N.C. Youth League"; and "Other Non-European or Left Wing Activity." There are editorial introductions to each period, which set the documents in a context. The editors approach this task in different ways. While Dr. Sheridan John III, who edits Vol. I and the first part of Vol. II, gives brief introductions which are closely tied to the documents, Professor Thomas Karis, who edits the final two sections of Vol. II, writes longer, more ambitious articles which could stand as pieces of scholarship in their own right. In guiding the reader through the documents, however, it would have been more appropriate if Karis had divided the articles into smaller groups, with shorter introductions for each group.

Having acknowledged the significance of the collection, one must recognize the inevitable limitations which the editors have had to impose upon themselves. In the first place most of the documents are formal records—minutes of African National Congress meetings, records of interviews with government ministers and officials, declaratory statements issued to arouse public support, etc. There are no private records, such as correspondence or personal diaries, to put flesh upon the official bones. Some aspects of political activity are therefore not recorded, or at least are under-represented. For example, we do not have documented the immense organizational difficulties faced by political bodies with few resources in a large country with a diverse, scattered population—difficulties of retaining even the simplest communications network, of arranging meetings, and ensuring that resolutions are followed up. Also while elements of rivalry and conflict, both between individuals and groups, are revealed much of this informal activity is unrecorded. We cannot gain from these documents a full picture of the private stands that were taken, the bargains that were struck, the passionate clash of personality, the strong grip of regional and ethnic interests. Nor do the documents cover local political activity. There is no record here of the activities in particular townships, or "native areas," where, because of the problems of central organization, much African political activity has taken place. At the other end of the scale there is reference to international influences but no documents dealing directly with this issue.

These limitations are not raised by way of complaint, for even if such personal and local records exist it would have required an immense number of volumes to publish them. The limitations are noted simply to make clear what the documents do offer. They provide an important record of African political activity at the center of South African politics, derived mainly from the records of the African organizations involved. The nature of the documents emphasizes the output and reactive elements of political activity, rather than revealing processes within the "black boxes" of the African organizations.

One striking feature which emerges from the documents is the persistence of many grievances. In its earliest document in this collection, dated about 1903, the South African Native Congress (which later developed into the African National Congress) was already repeating well-established complaints about land, taxes, labor conditions and pay, the treatment of Africans before the courts, and the small expenditure on African education (Vol. I, p. 19). Statistics are quoted to reveal the inequality of expenditure on blacks as compared with whites. A similar document could be prepared today which would differ in detail but not in substance. Where more change is found in the African organizations is in the methods employed to alleviate the grievances. Africans have always had limited choices because they have no direct voice in South Africa's government. They are therefore limited to using influence through the very narrow official channels open to them, or to recruiting the support of others (white liberals, the United Kingdom government, the United Nations), or to direct confrontation with the government. The influence/confrontation debate persists throughout the period, with a gradual acceptance that since influence carries no weight, confrontation is the only viable alternative. With increasing acceptance of confrontation, the debate then centers upon the use of peaceful or violent means. What these documents reveal clearly is that it was only after long years of frustration, in which legitimate appeals for greater equality and a share in the government had been persistently rejected, that the African organizations turned to confrontation and more recently to the use of violence. Perhaps the strongest single message which comes from these documents is the failure of the white response, rather than the African claims.

The editors are to be congratulated on making available a store of material which should be valuable not only to scholars, but to African leaders, and, it is hoped, government ministers and officials in South Africa.

JAMES P. BARBER
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Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970. By A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Vol. 1: January 1966–July 1967. Pp. 459. $14.50; Vol. II: July 1967–January 1970. Pp. 528. $18.00, set.)

This two-volume work consists primarily of 227 selected documents relating to the political conflict and civil war in Nigeria between January 1966 and January 1970. Each volume also includes a long chronological narrative of events. Volume One begins with a "prologue" to the *coup d'etat* that smashed Nigeria's first republic; it concludes with the invasion of secessionist Biafra by federal forces in July 1967. Volume Two reviews the course of wartime events, culminating in Biafra's exhaustion and unconditional surrender to the Federal Military Government.

Judged by his avowed principal aim—to record "the verbatim statements made by the leading *dramatis personae* of the Nigerian tragedy of 1966–70 as they were uttered and before they disappear or are dangerously half-remembered"—Mr. Kirk-Greene's achievement would be difficult to fault. In addition to the selected documents, the author-editor's comprehensive narrative includes many citations of important documents that have not been reproduced. Many researchers are already indebted to Kirk-Greene for his valuable listing and classification of sources. It should be noted in this recently commissioned review that his study, completed some two month's after the war's end, is thus far unrivaled as the standard reference work on its subject.

Historians and others will debate the issues of political conflict before and during the Nigerian civil war for years to come. Many such issues are suggested by Kirk-Greene's narrative, for example: the alleged role of British and American diplomats in forestalling secession by the Northern Region after the army mutiny of July 1966, which brought Lt.-Col. Gowon to power; the extent to which Lt.-Col. Ojukwu and his supporters were committed to a secessionist policy even before the notorious massacre of Ibos in Northern Nigeria in September 1966; the effect of Soviet support for the federal government upon British policy; the motivation of De Gaulle's support for Biafra in September 1968 at the apparent expense of French economic interests; the explanation of the federal government's long toleration of humanitarian relief flights into the secessionist enclave.

With prudent modesty, Kirk-Greene prefers to claim less authority for his carefully considered narrative than it may actually command. Its freshness and dedication to significant detail will enable the attentive reader of these tightly packed passages to relive the political events of those grim years. Yet Kirk-Greene wisely cautions future authors to expect large gaps and misleading signposts in his and other current histories for two very good reasons: the inaccessibility of essential archival materials and the lack of detachment on the part of contemporary historians. Furthermore, his is a specifically political study; he makes no attempt to write a military history. Nor does he present more than a cursory account of the trials and accomplishments of the beleaguered Biafrans.

Following Weber, it may be said that objective scholarship consists in the attempt to recognize and combat one's biases. If this work falls short of excellence, it may be because Kirk-Greene, who candidly avows his wholehearted commitment to the federal government's cause, fails to combat that bias in his narrative of events. The traces of his partiality are especially obtrusive in Volume Two, where all who questioned the British policy of military support for the federal government, including *The Times*, *The Economist*, Lord Brockway, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, are put down as having been misguided or wrongheaded. Yet Kirk-Greene endorses the dubious parallel drawn by federal Nigerian spokesmen between the American and Nigerian civil wars. He is alert to the flaws of Biafran propaganda but far less critical of the Nigerian vintage. Curiously, he suggests an analogy between the elusive "quick-kill" strategy favored by the federal Nigerian (and British) government and the American decision to drop an atom bomb on Hiroshima.

Kirk-Greene suggests that anything short of a decisive Nigerian victory would have endangered the long-term political stability of Africa. His viewpoint appears to equate the interests of the African people with the national interests of their existing states. This is also the ruling principle of the Organization of African Unity, which never deviated from its commitment to the federal Nigerian cause. This conception was challenged by Nyerere, Kaunda, and others during the Nigerian civil war. It will surely be challenged again under conditions which are less trying for principled Pan-Africanists.

RICHARD L. SKLAR
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Le Quotient Politique Vrai. By Vincent Lemieux. (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1973. Pp. 274. No price indicated.)

The role of Quebec in Canadian politics has become more noticeable in recent years possibly because of the 1970 Quebec Crisis and the rise of nationalistic fever in Canada. The key to understanding both of these issues is found in the politics of the province of Quebec, the only province with a predominantly French-speaking population, which regularly elects mainly French-speaking deputies to its provincial parliament and provides the foundation for the National Liberal party that dominates federal politics in Canada.

This newly discovered importance may mean that academicians will turn to Professor Vincent Lemieux's new book, *Le Quotient Politique Vrai*, expecting to discover some new facts about Quebec which might help them understand the Canadian situation. Indeed, our readers will be able to use this volume as a source book, an assembly of facts about Quebec politics. But they will be disappointed by the book as an intellectual exercise, for the volume consists of a series of disjointed, unevenly written and researched articles strung together on a very weak chain. Professor Lemieux introduces the volume by discussing the two notions of "equivalence" and "prevalence" which roughly translated refer to "equality" and "superiority." These two Cartesian-like concepts are used to organize the first chapter, and they reappear at the end of the volume as a conclusion. Between these two minor parts of the book there are no references or meaningful uses of the concepts. The attempt to found the book on this conceptual dichotomy fails not only because it is not utilized throughout the book but also because it provides the erroneous impression that there is a clear logical framework for the writer's thought which will be reflected in the text.

The best part of the book summarizes well-known facts about the Quebec political situation, analyzes the votes for the Social Credit party and provides some explanations of nationalism in Quebec. The book is set in the context of the elections of the 1960s. In modern times Quebec has had three of her sons become leaders of the Liberal party and Prime Minister—Laurier, St. Laurent, and Trudeau. This fact, the author argues, is part of the reason the National Liberal party has consistently been able to attract more votes in Quebec than the combined total of the remaining parties—Conservative, New Democratic, and Social Credit.

Another successful part of this volume is the discussion of electoral law and its effect on voting and seat distribution in Quebec and Canada. Mr. Lemieux seems at home in this kind of discussion, and he handles it well.

The book is most suspect and least helpful in those sections which attempt to demonstrate that the unemployment variable explains much of the voting behavior in the province. Such assertions are made with little evidence and are confused with the desires of French-Quebecers for equality among the provinces or equality between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Mr. Lemieux has made significant contributions to the study of Quebec and to voting behavior in Canada. It is unfortunate, however, that he has wasted his considerable talents attempting to mould together a series of essays written in different styles and intended for diverse audiences. While readers and collected volumes of essays do have a role in political science literature, they must be organized around the consistent application of a set of principles or methodology. This fundamental point has been overlooked by the author of this reader. If he feels strongly about his conceptual tools, perhaps Mr. Lemieux should write another book to demonstrate their theoretical utility in explaining recent voting patterns in Quebec and their effect on the Canadian federation.

Robert J. Jackson
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Allende's Chile. Edited by Kenneth Medhurst. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 202. $8.95.)

Unfortunately before we begin this series of essays we know the ending of the Allende saga and the authors do not. This tends to make the optimistically pro-Allende pieces sound naive and to give an air of omnipotence to those with doubts as to the Allende government's ability to hold the economy and political fabric of Chile together. But these essays, which were published in *Government and Opposition* in 1972, nevertheless constitute some extremely valuable insights to the Chilean situation during the first year and a half of the Allende government.

The singular feature of the book is that it is largely written by Chileans. This Chilean perspective contrasts with the American or English point of view that dominates most of the available writing on Chile. Unfortunately, evidence of the multimillion dollar C.I.A. expenditure in Chile which, assuming some competency on the C.I.A.'s part, helped produce the tensions that wracked Chile, is not available to the volume's contributors.

Medhurst, a Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester, begins the book by giving a well-balanced background to Chilean politics. His claim that the Chilean Communist party's cautiousness stems from its experience of being outlawed during the late 1940s and much of the 1950s would be more convincing if other Latin American Communist parties were not following a similar policy. One of the ironies of the Chilean situation is that, despite the Chilean Right's conviction that after the Allende election the Communist party would prove to be the gray eminence of the coalition and sweep aside the Chilean political system, in fact the Communists fought to keep the MIR and left-wing Socialists from doing exactly that and, one can plausibly argue, Allende would still be in power if he had followed the moderate counsel of the Communists.

Three of the essays are essentially pro-Allende: "Chile 1971: A Revolutionary Government within a Welfare State" by Joan Garcés; "Political Opposition to the Government of Allende" by H. Zemelman and Patricio Leon; and "The Economic Aspects of Allende's Government: Problems and Prospects," by Gonzalo Martner. Since all of these were written in the afterglow of the wildly successful first year of the Allende government, they contain some elements of unreality.

Garcés, in the best of the three essays, discusses a number of dilemmas but eventually finds no insurmountable obstacles in Allende's road. Perhaps it is a form of academic whistling-in-the-dark when he states that "anyone who faces the Chile of today with realism must have the courage to recognize that there is no social or class antagonism between the government of Allende and the coercive power of the state," (p. 31). The article is strongly in favor of adhering to the existing Chilean legal structure. This is ironic in view of the fact that the current Chilean dictators credit Garcés, an advisor to Allende, with authoring "Plan Z"—an elaborate document detailing a leftist coup which the Chilean military supposedly acted to prevent.

The John Biehl de Río and Gonzalo Fernández R. essay "The Political Pre-requisites for a Chilean Way" is an extremely valuable summary of Chilean electoral forces. The closing comment that "if the collapse of the government's economic policy comes before the political clarification [speaking of a workable strategy to obtain a congressional coalition], then the prospects for the *via Chilena* seem very gloomy" (p. 72) proves eerie in its accuracy about how events developed.

H. E. Bicheno, a historian of English and Chilean descent, presents a fascinating (albeit somewhat rightist) discussion of "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 1920–1970." The crux of his interpretation is that, while the democratic traditions were largely maintained, there were always plots and counterplots very near the surface when times were bad.

Luis Quiros Varela's discussion of the interplay between agrarian reform and political processes is an excellent, balanced survey. He is realistic in discussing the shortcomings of the Christian Democratic efforts between 1964 and the split within the Allende program between legality and the MIR-promoted land takeovers. He rightly considers the problem of the peasant mentality versus mobilization politics.

There will be a flood of books attempting to interpret the Allende experiment, but it would be unfortunate if this one were lost sight of simply because it was published prior to the conclusion of Allende's efforts. The pro-Allende essays give an excellent insight into the thinking of Allende's advisors. The other essays constitute a solid, and not particularly hostile, analysis of the situation within which Allende was operating.

MICHAEL J. FRANCIS

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Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. By Eric A. Nordlinger. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 137. $4.00, paper.)

In this short but very stimulating monograph the author seeks to generate hypotheses regarding the regulation of conflict in divided polities. The study is limited to open societies which have experienced severe conflict and deals only with those periods of high level stress when conflict was being successfully controlled. Professor Nordlinger "tests" his hypotheses through the analysis of six states chosen on the basis of available secondary source material, variations in time and space, and their success in regulation: Belgium; the Netherlands, 1890–1971; Austria, 1945–1965; nineteenth-century Switzerland; Lebanon since 1943, and Malaysia since independence in 1957. Other cases are briefly noted.

Professor Nordlinger states that he does not seek to test rigorously the hypotheses he presents in explanation of the successful regulation of conflict but only to generate points for possible future viable methods of analysis. The fact that Professor Nordlinger consciously decided to analyze his propositions only in terms of successful cases of regulation and has employed only a half dozen examples obviates the possibility of such testing in this volume; I, for one, wish that he had brought into his analysis the many failures in contemporary history.

Following a careful effort to define the area of discussion and terms of analysis, the author notes the necessary presence of one of six regulating practices if conflict is to be contained: stable government coalition, the principle of proportionality, mutual veto, purposive depoliticization, compromise, and concessions. At the same time he rejects as ineffective and dangerous means of regulation both democratic decision making (defined largely in majoritarian terms) and the rapid development of national identity. In this chapter, as in others, he illustrates his hypotheses from the six case studies.

Perhaps the strongest sections of the monograph are the chapters arguing the centrality of group leaders in controlling violence. While the elite is motivated by the need to meet external threats, look after the economic well-being of its clients, acquire or retain power, or avoid bloodshed and suffering, it acts on these motives in accord with the political culture in which the leadership itself operates. Professor Nordlinger's stress on the critical nature of the elite and the necessity of its structured dominance over the nonelite if conflict is to be successfullly regulated is the most interesting and provocative part of this work; and his questioning (sometimes he says "rejecting") of several hypotheses regarding the role of the nonelite is stimulating reading. Of considerable interest are the author's critical evaluation of theories of cross-cutting division in relation to democracy and conflict and his briefer discussions of the harmful effects of modernization on conflict regulation.

No new empirical data are presented here and the book contains a few factual errors such as the incorrect number of Malaysian sultans (p. 28). However, the author is honest in admitting the tenuousness of his hypotheses and evidence and careful in delimiting the boundaries of his analysis. The monograph is obviously intended to raise more questions than it answers. This truly comparative work will reward the reader with a multitude of ideas for research and contemplation.

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Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution. Edited by James Petras. (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. Pp. 274. $9.75, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

James Petras is prominent amongst that group of American social scientists which adopts a "neo-Marxist" approach to the analysis of Latin America's political problems. By contrast with those scholars who have sought to identify groups which might promote stability and orderly change in Latin America the "neo-Marxists" have focused on the fundamental conflicts of interest that they see inhering in the region's economic structures. The latter, above all, subscribe to a "theory of dependence" which attributes economic underdevelopment and political instability to Latin America's domination and exploitation by foreign capitalist interests. Local politics are generally viewed in terms of class conflicts between local elites, who depend on the support of external business interests, and other exploited strata of the societies in question.

This volume makes a useful and sometimes stimulating contribution to the growing body of literature on "dependency." It is uneven, but at its best it shows how models of the type alluded to above can draw due attention to aspects of a given situation whose significance might otherwise be underestimated, if not ignored. Credit for this can, in large part, be taken by Professor Petras who not only edits the book but is also personally responsible for much of its content. He contributes the two opening chapters on recent Chilean political developments (pp. 9–60) and is the co-author, with Thomas Cook, of two particularly interesting essays on the attitudes of Argentina's business elite (pp. 163–192). Equally, he shares responsibility with Robert LaPorte Jr., H. Michael Erisman and Charles Mills for two chapters on United States-Latin American relationships (pp. 195–271). Two chapters on Brazilian economic development (contributed jointly, in one case, by M. C. Tavares and José Serra and, in another case, soley by José Serra) are the only portions of the book in which the editor has taken no direct hand.

The usefulness of the general approach adopted in this volume is shown in Professor Petras's discussion of Chile, which makes plain how President Allende's necessarily very limited freedom of maneuver was further circumscribed by potentially disastrous economic pressures. Equally, the two well-documented chapters on Brazil offer an acute analysis of the country's "economic miracle." The authors brush aside official rhetoric by confirming that the benefits which economic growth has brought to limited sections of Brazilian society and to foreign investors have been largely the result of officially inspired attacks upon the living standards of the bulk of the population.

If the value of a given mode of analysis may be judged by its predictive possibilities then the usefulness of some of these essays can be further underlined. Professor Petras's chapters on Chile were written before the final collapse of Allende's regime occurred but evidence assembled by the author clearly points to the possibility of disaster. Similarly, detailed study of the attitudes of local and foreign businessmen operating in Argentina revealed a weakening of support for military rule on the part of those who had once been amongst its chief beneficiaries. Thus James Petras and Thomas Cook correctly foresaw the possibility of an at least temporary return to a more open style of politics.

The valuable data, incisive analysis and acute judgments that at some points characterize this book must, however, be set against certain other more negative factors. Given the extent to which James Petras has impressed his personal stamp upon these papers he must accept responsibility for the weaknesses in question. First, the underlying assumptions of the book, which sometimes engender fruitful hypotheses may, in certain circumstances, prevent the editor or his colleagues from doing justice to the complexities of a given situation. The result can be a measure of confusion, simplistic assertions and a failure properly to consider evidence that does not conform with a priori assumptions. This is partially true of the chapters on Chile. For example, at one point (p. 16) Professor Petras confidently assumes the existence of a high degree of political consciousness and working-class solidarity amongst Chile's copper miners, but subsequently (p. 32) he has to modify the assumption in the light of the miners' behavior during Allende's tenure of office.

The difficulties of Professor Petras's general approach are, however, most clearly revealed in the chapter he contributes, together with Erisman and Mills (pp. 231–271) on the Monroe Doctrine. One can accept some of the chapter's general assumptions concerning the deployment of American power in the Western Hemisphere but is left unconvinced by much of the detailed argument. Responsibility for extending the "Cold War" to Latin America, for example, is attributed solely to North American policy makers who, it is maintained, seized on an issue that would further facilitate United States economic penetration of the region. The possibility that other strategic considerations might have been involved, and the general global context, are not seriously considered. Equally, it is assumed, without proper discussion, that ideological factors have little or no autonomous role to play in shaping policy. Thus the Cuban missile crisis is discussed with only passing reference to the Soviet Union and with no examination of Soviet motives. United States reactions to the crisis are seen solely in terms of its relationship with Latin America and with no reference to possibly relevant global issues. The authors perform a useful task in "demythologizing" certain aspects of the United States' relationships with Latin America but do themselves a disservice by overstating their case. In this instance they demonstrate the limitations of their approach and point to the danger of creating a new academic orthodoxy more limiting than the orthodoxies they attack.

The book's title is also somewhat misleading. It implies a general review of Latin American problems but it very largely concentrates on the cases of Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. These are, of course, most important within the Latin American context and they present the authors with the opportunity to examine facets of some of the region's most significant political developments.

Of particular interest is the juxtaposition of sections devoted to Allende's Chile and contemporary Brazil. These two sections constitute an interesting study in radically different attempts to tackle the problem of economic underdevelopment. On the other hand the book's comparative component might have been enriched by a similar examination of, for example, the Peruvian case. Equally, a wider range of case studies might have underlined the extent to which foreign influence in Latin America can vary in nature and scope from country to country.

Despite such reservations, however, the book's case studies make it a useful contribution to the debate about Latin America's problems. The detailed case studies of Brazil and Argentina, in particular, ought to serve as a stimulus to further and similarly detailed research.

KENNETH MEDHURST

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Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla. By Arturo C. Porzecanski. (New York: Praeger, 1973. Pp. xiii, 81. $10.00.)

Unlike Chile, which has attracted the attention of many political scientists over the past decade, Uruguay, South America's "other" long-standing democratic nation, has been ignored. Even the rise of the Tupamaros, certainly Latin America's, if not one of the world's, most distinctive guerrilla movements, failed to receive its warranted attention until the kidnappings of European and American diplomats, and the execution of an AID official, Dan Mitrione. Since then a stream of books has been published by Latin American and North American political scientists and journalists on the Tupamaros and Uruguay's contemporary plight. Professor Porzecanski's slim volume is the best so far, and required reading for anyone concerned with Uruguayan politics or urban insurgency.

The rise of the Tupamaro urban movement in Uruguay coincided with the increasing containment or demise of rural movements elsewhere in Latin America, notably Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Porzecanski correctly observes that the special importance of the Uruguayan movement is that it took place in a modern and politically advanced society, and "provided an important case study of the extent to which an urban social movement can be a carrier of a revolutionary ideology and become an agent of societal change (p. xi)." Abraham Guillen, an important theoretician of urban insurgency in Latin America, lived in Uruguay during the peak of Tupamaro activity, and while often critical of the movement, he wrote recently in his *Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973) that they ". . . have served as the best revolutionary academy in the world on the subject of urban guerrilla warefare; they have taught more through actions than all the revolutionary theories abstracted from concrete situations" (p. 276). What Porzecanski has done is to describe as accurately as is now possible who the Tupamaros were, how they operated, and what they tried to achieve.

The movement began in 1961, when impoverished sugar-cane and sugar-beet cutters were joined by peasants on a 350-mile walk to Montevideo to protest their plight. Directed by Raul Sendic, a law student from the national university, the protest eventually led to the formation of the underground movement. Porzecanski provides a useful profile on the Tupamaros, a young and heterogeneous movement. Looking at police arrest records between 1966 and 1972, Porzecanski found students dropped from about 40 to 30 per cent of those arrested, while those identified as "professionals or technicians" rose from 12 to 32 per cent. The mean age slowly increased from 31 to 39, but the mode remained 21 years of age. The author argues that the movement was both national and nationalistic, organized clandestinely around small cells with members known only by their code names, and financed through robberies and thefts. The Tupamaros' rejection of the older generation's incremental solutions to national problems led them to establish what they termed a "parallel government" to demonstrate that they could act more decisively and effectively than the formal one. Abductions began in 1968, the targets being high government officials, wealthy Uruguayans, and diplomats; of those abducted, only Mitrione was killed. His execution, as Guillen argues, reduced their Robin Hood image in the public media to one of assassins, and the ransom demanded for hostages, Guillen further observes, brought them perilously close to resembling a political Mafia. It also prompted the military to assume responsibility from the ineffectual police for their control.

Porzecanski believes the widespread arrests and torture took their toll on the movement. Arrested Tupamaros in large numbers came into contact with one another, breaking down essential secrecy. When many gained their freedom—in one instance 180 escaped in a single, well-planned jailbreak—their return created rivalries and ill feeling within the movement.

What Porzecanski fails to point out are the several ironies in the more than a decade of Tupamaro activity. Today the movement is largely dissipated and its participants dead, exiled, imprisoned, or in hiding; yet one objective—to destroy the traditional Uruguayan political system and its institutions—has been accomplished, with the imposition of a military-dominated regime, the suspension of traditional liberties, and the discrediting of political and social institutions. Perhaps more ironic, the unwitting instrument for the Tupamaros was their principal opponent, the military, which originally was disinclined to exert political influence on government institutions, yet in the final analysis crushed the very institutions the Tupamaros were trying to destroy. Porzecanski's analysis is a valuable contribution to understanding one of the most important realities in contemporary Latin American politics, the urban guerrilla.

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The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy. By Robert D. Putnam. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 309. $10.95.)

Regret that *The Beliefs of Politicians* reached me for review about two years after its publication date is happily balanced by the pleasure with which I recommend the book to anyone seriously interested in comparative politics or in the importance of ideas in the study of politics in the broadest sense. Although a prompter review would have better served not just the author but our profession, the value of Putnam's work is not seriously diminished by the passage of a few years or even by the longer period since his research of 1967–68. Scholars specializing in leadership interview analysis presumably already know the book and have judged its specialized contributions—favorably, I believe. Lacking their expertise, I address, in any event, a somewhat more general readership. As suggested at the outset, Putnam has a great deal to offer many of us. He has carefully assembled data on the political beliefs that we often discuss in our teaching and scholarly writing, and he brings a sharp, learned, and sophisticated intelligence to the discussion of these beliefs. Moreover, Putnam writes with straightforward clarity and pleasant informality even when analyzing complex statistical tabulations. The primarily historical or philosophical scholar, or perhaps even the journalist, who still associates quantitative data analysis with opaque writing should find reading this book an enjoyable disconfirming experience. Intellectual pleasure, it should be stressed, comes from the breadth as well as the style of Putnam's exploration.

Putnam obtained his original data, forming the core but no means all of the substance of his book, from semistructured, almost entirely tape-recorded interviews, each lasting more than an hour, with 93 members of the British House of Commons and 83 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He makes a good case that he has interviewed a representative sample of at least nonministerial members (as of 1967–68), that members spoke freely, and that the use of two coders for each set of responses to open-ended questions produced reliable tabulations. The properly skeptical reader can check Putnam's procedure in appendices containing a methodological exposition and the codebook itself. In addition to tabulating responses. Putnam often quotes illustratively from the interviews, thereby giving a life and a liveliness to his presentation. In fact, he does this so well, while also citing a wide variety of historical, cultural, and philosophical ideas to explain the politicians' beliefs, that some readers might decide that Putnam thus makes a significant contribution entirely apart from quantitative analysis (or even in spite of such analysis if one has little use for statistics in the first place). I do not go that far. Rather, I believe that the tabulations, the illustrative quotations, and the more general discourse are elegantly complementary.

Summarizing many of Putnam's findings, with their rightly cautious qualifications, is not possible. His most general and recurrent theme, however, ought to be stated. It is the difference between the British and the Italian politicians—a difference all the more impressive because Putnam grants that his intention had been to describe the similarities between these two sets of parliamentarians. Among the differing national characteristics, the Italians were more ideological, more likely to exhibit partisan hostility, more sensitive to conflict (or less impressed by areas of shared interest), more likely to talk about democracy in terms of equality and justice and liberty and responsibility (while British politicians talk about Parliament and elections and party competition), and likely to have as their most common model "classical democracy" rather than the British consensus in favor of polyarchal and liberal interpretations of democracy.

Putnam's Part I, on ideology and politics, may be the most challenging since it uses the interview data to test views of ideological politics derived from Edward Shils (specifically from a review article published by Shils in 1958) and restated in systematic form by the author. Putnam verifies only a few of these views (which, of course, are not exclusively Shils's). He shows that the ideologically motivated politicians are also stylistic ideologues, in the sense of pursuing abstract purposes, and that they are associated with political extremes and with political and social alienation. But Putnam finds that individual ideological politicians are *not* more dogmatic, more hostile (as partisans), or more opposed to pluralist politics than nonideological politicians. So ideological style and partisan hostility, in particular, are distinct phenomena at the individual level (although, at the national level, the Italian group is both more ideological and more hostile than the British). Putnam's findings here are convincing, and so is the usefulness of the distinctions that he has made. These distinctions seem especially important in light of his showing of a decline in partisan hostility but not in the ideological style of politics. But I must raise a question if only to indicate enough critical objectivity to encourage readers to accept my highly favorable opinion of this study. Would partisan hostility be similarly dissociated from ideological style in a sample of nonparliamentary politicians, particularly of organizational activists who might have little if any experience in holding significant public office?

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Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbosis. By Itamar Rabinovich. (New York: Halsted Press, 1973. Pp. 276. $15.50.)

Defying expectations, the present Syrian Ba'thi regime has held power since 1963, and over that period it has evidently strengthened its organizational structure and has developed a number of workable political arrangements. The Ba'th party, established in 1947, was a pan-Arabist, secularist, westernizing party supported mainly by elements of the provincial and sectarian intelligentsia. It sought to resolve the issues of defining the Syrian political community and of broadening elite recruitment by means of a vanguard party of militants inspired by doctrine that was at once romanticized in its recounting of history, antimaterialist, and oriented to the economic aspirations of the petite bourgeoisie. The Ba'th gained a measure of political influence by joining the opposition to Adib al-Shishakli in 1953, by supporting the return to parliamentary government in 1954, by leading Syria into the union with Egypt in 1958, by standing aside from the plot to dissolve that union in 1961 despite substantial provocation, and by providing the only coherent (if factionalized) political leadership in Syria after the collapse of the separatist-bourgeois regime of 1961–63. In its post-union phase the Ba'th has gradually become more radical and also far more dominated by those members who are military officers. It has sought to expand its membership but has not become a mass party. Moreover, whatever political success has been achieved, has been realized in the face of the enhancement of the minoritarian and sectarian character of the Ba'th. Hence, the central question of Syrian politics is how to explain the evidently stable position of the Ba'th regime when it is minoritarian, sectarian, militarist, nonunionist, radical-leaning, secularist, and based on an elite party and a noninstrumental ideological doctrine.

Professor Rabinovich set out to explain the multiple anomalies of the Syrian situation, but his efforts have fallen far short of this difficult goal. Rabinovich was armed with a set of "liberated" Ba'th party documents in addition to a surprisingly rich literature of political memoirs and polemic writings. He was also able to use the daily press, and he relied upon a small but not unimpressive secondary literature on Syrian politics. The relatively large amount of documentation available to Rabinovich was to a large extent responsible for his failure here. The author knows what it is he should be explaining, but he apparently believed that a recounting of how one event led to another was a sufficient explanation. That the events recorded in those liberated documents might not be the really important ones does not seem to have occurred to him.

The fundamental difficulty with this analysis is that despite occasional references to sociological and ideological structures, such contextual elements are not used as an explanatory frame of reference. The meaning of the political tempests in the Ba'thi teapot is not to be sought in the disordered and bitter leaves. To show the linkages between conspiratorial stroke and counterstroke is a work neither of scholarship nor of analysis. This journalistic-diplomatic approach has not only prevailed in American and British studies of Middle East politics, but it is virtually dominant in the Shiloah Institute of Tel Aviv University which has published this study.

As might be expected, the best part of this book is its collection and more or less chronological presentation of much political information and many political names and dates. The book suffers not only from hyperfactualism but also from Rabinovich's evident preference for sequence to coherence in interpreting the facts. Numerous explanatory gaps are simply left gaping, and far too many sentences are simply opaque. This opacity is, needless to say, not due to the use of any political science jargon, but due to the tendency to refer to dates rather than events and due to poor editing.

Space limitations do not permit many examples of these defects to be cited, but the reader will get the idea from the following gaps:

on page 118, "The available information is too sketchy to permit a conclusive comparison of the social origins of the rival Ba'thi factions. Yet . . ."
on page 119, "The little that is known of this episode is . . ."
on page 122, ". . . whether this was an outcome of Bitar's new policy is a moot point."
on page 150, "little is known about the sources of internal strife in the Military Organization, but . . ."

Even more confusing is that the chronological account has al-Bitar expelled from the party on page 103, but on page 112 we see him being entrusted with the formation of a new cabinet, on page 121 we are told that his position is "tenuous" and on page 155 that "his membership status at that point is vague. . . . "

Much of the author's analysis is obscure because the reader cannot easily follow the meaning of key sentences such as the following: "It was the need to eliminate the impact of these radical elements on the Syrian Ba'th that the Regional Command cited in order to justify its request from the National Command to suspend the party's Internal Regulations for six months" (p. 125), or, "The calculating and withdrawn J'did had built the Military Committee's control of the army and its supporters in the party's civilian sector" (p. 162). On page 138 there is an example of the author's frequent references to dates rather than significant events: "It was the occasion for 'Umran's rivals to settle their accounts with him and to list all his "sins" going back to his conduct during the period between March 28 and April 4, 1962."

In sum, the book reads badly, gives little confidence that the author really has an explanatory hypothesis, and demonstrates once again that the possession of secret documents does little to advance scholarly political analysis.

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Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. VII/1972. Edited by Erik Rasmussen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Pp. 319. $10.00.)

This is the seventh edition in the continuing series of yearbooks published by the Scandinavian Political Science Associations. Like its predecessors, the yearbook has three parts: a principal section of substantive articles on a wide variety of topics, a review section of significant developments in the domestic politics of the Scandinavian countries, and an extensive bibliography of work published by Scandinavian researchers or foreign studies of the Nordic region. The reader and reviewer alike are therefore faced with a most challenging *smörgåsbord* of topics, interests, and methodologies. This review cannot discuss in detail each of the thirteen substantive articles and five review articles, but by looking selectively it is possible to gain an impression of the strengths and weaknesses of this annual cooperative effort.

The first article by two Finnish political sociologists, E. Allardt and H. Uusitalo, focuses upon "Dimensions of Welfare in a Comparative Study of Scandinavian Societies." This piece is part of the international effort to find indicators of social conditions that are suitable for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Two competing operationalizations of "welfare" are discussed: the individual's command of resources and the overall living standards of a given population (pp. 10–11). Frequent reference is made to Swedish social indicator studies where attention has been given simultaneously to physical, social, and psychological needs of individuals and groups. Nine components of the "level of living" are identified: health, nutritional habits, residence, living conditions during childhood and family relations, education, degree of employment and work conditions, economic resources, political resources, and leisure (pp. 19–20). Moreover, data from the Scandinavian countries is included for comparison and illustration (pp. 21–24). Three questions arise that are common for such indicator studies: (1) how recent and correct are the data, (2) how significant are the differences, and (3) what are the policy implications of such data.

Two articles consider problems of decision making in large organizations: "The Control Process: Steering and Review in Large Organizations" by L. Lundquist and "Public Policy-Making and Theories of Organizational Choice" by B. P. Olsen. Both of these pieces contribute to general issues in public policy theory with only passing reference to specific regional issues. As such they might reach a more appropriate audience in a specialized journal.

N. Elvander's contribution, "The Politics of Taxation in Sweden 1945–1970: A Study of the Functions of Parties and Organizations," is especially valuable. Summarizing his extensive Swedish study, Elvander focuses on what he rightly identifies as a seriously neglected issue: tax policy decision making and changing attitudes toward taxation by citizens, organizations, and political parties. He distinguishes three conflict dimensions in Swedish tax policy: government finance, distribution policy, and equality and summarizes the complex decision-making process. He concludes that while parties and organizations defer to government judgment in the first area, their concern and influence has been greater in the two remaining dimensions (p. 79). Elvander's piece demonstrates the advantages of policy analysis with specific references; the possibilities and limitations of different methodologies become apparent.

Several pieces apply advanced analytical methodologies to Scandinavian political issues. M. Isberg, A. Wettergren, and B. Wittrock apply content analysis techniques to Swedish political parties, and M. Laakso applies Riker's "Size Principle" to recent roll-call data from the Finnish parliament. P. N. Olsen focuses upon the historical dimension in his discussion of the "Cradle of a Party System: Voting Patterns and Voting Groups in the Danish Constitutional Convention 1848–1849." Olsen discusses the problems involved in treating historical data, but notes that factor analysis and related techniques highlight the emerging political groupings. One questions only whether this exercise has added significantly to standard historical interpretations.

More recent changes in voting behavior and party strength are revealed in "Local Voting Studies of Total Electorates: The Danish General Election of 1971" by J. Elklit, O. Riis, and D. Tonsgaard. In cooperation with the Danish State TV network, three voting districts were chosen for analysis in depth: a rural district in Jutland, a white-collar, suburban district in Funen, and a working-class district in Copenhagen. The selection provided, therefore, regional, occupational, and party variation. The importance of this survey is not only that it includes an unusual amount of detail but also that the same districts have been followed in subsequent elections providing continuity. Given the "political earthquake" that shook Denmark in December 1973, as well as the hotly contested issue of Common Market membership that was decided by a national referendum in October 1972, this continuing study is likely to grow in value.

Four American social scientists appear in the collection as well. W. M. Lafferty provides an ecological analysis of industrialization and labor radicalism in Norway. This is a useful piece developed from Lafferty's valuable study, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia* which appeared in 1971. Tested here is what the author calls the Bull-Galenson Hypothesis on the importance of the pace and timing of industrialization on ideological differences among the Scandinavian labor movements (p. 157). The Norwegian data collected by Lafferty elaborates and qualifies the thesis. The second piece, "Measuring Prejudicial Attitudes in a Situational Context," by E. Chaples, W. Sedlacek, and G. Brooks, lies more in the realm of social psychology than political science. An American survey of prejudicial attitudes toward different ethnic groups was applied to several hundred Danish university students. The results of the survey are summarized and compared to responses by American college students. The substantial and consistent pro-black attitude of the Danes is compared with their more qualified acceptance of Mediterranean foreign workers (p. 243). Although the findings confirm other observations of Danish attitudes, one worries about the application of an American survey, despite some Danish modifications, to Danish students who are far more socially select than their American counterparts. The few blacks residing in Denmark are artists, students, scientists, and diplomats, with occasional visits by political activists. To ask a Dane how he would react to being stopped by a black or Mediterranean policeman is not unlike asking an American how he would respond to being pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike by an East German *Vopo*. The authors are aware of some of these limitations (p. 245).

As mentioned above, the Review section of the yearbook reports recent significant developments in Scandinavian politics. Most typically, local and national elections are reviewed. H. Valen's extensive analysis of the Norwegian local elections of 1971 in the shadow of the pending Common Market membership question is invaluable. Not only students of Norwegian politics but also those concerned with the influence of national and foreign policy issues on local party organizations will want to read this piece. O. Riis provides a review of the parliamentary elections and change in government in Denmark in 1971, and P. Pesonen analyzes the Finnish parliamentary election of 1972. E. Husu's piece provices insight into the political consequences of economic policy in Finland. B. Molin takes a quick look at the first year of Sweden's unicameral Riksdag. H. V. Aareskjold continues to assist researchers of the Scandinavian region with her complete and extensive bibliography. Four hundred seventy-six works are cited, and the authors are indexed.

This edition of the yearbook is valuable to more than just regional specialists. It is a convenient survey of the advanced political research in the Scandinavian countries. Students of Western politics will find both the substantive issues and the methodologies presented in the yearbook of interest and application. Unfortunately few of the essays are easily applied to undergraduate course work. The expensive format of the volume (the price of the eighth volume has soared to nearly $19.00!) suggests that a way be found for sale of individual essays.

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The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States. By Abderrahman Robana. (New York: Praeger, Special Studies, 1973. Pp. 206. $16.50.)

Professor Robana's book deals with a subject of vital importance to the developing third world, namely the possibilities for maximization of development through economic integration in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In both the foreword, written by Professor I. W. Zartman, and the preface, written by the author, the reader is warned that the book does not pretend to constitute a blueprint for an economic community in North Africa (i.e., the three Maghreb States mentioned above). It is, as Dr. Robana states, "a treatment of the possibilities for eventual economic integration among those three countries" (p. vii). These possibilities are based on the feasibility of joint exploitation of resources and services in the Arab Maghreb, as well as on the present existence of joint institutions working toward an eventual Maghreb economic integration which were created in the course of the past ten years. Although it is a treatise of hope for the ultimate success of these efforts, the author, who is a professor of finance. at Alfred University, New York, and a Tunisian national, effectively analyzes the internal and external economic rigidities hampering the three countries' attempts at multinational coordination.

The book contains an introduction and seven chapters dealing with the following problems: the institutional and economic structure for the Maghreb; the theoretical aspects of economic integration in that part of the Arab world; the economic structure of the Maghrebi States; the structure of external and internal trade in that area; the attempts to restructure the Maghreb economies; obstacles facing and potentials for a "Maghreb Union," and Libya as a special case.

Three recurring themes substantiated with a host of tables, charts and appendices are: (1) that the goal of establishing a viable national economy can best be attained through economic policy coordination and integration; (2) that the substantial potential for integration is hampered by constraining national policies, existing rigidities, and vested national interests; and (3) that the author's "reasonable hope" for progress towards Maghrebi integration is based on "a coherent system of joint institutions" established following the first Ministers of Economy conference in 1964.

The author clearly believes that the institutional structure for joint consultations, studies, and coordination constitutes, among other things, the heart of the movement toward integration. This structure consists of a "Maghreb Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs," a "Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee for the Maghreb" (CPCM); a Secretariat of the CPCM; a "Center for Industrial Studies" (CEIM); various specialized commissions; and a "Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee on Education" (CPCEM).

"Although integration has not been achieved," Professor Robana optimistically points out, "the objective behind the establishment of the institutions mentioned above is to seek ways and means for closer and expanding cooperation that might lead to an economic community in ten years or so" (p. 6). In that context, his discussion of the question of a Maghreb Integration Bank (MIB) is illuminating. Although the MIB was officially mentioned in the Protocol of Agreement of the Fifth Conference of the Ministers of the Economy (held in November 1967), no action has so far been taken. Robana realistically notes that "the mere existence of national development banks in each of the Maghreb countries may well be an obstacle to the creation of an MIB" (p. 20). Having noted the obstacles, the author simultaneously discusses the potentialities for success, which is a general pattern throughout his presentation. Thus he proceeds to suggest that in its initial stage, MIB's lending activities could be devoted to expanding and modernizing the Maghreb countries intra-economic infrastructure. He also adds that close cooperation would be expected to develop between the MIB and other national or multinational African financial institutions.

The author assesses the results achieved thus far through those institutional structures as meager. The technical and specialized commissions and committees set up by the ministers have resulted, he contends, only in periodic contacts and studies that were never implemented. The political structure of the Maghreb, the author suggests, "may prove an important obstacle since supra-nationality is not easy to accept" (p. 27). In spite of the promise of immediate results in transport, communications, energy, tourism, and negotiation of a special trade relationship with the European Economic Community, the goal of integration is far away and its shape remains unclear. The obstacles include differing national political objectives, currencies, monetary policies, and the existence of strict exchange controls. In this regard, Professor Robana lends support to the pessimistic conclusion reached by Professor Charles F. Gallagher in his book *The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963) where he stated that "the road to a supranational entity appears very arduous."

Nevertheless, the author points to the modest steps taken in the 1970s, including an intergovernmental economic integration agreement presented by CPCM to the sixth Conference of Ministers of Economy held in Rabat in July 1970. In this readable and lucid treatise, he bases his hopes for the future, partly on the fact that no one country in the Maghreb has been able to be self-sufficient and none has a large enough national market to guarantee economies of scale enabling competitive production at world prices. Hence his prediction that "the three North African countries will continue to pursue the path toward economic integration of the Maghreb" (p. 132), especially since the concept of a "Grand Maghreb" is enshrined in their respective constitutions.

With regard to Libya (which has withdrawn, since 1970, from the institutions created for an economically-integrated Arab Maghreb in her quest for closer ties with the Arab Machrek), the author expresses the hope that, in the long run, Libya would belong to both the Maghreb and the

Machrek in an economically integrated Arab world. In view of its wealth of data, cogency of analysis, and political realism, the book constitutes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the promise and the challenge of integration and development not only in the Arab Nation, but also in the rest of the Third World.

YASSIN ET-AYOUTY

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Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization. By Donald Rothchild. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 476. $22.50.)

Race relations in East Africa today have attracted worldwide attention and have great intrinsic significance. The decision of General Amin to deport Uganda's Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) forced us all to recognize a major problem that we had tried to forget for a decade. Almost all the scholarly work on race relations in Africa was done during the late colonial period and was focused on Europeans (whites). The publication of Professor Donald Rothchild's book thus fills a major vacuum, for its focus is race relations between Africans and Asians in postindependence Kenya. Those who are unfamiliar with the details of Kenya's racial situation will find *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya* a very useful introduction, and several of the book's points and perspectives will be helpful even to those already immersed in East African affairs. Through the use of two opinion surveys, legislative debates, and the local press, Rothchild is able to give a good and balanced picture of the politics of Kenyan race relations.

The outstanding feature of the book is its fairness to all concerned. Rothchild takes great pains to explain why both Africans and Asians in Kenya are dissatisfied with one another and to give them credit for the uneasy political accommodation the groups have made. The study also is thorough in its presentation of viewpoints and issue areas. Almost all aspects of the Asian-African problem are touched upon, and a good deal of historical material is provided, particularly for the post-independence period, but also in a summary manner for the colonial era. Though Rothchild signed his Foreword in 1971, his analysis still is basically applicable to the Kenya of today. Given the volatile character of race relations, this is an accomplishment.

Having said all the foregoing, however, I must also point out some significant weaknesses in *Racial Bargaining*. For those already familiar with the Kenyan situation, the new material in the book comes from two surveys which Rothchild conducted, one of Asian businessmen, the other of "politically mobilized" Africans. Neither of the two survey samples is representative of the entirety of its ethnic group. This presents no problem for the Asian businessmen sample; we can visualize clearly the character and probable opinion biases of the population from which it is drawn, and the sample is genuinely random. The sample of "politically mobilized" Africans presents problems, however. Rothchild describes it as a random sample of Africans who have completed at least primary school and are located in small and large towns. Nonetheless, in fact the sample is not random. Given the towns surveyed, students and those fluent in English are greatly overrepresented, and civil servants and women are underrepresented. The biases derived from interviewing those who answered the door in sampled houses in the large towns and from doing quota sampling of those in public places and at home in the daytime in small towns. My inquiries suggest that in the small towns the primary education prerequisite was probably first determined visually. Since education is the primary determinant of social status in East Africa, a person's dress and bearing are likely to reflect closely his level of education. The relationship is far from perfect, however, and a selection of educated respondents by visual criteria is particularly likely to underrepresent those who barely have the specified minimum. (Given the reputation of the organization which did the African survey, I checked on their handling of this project. Let me say to Rothchild's credit that it was carefully supervised and apparently very little falsification of interviews occurred.) All of us who have conducted surveys in developing countries have experienced problems in getting a truly random sample, but Rothchild does not alert us to the biases of his sample and does not analyze his data in a way that would minimize the problems it presents. Thus he implies that statements such as the following describe the population of urban, educated Africans. "[When] asked whether European and Asian citizens should have equal chances with Africans at the present time . . . 32 per cent of the respondents replied positively . . ." (p. 196). Yet when a sample has not been drawn randomly, simple inference of population statistics from sample ones is impossible. The tolerant 32 per cent of the respondents could be almost exclusively schoolboys, who are nowhere near that proportion of urban, educated Africans. Only by carefully analyzing the data along the dimensions of the sample's known biases and adjusting the results accordingly, can one begin to make inferences from the sample to the population. Even then relational analysis (such as cross tabulations) is preferable to the use of descriptive statistics, for the former is more resilent to problems of nonrandomness than are the latter. These statistical errors, although serious, do not make the book valueless; even if one accepts very wide error margins on much of the data, the findings are highly suggestive. But the reader must protect himself from misplaced confidence in the African survey results, for the author does not.

A second problem comes from Rothchild's attempt to deal with the status of both the European and Asian minorities. The differences between the positions of the two groups are so great that it is difficult to treat both adequately in the same book. For the postcolonial period the book actually focuses on the Asian-African relationship, which is most helpful. Unfortunately, though, the discussion of the structures of legal, educational, and economic privileges in the colonial period is largely confined to the Europeans. Thus we miss a part of the background on the Asian community which we need for the rest of the book.

Finally, Rothchild likes to let the facts speak for themselves. This style helps to give his book the fairness which I admire. However it also means that the author does not draw many conclusions for us and leaves us uncertain about the balance of facts on occasion. Similarly, the theoretical framework of direct and tacit bargaining in which the book is set is given very little explicit treatment. The issue here is a stylistic one; I personally prefer a book which makes an argument, but others like the less aggressive tone *Racial Bargaining* uses.

Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya does have weaknesses, and the reader must treat part of its statistical analysis with careful skepticism. Nonetheless there is also a good deal of value in the book; moreover alternative studies of Asian-African and postcolonial race relations do not exist. Therefore scholars interested in these subjects will find Rothchild's work worth reading.

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Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. By Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 208. $12.50.)

Despite the great strategic and economic (oil) importance of the "Arabian Gulf" (the book under review refers to the Gulf as "Arabian" rather than "Persian"), only in the last few years have some American scholars developed a serious research interest in those areas along the southern shores of the Gulf which now make up the small, independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Consequently, until very recently there has been very little detailed and reliable statistical and other information readily available in the United States about these particular areas and their peoples and problems.

With the help of three research grants and the cooperation of local officials, Professors Muhammad Sadik and William Snavely were able both to visit and study at first-hand these little-known Gulf "city states" and also to gather a great deal of valuable statistical and other data, some of which had never been published before. The book's 97 tables (containing statistical data on population, health, education, employment, trade, and other topics) and eight charts (showing the governmental organizations of Bahrain, Qatar, and the three most important members of the UAE federation) should be of particular interest and value to specialists on the Middle East and the developing world.

After presenting a brief historical background, the authors discuss and analyze in detail the major economic, social, political, and administrative developments and problems of not only the independent countries of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, but also the seven, relatively autonomous members (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, UMM al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah) of the UAE federation. In the last two chapters the authors stress that, because of their small populations and resources (other than oil), limited markets, insufficient numbers of educated and trained personnel, and other reasons, the Gulf city states would benefit greatly—in the areas of economic and political development, foreign relations, defense, etc.—if they formed a wider and stronger federation.

The authors note that until oil was discovered most inhabitants of the Gulf city states remained poor and backward and depended heavily on the sea for their main means of communication and livelihood. The discovery of oil opened new horizons and opportunities and made it possible for the oil producing states to promote more rapid economic development. Even those areas without oil benefited indirectly, especially by means of the considerable economic and other assistance provided to them by some of their wealthier neighbors. The Gulf city states have shown different levels of economic and social development; and even the wealthier states still face serious economic and social problems. In all areas political development lags well behind economic development.

The Gulf city states, as the authors stress, do have much in common with many developing countries, e.g., a handicapping colonial past; low level of education and productivity; widespread economic and social inequalities; political inexperience; concentration of political power in the hands of a few. Nevertheless, in a number of important ways these city states are not typical of most developing nations. For example, unlike most developing countries, the Gulf States: have extremely small populations (Qatar has only about 80,000 people and several autonomous UAE states have less than 11,000 people each; depend heavily upon foreign workers (25 per cent of the workers in Bahrain and more than 50 per cent of the workers elsewhere are foreigners); are predominantly urban because a very large percentage of their populations live in cities; and, in most cases, they have adequate financial means for economic development and have unusually high per capita incomes because of the large oil revenues being received.

The authors have provided useful information, critical analyses, and sound recommendations for promoting economic, social, educational, political, and administrative development in the Gulf states. Nevertheless, they have recognized that their study was incomplete and only a beginning to the full understanding of the Gulf city states. They promised to "continue with research in this area and to analyze various problems in greater depth in future studies" (p. xxii). One can, therefore, look forward to further useful studies by the authors. These should enable them not only to provide more analyses in "greater depth" but also to update their statistical and other data in order to record the many significant economic and political changes (such as the new oil discoveries, the tremendous rise in oil revenues because of higher prices, the increased stress on industrialism and tourism, and the internal political changes in Qatar, Bahrain, and Sharjah) which have taken place since the book was completed. It would also be helpful if the next study were to provide more detailed information and analyses in depth about such matters as: the existing leaders and elites; the roles and influence of students, foreign workers and other foreigners, professional organizations, social clubs, etc. (as in Bahrain); and economic planning programs and activities.

The present scholarly study of an increasingly important area is a most useful and welcome contribution.

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Communism in Korea. By Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. Volume I. The Movement, Volume II. The Society. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xxi, 1533. 2 Vols. $55.00.)

This two-volume work, the culmination of nearly a decade of scholarship, provides one of the most thorough and valuable studies made of a modern political system. It deals carefully with the "traditional" aspects of political analysis—leadership, power, ideology, institutions; but, more unusual in a single study, it deals at equal length with the social and economic effects of that system. The research also goes well beyond North Korea, providing extensive comparative analysis of approaches to the same problems by the Soviet Union and China, as well. The authors place their work in the field of comparative Communist studies, which they see still in the pioneering stages. But to categorize it that way alone could be a disservice. For, if there is one problem with this work, it is its lingering ties to the stereotyped approaches to Communist systems that marked the research of the 1950s and 1960s. By its close, however, this work offers a broader and more relevant perspective that could guide future studies of both Communist and non-Communist systems.

The study is presented in two parts: Volume I, *The Movement*, and Volume II, *The Society*. Volume I covers the historical development of the present Communist regime in North Korea, including a rich account of the early history of the Korean Communist movement, from 1900 to 1945. This first volume really breaks into two parts, based not only on the subject matter but also on the availability of research materials. The first part covers the movement from 1900 to World War II, a period of revolutionaries and independence fighters working under nearly impossible conditions of persecution, dislocation, and hardship. They wove in and out of the Soviet politics of the Russian revolution, and the Chinese politics of China's revolution like a singular thread—part of that fabric but also part of a distinctively Korean history. There is a rich, human flavor to the account of this period. Through the notes of one leader's—Yo Un-hyong's—two month trip across the Gobi dessert and thence across Siberia in 30° below zero weather to attend the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow in 1921, one gets a vivid picture of the conditions, the intensity, the hopes, and the frustrations of these early revolutionary leaders.

The coverage of the period after 1945, in the balance of Volume I (and all of Volume II), is of a different character. The authors have been limited to only two sources of data about modern North Korea: official publications of the North Korean government and the reports of defectors (plus some access to unclassified South Korean and American intelligence estimates). Despite enormous efforts by the authors to overcome bias in these sources and to cross-check almost all accounts, this situation limits the analysis. At a minimum, the human flavor diminishes. More seriously, the study is restricted in the degree to which it can probe the leaders' thoughts and reflections beyond the official rhetoric, and their reasoning process in coming to decisions.

For the most part, however, Professors Scalapino and Lee have overcome this limitation. In

Volume I, through painstaking analysis of each published change in the composition and rank of the leadership, of the issues known to be confronting the leadership, and of the documentary record of debates, statements and decisions, the authors trace the establishment of Kim Il-Song's power. Initially under Soviet sponsorship but later more independently, Kim emerges as the head of one of the most thoroughly mobilized, militarized, and authoritarian states in either the Communist or non-Communist world. The primary influence, in style and structure, is the Soviet Union (the presence in Korea of a large contingent of the Chinese army from 1951–58 seems to have left curiously little by way of records or influence). But there is also a strong nationalist character to both the ideology and policies of the regime which has grown with the strains in the international Communist movement.

The total picture is of overwhelming public emphasis on Kim's personal leadership, his concern with absolute loyalty, and the resulting concentration of power among a few men whose roots go back in almost every case to the small guerrilla bands of Korean independence figthers in Manchuria from which Kim emerged. Simultaneously, there has been a militarization of the society reflecting not only the siege mentality of the regime and the continued confrontation with the South, but also the desire to reconstruct the character of Korean citizenry to fit the perceived needs of socialism and modernization.

Volume II, however, looks at North Korean society from a different perspective. Each major facet of the society—the leadership structure; the control system; ideology and the intellectual; the military; agriculture and the peasant; industrialization and the worker—is analyzed in terms of its character in North Korea and in comparison to the chief Communist "models," the USSR and China. The authors find the Soviet model to be dominant in each case in spite of the claims of innovation and departure. China has experimented more. North Korea has followed the model almost strictly, and—because of its smallness of size, homogeneity of population, and greater ease of control—has had even more success than the USSR with Soviet models of collectivization and certain forms of management. In economic development, comparisons are also made with South Korea.

What emerges as a result of this additional material is a broader and more balanced picture of North Korea as a system that has blended communism, emergence, and tradition in a state that is unquestionably authoritarian but that apparently need have no fear of mass disaffection. To the workers in all sectors, in contrast to the lowest third in South Korea and many other emergent states, North Korea is able to provide a guaranteed minimum allocation of food, free health services, and extremely low housing costs. On the other hand, consumer goods—whether simple items such as clothing or more luxurious ones such as watches and radios—are extremely scarce and expensive, in contrast to what they cost even average workers in South Korea. Allocations to the military and heavy industry are thus a major burden on the society. But isolation from the outside world and effective mobilization of the society minimize comparisons and grievances. On the whole, the authors find both rural and urban populations loyal to the regime. If there is little prospect for evolution to a more open system, there is also little prospect of mass discontent or serious internal dissension.

One of the most valuable contributions in this work is the analysis of North Korea's ability to mobilize and control the society so completely with relatively few overt forms of coercion. A number of years ago, Glenn Paige suggested that Korea provided a unique opportunity to measure the independence of the purely political variable, because two very different political systems had been imposed from outside on an essentially homogeneous culture. The authors of this work argue that the political variable is indeed a strong factor in shaping political-cultural development. They also resolve one of the troubling problems of recent scholarship on Korea. Ever since Gregory Henderson's *Korea: Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), authors—both Korean and American—have been obliged to attend to his important analysis, which showed that Korean cultural factors produce an almost incessant tendency to factionalism and instability. Valuable as this analysis has been, it has also become almost an albatross around the neck of subsequent scholars, seeming to make it impossible for them to conceive within the same cultural milieu of a highly structured and integrated system of Korean politics, to understand for example the sudden swift success of Communist mass organization throughout Korea in the first months of independence, or for that matter to understand North Korea at all.

The resolution of this enigma comes in Scalapino's and Lee's analysis of the nature of North Korea control. They conclude that it is precisely the cultural characteristics cited by Henderson—emphasis on small but unstable "kinship" groups, importance of personal loyalties, the pressure for upward mobility—on which the North Korean regime has capitalized. Standing Henderson on his head, so to speak, the authors find that

> It is in organization that the Communist system of North Korea displays its most impressive strengths. . . . These are strengths that owe a considerable amount to pre-Communist political culture and

> most particularly to the intensity with which primordial small-group relations operated in traditional Korean society. . . . By a process of trial and error, Party Leaders finally found that the most successful means of aggregating power lay in taking advantage of the "small group," adapting to the familial character of social organization that formed a central part of the traditional culture of their society. (pp. 1301, 1313).

Against the excellent scholarship and insight in this work, the one troubling aspect is the Cold War rhetoric that appears in it, particularly though not exclusively in those sections dealing with foreign policy toward South Korea or the United States. It seems out of place, and it is most disturbing when it influences the analysis and conclusions of the study. Foreign policy, for example, outside of the Communist countries, is one of the aspects of North Korea not examined in detail in this study. There is no content analysis of statements on key issues over the years; no examination of the milieus in which actions were taken or statements made (no real examination for example of various moves and statements by South Korea, of the special environment of the Vietnam War, particularly the bombing, and how it might have affected perceptions); and above all no opportunity to test and plumb the perceptions of North Korean leaders through direct access to them. Yet the authors assert that North Korea is motivated by its desire to "seize the south" (p. 954), and is spending great sums in preparation for an attack. The evidence offered, if suggestive of this, is at least somewhat ambiguous. The defense preparations that are described would appear to be at least as much defensive as offensive, particularly the enormous effort to dig a network of caves and tunnels and an underground communication system. The imminence of possible South Korean-American attack is also cited elsewhere by the authors as being one of the themes that effectively binds the population. In these circumstances, it seems too pat, at least too quick—too much in the vein that Eric Fromm warned us of years ago—to conclude, as the authors do in analyzing the purpose of North Korean defense expenditures, that it is "inconceivable" that Kim Il-Song could really fear an "unprovoked" South Korean or American attack (p. 986). We may perceive it in the West this way, because of how we see ourselves. But the task of scholars in this case is to plumb the realities as they are perceived in North Korea, or at least to measure the unknowns.

The point says something about the character of further comparative Communist studies, for which the authors argue strongly. It is significant, considering the time span in which this work was done, that the troublesome rhetoric drops off increasingly in the course of Volume II and is totally absent from the final chapter on perspectives. The authors conclude that North Korea can only be understood if seen as Communist, *and* emergent, *and* traditional; in this light its system and policies can best be understood, and indeed its character evaluated, as the authors provide their own final and extremely useful evaluation. In this direction, comparative Communist studies might well be encouraged, not out of the conviction of inevitable confrontation, the theme of an earlier era, but for purposes of understanding both the links between the Communist states and the ones between them and non-Communist states that confront similar tasks and milieus. This is the broad and valuable perspective to which this work brings us at its close, and, one hopes, the guide it will provide to future such studies.

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Sovereignity and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751. By Stuart B. Schwartz. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 465. $17.50.)

Despite its central role in administering and governing colonial Brazil, the judiciary has remained a virtually unknown and unstudied institution. This fascinating study fills in a large part of the gap in our knowledge about these hitherto faceless bureaucrats sent to Brazil to dispense royal justice. By carefully piecing together and analyzing the backgrounds, careers, and activities of the judges who manned the High Court of Bahia during the 17th and first half of the 18th centuries, Professor Schwartz develops a decidely original perspective on Portuguese governance of Brazil.

This book details an institutional nonsuccess story. The notorious reputation of the Portuguese judiciary for corruption and inefficiency was well deserved. Despite diligent efforts to send honest, well-trained, and well-paid magistrates, justice in colonial Brazil was regularly bartered like any other commodity, though delivered more slowly.

Why did the judiciary so run amuck in Brazil? Schwartz provides us with essentially two answers: (1) the judges were so busy with nonjudicial functions that they had insufficient time to devote to court business, and (2) local Brazilian interests entangled the judges in a snare of commercial and family alliances that perpetually compromised judicial integrity. Both points are convincingly documented.

The number of nonjudicial hats worn by the Brazilian judges during this period is striking. In addition to deciding cases, the judges of the High

Court led military expeditions, investigated and prosecuted official corruption (though not too vigorously), collected taxes, and supervised the treasury.

The crown had hoped that endowing the magistrates with considerable power and prestige and handsome salaries would create a loyal and incorruptible judicial bureaucracy. But these very endowments made the judges highly sought after by the Brazilian elite as husbands for eligible daughters and as business partners. Royal edicts against such matrimonial and commercial ventures were regularly honored in the breach.

But surely some of the blame must lie with inadequacies of Portuguese law. Substantively, the *Ordenações Filipinas* were obsolete even when first enacted, and procedurally they provided myriad opportunities for delay. Determining the law applicable to a particular case was all too frequently a nightmarish task. One had to search through the confused and contradictory mass of statutes, orders, opinions, regulations, letters patent, decrees, and instructions appropriately termed the *legislação extravagante* (literally, extravagant legislation) as well as the *Ordenações*. There was not even an official compilation of colonial legislation, such as the Spanish had, to begin to bring order to this legal labyrinth.

Unfortunately, this book devotes little attention to the nature of the law the High Court was supposed to be applying. Indeed, a basic weakness of the book is its failure to deal with the judges' case-deciding functions. Nowhere is there a discussion of the issues involved in specific cases, or the analysis the court employed to resolve them. Some of these omissions may be attributable to the loss or destruction of records about the High Court's day-to-day activities, particularly from 1609 to 1626. (See p. 141.) But it would be helpful to know to what extent the magistrates imaginatively reinterpreted Portuguese law. To what extent did they consider themselves without discretion to twist legal norms to achieve a "just" result? Aside from the decisions motivated by corruption, did the judges serve the function of adapting Portuguese law to colonial conditions? Did the Portuguese follow the Spanish administrative formula of "I obey but I do not execute" to shelve inconvenient or inexpedient laws?

Despite such omissions, *Sovereignity and Society in Colonial Brazil* is a very fine effort. It is painstakingly researched from manuscript sources in more than twenty-five archives and libraries in Brazil, Portugal, England, and Spain, plus an impressive variety of secondary sources. In addition to appendices with biographical summaries of all the High Court's judges, there are 29 pages of bibliography, with concise research guides to much of the manuscript data. This book should be required reading for anyone interested in the development of Latin American administrative and legal institutions.

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Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution. By William Shawcross. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974. Pp. 311. $10.00.)

Janos Kadar is a challenging subject for a biographer for at least two reasons. He does not believe in advertising either his ideas or the details of his personal life. The rambling speech made at the celebration of his 60th birthday is about as far as he has allowed himself to go in that respect. Second, he seems a man of great simplicity, even naiveté, yet his career shows an extraordinary touch for political timing, to say the least. William Shawcross, an enterprising journalist who has covered central Europe for the *Sunday Times* of London, is obviously intrigued by the riddle and at the same time not wholly sure of how to explain it, though not afraid to try. Kadar in the eyes of great numbers of his countrymen was a man who betrayed his best friend (Laszlo Rajk) and his country, but then somehow made up for it by 15 years of cautious accommodation to the people's needs and desires. Hence the title of the book.

The difficulty of portraying Kadar himself gives emphasis to the content of the subtitle, the politics of Hungary since the revolution of 1956. Here we get a rather breezy but basically competent narrative which gives the essence of Kadar's compromise with the people, including the changes which come under the name of the New Economic Mechanism, the relaxation of censorship, the easing of travel restrictions, and other developments, drawing largely on the Hungarian press, on Western and emigré sources, and on conversations within Hungary. The book does not dig deeply into the economic reform, as some Western economists have done. It does not analyze institutions and political practice in the way that William Robinson has attempted in his *Pattern of Reform in Hungary* (New York: Praeger, 1973). It has no secrets to reveal on Hungarian-Soviet relations. But the author did not set out to do those things. He has written a general book for the general public, a worthy successor to his earlier study of Dubček and the drama of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He shows a good sense of the tensions in Hungarian society today, the legacy and the lessons of 1956, and the limits within which leaders and people can act in finding ways to live with each other and with the presence of Soviet power.

Shawcross presents this picture mainly through personalities: Rakosi and Rajk; Gerö, Nagy and Münnich; Kadar's relations with all of them, and above all his relationship with his protector, Nikita Khrushchev. Because Communist politics is so much the politics of conspiracy, the unknown areas in the lives of these men are tremendous—especially in the case of Rajk, who left his mark on Hungarian political life long after the time of his trial and execution in 1949, less than two years after the Communists took full power. But the author does well with the material he has, and he is keen in his judgment of the political forces and issues behind the personalities.

Kadar is no heroic figure, but his toughness and resilience—he withstood cruel torture at the hands of Rakosi's police—and even his apparent simplicity and lack of dynamic qualities have brought him to the status of dean of political leaders within the Soviet bloc. And in the eyes of the Hungarian people, who had their hour of heroism in 1956 and have had to find other ways of seeking a more tolerable life, he has become an anchor. With the recent demotion, since the publication of Shawcross's book, of two leaders who have a prominent place in it as representing the new more liberal trend (Rezsö Nyers and György Aczel), all eyes have focused on Kadar. As long as he is there, the people feel an assurance that the clock will not be turned back, at least not very far back. His record of "crime and compromise" which this book describes so well may not justify such a feeling, but it is there none the less. They may not feel confident that he would ever stand up to the Russians or move beyond the narrow confines of the present system of party control, but he is, strangely enough, a symbol of whatever confidence there is in the future.

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Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics. Edited by Dusan Sidjanski. (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973. Pp. 237. $10.75.)

In *Political Decision Making Processes* Dusan Sidjanski has collected seven papers presented at the VIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Munich in September, 1970. The volume reflects, unfortunately, its origins, and though several chapters offer significant insights into the decision-making process, the volume as a whole lacks coherence.

Sidjanski's introductory comments provide a framework within which he suggests the following chapters can be understood. Focusing on the participation dimension of decision making, Sidjanski describes two kinds of processes: closed and open. Closed decision-making processes require the participation only of public authorities. Open processes, in contrast, are characterized by the participation of informed elites or other "social forces." Almost as an afterthought, Sidjanski adds a "mixed" category and concedes that most decision processes tend towards openness.

Two of the seven studies cannot be placed on this participation dimension. Charles Roig focuses on conceptual problems within the decision-making approach. He distinguishes Snyder's intrasystemic and Easton's extrasystemic approaches to decision making, and persuasively argues that the approaches are complimentary rather than conflicting. In addition, Roig argues against the historical (chronological) method of decisional analysis and for a systematic (logical sequence) approach. Despite these and other distinctions, Roig refuses to define "decision." His disclaimer—doesn't this suggest how complex the concept really is?—is not persuasive. Moreover, he fails to develop propositions relating components of the decision-making model to policy outputs. The chapter is less persuasive, consequently, because it is written at such a high level of generality.

Alexander J. Groth and L. L. Wade's study of international educational policy outcomes likewise fails to fit into Sidjanski's framework. But here this study's similarity to the Roig chapter ends. Groth and Wade develop measures of educational quantity (enrollment) and quality (student/teacher ratio) for 67 nations representing four political regime types: affluent democracies, poorer democracies, Communist systems, and autocracies. Using type of regime and level of economic development as independent variables, the authors examine their effects on the quantity and quality of educational policy outcomes. The results are surprising indeed. In short, Groth and Wade find political variables much more salient than economic variables in influencing educational policy: "In all but a few isolated cases, relationships between economic development and educational policy are only moderate or less for *all* political system types. National decision-makers appear to have substantial latitude in which to shape policy and are not as tightly confined by resource constraints as sometimes suggested" (p. 138).

The remaining five chapters can be viewed in terms of Sidjanski's open-closed participation dimension. Three studies focus on decision making within specific nations, while two studies focus on decision making in the international organization context. Sanjieva Nayak applies the mandala (concentric circles) theory of Kautilya to decision making in Ghana; the competition between governing and nongoverning elites provides his data. Nayak analyzes influence in the decision-making process in terms of the proximity of elite groups to the decision-making center represented by Nkrumah and the People's Party. Nayak describes a "mixed" decision-making situation, but unfortunately relies on the vague notion of "hegemonical tension" among elites to explain policy outcomes. Consequently, Nayak's "explanation" fails to materialize, and we are left instead with a description of various Ghanaian interest groups.

Robert Presthus has contributed an insightful empirical study of interest group-legislative interaction in the Canadian system. From interviews with 140 M.P.'s in Ottawa, Presthus develops generalizations concerning the significance of interest group activities to the policy process. Not surprisingly, personal contact between M.P.'s and interest group representatives is high. Policy-makers perceive interest groups as performing two functions: (1) mobilization of public opinion, and (2) provision of information. Most important, "contrary to conventional appreciations, most legislators tend to regard interest groups and their agents as functionally necessary and normatively legitimate elements in the political process" (p. 106). Presthus's study supports an "open" interpretation of the policy process.

A more "closed" model emerges from Paolo Urio's case study of Switzerland's selection of a fighter plane in the early 1960s. In 1962 policy-makers lacked sufficient information and did not study all relevant factors (particularly economic, political, and psychological) in their selection of a fighter plane for development. As a consequence, the Defense Department overspent and precipitated reactions both from Parliament and from the public. Several reforms in the defense decision-making process resulted. A parliamentary information service was created which allowed M.P.'s to question civil servants and establish commissions of inquiry. Within the Defense Department the staff structure was strengthened and the number of subordinates directly responsible to one head was reduced. Most significantly, in terms of Sidjanski's open-closed participation dimension, these reforms led to greater collaboration between policy makers and the scientific and economic communities, and better information circulation both within the department and between the department and others in government, Parliament, and the public.

Decision making within international organizations provides the focus for the Cox and Jacobson study and the Alger study. Cox and Jacobson have studied interactions within eight universal international organizations (ITU, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, IAEA, IMF, GATT, UNCTAD) between 1945 and 1970. They develop a sevenfold decisional typology based on the nature of issues: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervising, and operational. While Cox and Jacobson argue the salience of a particular decision type varies with the organization, they go further and suggest salience influences the decision-making process (p. 155). Operational decisions tend to involve executive heads and bureaucracies; representational or symbolic decisions lead to formal government representative participation. Cox and Jacobson's framework incorporates environmental influences as well; their analysis conforms to Sidjanski's open model of participation. The authors develop specific, empirically testable propositions relating actors, process, and environmental influences to policy outputs in international organizations. Their essay represents a significant contribution to the volume.

Chadwick F. Alger, in his quantitative study of decision making in the ILO, WHO, WMO, and UN in 1955, 1960, and 1965, classifies by subject (administration, budget-finance, elections and appointments, procedural, program) and discussion (no discussion, agreement, some disagreement) 5147 decisions made within those organizations. His descriptive findings are highly suggestive. Alger concludes a trend toward consensual decision making exists in all four organizations (p. 227). Furthermore, procedural issues tend to dominate UN activities, while program decisions occupy the attention of delegates in service-oriented organizations. Alger incorporates aspects of negotiation structure and informal interaction patterns as well as public debate into his model of the international organization decision process. The openness of the process to outside influences suggests that Sidjanski's open model applies to decision making in these universal organizations.

Although individual papers (in particular, the Presthus, Cox and Jacobson, and Alger contributions) add to our knowledge of the decision-making process at national and international levels, the volume as a whole suffers from the problems involved in collections of convention papers. Sidjanski has attempted to combine both conceptual and empirical studies in this volume, and the absence of a well-developed integrative framework (despite the introduction of the open-closed participation dimension) makes the book less successful. It can be recommended, however, for the separate insights of several authors.

LINDA P. BRADY

Vanderbilt University

Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria. By David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 408. $19.50.)

In this study David Smock, an anthropologist who was a Ford Foundation adviser to the Eastern

Regional Government before the Biafran war, and his wife, Audrey, who is a political scientist with extensive fieldwork experience in Nigeria and elsewhere, have produced a most interesting work focusing on the cultural and political aspects of rural development in Eastern Nigeria.

Relying in part on their own fieldwork, the authors refer to a variety of data and techniques. They use case study materials of community plantations and resettlement schemes. They refer to the path-breaking work of scholars such as Robert Le Vine and Simon Ottenberg on the problems of motives and values leading to innovation, achievement, and change. In addition they report the findings of their own survey data ($N=480$) stratified by ethnic group and degree of acculturation.

At the cultural level the authors verified once more that the Eastern region of Nigeria has a traditional cultural system that encourages hard work, innovation, and savings and leads to a willingness to use modern methods and techniques to increase production. Their major contribution here is to show that this generalized willingness to innovate and work was not limited to Ibo groups only, but seemed to be a pattern widespread throughout the region. At the political level, however, the authors are less encouraging. They point out that when political effectiveness is measured in terms of motivating and directing change, the Eastern regional government, especially the local councils, was a failure. This pattern of high motivation at the local village level, linked with an incapacity to organize initiatives for the common good at the district, province, and regional level, seems to be the major finding of the Smock study.

The work would have been stronger had it stressed the cultural aspects of political efficacy as heavily as it has those of innovation. It is only toward the end of the study that the authors address themselves to the problem: "the tendency to restrict one's moral frame of reference to a limited group of people, usually those to whom one can trace genealogical relationships, . . ." (p. 338). The cultural problem for Eastern Nigeria in the prewar period was not one wherein "traditional" villagers resisted change—to the contrary it was one where villagers sought change but lacked the cultural and structural facilities to translate this desire into cooperative and effective endeavors.

From a methodological point of view, the Smock study can be faulted for not being concrete enough on the one hand, and not being general enough on the other hand. Thus, the many interesting case study materials they discuss—resettlement schemes, land tenure patterns, propensity to change—do not refer to the same sample of cases. This prevents the authors from deriving insights by connecting one set of variables from one aspect of the case to another set of variables from another aspect of the case—from land settlement patterns to resettlement schemes, for example. Lacking the richness of case study material, the study fails to relate actions and events at the local level of culture and politics to actions and events at a more inclusive level of culture and politics. Though there is an interesting and competent discussion of Eastern Region politics in the pre-civil war period, that discussion tends not to illuminate subsequent case study material. Without cumulating case study data, and without relating that data to the larger framework, this work lacks focus and tends to be episodic. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind how rare and valuable is the material gathered by the Smocks. In choosing between methodological purity and bringing their findings to light, the Smocks have done the field of African politics and developing area studies an important service by taking the second course.

ROBERT MELSON

Purdue University

The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States. By Leon E. Stover. (New York: Pica Press, 1974. Pp. 305. $10.00.)

In this interesting volume an anthropologist simplifies history for us by schematizing China's development: the increasingly vast mass of peasantry has grown continuously from the prehistoric tribal folk who became settled farmers in the late Neolithic period, and has maintained itself by manpower agriculture producing cereal crops ever since. Sustained at this comparatively low level of energy production, the Chinese people were made an unprivileged peasantry by the growth of the elitist high culture of Chinese civilization with its overlay of privileged landlords, scholars, and officials. Both the peasant society and the high culture are structured internally and related by the extensive family system right up to the imperial dynastic family at the top. The higher culture and its parasitic administration kept the folk culture out of politics and overlay the great variety of China's local parochial cultures.

While this contrast between the privileged elite and the commoners is one mainstay of China studies, Professor Stover applies special metaphoric terms. The ancient folk community is the "Green Circle," and in the course of time overpopulation drives the less able element downward into the "Sink of Death" since "the overall consequences of the man-land relationship make for net downward mobility" (p. 6). To escape this fate the conjugal peasant family creates a "Cult of Poverty" to act out a life of hardship among families that are in fierce competition and constantly suspicious of one another. "The family stands isolated, as symbolized by worship of *The Kitchen God*, a deity particular to each household" (p. 7). On the other hand, the court lives by the transport of grain on inland waterways or "Rivers to Glory." At the capital so sustained, the emperor struggles to preserve his domination over the elite in a constant battle between "the Mighty Dragon and the Local Snakes," (p. 8). In the agrarian state wealth follows power, and hence landlords' sons can climb the examination system or "Ladder to the Clouds." In the end, of course, the whole high culture has been projected downward, and Mao has converted the ancient folk society into a mass society.

In working out this rather stark but intriguing scheme, Mr. Stover undoubtedly will find he has stepped on the toes of many Marxists and others who are trying to get China out of its special sinological status. But if he seems to echo some of the nineteenth-century literature on the stagnation of Asiatic society and the special character of oriental despotism, he nonetheless does touch a chord that runs through the Western world's observations of China. In the little tradition he finds that "the folk have no means via a middle class to align themselves with the wider civilization at large. They are reduced to and divided by their local cultural traditions. And this is the secret of control over so many by so few" (p. 26). China is thus an "archaic civilization that never felt the full effects of the second agricultural revolution or the Iron Age technology of the West" (p. 27). As compared with the other ancient civilizations, China is unique because it survived.

Mr. Stover gives the reader among other things a thumbnail summary of China's prehistory (was the loess "at first covered with a heavy growth of trees"? [p. 35]), and traces the flowering of the classical philosophers and the imperial unification. Separate chapters deal with ecology, economy, politics, kinship, class religion and the world view. Indeed, this book grew out of the course that he gave to Japanese students in cultural anthropology at Tokyo University, 1963–65. Twenty-two pages of bibliography and notes organized by topics refer to most of the Western literature and some of the Japanese.

Since a great deal has to be integrated in short compass in this kind of exercise, much depends on the author's attitude and the climate of opinion in which he works. The 1960s in Japan saw Japanese sinologists reflecting the new look of the new generation of historians on the Chinese mainland who were chiefly devoted to denigrating the Confucian society of the past. This volume fits perfectly into the debunking of China's great tradition and specifically imperial Confucianism with all its institutions in the black era before Liberation. No doubt there is progress, and our present-day cynicism about the achievements of the Confucian state is justified in retrospect as the record of peasant suffering is exhumed. Nevertheless, in an earlier generation much of the same data here presented might have been cast in a happier mold, stressing the achievements of the Chinese state in preserving so many people in comparative civility over so long a time. The new look of today is far more disillusioned, Confucian civility has no defenders, and Mr. Stover provides chapter and verse for a grand indictment of the agrarian state. For the future he sees much continuity from the past, but "collectivization under conditions of intensive farming must be a substitute for mechanization," and he therefore doubts whether team organization can raise agricultural productivity. No doubt the unhappiness suggested in this picture of the past can be projected by outsiders onto some future Chinese dispensation.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Harvard University

Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. By Kakuei Tanaka. Translated by Simul International. (Tokyo: Simul Press, Inc.; Portland, Oregon: International Scholarly Book Services, Inc., 1973. Pp. 338. $12.95.)

When Premier Kakuei Tanaka was told that the original Japanese version of this book, *Nippon Retto Kaizo-Ron* (Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 1972), had become a best-seller with over one million copies sold, he is reported to have said, "I suppose I ought to read it!" One should not, however, discount the book simply because it was originally a bureaucracy-produced series of studies prepared when the author held the portfolio of the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). It appeared in June just before Tanaka became Prime Minister in July, 1972. Late that year and early in 1973, when the "Computerized Bulldozer" was at the height of his popularity, the ideas of "remodeling" were being translated into policy and action.

All of that was, of course, before the disastrous "energy shock" of late 1973, the unfamiliar decline in growth rates, and the plunge into balance-of-payments deficits. Subsequently, Premier Tanaka's Liberal-Democratic Party came under assault (as was clearly shown in the LDP's poor showing in the July, 1974 upper house elections). Tanaka's popularity as shown in opinion surveys fell to a point about as low as that of former President Nixon. Nonetheless, the original "remodeling" thesis did shrewdly tap some of the deepest sources of dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese public: inflation, intensive urbanization, and environmental disruption (*kōgai*).

Later Premier Tanaka worked on a new plan to improve the "tarnished image" of his widely criticized "remodeling" scheme. Opposition parties had attacked the earlier plan on the grounds that it would not only alter the nation's landscape but would also increase pollution and spread urban blight throughout Japan. Furthermore, landowner supporters of the LDP had promptly made windfall profits from speculation on properties in areas to which industry was to be relocated under the original scheme.

Tanaka's newest grand design was called "A Plan for Making a Happy Japan." It embraced a 10-point program submitted to government advisory councils in June, 1974, to be applied over the ten-year period 1976–1985. It aimed at a "high-degree welfare society," in consideration of growth-limiting factors: population, food supply, and natural resources. On May 27, 1974 the Diet passed the National Land Development Bill with three opposition parties (the Japan Socialists, the Democratic Socialists, and the Komeito) supporting the LDP because the measure de-emphasized development. A compromise included a guarantee of an adequate supply of reasonably priced land for public use.

Fortunately we have also from Premier Tanaka's pen an English-language précis and update of the original plan ("The Road to a New Japan," *1974 Britannica Book of the Year* [Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1974]). Although this piece was prepared in September, 1973 before the energy crisis, it still stands as a definitive statement of his long-range goals.

According to the Premier's book and later article, Japan's economic development has reflected the transition from primary through secondary to tertiary pursuits toward a "post-industrial society—*i.e.*, an information-oriented society." This was accompanied by rapid urbanization. Citing MITI statistics, the Premier demonstrates that in the decade 1960–1970 the population of metropolitan areas on the Pacific coast—Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka—increased by 10,620,000 to reach a total of 45,580,000 (43.9 per cent of the total population). Meanwhile, farming areas lost population and energy vital to further growth. The major goal of "remodeling" remains industrial relocation so that the value of factory shipments from the Pacific coastal belt will decline from the present 73 per cent to 50 per cent of the national total by 1985.

The Prime Minister feels that sophisticated transportation networks are essential both to relocation and increasing emphasis on knowledge-intensive industries in regional centers. The goal is to put every point in Japan within one day's journey from any other point. Tanaka speaks of the conversion of the present "horizontal" urban sprawl into "vertical" high-rise cities. In any case, regulation of land use is now recognized as lying at the core of a solution.

Progressive as Premier Tanaka's schemes may have sounded, the fact remains that he was only head of a fluid coalition of competing party factions and was eventually forced to resign. There were still those powerful members of the party who looked to production and growth as salvation, with affluence trickling down to the new middle class of *sarari man* (salary man) in Japan. Tanaka's scheme and LDP policy revealed, however, politicians' recognition that a sizeable urban-based opposition coalition was snapping at the heels of the majority. The immense popularity of Governor Ryokichi Minobe of Tokyo was evidence of the public's concern.

Premier Tanaka would not be a Japanese if he had not concluded by tapping some of the most fundamental national characteristics. Thus he states the familiar ("modern," Western) standard of "the dignity of man," based on "freedom and democracy." He also expresses, however, the traditional (Japanese) norm: "Rights are always accompanied by duties, choices by responsibilities." Japan must strive to reconstruct a nation of "local communities" in which nature, culture, and industry can be blended harmoniously. If Japan can achieve this goal, the Premier predicts, the nation will be in the forefront of those who want to build a new human society for the 21st century.

ARDATH W. BURKS

Rutgers University

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making. By Bruce Thordarson. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 231. $2.95, paper.)

Upon assuming office in the spring of 1968, Canadian Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau undertook a comprehensive review of his country's foreign policy. Subsequent to a 25-month process of studies by interdepartmental task forces, public discussions, and meetings with Canadian foreign policy elites, a set of six booklets was issued entitled *Foreign Policy For Canadians* (an introductory booklet and five sector papers on Europe, Latin America, Pacific, United Nations, and International Development). In these booklets the Trudeau Government set forth a conceptual framework encompassing six national themes (e.g., economic growth and social justice) that was to orient Canadian foreign policy in the future. Noteworthy for the absence of references to the Canada-United States interaction, the booklets were grounded in the assumption that foreign policy is the extension abroad of domestic policy, suggesting an emphasis on economic factors as opposed to Canada's "helpful fixer" role preoccupation of servicing the international community through its mediatory and peacekeeping activities.

The purpose of the Thordarson volume is to "study the evolution of Canada's new foreign and defence policies and to analyze the events that took place between 1968 and 1971," while "above all it is a study in political decision-making that seeks to determine the major . . . inputs in the decisions that were reached by the Canadian Government" (p. 4). The author disaggregates the review into what he regards as three "major decisions"—to conduct the review (Chapter Four); to reduce Canada's NATO force commitment, which catalyzed discussions of the review for the first year (Chapter Five); and the decisions involved in the six foreign policy booklets (Chapter Six). These three chapters constitute the core, and the most useful, part of this volume. However, before actually disaggregating the review, the author invokes a "decision-making model" (Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 [March, 1969]) in Chapter Two. Rather than operationalizing the model, he extracts categories to organize his "mass of information." This is followed by an examination (Chapter Three) of Trudeau's "philosophical" and "instrumental" beliefs because "the psychological element must be explored in depth" (p. 7).

This volume was assessed by journalist Anthony Westell in the *Toronto Star* as "one of the finest pieces of Canadian political reporting I have seen in years," an evaluation with which one must entirely agree. From an analytical standpoint, however, this volume is somewhat disappointing. For example, one of the author's difficulties concerns his assessment of the significance of the review. Such an assessment should include some sort of a fairly rigorous definitional criterion of continuity/discontinuity vis-à-vis such explicit questions as, Does the review (both as process and outcome) constitute a departure from the previous Canadian foreign policy experience? The author does not in the final analysis adequately establish such a criterion and develop such questions. Moreover, he tends to prejudge in his introductory Chapter One by stating that his purpose is to study "Canada's *new* foreign and defence policies" (p. 4). His subsequent assessments of just how "new" the review is tend to be clouded—on page 209 he concludes that the Government's conceptual framework has not had "any significant impact on the actual content of Canadian foreign policy"; on the same page he asserts that the framework "indicated a changed emphasis in the foreign policy of Canada"; while on page 214 he observes that "Trudeau's major achievement during the review was not so much to alter the substance of previous policy as it was to change its articulation."

Notwithstanding the variable analytical focus of this volume, however, it is a most useful account not only of the Trudeau review, but also of Canadian external preoccupations during this period, and of how Ottawa's foreign policy process functions.

ROGER FRANK SWANSON
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Advanced International Studies

Comparative Political Violence. By Fred R. von der Mehden. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973. Pp. 124. $7.25, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

Today comparative political analysts often see their choice as one between frustrating parochialism and immature globalism. Thirty years is a brief span in the evolution of any discipline, but in less than that time political scientists have intellectually outgrown familiar area studies and country case study approaches—outgrown them without having fully exploited them and without possessing the methods or raw data with which to progress to global comparisons. One result of this drive to escape the cramped quarters of area and country studies is the fascination with cross-national categorizations, categorizations lacking sufficient analytical significance.

Professor von der Mehden's succinct overview of political violence relies heavily on categories. Countries are listed according to their levels of political violence, their sorts of justifications for violence, the types of objectives of violence. The reader, however, wishes that these frequently provocative lists were accompanied by more elaborate interpretive analysis. For political scientists should be increasingly pragmatic about their categorizations, demanding that each serve as a practical tool for answering specific analytical questions.

There could have been far more effort to relate categories to one another to explain the political repercussions of political violence. One country might have been selected, its categorical profile detailed, and the significance of that profile explained. For example, in the course of the volume France is listed as high in its level of political violence (p. 88), high in student violence (p. 15), low in electoral violence (p. 15), low in separatist violence (p. 10), low in both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence (p. 11), low in coup-related violence (p. 13). What does this tells us about the French political system or about the relationship between types of violence? Is there another political system with an identical categorical profile and consequently similar political attributes?

The volume's strongest section deals with causal analysis. Professor von der Mehden, a Southeast Asia specialist and experienced utilizer of the country case method, is skeptical of the conventional wisdom that political violence is highly correlated with economic deprivation. Employing intra-regional comparisons of aggregate data, he finds that only in the European region are those countries with low economic indicators the same as those with high incidences of political violence (p. 109). Unfortunately, he does not go on to speculate on this "European exception." In other regions, Professor von der Mehden finds that the colonial experience coupled with ethnic fragmentation provides the most potent stimulators of violence.

This book, like most other serious works on violence, concentrates almost single-mindedly on causality. Although we remain far from a definitive causal explanation for low as well as high incidences of political violence, we should start devoting more attention to the *consequences* of violence for political systems. All too often it appears as if we studied political violence presuming to know its long-range significance and thus curious only about why and when it occurs.

But, in fact, do we have an adequate systematic justification for spending so much time determining its causes? What does it matter whether a military junta came to power via a violent rather than a nonviolent coup? Specifically what difference does it make whether a country's citizens were politically mobilized by violent rather than nonviolent demonstrations? The common presumption is that higher levels of political violence dissipate valuable political resources—government revenues for unproductive defense and coercion, valuable manpower, limited political trust. In this sense, we are concerned about political violence because we presume it to be wasteful, inefficient, both an indicator and cause of political underdevelopment. On the other hand, as Professor von der Mehden notes in his chapter on justifications of violence, there are those who contend that violence is indeed a shortcut in the often tedious process of development. In the future we need to go beyond simply categorizing such implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the effects of violence to test the validity of those assumptions.

CYNTHIA H. ENLOE

Clark University

Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia). By Donald P. Whitaker et al. Foreign Area Studies. The American University. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, D.A. Pam 550-50, 1973. Pp. 387. $4.10 domestic postpaid.)

The goal of this volume is to provide "a compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions" of the Khmer Republic (p. iii). Fifteen years ago, a similar effort by David J. Steinberg and his associates, *Cambodia: Its People, its Society, its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), was a standard reference for students of this generally neglected Southeast Asian kingdom. The present volume, however, is not likely to achieve similar status in scholarly circles, partly because materials on the Khmer Republic are now much more broadly available then they were in the late 1950s. A more significant impediment is that the military nature of both the book's sponsorship and its intended readership seems to have constrained and distorted the authors' presentation of materials on politics in the Republic. In addition, the quality of writing and analysis simply does not live up to the standards established in the earlier work under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files.

Fully a quarter of the book is concerned with the country's political system, with separate chapters being devoted to the historical setting, the governmental system, political dynamics, and foreign relations. Much is made of the transfer to a republican form of government in the post-Sihanouk period. The Constitution of 1972, we are told, places the source of power in the people rather than the king, and in two places (pp. 4 and 198) we are reminded that the Constitution proclaims the "republican" ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, progress, and happiness. Actual patterns of political competition and decision making that conflict with constitutional norms and ideals, however, receive circumspect treatment.

Discussion of the insurgency movement is marked by similar ambiguity. At several points a dominant Vietnamese role in the movement is asserted (pp. 5, 47, 72, and 189), but in the brief section devoted to the organization of the movement a much more salient role is attributed to its Cambodian leadership and support (pp. 192, 194). On matters such as these one especially misses any system of source referencing.

Norodom Sihanouk receives short shrift from the authors: he was "obsessed by a belief in the advantages of nationalization"; his government was one of "essentially autocratic rule"; the substantial political party and National Congress which he created "acted to retard political institution building" (p. 3); and the masses of the people accepted his "paternal authoritarianism" and "went through the motion of supporting his program and policies" (p. 197). This kind of treatment is insensitive both to the nuances of Cambodian political culture and to the nature of Sihanouk's leadership.

Though material in this book would be of use to many visitors to Cambodia, its value to most scholars is likely to be very limited. The striking exception to this generalization is the 35 pages of bibliography which represent an extensive, if not exhaustive, compilation of sources on the Khmer Republic as of July 1972.

STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM
Columbia University

The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930. By Richard D. Wolff. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. 203. $9.75.)

Despite the proliferation of literature on almost all aspects of African studies in the last decade the economic history of the continent has been sorely neglected. This oversight is now being corrected, and readers interested in the colonial history of Kenya will welcome Richard D. Wolff's study of economic change in colonial Kenya from 1870 to 1930. There have of course been a number of excellent studies of modern Kenya. Yet most of the books have concentrated on political history and have relegated economics to a subordinate status. Professor Wolff assembles his data on economic development from a wide variety of sources. Supplementing British and Kenyan government publications with some judicious, though not exhaustive, reading in the Colonial Office files in London, the author narrates a story of the way in which the traditional economies of the Kenya African peoples were transformed through the influx of European settlers and the fostering of an agricultural export economy, based on settler ownership of land and the use of cheap African labor. While some of this history will be familiar to most scholars interested in Kenya, through the works of Rosberg and Nottingham, Mungeam, and Sorrenson, the focus on economics proves worthwhile. The British interest in East Africa, the author contends, was heightened by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and was championed by business interests and missionary groups. These elements eventually prodded the British into assuming formal control over the East Africa Protectorate, and then the desire to turn this sparsely inhabited area into a fiscally self-sufficient colony prompted the British authorities to encourage European settlement. Once having made this momentous decision, the British sought to develop an agricultural export economy of value to the mother country—hence their emphasis on the cultivation and sale of coffee, sisal, and tea. They also lent the full weight of their colonial power to wrenching Africans out of their traditional economic activities and compelling them to serve as a cheap labor force on European estates.

Wolffs presentation of these developments is carefully and skillfully done, and for the most part the main outlines of the story are correct. There are two stimulating chapters on the methods by which the British transformed the African population into wage laborers. Wolff shows the great variety of techniques used by the colonial government to force Africans out of their own economies, ranging from outright physical coercion to the alienation of African land and the enactment of high taxes.

Nonetheless, the presentation suffers from sketchiness, and while the main outlines of economic development are usually drawn accurately, the details are sometimes lacking or are not handled well. Two examples will suffice. This sketchiness arises in the very first chapter where Wolff tries to emphasize the importance of economic factors in causing British imperialism in the late nineteenth century. In the process he criticizes some of the prevailing noneconomic theories, specifically the works of Robinson and Gallagher, Fieldhouse, and others. But he fails to present these views as fully as they warrant, and the reader is left with an incomplete understanding of the major contributions and interpretations of these scholars.

A more serious problem arises, however, in Wolff's discussion of labor in Kenya after World War I. The author contends that all the elements of British power were directed toward turning the African population into wage laborers at that time and that the British used physical coercion, rising taxes, and a newly enacted pass law to dominate African lives and force them into the European economy. As proof for this contention Wolff cites the famous Northey labor circular of 1919 and its recasting in 1920, both of which put pressure on African chiefs to supply labor to European farms. Yet he seems to be unaware that these circulars caused such a furor in England that the new Secretary of State for Colonies, Winston Churchill, was compelled to issue a despatch carefully regulating the forcible recruitment of labor. In fact, the 1920s saw a considerable decline in the forcible despatching of African laborers to work on European farms—an important development which the author fails to incorporate into his analysis.

This book on economic change in colonial Kenya is welcomed because it investigates, with success, this important subject. It is to be regretted, however, that it is not as detailed and comprehensive as it might have been.

ROBERT L. TIGNOR
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The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly. By Oliver Woshinsky. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. 256. $14.00.)

This monograph is a revision of a doctoral dissertation completed in 1971. Conclusions are based on in-depth interviews with fifty French deputies during thirteen months of the years 1968 and 1969 and on documentary evidence. Its general purpose is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of "incentive analysis" in attempting to understand French political behavior. More specifically, three questions are raised: "What are French politicians really like? What does motivate men to engage in politics in France? Is there any relationship between these motives and the bitter divisiveness of political struggles in that country?" (p. 1).

One learns that, although seven "incentive types" have been "observed" internationally by James L. Payne and James D. Barber (in Columbia, the U.S.A., the Dominican Republic, and Brazil), only four are found among French deputies: "Mission" (38 per cent), "Program" (28 per cent), "Status" (20 per cent), and "Obligation" (14 per cent). French deputies, then, are not "really" motivated exclusively either by ideological or self-serving ends, as (Woshinsky asserts) specialists in French politics argue. Rather, their behavior, which causes the naughty political instability of France so decried by American and conservative British and French observers of French politics, is the result of this potent combination of four incentives, one of which each of the deputies possesses. Of particular concern to Woshinsky is the lack of numerical dominance of good, clean, healthy, pragmatic Program Deputies. These wonderful gentlemen are so heavily outweighed by their colleagues of different persuasions (particularly the evil Mission Deputies) that French political behavior barely resembles its counterpart in the U.S.A. This is evidently bad. A new Marshall Plan is needed, I should think. America should send a number of its abundant Program Politicians to France in order to solve her problems in a no-nonsense way. While they are there, they might mate with a large number of the non-Program Deputies' women, Voilà! The "bitter divisiveness of political struggles" in France would be ended in the space of a generation or two.

Apart from the normative overtones which cloud this book, Woshinsky presents an interesting analysis of French legislative politics. Six "attitudinal" and seven "behavioral" correlates of the four incentive types are creatively discussed. Moreover, a portrait of each incentive type, based on interview protocols, is included. This is useful not only for analysis but also for acquainting those not familiar with French politicians with the nature of deputies. These sketches are supplemented by an extensive but concise survey of the literature which links the author's incentive types with other empirical classifications of political motivation.

Several methodological problems detract somewhat from Woshinsky's attempt to demonstrate the value of incentive analysis. The problem of reliability, which he and Payne are attempting to solve, is freely admitted by the author (p. 199, footnote 22). I remain to be convinced that reliability can be achieved with the use of interview schedules alone. Too much interpretation and evaluation is left to the individual coder of the protocols, and he, in turn, must depend upon the assiduity of the interviewer. Moreover, Woshinsky reports (p. 189) that the number of questions asked in the course of the interviews varied. Was the question eliciting the date of deputies' entry into politics, one of the behavioral correlates of incentive types reported by the author, occasionally omitted? One does not know. My own experience in interviewing French politicians leads me to conclude that the quality of data obtained from an interview depends greatly on the way the question is asked and, of course, whether it is asked. The careful structuring and pretesting of questions and the systematic presentation of all of them to all respondents are steps prerequisite to one's success in obtaining both reliable and valid data.

The criteria for categorizing respondents' incentives are, moreover, confusing. I would have great difficulty in distinguishing, for example, a "Mission Participant" from an "Obligation Participant." Both have "moral concerns." It may be "clear" to Woshinsky that "he [the Mission Deputy] has moral concerns, but these concerns relate to the welfare of his movement" (p. 69). This is not clear to me, particularly in the case of "Gaullists" classified as "Mission Deputies": eight are members of U.D.R.; but, two are Republican Independents, one is a U.D.R. *apparenté*, and one is a *non-inscrit*!

These comments are not meant to condemn Professor Woshinsky's work. His book is well researched and well written. The interested reader, however, will find it somewhat lacking in methodological sophistication. He will be surprised and disappointed to learn that only fifty of a sample of one hundred deputies were interviewed in the space of thirteen months. He will be irritated by the lack of evidence presented in support of many generalizations. Finally, he may find, as I do, that incentive analysis, although thought provoking, is too simplistic to explain the behavior of French deputies.

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The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China. By Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 592. $17.50.)

The objective of this study, prepared for the National Science Foundation, was to assemble all available data on the organization and support of scientific R&D in China and to observe the methods by which China has acquired and used new knowledge in the fields of science and technology. In large part the authors have achieved their objective. The volume provides a detailed and useful account of the life sciences, the physical sciences, mathematics, and the engineering sciences. The fields of scientific activity as defined in the study include not only R&D as narrowly defined, but also include testing and standardization, training and information as those terms are understood in the United States. The cutoff date for a good part of the study is unfortunately 1964. An updating of this study would prove even more useful to the student of Chinese science and technology.

In their analysis of Peking's R&D efforts, Yuan-li Wu, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert Sheeks, former Associate Director of the Pacific Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, note five stages in the economic and political development of China since 1949: (1) economic rehabilitation, 1949–52, involving the regimentation of scientific manpower and the ideological conversion of the intellectuals: (2) orderly development, 1953–57, corresponding to the first Five-Year Plan, with R&D activities geared to the fulfillment of economic goals and centering on the establishment of the Scientific Planning Commission in 1957; (3) the Great Leap Forward, 1958–60, during which period growing differences with the Soviet Union led to emphasis on military R&D; (4) economic retrenchment and recovery, 1960–65, covering the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the cessation of Soviet aid, with R&D emphasis shifted to predominantly economic, in particular agricultural, objectives and the military aim of achieving a nuclear deterrent; (5) the third Five-Year Plan, 1966–70, with emphasis continued on both economic and military R&D.

The volume also contains sections on educational and man-power requirements, R&D decision making, location of R&D institutions, financing R&D activities, and the users of R&D funds. Wu and Sheeks conclude that finance is not a constraint on the continued expansion of the scientific program; that the major restraints lie in the shortage of senior research workers; that the total funds for science appear to be approximately four times as great as the published state budget for science; and that the nuclear program required funds at least as large as the state science budget itself, which was approximately 1.5 billion yuan in 1964 and 1965.

While concluding that neither economic growth nor economic stability, particularly in the agricultural sector, have been enhanced significantly through domestic R&D efforts, the authors recognize that Chinese R&D had by the mid-1960s become sufficiently advanced so that significant results could no longer be ruled out. China's success in her nuclear weapons development demonstrated the degree to which her R&D efforts had progressed.

The authors single out for discussion the nuclear weapons development of China, with emphasis on the Sino-Soviet aspect. I must take exception to the rendition of a sentence in China's August 15, 1963 statement on Soviet assistance. According to Drs. Wu and Sheeks, the Soviet Union would "provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture" (p. 363). Instead, the Chinese Government statement should read that as of June 20, 1959, "the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, August 15, 1963). It would thus appear that the Soviet Union may never have committed itself, in response to a Chinese request, to providing China with a sample atomic bomb. Much about the extent of Sino-Soviet collaboration in the development of China's nuclear program remains to be explored. It would also have improved the study if some analysis of China's progress in R&D with reference to conventional weapons had been included.

The volume concludes with a lengthly summary of findings which in large measure repeats earlier discussions but does contain some new material, such as observations on the effect of the Cultural Revolution on R&D. Generally, as noted earlier, the termination date for a good part of the study is around 1964. The usefulness of the study is further limited by the lack of an index. Nevertheless, the study, despite its limitations, should prove helpful to both the specialist and the student of the Chinese economy by providing in one volume an overview of China's scientific research and development and a key to more detailed exploration of specific areas.

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The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy. By Norman L. Zucker. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. 282. $10.00.)

As this review is being written the leadership of the *Maarakh*, the coalition of labor parties which has dominated the politics of Israel and Jewish mandatory Palestine, is attempting to form a coalition government.

The National Religious Party, which has been one of Labor's major coalition partners in the past, has been balking and has demanded essentially theocratic control over the question of "Who Is A Jew?," extending to the question of what constitutes legitimate conversion to Judaism. For Israel-watchers, this is but one of a long series of impasses between the secular and religious parties in Israel, ultimately reflecting different understandings of Jewish history and the Jewish future. What Professor Zucker calls "The Coming Crisis in Israel" in fact has been the center of debate within world Jewry since the beginning of emancipation and the re-entrance of the Jews as a nation into secular politics. The Israeli religio-political situation is neither a current nor coming crisis; it is the chronic problem arising out of the peculiar situation of the Jews as a people scattered and reconstituted, whose religion, culture and nationhood are intertwined and inseparable.

Professor Zucker gives those totally unfamiliar with the Israeli scene a useful overview of many of the major day-to-day issues covering what he terms "Theopolitics." The book touches upon the legal system, particularly laws of personal status, the educational system, the army, etc. He cites much of the factual material relevant to these and allied issues. In substance and material, however, the book is essentially journalistic, not scholarly—a series of prologues awaiting a study.

The book displays a lack of theoretical orientation, little understanding of Zionist theory and history, as well as scant acquaintance with the Jewish legal and political literature central to the issues dealt with. The author's "explanation" of the Balfour Declaration (p. 23) is facile and ignores the scholarly literature that has attempted to explicate this crucial document. So, too, the author's characterization of an element of the law of personal status as quixotic (p. 112) reflects unfamiliarity with the biblical and talmudic literature and the legal and jurisprudential theories with which they work.

I suspect that much of the problem of the book stems from the author's good intentions and limited resources. Thus when he deals with one of the most important personal status cases (the Shalit Case, p. 193), Professor Zucker wants to report reactions in the Israeli press. His discussion, however, is based upon a summary of Israeli press reaction as presented in the English language *Jerusalem Post*. Many studies that social scientists might execute do not require thorough knowledge of the language and literature of the society being studied. If, however, one is to deal with questions of meaning so central to the national culture and essence as those dealt with in this book, working through limited translations and digests without context leads necessarily to superficiality.

"The Coming Crisis in Israel" might be used effectively as supplemental reading in an undergraduate course on Israeli Society and Politics or a beginning course in church and state in secularizing societies. It can be read quickly and easily (illustrated) and its anecdotal style is entertaining. Presumably the author intended it to be something more and that it is not.

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Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma. By Nobuya Bamba. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. Pp. 440. $10.50.)

The author, who teaches Japanese and Far Eastern diplomatic history in Montreal and Tokyo, analyzes Japanese diplomacy during the 1924–1929 period with special emphasis on two key political figures, Kijūro Shidehara and Giichi Tanaka. He compares different goals and policies pursued by Tanaka (the traditionalist) and Shidehara (the modernizer), arguing that the contrast in the two types of diplomacy (one is called "positive" or "expansionistic" and the other "negative" or "peaceful") is a virtual reflection of the contrast in the two diplomats' "personality and cultural identity" (p. 7). *Prima facie*, his writing seems convincing, but on a closer observation it contains some serious problems, both substantive and methodological.

In his attempt at contrasting the differences between the policies pursued by the two decision makers the author oversimplifies. He points up the special importance Tanaka attached to Manchuria while Shidehara supposedly advocated the unity of all China. But in fact Tanaka's Manchuria policy had germinated under Shidehara, who had often referred to Japan's "visible and invisible rights and interests" in Manchuria and Mongolia. Bamba argues that Tanaka convened the Eastern Conference upon assumption of his office as Prime Minister cum Foreign Minister, "hoping to set up a China policy different from that of his predecessor" (p. 293). But the conference was actually more a meeting of Japanese officials involved in Chinese affairs to exchange information; it mostly re-endorsed the existing policies toward China, including the policy of assisting Kuomintang moderates. Tanaka did send the expeditions to Shantung and this was hailed by many Japanese as an expression of a "positive policy" toward China.

One should also point out, however, that the Tanaka cabinet essentially followed the policy of sympathy with Chinese nationalism and friendship with the Western powers. His fall from power in mid-1929 was related as much to the army's dissatisfaction with his "not sufficiently positive" policies as to the strong criticism of his "positive diplomacy" raised by the *Minseito* and the general public.

Bamba's tendency to overemphasize the contrast between "Tanaka Diplomacy" and "Shidehara Diplomacy" seems also related to his methodological inefficiency. At the outset of his study he makes what is claimed to be a new methodological proposition: "to understand a nation's particular policy at a particular time requires the student to investigate all four aspects, the international, the decision-making, the (social and cultural) milieu, and the key diplomats' perception (of the objective world), in the light of their intricate mutual interactions" (p. 20). Having enunciated this proposition, the author does not make any systematic attempt at relating these four (ill-defined) dimensions in his subsequent discussion. He mostly neglects the first two dimensions. The relationship between the milieu and the key diplomat is explained as follows.

The milieu, which apparently is synonymous with "dominant popular sentiments and aspirations in the society," determines the kind of diplomatic leadership. Once chosen, the key diplomat formulates policies in the light of achieving the "ultimate goal," i.e., "that which their nation aspires to most" (p. 9). "So far as the nation maintains a relatively cohesive culture," the author argues, any deviation of the key diplomat's perception of the ultimate goal from that of the general population, if ever, "will eventually be corrected and the nation's diplomacy returns to a 'normality' reflecting her general cultural tradition" (p. 10). However, when the milieu (which also seems identical with "national-cultural identity") is split, the nation's diplomacy may fundamentally alter depending on which side of the division the key diplomat identifies himself with. According to the author, the Japanese milieu during the 1924–1929 period was diametrically split between traditionalists and modernizers and Tanaka identified himself with the former and Shidehara with the latter. Hence their diplomatic policies were "fundamentally" different. In short, Bamba is a (domestic) "milieu determinist."

In the real world of diplomacy, however, impacts of the international system and decision making (which may be better referred to as pulling and hauling among decision makers) may be equally or more relevant. The general population does not always make policy-relevant aspirations, and decision makers themselves often create or guide popular aspirations. In the context of prewar Japan, the role of elite decision makers was particularly overwhelming. On the other hand, no single Prime Minister or Foreign Minister enjoyed a free hand over diplomatic decision making, though Bamba gives the impression that both Tanaka and Shidehara almost always prevailed over other decision makers. The "key diplomat" had his cabinet colleagues, party leaders, and the *jūshin* (elder statesmen) to worry about. Bamba seldom discusses Prime Minister Kato's inputs into Shidehara's policy making, though (unlike Tanaka) Shidehara was only Foreign Minister. Both the Foreign Ministry and the military also exerted powerful influences over foreign policy, and no single leader could effectively override them.

Consequently, even if Tanaka and Shidehara had possessed completely contradictory personal dispositions as described in the book, it would not necessarily follow that their diplomatic policies would also be fundamentally different. Obviously there was some policy change, but there were other intervening variables besides the difference in personality and cultural identity between the two leaders (and the change in popular sentiments). The shift from the Kato to the Tanaka cabinet also meant a shift of partisan leadership (from the *Kenseikai* to the *Seiyukai*) with resultant realignments in the domestic power balance. Tanaka came to power just at a time when the Nationalists achieved the military unification of China and were about to extend control over Manchuria. Regarding the shift in China policy, Akira Iriye makes a pertinent point in *After Imperialism*: "In effect, Tanaka carried on the Shidehara policy, but in circumstances that eventually made it a different policy."

In summary, Bamba's book is an interesting attempt at demonstrating the impact of "personality and cultural identity" on Japanese diplomacy but it falls prey to oversimplifications and faulty inferences.

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The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. Edited by James Barros. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 279. $8.95.)

This is a good, concise description of the background, structure, functioning, and principal activities of the United Nations. It consists of an introduction by the editor and six substantive chapters. Each of the substantive chapters treats the domain of one of the UN's six principal organs. The first three of the substantive chapters, by Leland M. Goodrich, Stephen G. Xydis, and Leon Gordenker, deal respectively with the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General. These are followed by a chapter on decolonization by David A. Kay, one on the development of international law by Leo Gross, and one on economic, social and technical activities by Robert W. Gregg. Although these latter chapters deal with the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Council, since none of these organs has been the focal point of the UN's activities in its particular sphere, the scope of these essays goes well beyond what the three principal organs have done.

As the title and the framework suggest, the book's orientation is historical and institutional, and despite the multiple authorship, the book has considerable coherence. The editor obviously developed a common outline, to which the six contributors adhered with substantial fidelity. The chapters uniformly treat antecedents of the UN, the structures and processes created by the Charter, and the major developments within the UN from its creation through the early nineteen seventies, and then conclude with brief speculations about the future. The scheme works reasonably well, except for the chapter on the General Assembly. Because the Assembly's competence is broad, Xydis could easily have infringed on material that is covered in detail in other chapters. He avoided this danger, but at the cost of writing a chapter that appears substantively thin in comparison with the other chapters.

Because the chapters follow a common pattern, a number of general themes emerge clearly. All aspects of the UN are portrayed as the logical continuation and extension of pre-World War II institutional developments. Each chapter demonstrates the flexibility of the Charter's provisions and shows how this has contributed to the organization's survival and vitality. All of the chapters make the point that the UN's activities have been deeply affected by the expansion in the organization's membership caused by decolonization. The reader is given a clear picture of the pervasive tension in the organization caused by the fact that while small and poor states from Africa, Asia and South America constitute a voting majority, relatively rich Western states control the resources for action. Especially in the fields of decolonization and development this has led to a pronounced gap between the UN's hortatory posture and its actual performance. Both Kay and Gregg express concern that if this gap persists for a long time, the majority of member states may become deeply disillusioned with the organization. Kay also sees the gap as a factor leading poor states to resist taking action in the UN on problems such as arms control about which the richer states are deeply concerned.

Taken on its own terms, the book has few flaws. There are minor evidences of sloppy analysis and writing. For instance, Xydis asserts (p. 75) that the number of Security Council meetings has decreased annually since 1948. Table 2 in Goodrich's chapter (p. 41), however, shows a fluctuating decline in the number of Security Council meetings through 1959, and a fluctuating increase since then. Indeed, one of Goodrich's major points is that the expansion in the UN's membership has led to a revival of the Security Council. It is also a superficial view to assert, as Xydis does (p. 88) that beyond demonstrating the existence of several geographic groups in Assembly voting, the research on roll-call behavior "has resulted in no consensus." Surely there is consensus that the effect of geography on a state's voting behavior, although it is important, is limited. Some issues such as decolonization command majorities that include states from all geographic areas, while others, such as increasing the authority of international institutions, divide all geographic areas. There are also instances in which it is possible to contest the judgment and the balance that is provided in particular chapters. Gregg generalizes that the economic and social activities conducted by the UN system have been redistributive and integrative. It is obvious that some of these activities have been oriented in these directions. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that either the purpose or the effect of the trade liberalization that has been facilitated by such UN agencies as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund has been redistributive. While some of the UN's activities might be held to have long-term consequences for global integration, and while several UN agencies—particularly the Economic Commission for Latin America and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—have strongly supported the notion of regional integration, the thrust toward "country programming" in the UN's technical assistance activities has given substantial support to national integration. Whether on balance the UN has done more to promote national or international integration is difficult to estimate.

How appropriate are the terms in which the book was conceived is a broader question. Is a better understanding of the UN likely to be achieved by eschewing conceptual and methodological apparatus and sticking to a narrative prose analysis? This question is not easily answered on the basis of existing literature in the field. There can be no doubt that this book provides a comprehensive view of the United Nations, and one that since it is based on a quarter of a century of experience is unlikely soon to become dated. Yet a more systematic and rigorous analysis might have provided a sharper picture. Another issue is the balance between treating the UN as a system, or as part of a broader system. It is important to know what has been done within the framework of the UN, and the book describes this very well, but it is difficult to interpret the significance of these activities without dealing with their broader context. None of the authors exaggerates the importance of the UN, but none of them goes very far in his analysis beyond the confines of the UN; thus readers are left to themselves to place UN events in context. In sum, the book is a good introduction to the United Nations, although one would hope that scholars and also those with only a general interest in world politics would want to go beyond this.

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The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research. Edited by C. Fred Bergsten. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973. Pp. xv, 357. $15.00.)

This important volume presents the results of a special inquiry commissioned by the Ford Foundation in 1972. Conducted by Fred Bergsten of the Brookings Institution, the study was intended to develop "a program of research that will provide a foundation for meeting the chief international economic problems of the next decade" (p. 1). The principal conclusions of the inquiry are summarized in a core report by Dr. Bergsten, written in association with John A. Mathieson, and distilled from interviews and correspondence with several hundred experts in more than twenty countries as well as from the coauthors' own personal research. The balance of the book consists of eight supporting papers solicited from outside experts (mostly economists) on what were considered to be among the most crucial individual issues affecting the international economic order, including the problems of internal adjustment to external disturbances (one paper each by Assar Lindbeck and Robert Stern), foreign direct investment (Raymond Vernon), world politics (Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the only political scientists in the group), minerals trade (Samuel Schurr), the developing countries (various staff members of the Overseas Development Council), East-West relations (Franklyn Holzman), and environmental management (Ingo Walter).

The importance of this book stems not only from the salience of its subject but also from the high quality of its contents. Unfortunately, attempting to cope with a menu as substantial and varied as this one could for many readers rapidly cause intellectual indigestion. The contents of the volume are simply too rich to be consumed at a single sitting. They are also far too rich to be digested in the course of a single short review. Since the best a reviewer can hope to do is merely give some flavor of the book, the following comments are necessarily *à la carte*, not *table d'hôte.*

All nine contributions to the volume, following the same organizing principle, address themselves to three sets of interrelated questions: (1) What are likely to be the dominant international economic issues of the next decade? (2) What is the present state of knowledge regarding these issues? (3) What research strategies can best mobilize available resources to seek needed advances in knowledge? Most of the contributors are more successful in suggesting answers to the first two questions than in responding to the third. Not surprisingly, the authors have quite definite ideas about what are likely to be the outstanding issues of the near future. Also not surprisingly (in a book dedicated to future research requirements), the authors stress serious deficiencies in the present stage of knowledge—at both the theoretical and empirical levels. All describe wide arrays of problems deserving increased attention from scholars, lists which are both enlightening and thought-provoking. When, however, it comes to suggesting an ordering of priorities or programs of implementation, most of the authors turn strangely shy. Few even hint at a coherent research "strategy." The result in most instances is less an agenda of research than a tasty potpourri of potentially researchable topics. Doctoral candidates seeking promising dissertation subjects will find this volume invaluable.

The major themes of the book are summarized in the core report by Bergsten and Mathieson. Two themes in particular stand out as being of special interest to political scientists. One is the need to construct a new international economic order incorporating new rules and standards for behavior. A variety of factors—including the steady proliferation of national economic and social policy goals, which in an interdependent world economy have led to increased politicization of international economic issues; the declining intensity of the Cold War; and the emergence of new national and transnational actors in global economics—have contributed to a breakdown of the old institutional framework based on the principles incorporated in the International Monetary Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The need now is to find new principles of political organization of the international economy. Many of the specific research proposals advocated in this volume reflect the contributors' concern with this problem of systemic transformation, a problem regarding which political scientists are at least as well qualified as economists are to offer solutions.

The second theme, obviously related to the first, is the dearth of interdisciplinary approaches to the solution of international economic issues. Most policy-relevant analysis today continues to be confined narrowly to the traditional academic specializations, economists persisting in treating political influences on policy as "irrational," political scientists remaining ignorant of much economic theory. What is needed is a systematic effort to breach the barriers between economics and political science—in short, as Bergsten and Mathieson emphasize, to revive the once-respectable "discipline" of "political economy." (More accurately, the need is to eliminate the monopoly that Marxist scholars have traditionally enjoyed in this area.) At the moment only a handful of non-Marxist economists or political scientists even dare to engage in such interdisciplinary studies.

Among this handful of scholars are Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, whose paper in this volume is the only contribution that not only talks about but actually uses an interdisciplinary approach. Addressing themselves directly to the connections between politics and economics in the international arena, Keohane and Nye outline a firm conceptual framework for analyzing such connections, based on key distinctions between political and economic goals and means and between the "process-level" and the "structure-level" of analysis. Their framework is then employed to develop a variety of powerful arguments about changes in the nature and role of force, power, interdependence, complexity, and leadership in international relations. It is also used to offer new insights into five specific international problem areas, currently of interest, where politics and economics intersect, including relations among market economies, North-South relations, East-West relations, multinational-enterprise activities, and the issue of possible natural-resources scarcity. Finally, Keohane and Nye conclude with some suggestions for research and training programs that form what is certainly the most coherent and thoughtful research strategy offered in this book. Their essay should be widely read, and indeed is likely to gain recognition quickly as a seminal development in modern political economy. In this menu of gourmet specialities, the Keohane-Nye paper stands out as the *pièce de résistance*.

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The Wasted Nations. Edited by Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 346. $3.95.)

Reading about the manner in which the United States fought the Indochinese War takes one two major crises back, the war having been replaced in the public's eye first by Watergate and then by the faltering state of the U.S. economy. Hence, the "intellectual and moral catharsis" (p. ix) that Gunnar Myrdal in the preface asks the American people to go through over the conduct of the war seems unlikely to happen. Still, this volume is of interest to students of the Indochinese War, particularly those interested in how it was conducted.

The Wasted Nations is an edited version of the Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971, and contains a perceptive introduction by Richard Falk. This was the second session of a commission of concerned private individuals who, in effect, appointed themselves to investigate the U.S. conduct of the war.

Evidence concerning American and South Vietnamese forces is set forth in five sections: a miscellaneous series of articles by journalists and scholars under the overall rubric "A Crime Against Humanity"; a "Task Force" report compiled by five investigators in North Vietnam in May 1971; individual testimony before the commission by Indochinese "Victims" of the war and by low ranking U.S. enlisted veterans who were the "Victimizers"; a series of articles by Indochinese Communist officials; and finally two essays by Hans Goran Frank and Douglas F. Dowd in a section entitled "International Law and American Policy." There follows a concluding statement based on the evidence presented.

The task force report is based upon data gathered in North Vietnam the month before the commission meeting in Oslo. Areas of investigation included U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Vietnamization, and the effects of "Chemical Warfare" in South Vietnam. The weakness of this section is a major weakness of the entire work—it is very subjective reporting. The task force was unable to visit South Vietnam, hence the "facts" are as related by the North Vietnamese; there is no Soviet Union supplying the means of warfare to North Vietnam; there are no atrocities by North Vietnamese in the South. Such considerations are simply not faced. The U.S. is conducting warfare against the Indochinese people. In short, the problem is not viewed in the international context but rather in a very selected framework.

From an examination of the evidence the commission prepared a concluding statement which it adopted in Oslo on June 24, 1971. The conclusions may be summarized as follows: 1) U.S. policies led to an extension of the war throughout Indochina utilizing highly developed technology, the side effects of which will cause serious difficulties for coming generations in Indochina, 2) the forced movement of peoples has resulted in a breakdown of the social structure of Indochinese society, and 3) the U.S. conduct of the war can be categorized as war crimes and crimes against humanity according to the Nuremberg Principle.

With this report as a basis Richard Falk wrote his introduction to *The Wasted Nations*. In fact, a reader is advised to read the introduction after the presentation of evidence since Falk's essay ties together the commission report. If Falk overstates his case, he nevertheless makes some perceptive points. For example, he is quite correct that the gap between the battlefield and the policy maker needs to be closed. How, is another question. Not by visits, that is certain, but by asking the hard questions. Visits of high ranking officials to Vietnam from Washington were a charade on which enough has been said.

When he becomes prescriptive, Falk is less certain. When he suggests that the U.S. place up to $75 billion toward reconstruction of Indochina, he is out of touch with reality. When he says the time is ripe to have a set of hearings in the U.S. on the conduct of the war, he raises an interesting point. Why not? However, they should have available the official data. Who would preside? Perhaps someone like Archibald Cox. One thing that is certain is that what happened in Vietnam isn't going to go away.

The Wasted Nations is one-sided, provocative, interesting, and insightful. If one keeps ones perspective, it is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Indochinese War, particularly for use in political science courses examining that war as a case history of what intervention can lead to.

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The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA. By Elizabeth A. Finch. (Liverpool, England: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1973. Pp. 70. $1.95, paper.)

To one who came to know and love Uruguay more than two decades ago, as I did, the subsequent downward path of that staunch little country has seemed saddening, even tragic. The evidence has been multiform: the balkanization of political parties, the rise of the military as a political force (and underlying it the anomie that seemed to make that rise inevitable), the economic dislocation and failure to modernize, the near-paralysis accompanying the restoration of the *colegiado*, repeated stalemates between executive and legislative branches, the petty bickering and self-seeking within congress. The pyrotechnics of *tupamaro* activity not so long back were simply an ugly icing on the devil's-food cake made of seemingly spoiled flour.

This study of Uruguay and LAFTA, a condensation of a master's thesis written at the University of Liverpool, was based on almost two years of research in Uruguay in the late 1960s. It is a straightforward, well-organized, workmanlike job. And it is a case-study illustration of many of the contributory factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

LAFTA, the Latin American Free Trade Association, was an outgrowth of a treaty signed in February, 1960, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay by which they sought to expand national markets by gradual elimination of trade barriers. Comparisons with the European Economic Community, the Central American Common Market, and other entities are often introduced. The frequently involved relationships with GATT, the UN's ECLA, the IADB, the IMF, and other international agencies are competently treated.

Uruguay did, after various touch-and-go developments, finally complete her approval of LAFTA, but cumbersome congressional procedures, political opposition, and sheer lethargy meant that "Uruguay was first among the signatories to initiate the process of legislative ratification and the last to complete it" (p. 38). Establishment of LAFTA headquarters at Montevideo gave the country a valued status symbol, but otherwise the consequences have not been earth-shaking.

Among her conclusions the author holds that: a restricted elite of government technicians was more responsible than "the politicians" for Uruguayan adherence to LAFTA; Uruguayan respect for ECLA was a major factor in her decision to join the new group; adherence was not a cause for heated party conflict but in some ways "Uruguay was motivated by optimistic fatalism"; and "the decision-making process in Uruguay exhibited numerous deficiencies in respect of decisional inputs, organization, and procedure" (p. 54).

Supplementing the text of the study are a chronology of events from 1948 to 1961; a list of abbreviations, from ALALC (Spanish for LAFTA) to UC (Unión Cívica, a political party); and an extensive list of interviews and of published and unpublished sources used.

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The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. By Mohamed Heikal. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1973, Pp. 357. $10.00.)

The personality and political actions of Nasser have been the subject of numerous journalistic and scholarly volumes, both before and after the Egyptian leader's sudden death in September 1970. Heikal's *Cairo Documents* is a journalist's account of the Nasser phenomenon as seen by a faithful admirer, collaborator, adviser and friend of the late Egyptian president. It does not contain official documents: nor is it a documentary study of the Nasserite regime. Rather it is a memoir based on

Heikal's recollections and Nasser's personal papers, some of which are included in the book.

Heikal's relationship with Nasser was an unusual one; at times he seemed to be the president's alter ego, and often he served as the regime's unofficial mouthpiece. Yet Heikal also acted as the government's primary critic whose often scathing attacks on the army and the police after the June 1967 War went beyond the authoritarian strictures of "constructive criticism." Of course, Nasser's person was left out of Heikal's wide-ranging criticism; indeed, in view of Nasser's charismatic hold on the Egyptian and Arab masses, no less than the regime's authoritarianism, few dared to reprove the president. In Heikal's book, however, objectively critical analysis of Nasser's leadership was too much to expect so soon after the latter's death. In Weberian terms, Heikal was a leading member of the charismatic Nasser's *gemeinde* (congregation) and as such his spiritual attachment to the leader would substantially preclude a critical attitude.

The book, nevertheless, remains an important contribution to our understanding of Middle Eastern and international politics. It is particularly useful for the area specialist, both in terms of diplomatic history and regional political history. It may be even more useful to political scientists interested in decision making and the role of mutual perceptions of leaders in determining foreign policy. A case in point is the way in which Nasser's impressions of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson influenced Egyptian policy making. Nasser's favorable view of Kennedy had a beneficial impact on US-Egyptian relations. With the accession of LBJ, however, US-Egyptian relations deteriorated rapidly owing largely to Nasser's instinctive dislike of Johnson, whom he regarded as rude, insensitive, and a wheeler-dealer politician. It is particularly enlightening to discover from Heikal's account that LBJ's several overtures to establish close personal ties were rebuffed by Nasser. Heikal goes on to recount how Nasser's negative perception of Johnson, coupled with other outstanding issues (the Yemeni War, arms to Israel, wheat for Egypt, etc.) led inexorably to the June 1967 War and the subsequent disruption of US-Egyptian relations until 1974.

The foregoing concern with the interaction of personality and politics points to another area of interest in modern political science—the psychological study of political leaders. However uncritical, Heikal's account of Nasser's personality provides a wealth of data for the student of psychopolitics. The techniques that have been utilized by Erikson, the Georges, Rustow, Mazlish, Barber, and Wolfenstein can be most fittingly applied to the study of Nasser's personality. In my opinion, the use of psychohistorical methodology could explain a great deal about Nasser's often peculiar behavior in Egypt and on the international scene. In that effort, Heikal's present work, along with others he has promised to publish, will be a most valuable source of data.

Despite their journalistic and subjective nature, books like Heikal's provide a mine of information for students of comparative political leadership. Heikal's pages give intimate portraits of some of the most important leaders of yesteryear—Eden, Dulles, Khrushchev, Hammarskjold. Tito, Nehru, Chou, Erhard, Guevara, Castro, Eisenhower—to name the most important personalities with whom Nasser interacted during his years in power. The behind-the-scenes-relations among leaders is perhaps the most valuable portion of this book.

Finally, Heikal discusses a most dangerous and dysfunctional aspect of US foreign policy, little known to most Americans but frequently and painfully experienced by many Third World states. This concerns the multiplicity of American foreign policies regarding Egypt which emanated simultaneously from the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and even private organizations such as the oil companies. Not only did these often contradictory policies confuse Nasser's perception of US intentions, but they aborted the effective execution of American policy in Egypt.

When everything is said and done, *The Cairo Documents* is an an eloquent testimony to the transitoriness of power and of the individuals who exercise it. Nasser has already left the scene, and so have all the major leaders he dealt with except Tito. Even Heikal, the Arab world's most powerful journalist, has been dispossessed of his power as editor of *Al-Ahram* for opposing the sharp about-face in Egyptian policy toward the US. In the new milieu dominated by Sadat and Kissinger, Heikal (as the Soviets) became the odd man out. Yet considering the phenomenal instability of interpersonal and international relations in the Middle East and Heikal's gift for survival, one cannot realistically exclude a return to power for one of the shrewdest men in the Arab world.

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The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 302. $12.50.)

The purpose of this collection of essays, in the words of its editor, "is to provide the reader with both a general overview of Soviet policy towards the developing nations and more detail on various aspects of that policy" (p. xii). Because all but one of the essays were written specifically for this volume, its editor expresses the hope that it comprises an integrated analysis of Soviet policy in the developing world. The first two essays provide the theoretical framework, a historical analysis of the ideological sources of Soviet policy since 1917. There follow five specific area studies, on Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The study concludes with three essays on general topics—Soviet economic policy in the developing world, the role of the United Nations, and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The total volume is a mixed bag. The five area studies are excellent, within fairly narrow limits. The attempt to "explain" Soviet policy, however, fails at several levels. The basic difficulty is illustrated in the two introductory essays by the editor, Roger Kanet. Soviet policy is defined primarily in "ideological" terms; that is, by taking more or less at face value the official "Marxist-Leninist line" ground out by Soviet Communist Party rhetoricians. Unfortunately, this line fails to tell us much about Soviet policy, as the five area studies unwittingly demonstrate. More accurately, the realities of Soviet policy constantly illustrate the basic contradiction between the objective perception of Soviet interests and the official "ideological" explanation of what these interests should be.

Each of the five area specialists is aware of this discrepancy. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, whose article on Africa is particularly good, concludes: "The Soviet Union has come to behave more as a great world power seeking influence and strategic economic and military position and less as the center of a revolutionary movement aimed at overthrowing African governments and installing Communist regimes" (p. 61). Unfortunately, neither Klinghoffer nor the other area specialists is willing to pursue the implications of this conclusion, and instead of moving toward a meaningful and objective definition of Soviet policy, Klinghoffer explains the contradictions in Soviet behavior as the result of a conflict between "practical" and "ideological" interests, concluding that "the Soviets viewed Africa more in the practical terms of furthering Soviet strategic interests than in the unrealistic ideological terms of encouraging states to advance towards socialism" (p. 59). The point, however, is not that "ideology" is necessarily and always in conflict with "practice," but that Soviet policy makers continue to be influenced by a "Marxist-Leninist" ideology which, largely through the authoritarian pressures of the Soviet state itself, and its suppression of criticism, has petrified into a meaningless "conventional wisdom." That conventional wisdom defines the Soviet Union as a revolutionary, left-wing, socialist, Marxist state, and prompts Soviet leaders to pursue policies which they quickly discover to be contrary to the objective interests of a Soviet state which is conservative, right-wing, authoritarian, and bureaucratic. Unfortunately, conventional wisdom in this country accepts the Soviet Union's self-image, and reflects the contradictions created by the acceptance of an inadequate ideological model.

Partly because of this inability to pierce the armor of Soviet rhetoric and to challenge conventional wisdom, the book fails at another level to explain Soviet policy. Roger Hamburg, in his essay on Latin America, puts his finger squarely on the problem when he speaks of "a chronic tendency to equate Soviet 'inputs' (trade, military aid programs, and so on) with 'outputs' (influence) without proving that the inputs actually brought about changes in the actual behavior of the target country" (p. 208). The issue is even more basic. What, in fact, *are* Soviet interests in the developing world? What kind of "influence" would serve these interests? Even if "input" can be shown to produce "output," what kind of "output" would serve Soviet interests? Is a "socialist" system an "output" that will serve Soviet interests? The question is extraordinarily difficult, and applies as much to the United States as to the Soviet Union; the bureaucracies of neither superpower have answered it satisfactorily. John Campbell indicates his awareness of its difficulty when he asks, after describing the elaborate pattern of moves by which the Soviet Union sought to increase its "influence" in Iran after World War II: "Was all this a great success for Soviet policy?" (p. 160). The answer, he suggests, is problematical.

Although most of the authors are aware of this difficulty, they tend to fall back on the "conventional wisdom," and evaluate gains and losses for the Soviet Union by applying a left-wing/right-wing test to the developing countries. But as the substance of these essays constantly demonstrates, the objective interests of the Soviet Union are not necessarily related to the kinds of political-economic systems which exist in the developing countries; and short of direct military or economic control, there is no way in which the Soviet Union, or the United States, for that matter, can guarantee that any particular regime in the developing world is "on its side." Van der Kroef comments that the Soviet Union, in North Vietnam, "could not afford to be outflanked by Peking" (p. 88). But in what sense? Was Hanoi more interested in the kind of ideological "image" the Soviet Union, or China projected, or in who was willing to help North Vietnam? Would the Soviet Union then be able to translate its help into "influence?" Neither the experience of North Vietnam, nor that of Egypt, gives a very satisfactory answer. The prickliness of the question is well illustrated in the essay by Richard Mansbach, in which he quotes a United Nations analyst to this effect: "There was overwhelming agreement among all categories of specialists that Soviet influence increased during the 1955–59 period" (p. 257). What kind of esoteric definition of "influence" requires a body of "specialists" to detect its subtle presence?

Despite the limitations of its conceptual framework and the resulting lack of integration, *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* is a valuable collection of essays, even more so for the reader interested in conditions in the developing world than for the reader interested in Soviet policy.

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Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. By Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White and others. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973. Pp. 378. $4.50.)

In his book, *The Future of Political Science*, Harold D. Lasswell concludes that political scientists' responsibilities include "the linking of descriptive and explanatory knowledge and estimates of the future with clarified interpretations of community goals and evaluations of major policy alternatives" (p. 26). These are weighty charges indeed, requiring comprehensive research, interdisciplinary communication, foresight, and a measure of nerve. Political scientists were unlikely to meet these responsibilities during the period of their methodological sophistication. But they have been properly challenged in recent years to judge disciplinary purposes by the criteria of social relevance—a process taken for granted by many of our predecessors.

Energy Under the Oceans fulfills the requirements of Lasswell's assignment and meets the challenges of the so-called "postbehavioral revolution." Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White direct the Science and Public Policy Program at the University of Oklahoma. They collected an interdisciplinary team drawn from engineering, zoology, physics, and law, and made application to the National Science Foundation to conduct a technology assessment of outer continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations. The NSF funded the project under its program of Research Applied to National Needs (RANN). At the urging of the NSF, Kash and White formed an oversight committee "to provide a divergent complementary sounding board, wise council, and in some cases access to knowledge and information not otherwise readily available" (p. iii). A one-week seminar was also held to assist the investigators in their understanding of the issues and inform other interested communities of the project. As a result of these procedures, the research team maintained contact and derived criticism from knowledgeable persons in government, industry, foundations, universities, and citizen groups. The project began in September, 1971, and this book was published in the Summer, 1973.

I mention these details to illustrate what is involved in meeting the challenges of contemporary policy research. Political scientists interested in contributing to policy analysis and decision making must accommodate themselves to interdisciplinary team research, review and criticism by those directly involved in and affected by policy making, and a less leisurely time schedule for research than is typical in academic life. Kash and White have demonstrated in this study that political scientists bring unique qualifications to policy analysis—even in highly technical issue areas. For whatever specialized knowledge was necessary in identifying this or that technological problem, the political scientists could make judgments about the use of this knowledge in the public policy process. Further, they above all were trained to identify nontechnical inputs into decision making, assess existing organizational capabilities, and spot jurisdictional complications.

The book itself is organized into four main parts, with a number of specialized papers appended. The first part discusses technology assessment, places OCS development in its broader energy and environmental context, identifies the purpose of the study, and outlines the research strategy. Part two describes the development of OCS oil and gas resources—including the technical processes involved and the characteristics of the developers (the petroleum industry) and the regulators (relevant government agencies). Part three is the heart of the book since it identifies the major policy issues of OCS development: the adequacy of technologies, availability of scientific data (including data on environmental effects of development), preservation and improvement of environmental quality, governmental management, and jurisdictional matters. The last section summarizes OCS impacts, compares OCS with other possible oil sources (imports and the trans-Alaska pipeline), and outlines a plan for OCS development. Overall it is an impressive document which reportedly has received considerable attention and use among policy makers.

What of the recommendations themselves? The team accepts the utility of the rational, comprehensive model of decision making. Such terms as coordination, effective management, integration, centralized responsibility, long-range planning, and optimal development are used throughout the proposed plan for OCS development. Though they do not appear to have relied on the optimal model of policy making proposed by Yehezkel Dror in *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1963), their research approach and recommendations would presumably meet Dror's criteria. Thus, for example, the investigators were quite properly sensitive to the diverse effects of OCS development. Accordingly they seek to increase participation in decision making and provide for coordinated evaluation of effects through "expanded use of the . . . environmental impact statement process" (p. 251). There should be a "hierarchy of impact statements that starts with a general programmatic statement" (p. 252). The Department of Interior would be the lead agency for such statements, which would be coordinated with all agencies having any responsibility for OCS.

Not all students of public policy would agree with this tack. Why not seek to facilitate impact analysis from agencies, congressional committees, or groups outside government who might be presumed to represent more directly the adverse effects of OCS development? Can an advocate agency achieve coordination in fact? Possibly coordination merely becomes one more paperwork responsibility unless another agency or group with differing interests and real authority has the obligation to offer counter evaluations of impact. If so, then the current environmental impact statement process is hardly the appropriate model to achieve the desired goals since the advocate agency is responsible for drafting the statement (albeit charged to elicit others' views and consider them in redrafting). Rather one would be led to a process of adversary decision making which facilitates access, criticism, bargaining, and compromise. Should this approach dominate recommendations, one would expect a positive role for Congress—an institution all but ignored in this analysis. I make this point not so much to criticize this study as to illustrate how different values and analytical approaches can lead to quite different recommendations—another major lesson for those turning to policy analysis.

Though directed to an audience of decision makers, this book should also find its way into the classroom—particularly graduate seminars in public policy. Not only is it a fine example of the scope of knowledge required for contemporary policy analysis, but it can also serve as a basis for discussions of the energy issue-area itself, the advantages and disadvantages of government-funded team research, and the various policy approaches to be taken by the political scientist as policy analyst.

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The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1973. Pp. vii, 462. £5.50.)

Whoever is asked to review this twenty-seventh volume of the yearbook published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, should pay serious attention to Patrick McGowan's very critical review of the preceding volume (APSR 68, [March 1974], pp. 352–353). Many of Professor McGowan's comments also hold true for this later volume. It still reads like "a well-edited journal published once a year, bound in hard covers" and it probably still costs more than the average quarterly review. It is also true that the articles are wide-ranging (from the biological factor in international relations, written by a professor of medicine, to the problem of functional incompatibilities before international courts, written by long-time editor Georg Schwarzenberger himself). Most of the articles do reflect chiefly a "classical approach," as defended by Hedley Bull in his classical essay, although contributors such as James Rosenau (International Studies in the United States), R. J. Vincent (The Functions of Functionalism in International Relations), and C. C. Pentland (Neofunctionalism) are of course well aware of everything social science methodology would have to offer by way of hypothesis testing, etc.

Not unexpectedly, the twenty-two contributions are of uneven quality. More and more of the books in the field of international relations seem to take the form of multiauthored compilations, with similar differences in quality and sometimes similar lack of sufficient cohesion. One may call such a book a "nonbook," as McGowan does, and as such it defies reviewing. Yet, a number of observations can be made about the usefulness of this volume.

In the first place one may wonder about the use of having a select bibliography from previous volumes of the Year Book listed in the beginning of this volume under the heading "Trends and Events." The editors would probably agree that there are other, and possibly better articles that have appeared on subjects such as strategic arms limitations, the Middle East, or South East Asia, and the Far East (to cite a few of the subheadings) than those that appeared in the Year Book of World Affairs. Why then list only those and no other publications? Moreover, this list would seem to be of use only to those readers who have all of the earlier volumes on their bookshelves, ready to be consulted. It is also not very clear according to what criteria the bibliography was compiled. Are these the contributions which, according to the editors, were of the highest quality at the time of publication or are they the ones that have best withstood the passing of time (which may not be quite the same)?

Some of the contributions even in the present volume have been overtaken by events. The article by Harold Blakemore on Chile was written before the overthrow of the Allende government, although he was clearly aware of the fact that something might happen soon, as witnessed by the question with which he ends the article: "At the time of writing, the basic question remains: can Chile secure a middle way between stability based on exploitation and radical change built on hatred?" (p. 61). (At the time of writing this review—August 1974—the unhappy answer would seem to be "no"). Although the article provides some insights into the problems which the Allende regime faced during its last months in office, it illustrates on the whole the dangers of this type of time-bound study.

The authors who write on aspects of the situation in Eastern Europe seem to be on safer grounds, possibly because political changes occur there only very slowly or not at all. Robin Alison Remington's article on the Warsaw Pact is competent and thorough but contains few surprises. Much more interesting is George Ginsburg's article on the constitutional foundations of the "socialist commonwealth," in which he analyzes the principles on which Soviet thinking about international organization is based. He cogently discusses the ever recurring dilemma in the idea of the "socialist commonwealth" between internationalism on the one hand and the avowed respect for national sovereignty on the other. His article, based on a study of Soviet sources, contains a thorough analysis of the twelve international organizations that belong to the "socialist commonwealth," starting with the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and ending with the International Investment Bank. This original piece of research can be considered one of the best contributions in the volume, containing factual analysis of the highest level.

Perhaps the most interesting and stimulating contribution is the one entitled "Labour in the New Global Economy" written by Charles Levinson, who is Secretary General of the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Unions. He argues that the labor unions, in order to be more successful, should expand their basically nation-state centered types of organization and set themselves up at the level of the multinational companies—their main adversaries and negotiating partners. He rightly argues that the labor unions should make use of the same advantages that accrue to activities across national borders as the multinational corporations do. Some readers may wonder whether his faith in the effectiveness of workers' participation in boards of directors and in management is not somewhat exaggerated.

Five contributions belong more specifically to what is commonly called the discipline of international relations. I have mentioned the pieces by Vincent and Pentland on functionalism and Rosenau's on international studies in the U.S.A. Robert Boardman writes about the advantages and disadvantages of the comparative method for the study of foreign policy. Geoffrey Goodwin discusses the discipline of international relations, mainly as taught and practiced in Britain. He argues in favor of breaking through the strict limitations of the field and in particular of bridging the gulf between economics and politics in the study of the international economy by setting up interdisciplinary study groups on such topics as the political dimensions of the world monetary, trade, and investment systems, the role of economic sanctions, and the economic factor in foreign policy studies. Readers more familiar with the British scene than I am may be better equipped to judge whether there also should be a new interdisciplinary international studies journal, "ready to publish the work not only of international relations specialists but of specialists from other disciplines with a particular interest in the international dimension of their studies" (p. 400). Experience with the *International Studies Quarterly*, the American journal which was launched on a similar formula, may suggest some caution in this respect. It just seems rather difficult in practice to attain the desired combination of disciplines.

The 1973 Year Book of World Affairs contains many diverse contributions. It should indeed be read as a journal, from which one picks and chooses the contributions according to one's particular interests and liking. The very variety of contributions contained in this volume virtually guarantees that one is not likely to be disappointed.

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European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973. Pp. 322. $8.95.)

This volume of eight essays and participant discussion represents the proceedings of a Brookings Institute conference, convened to address the question of the likelihood of European monetary unification (EMU) and its impact on United States policy.

Arthur I. Bloomfield sketches the historical development of the European political community out of which the movement for EMU has arisen, and Joseph Nye summarizes the conclusions of integrationist theorists on European union. Harry Johnson, Lawrence Krause, W. Max Gorden, and Walter Salant deal, respectively, with narrower economic issues of how to reduce ratios between European currencies, private capital flows, the impact of payments adjustment on employment and inflation, and international reserves. These technical discussions lead to the broader issues posed in Richard Cooper's speculative discussion of the implications of EMU for the development of the world economy and Philip Trezise's curiously elliptical and forbidding assertions about the problems that EMU presents for American economic interests. Harry Johnson provides a trenchant summary of the proceedings, and the editors display good sense in adding a short glossary of commonly misused terms in international economics—band, parity, par value, *numéraire*, etc.—that even the experts fail to use consistently or coherently.

Students of American and West European foreign policy, especially those interested in international economics, will find these readings stimulating and informative. From the perspective of monetary reform, the proceedings explore the many subtle transatlantic interests in conflict between the United States and Europe which bear on the larger political question of American policy toward European union. These turn on hard issues of exchange rates, trade, capital investment, employment, and price levels. How these issues are decided has an important bearing on the economic development of these states, the personal income of their peoples, and the political fate of elected officials. The debate over American policy toward a united Europe turns significantly on these issues.

The essays and discussion reflect two contending schools of thought. The first, shaped still by Cold War fears and the hope of greater European cooperation to bury past animosities, remains optimistic about the prospects of EMU as a critical step to European unity and bullish about the effects of EMU on the American economy. The second group, larger in number and in the force and relevance of its arguments, is skeptical about the likelihood of European union and even more bearish about EMU's benefit for the United States. Progress toward monetary integration is seen as a prelude to greater European control over foreign investment and more pervasive protectionist moves.

Both groups agree, however, that the American dollar holds the key to EMU and European union. "Union" is no longer a desirable goal for Europe in the abstract. Its meaning is secreted in the economic benefits enjoyed by member states. The welfare of each European state significantly depends today as much on their several currency relations with the dollar as on their parities with each other. Johnson drives home the arresting point that for most of the postwar period, and even now in good measure, European currencies are more closely tied to the dollar than to each other. The size of the band between the dollar and European currencies has often been narrower than those between European currencies. In a technical sense monetary integration has been more Atlantic than European. The first task facing the Europeans remains the narrowing of exchange rates among EEC currencies without narrowing further the range of European currencies against the dollar. The present acceptance of American pleadings (and market pressures) to float European currencies makes the discussion of narrowing bands through European governmental cooperation temporarily moot, but any serious movement toward EMU will again have to face this problem and the associated questions of which state will determine the average fluctuation for community currencies against the dollar.

These considerations cast further doubt on European integrationist thinking. One can wonder whether there was ever any realistic basis for Jean Monnet's theorizing about the inevitability of European union once the gears of economic cooperation (*engrenage*) produced ever widening and deepening interdependence (spillover) and eventual political union. These essays support the proposition that the United States, more than the European states themselves, will determine the possibilities of European union as long as its influence continues through its military and economic predominance. These essays suggest that integrationist thinkers have never posed the right questions. The largely careful analyses characterizing these papers and discussion present a complex web of transatlantic monetary ties that are not adequately reflected in integrationist literature. It has tended to posit what it was supposed to demonstrate, viz., the inexorable movement of the European states to union.

On the other hand, there is no lease on life in these proceedings for outmoded ideas about creating an Atlantic community built on American and European pillars. If monetary relations are closely examined, neither notions of Atlantic community nor Monnet's European union are viable. For that matter, Gaullist mercantilist visions are of limited utility. What is needed are conceptual tools and models of developmental politics that avoid the obvious simplicity of these competing representations. These essays on monetary relations are helpful in providing a clearer and firmer base on which to proceed in political theorizing.

Some parting shots are in order. The papers focus too heavely on EMU rather than on whether EMU is likely to come about in the first place. There is little discussion about the likelihood of the introduction of flexible, floating rates. Much needless attention is paid to the Smithsonian accords although they were overtaken by governmental actions and market forces on both sides of the Atlantic even as they solemnly announced. There is also no anticipation of sudden shocks, like the recent oil crisis and its inflationary pressures on Western economies. There is, finally, a failure, striking in the surface characterizations of French policy, to distinguish carefully between announced and operational policies of the Paris government. The French may have appeared to be ideologically committed to fixed exchange rates, but they were more concerned with trade and unemployment than ideology in floating the franc in early 1974 and in re-valuing their gold stocks at current prices a year later.

Despite these shortcomings, these essays are, as one discussant observed, a useful "background to policy formation."

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Soviet-Asian Relations. By Charles B. McLane. (London: Central Asian Research Centre and New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 150. $15.00.)

This is volume II of a three-volume survey of Soviet-Third World relations. It is a very useful study of Soviet relations with fifteen Asian countries. Professor McLane has successfully presented a clear, well-researched, and compact narrative covering Moscow's intercourse with each of these countries since the 'fifties. Each chapter examines the sequence of events in one of the Asian nations and further clarifies the historic account with a chronological table of political, economic, and cultural highlights.

It is impossible in a brief review to discuss the details collected and brought into focus by the author. Among the well-written narratives the skillfully condensed description of Soviet relations with Pakistan and India are perhaps the best. Primarily, Professor McLane reports but does not analyze, except perhaps by implication. Clearly, his main purpose must have been to present readable sketches of historical and political events. There can be no objection to this approach which offers to scholars, researchers, and students a clear picture of immensely complex, interdependent situations.

I have, however, some "ideological" reservations. Throughout the book, the Soviet Union is treated as a "normal," traditional nation-state even though it has never ceased to oppose all governmental systems and societies that might impede its revolutionary aims. I believe that the author's approach—and that of many of our colleagues—is a serious mistake. The Soviet pragmatic trend toward "détente" has not displaced the fundamentals of the Soviet system. Whatever Moscow does is linked with these fundamentals. Soviet foreign policy is, *au fond*, Communist foreign policy. To disregard this fact is to accept Soviet international maneuvers at face value. Moscow's attitudes and intentions toward the Asian countries is a particularly good example of the Soviet policy of favoring Communist or leftist regimes which are inclined to be partial to Moscow and therefore strengthen Soviet opposition to the free world.

Perhaps inherent in the author's position is his inclination to use the term "Russian" rather than "Soviet," a usage to which I am opposed. We are dealing with the revolutionary Union of Soviet Republics and not with Russia. Using the term Russian instead of Soviet is a bad habit of many statesmen, scholars and journalists, a habit that delays a better understanding of what the Soviet Union stands for. Nevertheless, the vast arsenal of facts harnessed by McLane is an awe inspiring achievement. The book should be on the shelves of all students of international affairs.

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From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure. By Tibor Mende. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. Pp. 317. $10.00.)

Tibor Mende, who served as a senior UN official, particularly with UNCTAD, in 1965–71, and who is now on the Sorbonne political science faculty, has written one of the most humane and trenchant critiques of development assistance available. His wide reading and extensive personal encounters have led him to the conclusion that aid has just perpetuated the dependence of the developing countries on the former colonial powers and other donors.

The author lucidly analyzes the operation of the world economic system, with the growing disparities between the industrialized North and the less-developed South and the likelihood for greater accumulations by the rich countries at the expense of the much more numerous poorer countries. After sketching the real differences that exist along states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, he stresses that each country has to find its own form of development.

The book attacks many facets of the aid relationship, including aid which only increases dependency, the brain drain, the exaggerated sale of arms to the low-income countries and corruption.

Mende tells us that overdependence upon econometric criteria to measure economic growth often leads to neglecting human needs. Aid frequently leads to debt-servicing problems and limits access to alternative sources of manufactured goods. The ones to profit are officials and companies in the industrialized countries, the aid administrators and the Western-oriented elites in the developing countries. Most of the people who were supposed to be helped, however, remain hungry and humiliated.

Mende's critique of the disparities in the aid relationship is not new; it eloquently enlarges those of other concerned observers, such as Barbara Ward and René Dumont. It is also worth comparing his criticism of aid as a political and economic policy instrument from the perspective of the recipient countries with the more usual discussion from the donors' viewpoint by John Montgomery, Hans Morgenthau, Joan Nelson and others.

At first Mende appears to join the liberal supporters of aid, such as the 1969 Pearson Commission, whose report he quotes extensively, in indicating that the industrialized countries, except France, have not contributed even one per cent of their GNP for aid and that development assistance has been decreasing since 1967. He parts ways with them, however, in condemning aid outright and in insisting that the goal of quantifiable economic growth is insufficient: It is necessary to bring about social, cultural and economic restructuring as well.

Mende echoes the self-reliance pronouncements and policies of Chairman Mao, President Nyerere, and radical critics in other developing countries. The special value of this book is the expression of these ideas by a cultured Westerner, who has had practical experience with the approach he criticizes and who supports his beliefs with empirical evidence.

Although Mende indicates that humanitarian motivations are insignificant in practice, he still seems to expect industrialized countries to change their policies out of their desire to encourage dignity. The aid experience so far, however, has indicated that this is an unrealistic expectation.

Ironically, since the original French edition appeared in 1972, France has reduced its aid commitments to the developing countries, especially in Africa, mainly because of internal pressures and competing European and Mediterranean interests. This in turn has led many countries which were almost entirely dependent upon France to look for alternative aid and trade sources. The most dramatic change in the terms of trade, moreover, has been achieved not through the decency of the industrialized countries, but through the bargaining skills of the oil producers. Political realities suggest that well-intentioned authors like Mende can pave the way, but that real structural changes both within individual countries and the global international system can be brought about only through the independent efforts of indigenous leaders from the developing countries themselves, as undoubtedly the author himself would agree.

SUSAN AURELIA GITELSON
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Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide. Edited by James William Morley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Pp. 618. $25.00.)

This is the type of book that is intended to be an aid to scholarship rather than a contribution to scholarship itself. However, this particular book is both; it includes a 116-page bibliography plus two glossaries of Japanese titles and names given in English, romanized Japanese, and Han characters, as well as eight substantive articles by the top Western and Japanese specialists on Japan's international relations from the Meiji Restoration to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a research guide it undoubtedly succeeds, in that all future researchers into the problems covered will have to consult it—to see what it contains, how it treats various topics, and what it omits. Moreover, new researchers looking for a subject will find numerous intriguing suggestions for further study. But this raises a problem. Generally speaking, the more one already knows about Japanese international relations, the more he is going to get out of this book, whereas a novice could be seriously misled by it.

Rather like Lieutenant Onoda of the former Imperial Japanese Army, who walked out of the jungles of the Philippines some twenty-nine years after World War II had ended, this book is something of a living fossil. It is based on a conference held in Pennsylvania in January, 1963. The conference was convened to promote research on the history of Japan's international relations by surveying the massive number of official Japanese archives that had become available after the war, including the documents of the Tokyo war crimes trials and Japanese materials published after Japanese independence, which correct many of the sources used in the trials. Until these official archives began to be opened and published, the study of Japan's foreign relations was restricted almost entirely to a few memoirs, newspaper accounts, and polemical materials. The conference was thus a good idea, but the period after 1963 has seen the publication of many more archives. Only one of the eight essays in this book utilizes the eight-volume *Taiheiyō sensō e no michi* (The Road to the Pacific War), published by the Japan International Political Science Association, and none of them refers to any of the forty-four volumes of Misuzu Shobō's *Gendaishi shiryō* (Source Materials on Contemporary History) or the more than fifty volumes of the War History Office, Japanese Defense Agency. These are the most important sources, still largely unexplored in English, for many of the topics covered in the volume. The bibliography of the research guide is divided into two parts—standard works published before 1963, and recent works from 1963 to 1971—so the materials that were published after the conference are listed, although not analyzed in the essays. Considerably greater candor by the editor on this matter would have been desirable. The usefulness of the volume is not seriously diminished by the time lapse, but only the knowledgeable are going to be able to make the necessary adjustments.

The critical essays themselves are fascinating, but not all equally so or for the same reasons. There are three essays on functional areas—Japan's military, economic, and cultural foreign policies—and five on regional areas—Japan's policies toward Britain, China, Germany, Russia, and the United States. Korea is omitted, for reasons that are not explained, but its presence suffuses every other essay. Of the three functional essays, the one on cultural policies by Robert Schwantes is outstanding. His section on the East Asian Common Culture Academy in Shanghai should stimulate a Ph.D. dissertation, and his comment concerning Japanese-American immigration issues that, "Charges have even been made that the Japanese government, through its consuls, deliberately manipulated and victimized the Japanese community on the West Coast" (p. 171) points to another area of needed research. In this connection, a new bibliography should be added: Y. Ichioka et al., *A Buried Past* (1973), which is an annotated guide to the Japanese-American collection at UCLA.

Of the other two functional essays, James Crowley's on the military is the longest in the book. Crowley is a well-known authority on the prewar Japanese military, but his lack of analytic focus and his occasionally apologetic tone—Korea is repeatedly referred to as the "Hermit Kingdom"—leave some doubts about his utter reliability. The Anti-Comintern Pact, for instance, which was indubitably a product of Japanese army diplomacy, is not mentioned by him. The military is thoroughly covered from another angle, however, by Frank Iklé in his essay on relations with Germany.

The greatest weakness of the whole volume is in the economic area. Arthur Tiedemann's essay is quite interesting, but it only covers 1868–1893, and the discussion of source materials is very sketchy. No reason is given by the editor (or by Tiedemann) for stopping at 1893 or for not commissioning another essay on the later periods. Economic policy stands out as the area most in need of further research, and Akira Iriye in his essay on relations with the United States repeatedly cites the inadequate appreciation of "Japan's economic dependence on the United States" (p. 426) as the major shortcoming of our understanding of the 1920s and 1930s. Still, Tiedemann's essay makes a worthy contribution by pointing out that from the day the Meiji government came to power down to the present time, balance of payments considerations have affected virtually all foreign (and many domestic) activities of the Japanese.

Of the regional essays, Hosoya's on Russia, Nish's on Britain, and Iklé's on Germany are all by leaders in their fields and are consistently valuable. Nish's contribution needs only to be supplemented by the addition of Bradford Lee's recent book, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939* (1973). Shinkichi Etō took on the toughest job of the whole project by writing about policies toward China. His paper is the only one that presents a framework for research—he sees policy emerging from the interaction of initial popular responses to Chinese actions, the views of responsible officials, the political interests of peripheral agencies of the government, and the inputs of private interest groups—and he indicates which Japanese materials are more important to read than others. Still, he could have used another fifty pages—and should have taken them. Iriye's essay on the United States is largely a restatement of views that he has presented elsewhere, particularly in *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (1965). It is, in any case, an authoritative treatment.

Except for Etō and the editor, all of the authors are historians, which means that many questions of importance to political scientists are unasked or assumed, although the essays and the bibliography will certainly be of use to political scientists. This is a good book, of clear value to the professional, and one with just enough booby traps to make for stimulating reading.

CHALMERS JOHNSON

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Creating the European Community. By R. C. Mowat. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973. Pp. 235. $7.00.)

Professor Mowat's cursory review of the consolidation of Western Europe since World War II concentrates on the "motives and ideas" that inspired the founders of the European Community. The underlying thesis is that the roots of the European idea can be traced to Christian convictions and to European cultural values, more generally. This is hardly a novel argument, but Professor Mowat reaches beyond its usual formulation. The Community was indisputably the creature of the Christian Democratic leadership of post-World War II Western Europe. But to what extent did integration draw sustenance from Christian, democratic, and humanist values? This is the question to which Professor Mowat addresses himself but, unhappily, in a superficial fashion.

The device employed for getting at motives and ideas is a series of portraits of those leaders who typify particular periods and projects—Adenauer, de Gaulle, Monnet, Schuman, and a number of lesser figures. This approach has both its attractions and its shortcomings. Professor Mowat has produced a useful and engaging introduction to the European Community. He has not, however, provided very much for the specialist save the glimmer of a promising idea.

First, the good news. The book offers lively glimpses of important European leaders at key moments in the development of the European Community. These portraits are nicely woven into a chronological overview which highlights ethical themes. By beginning with the World War II resistance movements, Professor Mowat is able to present the emergence of integrationist ideas as the logical and humane counterpart to those fascist and nationalist impulses that came so close to destroying European civilization. He is less successful, I would argue, in defending the positive side of his argument, i.e., that the eclectic tangle of Christian and enlightenment values which inspired the founders of the European Community is capable of providing continuing sustenance to so momentous an undertaking as the uniting of Europe.

Part of the problem is that the book promises more than it delivers. Professor Mowat tells us that he is in a position to pursue an "examination in depth" as a result of his access to private archives and to persons involved in the creation of the European Community. What he provides, however, are brief sketches of European leaders in action. Rather than their "motives" and their "ideas," we get their rhetoric, transmitted rather than analyzed. Moreover, very little is done to evoke the spirit of the unique period in which the European idea gathered momentum. (In this respect, the book suffers by contrast to Richard Mayne's sensitive and searching presentation of similar materials in *The Recovery of Europe 1945-1973* [New York: Anchor, 1973, rev. ed.].)

There are additional difficulties that transcend Professor Mowat's methods and perhaps his purposes. He has raised a series of profoundly complex and important issues but has dealt with them in an offhand fashion. The vital cultural themes ("motives and ideas") emerge as ancillary to diplomatic portraiture and would probably remain so even had Professor Mowat dug more deeply into the lives and times of his subjects. The value consensus on which the Community purportedly rests is treated in a bland and static fashion. No effort is made, for example, to probe the underlying tensions between Christian and enlightenment values, nor is the difficulty of integrating the socialist tradition confronted in a serious manner. A consensus that may have been adequate to the desperate but hopeful postwar period is, moreover, accepted largely without question as suitable to ensuing times. What is missing, briefly put, are concepts and analytical techniques that would sustain a more forceful and systematic investigation of the cultural determinants of the European Community. While brought directly to mind by Professor Mowat's book, these largely neglected themes in the study of European integration remain to be adequately investigated by the enterprising social scientist.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD

University of Washington

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. By Thomas G. Paterson. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 287. $12.00.)

The word "imperialism" does not appear in the index, nor does the author anywhere characterize American foreign policy as imperialist, yet the substance of the book adds up to an overwhelming documentation of the imperial mind and mood of American policy at the close of World War II. The policymakers knew what kind of a postwar world they wanted and they employed their economic weapons against friend and foe alike to achieve it. As Paterson, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, writes in his conclusion: "American diplomacy was not accidental or aimless: rather, it was self-consciously expansionist" (p. 263). The economic arm was employed consciously both to insure the viability of domestic capitalism through the development of foreign trade, investments, and acquisition of raw materials and to apply pressure to secure political arrangements for the expansion of international capitalism in which the US was dominant. The relentless pursuit of such a policy was bound to clash with Soviet interests.

Explicit recognition of the imperial thrust of American policy is, in this reviewer's opinion, an integral factor in an analytical framework for the study of Cold War politics. This imperial or expansionist policy was a basic conditioning factor antecedent to specific policy issues with the USSR, quite apart from Soviet culpability for one action or another. American policy was not, of course, articulated as an imperial policy nor could it be to the American people, given its historical notion of itself as anti-imperialist, but the containment doctrine as it was implemented into an expansionist policy, as the author contends, translates into nothing other than imperialism. Paterson avoids the characterization of American policy as imperialist, perhaps because of the organic link between capitalism and imperialism in Marxist theory. He prefers to characterize it as "expansionism," motivated by a will to dominate not merely because it was capitalist but, like other great powers through history, because it exploited opportunities. To ascribe the thrust of American policy to the fact that it was capitalist is to explain too much and to deny that it had options, as the author proceeds to spell out in his account of reconstruction politics. The United States used its overwhelming power to mold the world in its own image which, in itself, contributed to the Soviet-American confrontation. Yet, despite its considerable success in the rehabilitation of devastated areas and the revitalization of the world economy, American policy failed, in the author's opinion, to achieve its goal of postwar peace and prosperity. Washington's unilateral exercise of power and its ". . . disdain for diplomacy as a means of solving disputes and avoiding confrontations" contributed to the division of the world into hostile spheres of interest (p. 267).

The framework for Paterson's study is the ideology of "peace and prosperity," with Wilsonian overtones, which enjoyed the support of a wide political spectrum of American opinion from liberal to conservative. As Paterson lays out the underlying premises of the ideology, international peace depended on economic well-being which presumed a healthy world trade based on a growing world commerce that itself would ensure the economic health of the United States. Derived from these premises was the notion that improvement of economic conditions was basic to the promotion of political stability that would guard against unrest, revolution and communism. The US alone possessed the military, political, and economic power to attempt to fashion the world to its liking, and it did so. In focusing on the economic aspects of American policy and the bargaining power derived therefrom, Paterson has contributed a useful corrective to the line of analysis that has attributed the Cold War to atomic diplomacy, or to mutual misperceptions over policy, or to disaffection over particular issues, such as Soviet hegemony in East-Central Europe. As the author sees it, the exercise of economic power was a major underlying factor that was both the cause and consequence of the developing Soviet-American confrontation and, in itself, contributed to the configuration of postwar politics that emerged after 1948. Moreover, the pursuit of its interest brought the US into confrontation not only with the Soviet Union but also with its allies. The generous loan to Britain in 1945, nevertheless, entailed concessions on imperial trade preferences and bilateralism. International economic programs such as UNRRA, which could not be controlled by the US were abandoned in favor of organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which it dominates. In treating reconstruction politics in *both* the Soviet and "American" spheres, Paterson has provided a special insight for reevaluation of American policy.

Paterson deals methodically with the economic issues that affected the Soviet sphere: the postwar loan to the USSR, lend-lease, trade, export controls, relief, the Danube controversy, and others. Clearly, economic power was used to exact, or to attempt to exact, political concessions, which is not so much the issue, but rather its effect on Soviet calculations of the motives and intentions of American policy. Thus, while the British received their loan, the negotiations for a proposed American loan to the Soviet Union dragged on for more than a year and a half after Mikoyan and Harriman first discussed it in October 1943, while the US attempted to exact concessions from the Russians, ranging from claims of American nationals to the disposition of the states of Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe loan policy was aimed at slowing down nationalization and securing adequate compensation for American property. Paterson makes a good case that the failure to provide economic assistance weakened the democratic socialist leadership vis-à-vis the Czech Communists and contributed to the undermining of Czech independence. In short, pressure on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with regard to loan and trade policy leading to export controls had the unanticipated effect of tightening control over the economies of Eastern Europe and contributing to Soviet policies of autarchy. (But see Professor Richard H. Heindel's review in *APSR*, 68 [June 1974] 867–868 of George C. Herring, Jr.'s *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1973): Herring ". . . rejects the notion . . . that the United States used its economic power to force the Russians to comply with American postwar designs.")

A summary characterization of *Soviet-American Confrontation* can do no more than reflect the thrust of Professor Paterson's argument. The force of the argument comes through in the extensively researched treatment of the interlocking factors and events which adds up to a critical view, moderately stated, of American Cold War policy. Formulated within a traditional perspective of American policy, and cautiously advancing its opinions, the study perforce is a substantial contribution to the radical interpretation of American Cold War policy.

BERNARD S. MORRIS

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The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U.N. Eras. By Michla Pomerance. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 439. Appendices. Selected bibliography. Index. $17.50.)

The study of the World Court holds for aspiring international legal scholars something of the same attraction that the study of nudes holds for aspiring painters. Since so many of one's future peers have also studied the subject, one may reasonably expect to find not only expert guidance for, but also attentive interest in, one's own work. And for the same reason, the profession itself finds the study useful as a standard by which those with unusual insight and talent may quickly be distinguished from those without. Finally, though the analogy is stretching thin, I admit, it may not be too outrageous to point out how often the Court, like many nude models, finds itself obliged by unworthy circumstances to pose in silence and relative stillness for substantial lengths of time, thereby affording students the luxury and convenience of a nearly immobile, though still classic and arresting, subject.

How much attention the Court receives is suggested by the fact that this book by Dr. Pomerance, of the Hebrew University, is the third to appear in as many years which deals with precisely the same focus of inquiry: namely, the ambiguity of the Court's competence to render advisory opinions. This, essentially, is a comparative survey of the different experiences of the old and new Court: the PCIJ and the ICJ. Dr. Pomerance begins with a brief summary of the drafting history of the PCIJ's advisory jurisdiction provisions, then reviews that body's own development of the still uncertain function, contrasts each with the constitutive and empirical development of the ICJ's advisory competence, and concludes with an analysis of how the advisory opinions of the Court have been reviewed and translated into social action by appropriate political organs.

Some background may be helpful here. The peace-keeping scheme designed at Versailles in 1919 envisioned the Court as one alternative to war in international dispute settlement. So from the outset the Court's objectives were diplomatic as well as judicial. In providing for the Court's competence to settle contentious matters—cases—the draftsmen were able to finesse the ambiguities inherent in these sometimes conflicting objectives by following the procedural pattern already prominent in international affairs through *ad hoc* litigation. But they were only moderately successful in providing the framework of a controversial innovation in international practice which permitted reference to the Court of questions of general applicability submitted to it by the League's Council or Assembly.

The term *advisory* was not introduced until late in the drafting, and while the draftsmen may have had in mind the analogy of advisory opinions in national courts, there was certainly no extended consideration of the term. It is Dr. Pomerance's conclusion that initial drafts intended to divide the Court's advisory competence into two subprocedures—one in which the Court's function was in the nature of a lawyer's advice to a client, the other which stressed the Court's traditional judicial character: that is, its authoritative pronouncement rather than its legal advice.

In fact, the matter was left for the Court to develop in practice. Like many others, Dr. Pomerance concludes that the Court gradually assimilated its advisory and contentious procedures but that the process of assimilation was upset by the changes introduced when the old Court gave way to the new. These, essentially, were threefold. First, the scope of the Court's advisory competence was reduced from that over "any dispute or question" to that over "any *legal* question" (emphasis added). Second, the Court itself was linked organically to the UN as its "principal judicial organ." Finally, the category of political units entitled to request advisory opinions was vastly expanded to include a wide range of UN organs and agencies.

The third of these changes has had little effect in practice. In fact, bodies such as the International Labor Organization, using the League Council as intermediary, figured much more prominently in the work of the PCIJ than they have in that of the ICJ. The other two changes, however, created problems the PCIJ did not have to face, foremost among which is the apparent incompatibility of the ICJ's UN and international judicial responsibilities. When the Court was independent of the League and empowered to render an opinion on any dispute or question submitted to it, it was freer to develop the limits of its competence in light of its experience and its perception of its institutional identity than it has been able to do when limited by treaty to consider only "legal" questions (whatever that means) and asked to act both as adviser to the UN and judge of disputes in which the objectives and interests of the UN are at stake.

Dr. Pomerance's exploration of the jurisprudential implications of this dilemma fall somewhat short of the mark. On this score, there is still nothing to surpass Leo Gross's 1967 Hague Academy Lectures ("The International Court of Justice and the United Nations," *Recuil des Cours*, vol. 120(I), pp. 313–435). And she reaches conclusions with respect to the continuing impact of certain landmark cases (e.g., *Eastern Carelia*, *Northern Cameroons*) with which other scholars will find it difficult to agree. But these are marginal drawbacks to a study which so unmistakably establishes Dr. Pomerance as a legal scholar to be reckoned with.

Her style is superb: tight organization; summaries of conclusions at convenient intervals within, as well as at the end of, chapters; a masterful, case-by-case survey of the considerations which actually determined why and when the Court's advisory function has been invoked so far; and, for good measure, a set of appendices and a selected bibliography that are invaluable to other researchers.

Without duplicating Dr. Pomerance's own summaries, it may be noted that she concludes that the ICJ has come to ignore the quasi-contentious aspects of requests for advisory opinions in favor of an emphasis upon its lawyer-client relationship to the rest of the UN organization. She observes, as have others, that the ICJ's advisory opinions tend to involve organizational matters limited in both scope and generality, in sharp contrast to the PCIJ's. Finally, she predicts only modest success for the Court, regardless of attempts to increase its availability, until the world political situation stabilizes.

EDWARD GORDON
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Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Ernest H. Preeg. (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1974. Pp. 204. $7.95, cloth; 13.50, paper.)

Since the spring of 1971 it has been difficult to profess allegiance to the principles of Bretton Woods, even if it had been possible during the preceding twenty five years to overlook the failure to implement the spirit of universal multilateralism enunciated in that conference.

Ernest Preeg, a U.S. Foreign Service officer, faces this situation directly and attempts to assess the present world economic system in terms of multilateral rules versus more limited economic arrangements among particular groups of countries. As the title of his book suggests, his principal concern is with economic policy in a situation of developing economic blocs.

The main theses of the book are that the international economic system is polarizing into three dominant blocs—North America, Western Europe, and Japan; that one of the most urgent needs of the present economic system is an improved balance-of-payments mechanism; and that this need can partly be met through a system of flexible exchange rates between the currencies of the three major blocs. Preeg sees this tripolarization continuing in the future with higher degrees of economic and even political integration occurring within the blocs between the United States and Canada and among the member states of the European Community. Each of the three poles would have a single currency, with a monetary union in Europe and between the United States and Canada, with the yen, the europa, and the dollar providing the basis of a triple key-currency monetary system. There would be a linking of the smaller-country currencies to one of the three key currencies as denomination of assets and regional transactions take place in the key currencies.

Having outlined this evolving world economic structure, Preeg gives a well-balanced and succinct description of economic conditions and relations in North America, Europe and Japan, laying the empirical groundwork for his policy framework. In two separate chapters an outline of economic policies is offered, one among the advanced industrialized countries, and one between the industrialized countries and the rest of the world. The culmination of the policy chapters is found in the proffering of a "multilateral framework of non-multilateralism" (p. 174), in which universal multilateralism is replaced by a "double standard" whereby different rules would apply to different situations. The analysis offered is more elaborate and detailed than the present review can adequately represent; suffice it to say the arguments are interesting and provocative.

Of particular interest is chapter 9, "The Foreign Policy Dimension of Economic Relations," a welcome treatment of the political implications of economic policy, two realms that are rarely explored within the covers of a single book. Preeg points out, "If economic policy makers sometimes appear to be less than fully appreciative of the political consequences of pursuing a given economic interest it must regrettably also be recognized that the political scientist, consciously or unconsciously, often avoids taking account of economic issues" (p. 138). This chapter represents a lucid and generally comprehensive elaboration of the political implications of the economic policies, particularly the trade-off between economic gains from freer trade and the political constraints resulting from greater dependence, especially for small countries. Yet this consideration of political implications does not seem to pervade the entire analysis.

Underlying the development of the three major poles is the greater integration of each pole. This is politically achieved in the case of Japan, a single country, and it is an avowed goal in the case of the European Community. Within the North American bloc, however, increased Canadian dependence and further integration, both economic and political, with the U.S. represent sensitive political issues in Canada. Indeed, in 1972 a major foreign policy paper by Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, specifically eschewed the option of closer integration with the U.S. And this was from a Liberal government whose position is the most "continentalist" of the three principal political parties. Perhaps this simply reflects the perspective of the book which is one of an American position, which is amply identified in its title.

W. ANDREW AXLINE
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No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II. By Bruce M. Russett. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 111. $1.95, paper.)

In the 1930s and 1940s, the study of international politics at Yale was dominated by Nicholas Spykman and Arnold Wolfers, whose geopolitical and power analyses of world politics had considerable influence on the future development of more "scientific" approaches to international studies. It is perhaps ironic that a professor teaching international politics at Yale today—Bruce Russett—can publish a book on the earlier period that notices neither Wolfers' *Britain and France Between Two Wars* nor Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics* and has as its astounding thesis that the United States should have stayed out of the Second World War because, as its title implies, there was "no clear and present danger" to the republic in the course of events as they were then unfolding in Europe and Asia.

Russett admits at the outset that his book is meant to be provocative, that many of his readers will be offended by its theme, and that he wrote it while still in the process of rethinking its subject matter. One wishes that Russett had kept thinking before writing, because the central proposition of this brief volume is not only repellent but it is also supported with some exceedingly dubious assertions. For example, the fundamental theme of the book is that "American participation in World War II had very little effect on the essential *structure* of international politics thereafter" (p. 19), and this structure, Russett seems to argue, was changed in only one important respect, that Russia replaced Germany as the great threat to European security. But just as World War I resulted in the destruction of three empires, which decisively altered the structure of international politics (defined by Russett as "the basic balance of forces in the world" [p. 20]), so World War II resulted, as most elementary texts in international politics would agree, in the transformation of the world balance from multipolarity to the familiar bipolarity of the postwar decades.

What Russett suggests is that the United States should have stayed out of the war but should have provided all help short of war to the British, as it appeared to be doing in 1940–1941, because by the end of 1941 the European war was actually stalemated, although no one realized it at the time. In fact, however, it was Hitler who declared war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, and Russett, who ascribes this action to "Hitler's psychopathology" (p. 30), thus has no realistic basis for his preferred policy of United States aloofness during what would have been, he admits, a longer and more bloody war than the one that was really fought. In a sentence of exquisite delicacy, Russett acknowledges that "perhaps any idea of 'fighting to the last ally' would have been too 'cynical' to survive public debate" (p. 69), but nevertheless this is the policy that he thinks would have been preferable to American belligerency. He believes this "longer and even more bloody" (p. 30) war would have ended in a long drawn-out stalemate without American entry, and this presumably would have provided a safer, more secure environment for the United States than the cold war that actually did follow World War II; but the accurate perception by the survivors that the United States policy had been to bleed all parties in the war, hoping for a favorable outcome for itself could have led to an even more hostile and dangerous environment for this country.

Russett grants rather grudgingly that war against Nazism on moral grounds is a "perfectly reasonable position" (p. 43), but says that he prefers to argue in the arena of "realists" concerned with the structure of the international system. Perhaps this is why he curiously omits any mention of fascism as a worldwide political and ideological movement during the 1930s; others, however, would insist that a realistic consideration of the stakes of the war would include not merely dominance or subjugation of great powers or alterations in the structure of the international system, but, more profoundly, the survival of basic Western values threatened by transnational totalitarian mass movements.

It is possible to conclude that this slight volume is not really about its ostensible subject, but is merely another critique, somewhat disguised, of United States involvement in Vietnam. Russett indulges in some of the loose generalizations of leftist revisionists: "In the early years of the cold war all American liberals were required to demonstrate their loyalty and freedom from any taint of pro-Communism" (p. 85). He also seems to believe that American foreign policy after World War II was "to oppose injustice everywhere by military means" (p. 107), a vaulting ambition actually pursued by no president, secretary of state, or any leader of the American military and strategic establishment.

Nevertheless, Russett is clearly not a New Leftist. He is attempting to revive the older revisionist stance of Tansill, the Beards, and other inter-war critics of United States foreign policy. His hero seems to be the late Senator Robert Taft rather than Henry Wallace. His prescriptions for the future, such as "there must be an initial presumption against the use of force in international politics" (p. 88), are easily agreed-upon banalities. The problems begin of course after such a presumption has been held for a good while, and events, such as the fall of France, lead one to think what to do next.

Morton J. Tenzer
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South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute. By Solomon Slonim. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 409. $13.50.)

This work by Professor Slonim is one of the first to deal comprehensively with the development of the international dispute concerning the South West African mandate from its inceptive years right up to the last advisory opinion of the World Court of June 21, 1971. The author writes succinctly and switches expertly from pure narration to analysis and comment. A review of the historical background of the mandate is followed by accounts of the trusteeship struggle, the attempts to implement the 1950 Advisory Opinion, the efforts to obtain a binding judgment, the revocation of the mandate and its aftermath. Despite the density of argument, the wealth of material presented and the complexity of the problem, the work is, on the whole, most readable. It says a great deal for the author's wide knowledge and grasp of the background and development of the thirty-year-old dispute that he was able to produce a work which deals so directly with the most important aspects of the controversy. In addition, he furnishes a concise account of the complex legalities and tortuous political mazes confronting the United Nations.

The author gives an accurate account of the creation of the mandate system under the League of Nations and of the controversies which ensued, culminating in United Nations efforts to convert South West Africa into a Trust Territory (or at least to compel South Africa to accept international accountability for its administration of the mandate). The refreshingly dispassionate analysis of the protracted court battle between Liberia/Ethiopia and South Africa is particularly instructive. The author quite correctly refutes the assumption that since the court denied Ethiopia and Liberia the right to obtain a decision on the merits, a study of the pleadings would be entirely misplaced: "Nothing, however, could be more misplaced than this assumption itself. For, in fact, it is only by seeing how the case evolved and what was asked of the Court that one can gain proper perspective on the refusal of the court to make any determination on the merits" (p. 213).

Although Dr. Slonim's work is not primarily intended to present a broad picture of the mandate question in an international context, the author does intersperse his treatise with many apt observations on the realities of the dispute. For instance, he comments on the anomaly whereby the United Nations acts in the place of the League of Nations in controlling an instrumentality created by the League: "It was anomalous, because a mandate was something of a fossilized remnant of an earlier colonial age, and the United Nations was not equipped to handle relics. How does a gasoline station service a horse and buggy?" (p. 92).

This book does not supply all the answers—nor does it presume to do so. Nagging questions like the following remain: If South Africa merely wanted to bluff the world and the Court with her inspection and pelebiscite proposals (as was so often alleged), why was this bluff not called and the ploy exposed, by simply accepting the proposals? The Court was afforded the opportunity to undertake a full factual investigation into South West Africa; why was it not used in order to "unmask" South Africa? What were the underlying big-power considerations and political maneuvers which influenced the protracted tug-of-war in the debating halls of the United Nations and the World Court? Finally, the most important question: how can South Africa, the United Nations, the members of the Third World and the superpowers reach an agreement on the South West Africa issue which will satisfy anticolonial sentiments, dissipate South Africa's fears and resistance, salvage the prestige of the United Nations, and, above all, safeguard the interests of all the inhabitants of the Territory?

Though some of the more "progressive" idealists may regard it as somewhat too realistically conservative, Dr. Slonim's factual and precise work is highly recommended to anyone who would dare to answer any of these agonizing questions.

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China's Trade with the West. A Political and Economic Analysis. Edited by Arthur A. Stahnke. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 246. $16.50.)

While this collection of essays (written mainly in 1971, published in 1972 and sent to me in early 1974) has been somewhat outdated by changes in Chinese-American relations during the past four years, it actually serves as a useful benchmark against which to measure political and economic changes in *China's Trade With The West.* This book is at first glance a rather unpretentious one, containing six essays by international specialists with backgrounds in various aspects of China's relations with the West. The reason I suggest that it may seem unpretentious is because neither the editor nor most of the contributors appeared to realize that the volume really has a powerful, even devastating theme: that U.S. policy toward China since 1949—while not entirely setting the pattern for China's trade with the West—in fact very potently influenced that trade whenever it had the opportunity to do so.

Oliver Lee's somewhat simplistic essay focuses mainly on the hostile nature of U.S. trade policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC; or simply, China) since 1949, but the props are partially knocked out from under him by developments occurring since the essay was first written. The problem however, with both Lee's essay and the book itself is that they do not recognize that U.S. political and economic policy toward China since 1949 thwarted the long overdue reversal of U.S. policy toward the PRC which finally occurred during the first term of the Nixon Administration; nor do they indicate that U.S. policy blocked or threatened the normal conduct of international trade and political relations between China and Canada and China and West Germany; although Professor Allen Whiting concludes to the contrary (p. 5), I believe those constraints had an impact on China's trading potentialities. (Incidentally, it would have added to the vigor of this volume if chapters on trade between China and Japan; China and Australia; and China and a major Latin American country—for example, Brazil—had been included. These would have shown even more graphically how U.S. pressure acted as a deterrent on trade development between given countries and the PRC until the U.S. itself decided to change its posture toward China.)

As a collection of essays, then, these pieces do not explicitly enough drive home the above mentioned major theme. Additionally, they vary in quality and scope, some focusing on specific problems, others (like Whiting's) dealing with overall concerns; another, Victor Li's, has some advice that is good for the China trader but has only marginal relevance to this volume.

While American policy has been a major deterrent in the development of many countries' relations with China, it does not seem to have been so in the case of Chinese trade with Hong Kong. Colina MacDougall Lupton's thorough essay on trade between the P.R.C. and the British Crown Colony is an important summary of that distinguished reporter's writing on the China scene from Hong Kong for a decade; her writing on many aspects of China in the 1960s has never really received the accolades it richly merits. Hence, we should be grateful for this piece. Yet in her summary on P.R.C./Hong Kong trade, she fails to answer several interrelated questions: Why didn't the U.S. *seem* not to interfere in that trade? Or did it interfere, and do we not know about such interference? What were the political pressures at work between the U.S. and the U.K. which discouraged such American activity? Or did the U.S. benefit *sub rosa* from that trade sufficiently so that it chose not to make an issue of it unless American concerns openly flaunted their government's pre-1971 trade policy toward the P.R.C.? The Lupton piece, for all its genuine *feeling* for the nature of P.R.C./Hong Kong trade, seems to have not dealt with this issue area. (The omission, I should think, is more that of the editor than the contributor.)

But this review was not written for an international economics journal, and I am not an economist. Hence, instead of commenting more on each essay—as I would like to do—it is important to iterate a point that this book is supposedly driving at: that from time to time, it is possible to separate political relations from economic ones, that China has been very pragmatic in various cases, that other countries have tended to respond in kind; however, the international political dimension should not be in any way down-played. We need not belabor the Sino-U.S. case further. The books shows in its well-written two major case-studies, however, China's trade with both West Germany and Canada was hampered by political considerations. These were mainly American-inspired, unquestionably, but in both instances to a very limited extent as well as that of Hong Kong during 1967, Chinese political considerations also entered into play. In the case of Hong Kong the Chinese political environment affected trade with Hong Kong indirectly more than directly: that is, when internal transportation facilities were interrupted by Red Guard activities in south China in the summer of 1967, Hong Kong suffered from the impact of internal upheaval. That impact however, was almost certainly not the result of conscious political and/or economic decision making by the Chinese leadership in Peking (or even in Kwangtung province). Indeed, when the British authorities were cracking down most heavily on Hong Kong Communists, interruptions in trade from China were minimal, at worst.

I will conclude with two observations derived from Professor Whiting's introductory essay. First, I disapprove for political and intellectual reasons of referring to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as "an authoritarian regime" (p. 9). Indeed, the more one reads Whiting, the more one is convinced that Whiting himself does not regard China as "an authoritarian regime." Certainly, for anyone who has actively been involved in political and economic relations with the officialdom of the PRC, that terminology is, to use the vernacular, "inoperative." Second, as this review is being written (July 1974), I recognize that I have all the advantages of 20-20 hindsight in noting that Whiting may have erred in suggesting that the ". . . Cultural Revolution . . . is not a likely prospect in the near future. The disruptions to foreign trade consequent from Red Guard activity are not probable . . . " (p. 27). As the Criticize-Confucius, Criticize-Lin Piao campaign continues apace, albeit at this writing *sans* Red Guards, as the Chinese national and provincial leadership shows continued flux, it may very well be that the foreign trade institutions may be no more insulated from domestic change in the next few years than they were during the Cultural Revolution. Such a result may obtain despite efforts to prevent society-wide political movements from affecting external affairs institutions. It is unlikely, however, that China would ensure that such insulation occur; indeed, as in the Cultural Revolution some Chinese may feel that those institutions *must not* be isolated from the general political environment.

In any event, the posited interrelationship between internal and external politics and economics is not unique to China, as Americans who have witnessed the unfolding of the Watergate affair can well testify.

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Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. By Richard W. Sterling. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. Pp. 648. $13.95.)

Richard Sterling offers a textbook with a difference. The difference lies in the thesis which he sustains throughout the book by posing a macropolitical approach to international relations against the more common micropolitical perspective. Professor Sterling believes that micropolitics threatens global disaster by exalting the claims of the nation. Conversely, macropolitics promises global survival by placing the international interest in first place.

By extrapolating from the present in the now common neo-Malthusian fashion, Sterling describes the frightfulness of the future we are making. We must change our ways. If doom is to be avoided, the argument runs, peace must be kept. Peace rests on justice and affluence. Justice and affluence require the reduction of world inequality and the economic development of poor countries. As he puts it; "If development is the path to a peaceful world, then the failure of development is the road to a world at war" (p. 426). He affirms the first conditional statement by claiming without much evidence that domestic violence is associated with poverty (pp. 84–85). Quotations from "Populorum Progressio" show that Pope Paul VI agrees with the proposition that world peace depends on worldwide economic and social development (pp. 398–399). Since by assertion Sterling has abolished any "qualitative difference between international and domestic politics" (p. 330), what holds domestically will obtain internationally. And thus a proposition resting on doubtful evidence, dubious authority, and unfounded assertion becomes the basis for defining global necessities and for prescribing policies throughout the book.

The policies, moreover, are ordinarily to be carried out by no one in particular. Necessities impose themselves; rational policies have their requirements. They take over from personal agents or governmental agencies. Thus, "society" must eliminate social evils (p. 399); "the nation must begin to slough off its parochialism" (p. 202); "states must meet the needs of the political ecosystem" (p. 336). Thus, "rationality impels men in the direction of global equalization" (p. 457).

Because Sterling prescribes policies for abstract actors and relies on disembodied forces for the solution of problems, he omits from the first half of the book any analysis of the foreign-policy input to international politics. Otherwise, Part I is a highly competent, admirably succinct, and pleasingly readable account of international politics written along conventional, or micropolitical, lines. The second half of the book examines the macropolitical world mainly by looking at the economic and demographic problems that threaten world disaster. The large recent literature on those matters is competently summarized, though not considered critically. In Part II, the survival requirements of the global system and the imperatives we must act upon are urgently stated. But still one has trouble figuring out who is supposed to follow the imperatives in order to fulfill the requirements. In the midst of all the whirring about of disembodied forces, the answer nevertheless slips out. The rich nations must help the poor ones, and ultimately, if much good is to be done in the world, the superpowers must do it (pp. 339, 352–356). Sterling realizes that great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability.

The problems, then, are found at the global level; solutions to the problems continue to depend on national policies. But what are the conditions that make nations more or less willing to obey the injunctions that Sterling lays upon them? How can they resolve the tensions between pursuing their own interests and acting for the sake of the system? Sterling believes that the tensions can be overcome, but he does not say how. If he were to do so, he would all the more clearly reveal that the shift from a micro- to a macroperspective has not brought off the "Copernican revolution" in international politics that he tried for. What went wrong?

Sterling uses the prefix "macro" merely to focus concern on the world as a whole, rather than on the nation. He does not ask whether a macroperspective requires altering one's analytic approach or suggests a new way of developing an international political theory. In economics, the meanings and distinctions of micro- and macrotheories are well understood. A microtheory is a theory of the market built up from assumptions about the behavior of individual entrepreneurs. The theory shows how the actions and interactions of the units form and affect the market and how the market in turn affects them. A macrotheory is a theory about the national economy built on system-wide aggregates. The theory shows how they are interconnected and indicates how changes in one or some of them affect others and the performance of the economy. In economics, both micro- and macrotheories deal with large realms. The important difference between them is found not in the size of the objects of study but in the way the objects of study are approached and the theory to explain them is constructed.

Sterling does not follow the economist's suggestive usage. Instead, he uses "micro" and "macro" as prefixes of fashion in the ever developing jargon of the field. He believes that the shift to a macroperspective is made necessary by the growing interdependence of our imperilled planet. But how does necessity become possibility? Lacking a theory, Sterling cannot answer that question. He can only describe the problems that he thinks must be solved and then assign to nations the duty of adopting the perspectives and values that would lead some of them to act for the sake of humanity. Sterling relies on final causes—the imperatives of world survival—to turn national actors into international agents.

One who wants to change things, as Sterling earnestly does, should look for effective causes and ways of acting upon them. The search for causes is in part a theoretical endeavor. The first strategic requirement, if a Copernican revolution in the study of international relations is to be made, is to ask what a macrotheory of international relations might reveal. Such a theory would show how the international system is moved by system-wide aggregates. The theory would look somewhat like a macroeconomic theory in the style of John Maynard Keynes. It would, however, lack the latter's practical implications. National governments can manipulate system-wide economic variables. No agencies with comparable capabilities exist internationally. Who would act upon the possibilities of adjustment that a macrotheory of international politics might reveal? Even were such a theory available, we would still be stuck with nations as the only agents capable of acting to alleviate global problems. We would still have to revert to a micropolitical approach in order to examine the conditions that make benign and effective action by states separately and collectively more or less likely. Sterling fails to do so. He also fails to develop his macroperspective into a usable approach or a viable theory. He therefore can do no more than describe problems and insist that the world's survival requires their solution.

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The Arms Trade with the Third World. By SIPRI. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971. Pp. xxxi, 910. $15.00.)

Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World. By Miles D. Wolpin. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. xiii, 327. $12.50.)

As descriptive studies, each of these works is a *tour de force*. While the SIPRI authors have sought to present a comprehensive analysis of the transfer of military goods and services (excluding small arms) from the developed to the Third World, Wolpin has endeavored to lay bare the iniquities of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of the United States. Without in any way denigrating the high quality of the factual material presented in these works, I believe it is appropriate to comment that each work, considered at the level of an understanding of the raw data, is an exercise in the glaringly obvious. The reader emerges from exposure to these authors considerably better informed factually, but scarcely more enlightened about the political consequences of the transfer of military goods and services. Whether or not the subject matter lends itself to a greater measure of understanding is a moot point.

Underpinning *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is the laudable social scientific belief that understanding is required for control. The 910 pages on the arms trade has served to confirm my prior conviction that the prospects for serious international regulation, let alone cessation, of the trade in arms are very close to zero. The SPIRI authors confirm what every thinking man already knew: that the motives impelling arms supply and arms receipt are myriad and redundant and that they derive from the anarchic character of organized human life, both international and domestic. By way of contrast with the somewhat ideological *SIPRI Yearbooks*, this volume does not preach at the reader, nor does it offer any very serious prescriptions for what one suspects its authors appreciate to be an insoluble problem-mix. The author of the Foreword was moved to write as follows: "The book makes sobering reading. But it may help to create a better understanding of the complex problems involved and also promote further thinking on measures for stopping *the general arms race*. If so, the book has achieved its aim" (p. 5, emphasis added).

These sentences suggest two questions. First, what is the point in the writing of a book of this kind? And second, how closely have the authors considered the connections between their subject matter and conflict phenomena? In response to the first question, the authors would seem to believe that public opinion might operate to restrict the trade in armaments, if only the facts are presented (p. 123). The trouble with this argument is that it is almost certainly false so long as there are major arms-supplying countries wherein public opinion will be granted no access to the relevant information. Men-in-the-street everywhere will admit to the generic belief that armaments are "bad," but they also prove responsive to the following brands of argument: that the choice lies not between (say) British arms and no arms but rather between British arms and (say) French arms; that moral judgment is appropriate to individuals, not to governments; and that the principal duty of the (say) United States government is to protect the interests of Americans, not to restore or to establish democracy in diverse foreign climes.

As knowledge for its own sake, the detail in *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is invaluable. Underlying the monumental task of data assembly and processing, however, lurks the shadow of the scholarly fallacy—the notion that the truth will set us free. To present the facts of weapon transfer is not to contribute usefully to the control of the arms trade. The participating individuals, in developed as in Third-World countries, know perfectly well why they are trading in armaments—and those reasons are deemed to be sensible. To control the trade in armaments, as the SIPRI authors recognize (p. 1), one must needs step beyond the detail of weapon transfer and address the reasons why states consider it essential to supply and to receive armaments.

That the arms trade is an important subject few would deny. It is when one seeks to proceed beyond the vague appreciation of importance that the difficulties begin. For example, what are we to make of the facts that the GNPs of "all developing countries have grown at an average rate of 5 per cent a year since 1950. Their military expenditures have grown at a yearly rate of 7 per cent, while their major weapon imports have grown at a rate of 9 per cent" (p. 83). One feels that too much is being spent on armaments, but this is a very soft judgment. The varied motivations that impel armaments acquisition in the Third World are not to be deemed frivolous by Olympian observers from the developed countries. Whether or not the major arms-supplying states are analogous to drug pushers, they are able to peddle their wares because local clients are addicted. Eliminate the demand and the supply will cease.

If it be granted, in a very general way, that the arms trade is important, it may yet be difficult to itemize specific charges. It is in this linkage area that *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is particularly weak. Clearly the SIPRI authors are concerned with the impact of the arms trade on local arms races, and with the connection between arms races and wars. Here the authors have stepped apparently unknowingly into a social scientific void. Social scientists are at last recognizing that the dynamics of arms races must be studied seriously, that analysis by dead reckoning or by no less lifeless models, is not good enough. The authors refer to "the general effect of arms races on wars which is the same whether weapons are produced domestically or purchased abroad." This is surely a gross error in judgment. The attractions of trial by combat may be sharply reduced if it is believed likely that the principal arms-supplying power(s) may elect to avow neutrality in the conflict and hence to deny spare parts and ammunition for the systems supplied. The SIPRI authors are prone to refer to "the global arms race" and to "the general arms race" (p. v). Such glib characterization of a multitude of complex processes both testifies to intellectual slackness and aggravates the book's worst fault, namely, the tendency to state conclusions and imply connections at the outset—and then in the remainder of the book, to let the data (the authors hope) speak for themselves.

If local arms races are the transmission belts linking the arms trade with local wars, it is incumbent upon the authors to demonstrate the structure of those competitions. In fact, neither arms races in general, nor any local race in particular are dissected in the course of these 910 pages. Is some arms supply, and indeed even the occasional arms race beneficial to the cause of local stability? Possibly (pp. 77–78), but such balances in arms supplies are "not very stable" (p. 77). This assertion, in common with many of this work's general statements, is true enough, even obvious, yet is somewhat unhelpful. With more thought given to the meanings of stability, the structure and processes of arms races, and the character of the political systems and subsystems to which the arms trade is relevant, SIPRI could have produced a book that yielded sophisticated understanding as well as the plethora of relevant factual material this volume contains.

The critical tone of these comments has been induced by my strong conviction that a manifestly useful book should have been conceived in such a way as to render it far more useful. The book is organized in four Parts. In order, the reader is presented with a general survey (Part 1), with the perspective of the suppliers (Part 2), the perspective of the recipients (Part 3), and with a critical review of the reference material used (Part 4). Parts 2 and 3 proceed doggedly, country by country. The authors appreciate the complexity of motives on both the supplier and the recipient sides. Supplier policy orientations are usefully, if somewhat obviously, declared to be some mixture of the hegemonic, the industrial and the restrictive (p. 17). The authors stress, appropriately enough, the fact that the superpowers have been the sources of approximately two-thirds of the flow of major weapons to the Third World, while Britain and France have contributed approximately another twenty per cent. Thus, four supplier countries are responsible for between 85 and 90 per cent of the trade in major weapons (p. 9). Also, the SIPRI authors have presented an excellent analysis of the arms supply policy of the superpowers, stressing the role of preemptive supply considerations (pp. 161–164).

As implied above, this book comprises a series of high quality vignettes, all-too-loosely linked with theorems that should have been subject to rigorous empirical testing. Repeatedly, and on *prima facie* grounds, reasonably enough, the connection between superpower competition and local arms races is emphasized (for example, pp. 121–122), yet the linkages are not examined systematically. We are left with bland and obvious general truths. One pertinent question quite ignored by the authors concerns possible connections between the course of the Soviet-American arms race and the pattern of competitive arms-supplying policy.

This book is indispensable for anyone interested in the trade in arms, but in its level of political and social scientific sophistication, it is distinctly inferior to the earlier publication of Amelia Leiss from M.I.T. (*Arms Control and Local Conflict*. Vol. III: *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries*. [Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1970]). Indeed, it is possible that despite its useful presentation of factual data, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* may contribute to the perpetuation of fallacies concerning the alleged evils of the trade in armaments (see my article "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" in *Foreign Policy*, 6 (Spring 1972) 153–169). If Third World countries are not to acquire advanced weaponry, that should be a decision for those countries. A suppliers' convention on the regulation of the arms trade would be inherently inequitable and would deny the validity of local determinations of need. If Western analysts are uncertain that they are able to identify needed military equipment for their own countries, how much less confident are they when it comes to the determination of the legitimate needs of (say) Mali, Saudi Arabia, or Peru? More to the point, there is every reason to believe that the major supplying countries are profoundly and, in many respects, for good reason, hostile to the notion of the international control of the trade in armaments.

In *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*, Miles Wolpin reveals the seamy side of the United States' Military Aid Program (MAP). The author seeks to demonstrate that

> the attitudinal modifications and personal friendships structured by one or more MAP training/orientation tours not only intended to but in fact significantly reinforced and diffused conservative tendencies within foreign military establishments. By creating new external reference groups and definitions of national interest, the MAP has transformed dependent officer corps in many nominally independent Third World countries into servants of America's informal empire. (p. 121).

Leaving aside the cruder of the ideological flourishes in the above, the author succeeds despite himself. This book is a damning indictment of an MAP that has been so crass in many of its features that it did not deserve to accomplish its objectives (overt or covert). In his didactic, ethnocentric, and ideological presentation Wolpin betrays a politically reversed mirror-image of his subject matter. It is no exaggeration to comment that Wolpin's material triumphs over the author. In superb and fascinating detail, Wolpin presents the nuts and bolts of the United States' MAP. The perspective of the American MAP officers is presented, as are the appalling details of the crude propaganda material to which foreign military officers are exposed. Usefully, and denying the off-the-cuff judgment of the SIPRI authors (p. 70), Wolpin endeavors to appraise the effectiveness of the MAP in terms of its covert objective of supporting counterrevolutionary forces among friends and potential adversaries (Chapter 7).

There is a certain wide-eyed innocence about this book, as Wolpin labors to demonstrate the obvious. Surely it can hardly be a revelation to discern that the MAP is, to a very significant degree, intended to influence the attitudes of individual foreign military personnel. Nonetheless, obvious or not, Wolpin does tell a story that should be told.

Wolpin's ideology hinders his scholarship in that, as with the SIPRI volume, the most salient questions are not addressed. While it is difficult to deny Wolpin's thesis that the MAP has served as a vehicle for United States intervention in the domestic affairs of friendly states, it is appropriate to ask, "By what standards should one judge the United States MAP?" A conservative (counter-revolutionary in Wolpin's language) superpower is naturally going to have a conservative MAP. Is it illegitimate to seek to influence the attitudes of foreign military trainees? Surely not. Clearly it is a matter of degree. Does Wolpin believe that the MAP is fundamentally illegitimate, or only that it has been maldirected? We are not told. If one grants that great powers will indulge in MAPs, which is a reasonable assumption, then one must seek to explore what an MAP should and should not endeavor to accomplish and by what methods.

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Russia in the Caribbean: A Special Report, Part Two. Special Report Series, No. 13. By James D. Theberge. (Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973. Pp. 166. $3.95.)

This volume accompanies a separately published and very brief (36 pp.) Part One which consists of the findings and recommendations of a panel of experts. To some extent, Part Two provides an updating of some kinds of information found in an earlier study edited by Theberge, *Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1972), but the present report is somewhat broader in scope and more consistent in viewpoint.

Essentially the study is concerned with analysis of certain developments in the Caribbean area since the early years of the Castro regime, particularly the growth of the Soviet Union's political, economic, and military presence. From a limited, primarily political influence this presence has expanded to major multidimensional proportions by the early 1970s.

Defining the Soviet Union's long-term objectives in the Caribbean as expansion of its own power, protection of Cuba, and erosion of United States influence, the study examines the strategic and tactical means being utilized in pursuit of those ends. One chapter summarizes the Soviet government's view of the Caribbean area and Latin America as a whole, the bases of its commitment to a future in the region, and its general approach toward achieving its aims. Other chapters treat individually the chief tactical instruments and activities: greatly expanded conventional diplomatic relations; support of and, where possible, control of communist parties; conduct of and supervision of espionage, propaganda, and subversion; selective support of revolutionary violence; expanded trade and economic aid; expanded fishery and oceanographic endeavors in cooperation with Cuba; an enlarged naval presence, also in cooperation with Cuba; and, an increasing dependency of Cuba upon the USSR. Professor Theberge does not assume the task of formulating an overall Caribbean policy recommendation for the United States, but he does discuss in summary fashion some of the implications of the developments and the present situation in terms of this country's interests.

As we have seen for quite a number of years, some Americans view any amount of Soviet influence in the Caribbean with apprehension and pessimism. Avoiding that extreme as well as its opposite, promoted perhaps by some relaxation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions, Theberge's moderate position might be labeled a "realistic" one. Recognizing that the Soviet posture, actual and potential, is indeed pertinent to this country's interests and needs, he sees it nevertheless as "more a cause of concern than of alarm" (p. 31). He thinks that the military aspects of the great-power rivalry are less significant in the long run than the political and economic dimensions and the United States enjoys certain advantages as the incumbent dominant power and friend. While the Soviet Union has achieved many of its aims, it has been compelled to move with caution, mindful of the risks and uncertainty of its position. Its gains, such as in consolidating control over Cuba's economy and foreign policy, have been at tremendous cost.

Given the brevity of the book and its comprehensiveness, the chapters necessarily are very short. Nevertheless, a good deal is accomplished as a result of succinct text, numerous tables and maps, and several supportive appendices. A lot of information is packed between the covers.

At times one might wish a source had been cited to support a given statement. At other places, certain "well-informed sources" ought to have been identified. Numerous expressions such as "Moscow's involvement" and "Washington's purpose" may annoy some readers. Nevertheless, this is a well-written, very readable book; it appears to present its information reliably, and to suit the needs of both the specialist and the general reader.

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American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964. By Stephen R. Weissman. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 325. $13.50.)

Professor Stephen Weissman offers an important contribution to the growing body of revisionist interpretations of American international behavior during the Cold War period. He places himself outside the framework of the classical premises of American policy during this era, to seek out explanatory variables from a critical, left-wing perspective: class origins of policy makers, well-springs of the imperial urge in American-Third World relations, economic bases of policy choice, determinants of the Cold War ideology.

Weissman has been thorough in ferreting out documentary sources for his study. More important is his success in interviewing a large number of the key American actors, supplemented by some of the Zairian participants (the Congo became Zaire in 1971). The author deserves high marks for the quality of his documentation; this permits a sophisticated revisionism, with a rejection of some standard hypotheses, and qualification of others.

Weissman discerns three stages in the unfolding American involvement. The Congo crisis burst upon the international scene at a time when American foreign policy was dominated by a moderately conservative establishment, of patrician Eastern genealogy, interlocked by family ties and personal economic interests with major corporate and banking houses. This policy elite, argues Weissman, was thoroughly Europhile, unsympathetic to African nationalism, and crudely anti-Communist. During this first stage, a number of critical commitments were made: the United Nations intervention, the failure to take action against the Katanga secession, the overthrow of Lumumba.

Phase Two, according to Weissman, was marked by the advent of the new frontiersman, bearing as ideological baggage a sophisticated anti-communism, and consequently a greater sympathy for African nationalism as a potential bulwark against Soviet penetration. This group would have tried to coopt Lumumba, but was forestalled by his assassination just as they came to power. They were able to engineer the installation of the Adoula government, the liquidation of the Katanga secession, and the elimination of the Lumumbist rump regime in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville).

In the third period, with Johnson at the helm, there was a militarization of policy, as Vietnam came to dominate all preoccupations. In Zaire, this was the epoch of the Tshombe government, the rebellions, and the American-Belgian parachute operation in Kisangani and Isiro (ex-Paulis).

Weissman intends the study as a critique but avoids the tone of a prosecuting attorney. He is in good measure persuasive in his interpretation of the ideological postulates operative and the actual role played by the policy matrix of the State Department, CIA, and Pentagon. He is usually careful in his judgments, and generally eschews undocumented assertions.

A stimulating and provocative book such as this will necessarily generate debate. The argument linking class origin and policy role, even though substantially qualified in comparison with the dissertation version of the present work, remains unsatisfactory. Certainly one can argue that the Brahmin background of Christian Herter and his connections in the corporate establishment made him accessible to pressures arguing the higher priority of European interests and a favorable climate for capitalist enterprise. But the Bowles family, also used as example, shows an evolution in three generations from conservative capitalist to liberal sophisticated anti-communism to radical New Left, without any obvious change in the class determinants of political values. Both the conservative crude anti-communism and liberal sophisticated anti-communism of the Weissman typology found advocates, at the field level, among key actors whose class background could not be compared to Herter or Harriman. Weissman elsewhere concedes that direct economic interests in Zaire are not very powerful in determining the American role; his discussion of this aspect is both informative and convincing.

Weissman seems to me quite unpersuasive, however, on the viability of the Lumumbist alternative. It is possible that Lumumba could have been imposed on Zaire with a substantial international intervention, comparable to that which was exercised on behalf of some of his rivals. Much less certain is whether Lumumba would have triumphed if internal forces had been allowed to sort themselves out. The author fails to distinguish between the strength of urban and rural hostility to the manifold oppressions of the Belgian colonial system, on the one hand, and nationalism as a structured, integrated force on the other. Lumumba had very little support among various absolutely critical sectors: Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville), and southern Shaba (ex-Katanga) cities, the Luba-Kasai and Kongo, the two groups most strongly represented in the new elite. But Weissman appears to assume that a real nationalist consensus existed.

Elsewhere, the analysis of internal politics is inadequate. The Katanga secession is argued as a Lunda-Yeke phenomenon, based on traditionalism. Yet the paramount ruler of the Lunda, the Mwaat Yav, was deeply suspicious of his son-in-law Moise Tshombe, who represented a competing lineage; the chief lived in mortal fear of a Tshombe assassination attempt. The "Yeke" are an extremely small group, with a miniscule representation in the copperbelt cities; they are visible only because of the folklore surrounding Msiri, the ruler who created the group, and the prominence of some of his descendants, especially Godefroid Munongo. The argument that Lumumbist nationalism appealed to segmentary systems also fails to cope with the fact that large numbers of such groups did not support his party.

The main contribution of the Weissman study, however, is an examination of the dynamics of American policy in Zaire during the first years of independence. For the questions it raises, for the documentation and candor of its analysis, and for the alternative perspective it offers this book will take its place among the major sources of Zaire political history and American foreign policy studies.

M. Crawford Young
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The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U. S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. By Charles W. Yost. (New York: Random House, 1972. Pp. xvii, 234. $7.95.)

Charles Yost writes about important things with grace and a good measure of wisdom. He is one of this country's most versatile and experienced diplomats, having served finally as Ambassador to the United Nations; his book conveys a sense of personal witness.

Yost undertakes a dual task: to discover and criticize the sources of American foreign policy (the decisional apparatus, domestic influences, the psychology of leaders, the military), and to prescribe an improved world order.

His analysis of the "misconduct" of American diplomacy since World War II leans heavily on the alleged distortions of ideology and militarization. Like most limitationist liberals, Yost commends the policy making of the Truman years: Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Korea. In his words, "There has probably been no period in American history when the conduct of foreign affairs was both so significant and so successful" (p. 64). But somehow this period was also the foundation of the American stand in Vietnam, which most limitationist liberals have come to disapprove. Therefore they seek an analysis that will preserve their positive evaluation of the diplomacy of 1946–52 and yet explain and condemn consequences such as Vietnam.

Here is Yost's explanation:

> Because it was assumed that public support of limited and necessary objectives could only be assured by stating them in apocalyptic terms, as part of a world-wide struggle between good and evil, a doctrine was put forward, a precedent was set, and a moral commitment was assumed which was far more comprehensive and open-ended than the circumstances required; which helped create an enduring and militant climate of opinion in the United States; and which, two decades later, was to lure three other American Presidents into the morass of Vietnam (p. 36).

But the disembodied spirit of the Truman Doctrine—its ideology, or its license for "militarization"—didn't cause Vietnam. It was the structural categories of mind and system, and the similar morphology of situations that induced American intervention. One must either accept such military interventions or reject the fundamental categories that made them seem necessary. Yost is reluctant to do either.

Yost has some acute reflections on the use of military force and the organization of the Services (e.g., p. 94), though he misses the logical bite of the strategic debate of the 1950s and 1960s (massive retaliation, the discovery of its flaws and ultimate incredibility, and the necessity of either building adequate conventional forces or retreating from certain foreign policy objectives). Occasionally he wanders into trivia such as the size of our military missions (MAAGs) abroad (p. 106), and into "pop" criticism such as his deprecation of "worst case" planning (p. 96) and the "intoxication" with counterinsurgency (p. 106).

Yost proposes sensible and even bold suggestions for the internal reform of the State Department and the Foreign Service, to make them leaner and more responsible at all levels. He is sophisticated about intelligence (p. 161), skeptical about secrecy (p. 174), and constructive about the proliferation of agencies engaged in foreign affairs (p. 164)—he would consolidate their functions, even the economic ones, under the Secretary of State (p. 166). But he remains a partisan of the executive branch. Even after describing the egregious powers of the American president, he recommends only a bit more candor and some consultation "with the appropriate leaders of the Senate and House" (p. 168). This looks like business as usual between the branches.

Yost complains about the National Security Council—the option papers, the vapid State of the World messages, the crisis management. Curiously, he refers to Kissinger only obliquely through invidious code words; "If an outsider without practical experience in foreign affairs, even though he may have vast 'scientific' erudition and outstanding intellectual ability, is suddenly placed in an exalted position in government, such as that of National Security Adviser to the President, he may be tempted to try to carry out dogmatically some of the elegant but theoretical conceptions he has distilled in his ivory tower and elaborated in his books" (p. 171). Yost would employ such "outsiders" "in the middle ranks of the government foreign affairs apparatus" and be wary about promoting them.

The second large message of Yost's book is his blueprint for a more rational and humane international order. Basically, his is a "requisite" approach: Security, even survival, in the face of science, technology, and a shrinking world, *requires* "a single universal political structure" (p. 224). Actually Yost prescribes "four parallel elements." The first is simply more realistic and moral conduct of foreign policy by each powerful nation state. The second is "an association of developed democracies," which he admits might become an "imperial league" and even lead to an Orwellian tri-polar world. A more serious objection is that this element is not compatible with the next two elements in his own scheme. Yost is trying (literally) to have the best of all worlds. But, since the tendencies of several of his elements are contradictory, they should compel *choice*, rather than inspire superimposition.

The third element is "peaceful collaboration among superpowers." Yost does not mean a "concert of two, three, or five great powers, including one or both of the Communists" (p. 204)—only modest *ad hoc* agreements such as limitations of arms. But a "concert" of great powers is the necessary foundation for his fourth (and most important) element: "an eventual world federation," with a "central executive and parliament with overriding powers," and endowed with "sufficient preponderant military power to prevent large-scale violence" (pp. 182, 220, 223–225). But effective implementation of collective security requires, as the very minimum condition, the unimpaired operation of the UN Security Council—that is, the restriction of the veto of the great powers; and this requirement is like Aesop's fable about the mice belling the cat.

Why haven't the great powers put this system of collective security into operation? "All" that is lacking is the "will, determination and conviction" (pp. 217, 219)—which is to say, of course, that there are *reasons* why the great powers don't want that system to work. Inevitably, the case for supranational organization includes the notion of the obsolescence and demise of the nation-state: "the most stupendous of political anachronisms . . . the most archaic of systems of government" (pp. 44, 211). But in their assault on the nation-state, proponents of a federal world typically mistake the phenomenon of community—the conditions of trust, the limits of political delegation, the bases of legitimacy. These relationships are not supranational. If anything, they tend to be subnational; indeed, the nation-state might be their *highest* practicable expression. In situations where power is diffused and real interests are opposed and intractable, the "requisite" approach becomes simply a fond and self-validating wish-list. We might have to "do" with less than we "need." Though the problems and disasters might well be the product of the nation-state system, the solutions might also have to be within the powers of individual nation-states.

Yost's brief on the misconduct of foreign policy, though sweepingly presented, is not sustained; what we find are not incapacity or error or perversity, but deliberation and at least the illusion of necessity; not misconduct, but something closer to the essence of tragedy. And Yost's remedy of universal government, though perhaps "required," is not available, in the sense of being attainable through our efforts; or even if it were, at a cost and with consequences that would be bearable or desirable.

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

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
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
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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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